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THE ATTACK ON WHEELER POINT

 

PART II: SEARCHLIGHT TO UNKNOWN POINT

Good fortune smiled on Company “E” the night of 22-23 February. Only one minor attempt at filtration was made on the company perimeter. The men got a reasonable nights rest. 

Right on schedule the company assembled, picked up their supplies and moved out at 0630 hours on the “nose.”  0655 hours found the company closing on Searchlight Point. 

A hasty conference was held with Lt. John P. Rucker, C.O. of Company “C”. At 0705 hours “C” company moved out to join the 1st Battalion at South Dock.[46]

Lt. Rucker had stated that each time he tried to move around Searchlight Point, the first man around had been killed by the large volume of fire from Unknown Point. To lend emphasis to this fact was the body of a man who had been killed not fifteen minutes before. The man had looked around the point too far. Sniper fire, apparently, was extremely accurate. In spite of this the area had to be looked over.[47]

I managed to work my way out toward the tip of Searchlight Point and under the concealment of some small scrub, had an excellent point of observation. From here I could see that our initial basic plan would work satisfactorily. Working my way back to the roadway, I had a brief conference with the assembled company officers and settled the final details of the plan of attack.[48]

I would take the radio and go back out on the point and direct fire from the destroyer on to Unknown Point. When I registered in, I would have the destroyer give Unknown Point a good five minute “pasting” from top to bottom. 

Under the cover of artillery fire, Davis would set up his machine guns and when the artillery lifted, traverse and search the top of Unknown Point until told to lift his fire.

Lt. Corder was to move his platoon around Searchlight Point under cover of the artillery, and when it lifted, move in on Unknown Point, covered by machine gun fire.[49] 

SAP was contacted on the SCR 300 and a ranging round asked for. Three minutes later the destroyer had fired, the round landing, gun-target line, halfway up the vertical side of Unknown Point. A correction of “Repeat deflection, up 400,” was given. The second round hit the roadway, point 2, Map B, dead center. “Repeat defection, up 400,” was given as the correction again. The third round was a gun-target line about 50 yards above the roadway on the face of the cliff. Needless to say, that was good enough for me. In fact my mouth was hanging open in amazement. Three rounds, ten minutes time, and a perfect bracket. The Navy can really shoot! The time was 0739.  [50]

SAP was told to lay it on and almost instantly the destroyer began throwing out five gun salvos with mechanical precision.  It was later learned the destroyer had been compiling firing data with her range control instruments since daylight. [No person with a recollection of destroyer support has been located at this point. To the contrary, there are emphatic recollections that no destroyer support existed that day. Corder, the leader of the very element waiting to advance against a deadly enemy says "There was none"  and he would be the last person to forget such bizarre support. Furthermore, this is substantiated by the company executive officer, Don Abbott, who was in a position to see any such action. It is probable that Hill is writing “The School Solution” – permissible in such a document as he was authoring,  but disqualifying it as a document of prime historical record.  Of course, Hill was not to know in 1958 that the document would be used as the basis of an account by Flanagan.]

During this time Lt. Crawford had taken his platoon down to the beach.

At 0735 hours the fire was lifted and the machine guns opened up. The entire 2nd platoon had moved out fast and was entirely around the point.[51]

The lead squad had reached a position near point 1, Map B, when two wild rifle shots cane from the tip of Unknown Point. These shots were followed immediately by a burst of machine gun fire coming from the vicinity of a smashed up Jap truck at Point 2, Map B. The burst was high and did not cause any casualties, but did pin the man down. 

Using the SCR 536, the fire of the LMG on Searchlight Point were given the truck as a point target. This fire coupled with two well placed rifle grenades, stopped the enemy fire. Cpl. “Moose” Elder, scout of the lead squad rushed forward and neatly dispatched two Nips with his M1. [RCT lists John A. Elder as a Pfc. Scouts were not corporals. In fact there were no Corporals in our rifle platoons]. Elder’s move was quickly followed by the remainder of the squad. The LMG was lifted, and as the men moved out to the tip of Unknown Point, a lone Jap committed honorable “Hari-Kari” with a hand grenade. Time was now 0810.[52]  

Thus one platoon had reached Unknown Point. The next move was to advance the platoon on the beach to Unknown Point.

Unknown Point from the level of the roadway down to the beach was vertical on its south side and sloped between 80-90% on its north side. The point was relatively flat from the roadway out to its lip. 

A flat surface of between 10 and 20 feet in width extended from the road way to the tip. In the center of the flat area was a parapet about 25 feet long extending along the long axis of the point. At the extreme end of the point was an open gun pit. Another gun pit had been built under the truck.

The earthen parapet was about 6 feet high and afforded excellent cover for men to operate on its south side. Any movement in the vicinity of the truck drew sniper fire from Wheeler Point.

From the gun pit on the tip of the point it was possible to see and fire directly into the natural cave at point 4, Map B. Also the opening of the barricaded cave at point 5, Map B, could be seen. It was possible to fire into the cave at only a very sharp angle. The small cave at point 6 could not be seen, nor could it be fired upon by the LMG’s still on Searchlight Point. Therefore the section of guns was brought forward to Unknown Point. 

Lt. Crawford was told to start around Searchlight Point and that he would have to cover the cave at point 6 with his own fire. The platoon on the roadway would drop WP grenades in front of the cave to screen observation as his platoon moved around the point. It would also give him a chance to set up a LMG to cover the cave by fire. The platoon on Unknown Point would also keep a high rate of fire on the caves at points 4 and 5. 0820 was given as the coordinating time.

Six W.P. grenades were dropped at 30 second intervals in front of the cave at point 6 and two BAR men kept up a steady stream of fire pouring into the cave at point 5. The LMG’s had been set up on Unknown Point and were able to depress just enough to fire into the cave at point 4.

Under the cover of this “crazy quilt” pattern of fire Lt. Crawford was able to set up one LMG and start firing into the cave at point 6. The gunner sat in ½ foot of water. The gun was placed on a small hummock of coral. The fire of the gun was effective. Three Japs tried to run out of the cave at point 6 and were immediately cut down. They carried a Nambu Light Machine Gun.

With the enemy opposition eliminated at Point 6, Lt. Crawford shifted his machine gun fire to the cave at point 5, Map B. At this point the fire from Unknown Point was lifted, but had to be resumed immediately as the Japs in the cave at point 5 opened fire for the first time. They were firing from small loop holes in the barricade across the front of the cave. 

Lt. Crawford quickly sent four men up to the cave at point 4, Map B. These men tossed grenades inside the caves and immediately followed the grenades, firing from the hip as they moved in. Very shortly the men reappeared, dragging four rifle and a Browning Automatic Rifle out of the cave. The BAR apparently had been captured in 1942, judging from its “beat up” condition. Lt. Crawford reported 7 Nips had been killed.[53]

     While the four men were working on the cave, Crawford had moved his platoon around Searchlight Point and well up the beach. In this position they were well out of the line of fire from the cave at point 5. Also they were in a position to flank the cave. At this time a fine display of teamwork occurred.  As his machine gunners kept a steady stream of fire pouring into the cave entrance at point 5, Lt Crawford worked his way up to the cave and tossed in two W.P. grenades. Simultaneously, with the detonation of W.P. grenades, the machine gun crew picked up their gun and raced for the safety of the beach. The success of the maneuver brought cheers from the men on top of Unknown Point. [Hollywood. No-one except Hill recalls this.]

Reduction of this position was accomplished in the following manner.

To accomplish the job of clearing out this cave called for courageous action. Lt. Crawford led the way. 

In order to get effective fire into the cave, which angled back from the cliff face, it was necessary to cross in front of the cave or from the northwest side. Lt. Crawford, using a TSMG, started across the entrance to the cave firing bursts as he moved. In this manner he reached safety on the other side. Although several shots were fired at him from the interior, he was not hit except for one canteen punctured! 

From his vantage point he kept firing into the cave and gradually more men moved out in front of the cave. In this way a terrific volume of fire was built up. The Japs still continued to fire from inside the cave. To add to the consternation of the men fighting the cave position a shower of hand grenades were thrown out of the cave. The grenades were followed by eleven charging Japs. Only two Japs managed to get over the barricade across the cave entrance. The rest were killed while climbing over the barricade. Of the two who managed to survive thus far, one was killed when he grabbed the barrel of a BAR with both hands. It proved to be a very foolhardy step. The other Jap was knocked down by a butt stroke by one of the riflemen, and his skull crushed when the man followed his butt stroke by smashing straight down on the Jap’s head with his rifle butt. This Jap proved to be the last Jap alive in the cave. [Thank goodness-anymore and I’d have puked!]

Examination of the cave at point 5, Map B, found a total of 47 dead Japs, 41 rifles, and a badly damaged heavy machine gun. Our own casualties were five men slightly nicked by fragments of the Jap grenades.[54]

A trench capable of holding about 12 men had been dug across the interior of this cave. This accounted for the Japs being able to withstand tremendous volume of fire being put into the cave, and stage their little Banzai attack.

A summary of the situation was sent by radio to Lt. Brown [Browne] at this time. A total of 59 enemy KIA, our casualties 5 slightly wounded. The area between Searchlight Point and Unknown Point clear of the enemy. The time was 1105 hours.[55]

Lt. Brown stated that he had been trying to call me for nearly an hour to tell me that the destroyer had developed some kind of trouble and had to leave. Another ship would not arrive until some time between 1215-1245 hours. 

As further advance without the destroyer’s support would be foolhardy, it was decided to give the men a rest and allow them to eat their “K” ration. It was also a chance to make further detailed, step by step plans for the final assault on Wheeler Point. [Roscoe Corder does not remember a pause to eat and has stated a number of times “No destroyer.” As he remembers, the action was continuous.]

 

 

 

THE ATTACK ON WHEELER POINT

  

 

PART III: UNKNOWN POINT TO WHEELER POINT:

It can be said that the company’s success up to this point created a false degree of over confidence, causing the company commander to overlook an important detail: that of ammunition! The men started out with a unit and a half of ammunition [riflemen 128 + 64 rounds of ball]. Over half a unit of fire had been expended! Failure to check this item thoroughly was a result of fighting in thick jungle. Seldom had the men used as much as a half unit of fire in a day’s fighting. As a result all personnel failed to realize that during the morning we had used as much ammunition as we normally did in a whole day’s fighting. This error was to be bitterly felt later.[56]  

Close and detailed study of the intervening 400 yards of space from Unknown Point to Wheeler Point indicated that the same routine should be followed as had been followed during the morning. The platoon on the roadway would have to advance before the platoon on the beach could be moved forward. 

The roadway, or what used to be a roadway, was a curved, barren slope of loose sand and boulders and debris. It was entirely covered for a space of 50 yards east of the tunnel entrance to point 7, Map B. At point 10, [?] the road made a shallow cut. A five to six foot wall of earth existed on the outside edge of the road at this point. This earthen wall was approximately 30 yards in length. It would provide suitable cover from small arms fire from Wheeler Point. On either side of the road cut, the only protection afforded from enemy fire would have to be provided by fire power and unfailing faith in God.

Another problem was brought into view in studying Wheeler Point. The point leveled out, somewhat as did Unknown Point [I can’t see that in photos]. It formed a knife-edge ridge leading out from the face of the cliff into the sea. [As I understand it, there was a saddle between the cliff and the knob, and a 155mm had been mounted there on a panama mount] It was also about 15 to 20 feet higher than the level of the roadway at the tunnel entrance, point 7, Map B. Moreover, the sides of the ridge were almost vertical. A small ledge, wide enough for a man, extended from the roadway to the pillbox at point 8, Map B.

As the terrain was carefully studied, Lt. Corder briefed each man in the platoon on terrain to the front. It was felt, however, that one squad would have to be maintained at the tunnel entrance, when we reached the tunnel, and casualties be replaced with single men of the other squads as the casualties occurred. There was not room to relieve a squad intact should the attack require it. 

One squad would be held as a reserve and covering force at the road cut.

Supporting weapons were dispensed as follows: 60 mm mortars emplaced behind the earthen parapet at point 2; one LMG in the gun pit of the tip of Unknown Point; and one gun in the gun pit under the wrecked Jap truck. [I expect this was an old US Army Chevrolet flat bed, rear-wheel drive truck, like the others I saw.] The tunnel entrance at point 7 and the pillboxes at 8-9 would be pounded by the destroyers prior to moving out toward Wheeler Point.

Just at 1215 one of the lookouts in the gun pits at the tip of Unknown Point reported that he could hear movement below him. This was on the northwest side of the point. Pfc Robinson unconsciously looked out over the edge of the cliff and was shot squarely in the center of his forehead, killing him instantly. 

It was impossible to place fire on this side of the cliff without completely exposing one’s self to the enemy. Lt. Brown was called on the radio and asked if he could discern any movement on that side of the point. He reported that the men on the cliff could see a small opening in the side of the cliff but no movement. However the area around this opening was “posted” with 12 Bazooka rounds, and thoroughly sprayed by machine gun fire. One Jap was seen to roll down the cliff side just below the gun pit. Thus the company received its first KIA of the day’s fighting.

At 1235 the replacement destroyer arrived about 2000 yards off shore. [I have found no one on the South Shore Road that day who recalls destroyer support. Don Abbott has said in support of his not remembering a destroyer, "This type of support was so noteworthy, that it is doubtful that it would have gone unrecorded."  Roscoe Corder said clearly, “There was no destroyer supporting my platoon!”] Contact was made with SAP, and they were told to register on points  7-8-9 , Map B. When ready, they were to fire on points designated in the order of 9-8-7, the bulk of the fires to be placed on point 7, Map B. SAP stated that he could register on points 8-9, but could not see point 7 well enough to be effective. Therefore it was decided to have SAP register points 8-8 and the company would register point 7.

By 1245 the destroyer stated they had sufficient data but would have to move out to 4000 yards in order to insure good coverage of point 7. At 2000 yards, Wheeler Point partially masked their fire. Some of the registering rounds had struck Wheeler Point when aimed at the tunnel entrance. The ship would require 10 minutes to get into position. As a result then preparation was to start at 1255 and end at 1305.   

Lt. Corder was instructed to advance two squads as far as the road cut during the naval bombardment of points 7 and 8, advance from there would be covered by LMGs and the covering squad when it had moved to the road cut.

With exacting punctuality the destroyer started shelling the pillbox at point 9. Four salvos completely pulverized this concrete emplacement. The fire was shifted to the concrete emplacement at point 8, but due to a large outcrop of rock on the extreme tip, only one round hit the emplacement, doing little damage. This was a bad omen as it meant the Japs had a strong fortification from which they could place fire on us at will. The destroyer then shifted its fire to the tunnel entrance. Placing a total of 19 salvos on the entrance. Many of the rounds went directly into the tunnel entrance. 

As methodical as a clock the naval fire lifted at 1305 and the machine guns opened their covering fire. Lt. Corder moved his men forward. 

The shelling had had no effect as no enemy fire was received until the leading man reached a point about five yards from the outer wall around the tunnel entrance.  (See figures 1 and 2, Diagram No. 1). About that time all “Hell” broke loose. 

Nine Japs charged out of the tunnel entrance hurling grenades as they charged. A machine gun started firing from the side port of the concrete emplacement at point 8. The men moving in on the tunnel entrance had cautiously been advancing by bounds. Consequently all but one of the men were in the prone position, and only the one man standing was hit.

Apparently the Japs were blinded somewhat by coming out the dark tunnel into the bright sunlight. Most of their grenades were thrown over the cliff. Also as they charged straight out of the entrance and ended up the outer wall, there was a moments confused milling around. The full blast of the machine guns and the lead squad weapons, hit the Japs. All were killed in a moments time.

One LMG was now given the sole mission of firing at the single firing port in the concrete emplacement at point 8. The other LMG was to watch for targets of opportunity, paying particular attention to the ridge above point 8, Map B. 

With the lifting of the machine gun fire from the tunnel entrance the Japs inside began to fire rifles at random out of the entrance. By having the riflemen of the second squad, in line, fire into the tunnel entrance the first squad worked its way, by crawling, to a position around the outer wall of the entrance. (See figures 1 and 2, Diagram No.1). 

At this point a stalemate was reached, that lasted about 35 minutes. The Jap fire from inside the tunnel was so intense that it was impossible to gain an opening. Study of Fig. 1, plate 1, will explain this situation. In order to put effective fire into the tunnel, a man had to expose his entire body, wherein the Jap had only to expose his head and shoulders to fire across the outer wall. Grenades thrown into the tunnel had no apparent effect, although an occasional scream could be heard over the sound of firing when W.P. grenades were used. All available W.P. grenades were then passed up, and used, without effecting an advantage that was noticeable.

Our position outside the wall had one advantage, Jap grenades either fell inside the wall or over the cliff side just past the outer wall.

In order to effect a decision of some sort the company commander went forward to the entrance and had the BAR men of the 2nd and 3rd squads as well as the TSMG men of these squads come forward and work into a position around the outer wall. The plan to be executed was to have all men throw a hand grenade into the entrance simultaneously and then follow this up by standing and spraying the tunnels with all automatic weapons. 

The first attempt with this plan was not too successful and one man was killed and two wounded by heavy fire out of the tunnel.[57]

By crawling around and coaching each man in front of the tunnel to throw their grenades just over the wall across the tunnel entrance and to direct their fire low and deep into the tunnel, a second attempt of the plan was set up.

With all men watching for the signal, I raised my carbine over my head and the men threw their grenades almost as one man. At the same time they stood up pouring very heavy fire into the tunnel. Jap fire slackened perceptably [sic], and much shouting and chattering could be heard through the momentary breaks in the firing. 

Suddenly the Jap firing stopped. This resulted in a slowing down of our fire. Two men, Pfc W.A. Brown and Pvt. [Howard J] Jandro, moved cautiously toward the entrance, and were almost to the wall across the entrance, when 14 Japs came swarming out of the tunnel, we had been nicely “sucked in”. 

The Japs grabbed the two men, and a Jap officer started hacking at Pfc. W.A. Brown with his saber using short choppy strokes. The men outside the wall moved in firing from the hip, and engaged the Japs hand to hand. The advantage was ours, in having weapons. The Japs had charged with only hand grenades, and the one officer, with his saber, had the only hand weapon. An almost humorous tug of war took place between the men of the 2nd platoon and the Japs for possession of Jandro and Brown. This scrap lasted nearly 10 minutes. It ended when Jandro and Brown were retrieved and the Japs dead or wounded. Brown was seriously wounded (died of wounds on 25th February), but Jandro wasn’t seriously injured, but was considerably battered up by his own helmet which the Japs used as a bludgeon. Most of the other men had received a few hard knocks but not serious enough to impair their efficiency.

[Why is Jandro’s name inscribed on the marble wall at Manila cemetery along with Emory Ball’s? Their bodies were not recovered. The sad truth is that writers like Flanagan record such BS. The 2nd Platoon of "E" Co., a rifle platoon armed with semi-automatic M-1’s, did not take 10 minutes to dispatch 14 unarmed Japs.] 

We were just getting organized again when the Japs opened up with intense rifle fire again from the tunnel entrance. This fire was high for some reason. The men, flushed with their hand to hand skirmish, did not hit the ground and were in excellent position to meet the next Banzai charge that followed the enemy rifle fire. 17 Japs were killed in this effort. 

It was at this time that I noticed Lt. Ball in the firing line and immediately ordered him back to his mortar platoon, (Failure to obey this order given Lt. Ball, at this time, resulted in his useless death about 20 minutes later). 

[This mendacious comment will be proven false.] 

As Lt. Ball departed to the rear, the Japs mounted another Banzai charge. It was preceded by a shower of hand grenades, most of which were over the heads of the men outside the tunnel and over the cliff. Several, however, detonated with some effect.

Seven Japs charged out and were killed as soon as they broke out of the tunnel entrance. Several men were hit by small grenade fragments, including the company commander. Two of the men were sent back to the road cut and told to send two more men forward. Unnoticed by the company commander, one of the men to come forward was Lt. Ball.

Silence from within the tunnel followed the last Banzai. The men prepared for another charge. All were beginning to feel the strain of the past two hours and a half. Time was now about 1530. [58]  

There was about 5 minutes of waiting, punctuated by an occasional shot from the tunnel which was immediately answered by a burst of fire from the men outside the tunnel.

Then the build up started. First there was a few scattered shots, which steadily grew in violence. Pvt. Jandro, of the hand to hand skirmish, was hit five times, and was killed instantly. Lt. Ball was hit twice in the chest and staggered over and fell in front of me. [Roscoe Corder directly contradicts both the manner of Ball's death and the fact that Hill was present, and his version must be preferred because he was present with Ball and Hill was not] (I will never forget the mixed emotions I felt one of my men die in front of my eyes as a result of disobedience of my orders.) [Hill may be excused many things he wrote under the guise of presenting tactical principles, but no principles are involved in this vicious and slanderous pandering for empathy].

     Almost on the instant of Lt. Balls death the Japs charged, 22 strong. Two Japs charged with such violence that they leapt over the outer wall and tumbled down the cliff. Their efforts carried Pvt. Jonas (Jones) over with them. Jonas, however, managed to grab the stubble of brush and save himself. Another Jap succeeded in grappling with Pfc Kirkpatrick, who killed the Jap with his trench knife. The rest were killed by small arms fire. 

As this attack subsided, Lt. Corder told me that some of his men had no ammunition. Word was passed back to send forward all ammunition that could be gathered up. Two BAR magazines and two bandaliers (sic) of rifle ammunition were all that were produced. Lt Davis sent word forward with the ammunition saying that his LMG’s had but 50 rounds left for one gun and less than 50 rounds for the other. They had even sent down to the section on the beach and gotten all but 125 rounds of their ammunition.

The decision to withdraw was made immediately and the platoon started carrying Brown and Pfc McBride, who had been wounded in the last Banzai charge, back to Unknown Point. 

While this was going on two shots from above the tunnel hit my radio operator T/5 George A. Chuises, one hitting him in the hand, and the other shot struck the radio putting it out of commission. This was trouble from a new quarter. The LMG sprayed the area with their remaining ammunition. An uncomfortable silence settled on the area as the ammunition was used up. 

     Lt. Corder, my radio operator, and the few remaining men in front of the tunnel, were ordered to run for it. The order was promptly complied with. 

As the men started to the rear, I fired a clip of ammunition, hoping it might be at least harassing to the Nips snipers, then I cut loose and really ran for safety. I can say, without shame that I arrived at the road cut to the rear right on the “tails” of the group I had sent back a moment before.

The men watching from Unknown Point stated later that several Japs raised up over the ridge at point 8, Map B, and opened up on us as we crossed the exposed ground between the tunnel and the road cut. I wasn’t aware of it at the time. However. T/5 Chuises life was apparently saved by the radio on his back. It now had three holes in it, instead of one.

The time of withdrawal recorded by the 1st Sergeant was 1615.[59] The company had been fighting approximately 9 hours to cover a distance of about 700 yards. 

The 3rd platoon had not been employed during the afternoon attack. After the destruction of the pillbox at point 9, Map B, it was deemed unnecessary to commit the platoon. Too, had the enemy attempted to cut off our rear, he would have had the entire company contained in the compartment formed by Unknown and Wheeler Points. There was not enough room for employment on the roadway level to make possible the platoon employment there. 

Lt. Brown, seeing the company start to withdraw, had called for an LCM to meet us South of Searchlight Point to pick up our dead and wounded. 

The bodies of Lt. Ball and Pvt. Jandro had not been evacuated from Wheeler Point. The danger of losing more men in the process was not deemed worth the risk at the time. Sometime during the night of 23-24 February, the Japs removed their dead as well as the bodies of the two Americans and subsequent patrols did not find a trace of them. [It would be hard under the tons of dirt and rocks cause by the landslide resulting from the destroyer shelling]

After placing the dead and wounded aboard the LCM* now the more fatigued men were loaded and instructed to ride ambulance jeeps [!] back to “topside” when they reached the South Dock. The remainder of the company worked its way back up to the parade ground and headed back to their perimeter positions. 

[* I can find no trooper present that day who recalls the assistance of an LCM to withdraw dead and wounded. An LCM evacuation of dead, wounded and “fatigued” is unrecorded in Battalion records.]

I believe the intensity of the attack on Wheeler Point can best be understood by what happened as the company filed back across the parade ground toward the Troop Barracks. [This and the following paragraph are beyond comment.]  

Small groups of men stood in tight knots along the parade ground. As the company passed each group, men would break away and walk up to the men in the column; offer a cigarette, a canteen of water, or lift the weapon from his shoulder and follow along the column silently. Each tried to help the tired men along, but were firmly shaken off. It was a proud company! Although tired beyond reason, they held their heads high. [If you ask me to describe the most bizarre BS account I’ve ever heard, this ranks with that of the man who said on Noemfoor his company kept count of the Japs they’d killed by skinning them and stacking the skins. They had a stack waist high.]

  

 

 

 

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

 

Looking back on the operations of Company “E” on the 23d February 1945, means looking back on the entire span of the assault on Corregidor Island. It was not a normal operation. From its conception in plan to its closing date of 8 March 1945, it was not a normal operation.

It seems ludicrous today, to realize that the conduct of the operation was to hold a small tight perimeter in the center of “topside”, and then each day strike out and retake the ground that had been taken the day before. [60]  Yet, this was how it had to be done. Whoever held the “topside” or high ground, controlled the Island. To relinquish the hold on “topside” meant defeat. Such a statement can be no more aptly proven, than by the reason that the Japs, who held the almost impregnable defenses on the outer rim of the island, had, in 20 days, been defeated in detail.

To hold “topside” against the ingenious, tunneling Japs, as well as the outer rim and ravines, would have required a force several times the size of units used.

The operation as a whole was brilliantly conceived and effectively accomplished. It was typical of the startling successes achieved by General MacArthur forces in their drive toward Japan. 

The success of the operation clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of men who know their jobs, what tools they have to work with, and possess the skill and coverage necessary to close with and defeat the enemy.

In comparing the relative cost of an air assault against the relative cost of an amphibious landing against Corregidor, the jump casualties suffered can be more than balanced off by the terrific cost in casualties suffered by the Japanese in their conquest of Corregidor in April 1942. [61]

Many of the basic principles of war were violated during the operation as a whole and in the action at Wheeler Point.

The principle of mass could not be obtained due to the small rugged drop zones, and the limited areas of maneuver after reaching the ground.

Surprise was initially exploited to the maximum. The Japs so failed to anticipate air assault that they did not react to the situation for nearly an hour after the initial drop. It is without question of doubt in the writers mind that Japs could have prevented the recapture of Corregidor, in at least this first attempt, had the Japs attacked the Japs attacked the 1st lift when at first landed with the man power that was found to be on the island at the time of the drop, or soon after the landing of the 1st lift, the Japs would have annihilated the initial landing force.

The enemy’s failure to mount a large scale counterattack at this time or later was one reason for his downfall.

The failure of the enemy to effect any large scale coordinated attacks was due to a failure in his basic concept of the defense of the island. The Japs did not tie in their defense sectors with adequate communications. Their communication nets were al laid on the surface, “topside”, consequently shelling and bombing destroyed most of it. Actions of the attackers destroyed the little communications that remained open to the enemy. [62]

Throughout the Corregidor operation, and as emphasized by the attack on Wheeler Point, definite, specific objectives were assigned.

[illegible] completed the one initially assigned. This procedure, as well as non-interference in the method of accomplishing a mission, led to greater efficiency and initiative on the part of small unit commanders.

The element of maneuver was virtually non-existant. The very nature of the terrain left no choice but direct assault on enemy positions. Full use was made of field expedients, however, to destroy the enemy in his underground positions. The number of enemy killed and buried alive will never be determined. Enemy casualties physically accounted for numbered 5773. [63]

Later, unofficial newspaper accounts boosted the total to about 8000. These reports came from the Engineer units inspecting the underground installations of the “Rock” about a year later. It is interesting to note that 14 months after the fall of Corregidor, a group of 20, well fed and equipped Japs walked out of Wheeler Battery. They were totally blind. This was from a radio newscast heard by the author. [64]

Specific analysis of the attack on Wheeler Point does show that the plan of attack was sound and that the best solution to a difficult situation was accomplished.

The enemy suffered 110 KIA that could be counted physically. [65] How many Japs had been killed and wounded within the tunnel, and the destroyed pillbox on the beach, will undoubtedly never be known. Company E’s losses were 3 KIA, 1 DOW, 4 WIA (evacuated) 11 SWIA (not evacuated) [66]

A serious error was made in not making a proper ammunition check when the attack was halted at Unknown Point. This mistake resulted in the company having to withdraw from Wheeler Point at a time when I believe further efforts for a very short period of time, would definitely have resulted in the destruction of all but a very few of the remaining enemy. In addition the withdrawal would not have been so dangerous had we been able to properly cover the withdrawal with fire.

The use of the LMG as an overhead close support weapon, in spite of all accepted doctrine, proved to be a deciding factor in the troops reaching Wheeler Point over extremely exposed terrain. This was particularly evident in the close support given while attacking Unknown Point at the roadway.  It was further exemplified by the 3rd platoon in attacking the cave position at point 5, Map B.

A proper terrain analysis would have prevented the tying up of a JASCO team for an operation that could not have made use of the teams services. A correct analysis would have shown on the evening of the 22nd February, that air attacks on the cliff face would be dangerous to other troops, and would not be of sufficient value to warrant the clearing of a bomb line “topside”. ( I believe this company commander was carried away with the thought of so much support.)

  

 

LESSONS

  

  1. The LMG in the hands of skilled personnel is a weapon that can be used with extreme effectiveness as a close support weapon.

  2. Ammunition requirements for a given operation should not be predicated on a previous operation unless sit is to be against similar terrain, enemy in strength and dispositions.

  3. Men moving forward when under fire suffer less casualties and achieve greater success. The relentlessness of his forward movement rattles the enemy and his defense becomes progressively weaker and less cohesive. As in the case at Wheeler Point, once the tunnel entrance had been reached, the Japs reverted to his useless tactics of “Banzai”.  This, as usual, results in his complete destruction.

  4. Use of bayonets in the hand to hand fighting at Wheeler Point would have prevented any doubt as to the skirmish. In both cases cited the attackers were outnumbered. Although the Jap is no match for a paratrooper in this act of close combat, bayonets would have provided a positive margin for success. More emphasis should be placed on this phase of an infantryman’s training.

  5. The fire control instruments that can be used aboard naval combat vessels, insure an accuracy of fire not obtainable by land based mobile artillery.

  6. Too great a stock should not be placed in Intelligence enemy strength estimates. When war is being fought in jungle and island areas, many instances would show that Jap commanders themselves did not know their exact troop strength. (Estimate on Corregidor, 850. Japs KIA 5773) [67]

  7. Shifting of personnel from platoon to platoon within a company is feasible and necessary in an operation of this nature. Lack of replacements and high casualty rates make this expedient necessary to maintain combat efficiency.

  8. Squads of 7 to 9 men were extremely effective and easier to control. In limited areas of maneuver and in close terrain, the 10-12 man squad is too unwieldy for one man to effectively control.

  9. Absolute and close adherence to discipline and orders must be followed at all times to insure proper behavior and efficiency while in combat. Permitting the company officers to wander around even to a limited degree during training periods can cause such a practice to be followed in combat. Failure to obey orders was the direct cause of Lt. Ball’s death.

  10. The practice of training each parachutist how to handle all types of weapons pad dividends in facilitating the shifting of personnel within the company in order to maintain a cohesive combat unit. On the 16th some men were able to, and did, step in as crew members on the 75 howitzer and performed in an exceedingly satisfactory manner.

  11. No defense, however strong, can long repel the efforts of an aggressive, well trained infantry man and his supporting arms.

  12. TSMG is unequaled in close combat and is outstanding in its effectiveness in cave and hand to hand combat.

 

    -FOOTNOTES-  

 

[46] A-3, p. 31.

[49] A-3, p. 32

[50] A-3, p. 32

[51] A-3, p. 33

[52] A-3, p. 33

[53] A-3, p.33

[54] ***

[55] A-3, p.34

[56] A-3, Personal Knowledge

[57] A-3, Personal knowledge of author.

[58]  (illegible)

[59]  A-3, Personal knowledge of author.

[60]  A-2, Personal knowledge.

[61] illegible

[62] A-2

[63] A-1. A-2

[64] Personal Knowledge

[65] A-1, Sec. III

[66] A-3, p.59

[67] A-1, A-2

 

      -SOURCES-            

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 A-1  Corregidor Island Operation, Historical Report Operation No. 48 (6 March 45) 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team (TIS Library)

A-2   Corregidor Island Operation, (16 Feb.-  8 Mar.1945) SEAFFE Board Report No. 308, (TIS Library).

A-3  History, Company “E”, 2nd Battalion, 503d Parachute Regiment, (1 Feb.-9 Mar. 1945) (Personal possession of 1st Sergeant A.E. Vance, former 1st Sergeant Company “E”.)

A-4  Field Order No. 9 (16 Feb.-8 Mar. 1945) Vol. II, USAFFE Board Report #8- (TIS Library.

A-5  The Corregidor Operation by Lt. Col. Edward L. Jenkins. A.C. Military Review, April 1946 p. 57 (TIS Library)

A-6  Drop on Corregidor by Major Thomas C. Hardiman. (TIS Library) Coast Artillery Journal, July-August 1945 p. 4 (TIS Library)

A-7  Retaking the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bay, Lieutenant Perry Reed McMahon. Coast Artillery Journal, July-August 1945 p. 4, (TIS Library)

A-8  Enemy on Luzon. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Periodic Reports, Hqs. 6th Army (TIS Library).

A-9  The Return to Corregidor by Harold Templeman (American Red Cross) Strand Press  (Personal possession of author)

A-10 Corregidor Coordination by Lt. Col. E.M. Postlewaite, The Infantry Journal, August 1945. (TIS Library),

A-11 General Wainwrights Story, edited by Robert Considine. (TIS Library)

A-12 Parachute Field Artillery, United States Pacific Warfare Board (TIS Library)

A-13- The Philippines, Field Artillery Journal, May 1945 (TIS Library)

A-14 Harbor Defenses, Coast Artillery Journal, July-August, 1945 (TIS Library)

A-15 I Have Returned, Coast Artillery Journal, July August, 1945  (TIS Library)

A-16 Report on the Miscellaneous Observations of Destruction of  Manila and Corregidor, No. 297. (TIS Library) SWPA AGF Board, Allied Forces Headquarters.

A-17 General Orders No. 9., Section III, Headquarters II Corps, APO 471, 7 March 1945, (Personal possession of author)

  

*Note: Available sources of information failed to give adequate coverage of this operation after the date 22 February 1945 . This was the official date that island was secure. However, as was typical of Pacific operations, most of the fighting remained to be done. Source A-3 proved to be the only source available for information concerning operation on 23 February. 1945.  

 

 

 

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