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19 FEBRUARY 1945 - DAY 4
No. 4
181800I February 45
to
191800I February 45 |
3. OUR
OPERATIONS:
a.
Infantry:
Our troops continued their
assaults on enemy emplacements, some for the second time as interlocking
tunnels allow re-entry. A heavy enemy attack began at 06001 from the
vicinity of 30.5-40.0." Cheney Ravine. "The attack was well organized and
succeeded in penetrating our line to some extent.
Heavy fighting resulted, but the attack was completely repulsed by 11001.
Enemy blowing their own ammunition dumps, one being blown at 03301, vicinity
32.4-39.75 that caused several casualties to our troops. Other dumps were
blown in vicinity BATTERY POINT. Our troops blew dumps at 32.2-40.7 and
31.5-39.6. BREAKWATER POINT was successfully assaulted after a day long
battle in which naval support fires were utilized. Innumer�able caves and
tunnels were located and remain to be exploited."
4. CASUALTIES:
a.
Our
Casualties:
This report- 33 KIA, 75 WIA, 4 Jump IIA
(Additional Reported), 13 MIA.
To date- 75 KIA, 207 WIA,
182 JUMP IIA, 13 MIA.
b.Enemy Known
Casualties:
This report- 493 KIA, 3 PW
To Date- 1583 KIA, 3 Pw." |
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#62 0105 |
Mysterious
explosion vicinity of A Co. perimeter - believed to be an
underground ammo dump set off by enemy. A Co. reports it in
vicinity of 32.3-39.7 and heavy casualties. |
#63
0530 |
"C" Co called
for star shells & reported they were attacked by 180 Japs
(31.2-39.4) and some infiltrated thru their lines." It appears that
the 1st battalion did have radio contact down to their companies. |
#64
0600 |
D" Co reported
they were being attacked by 200 appx enemy at 30.5-40.1. Casualties
are heavy and enemy breaking thru lines. Co. C.O. killed." Note
that the first D company report comes in at 0600 - or the time when
2nd Battalion opened their radio net. |
#65
0630 |
Firing in
vicinity of west end of main C.P. building. |
#66
0645 |
grenade landed
in 2nd Bn wounding four men. |
#67
0700 |
1st Bn reported
being attacked and grenades dropping in vicinity of C.P. |
#68
0700 |
Msg #1 to XI
Corps. Reporting enemy attack in vicinity (30.5-40.0) at 0630. |
#69
0710 |
7 Japs reported
killed at CP Bldg. Firing ceasing and enemy either retreat�ing or
taking shelter in houses & bunkers. Art fire being prepared to lay
in the area. |
#70
0745 |
C.P. Area
cleared - Patrols being sent to check remaining bldgs inside the
peri�meter. Attacks being organized to clear all probable Jap
concentrations. |
#71
0830 |
Msg #2 to XI
Corps- Reporting heavy explosion at 0330 to have been in vicinity of
32.4-39.15 & believed to have been suicidal demolition of enemy
arsenal. 3 KiA- 22 WIA - our casualties. |
#72
1000 |
Field Artillery
(462 E.A.) blasted area in vicinity of 31.3-39.8 with 4-75 How. 85
enemy counted dead and count not completed. |
#73
1045 |
Air strike at
James Draw by 12 planes dropping #500 bombs. 6 direct hits - Patrols
in area reported enemy immediately set off demolitions destroying
barracks and selves. 1 POW captured and proved to be Korean.
Couldn't see the idea of suicide. |
#75
1040 |
Ammo dump in
vicinity of Battery Point blew up. Upon check find that patrol
covered outside of underground barracks. Platoon leader (Lt Joe
Whitson, E Co.) went to entrance and fired carbine thru doorway and
the explosion followed - 4 men completely covered with debris." (Joe
Whitson sustained injuries to his eyes and had to be evacuate) |
#74
1100 |
Navy shelling
Breakwater Point and vicinity. |
#75
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Navy shelling
Breakwater Point and vicinity. |
#76
1050 |
Msg #3 to XI
Corps covering the above mentioned explosion. |
#77
1300 |
Msg #4 to XI
Corps reporting enemy blowing own ammo dumps at (32.4-40.7) Heavy
fighting vicinity of (31.3-39.7) & Breakwater Point. |
#78
1330 |
Navy began
shelling breakwater Point again |
#79
1400 |
James gully hit
by air strike again. This time "napon" bombs used and area gave a
schorching.(sic) |
#80
1500 |
Msg #5
reporting to XI Corps. Ground & naval strike on Breakwater Pt very
effective. |
#81
1640
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Firing broke
out in vicinity of (30.7-40.4) at 1730- Lt Brown reported that we're
clearing away debris to set up a Co. CP
Firing
broke out in vicinity of (30.7-40.4) at 1730- Lt Brown reported that
while picking up wounded in vicinity men were fired on. HMG and F.A.
then laid down a barrage after which Lt. Lee and platoon went to
tunnel to investigate. Found 23 Japs in dazed condition. All were
exterminated. Undetermined how they got there and how long they had
been there." |
Lt. Brown is Lt. Browne, 2nd Battalion S-3. Lt Lee
is Dan A. Lee. Although
the coordinates are way off,this has to be the attack on the
Ordnance Machine Shop |
#82
1725 |
"Msg #6 to XI
Corp reporting enemy ammo dump 32.2-40.7 blew up by own troops -
Fire fight 30.9-40.4. Enemy known dead 1509. Our casualties
high." |
The above coordinates almost the same
as those given in message number 81 just proceeding this message.
This would put the action at Battery Grubbs and no action was fought
there. Possibly a map other than one I know of is used. I would
advise anyone using the "Special Map" to be forewarned. |
#83
2135 |
" Msg #8 to XI Corp. Interdictory
fire by our weapons only activity at present. |
#84
2205 |
Reported to us & XI Corp by Msg. 9.
Estimated 100 enemy observed proceeding east from Malinta tunnel
dragging large field piece under our fire. Naval fire to be
utilized. |
#85
2250 |
Msg 10 to XI Corp reporting
effectiveness of our mortar fire & naval fire on Jap field piece
reported above. Destruction almost certain and at least 30 enemy
dead. |
#86
2332 |
Report from XI Corp - no gas stored
in Malinta tunnel. |
#87
2400 |
By far our
roughest day. Heavy enemy resistance & strong counter attack &
inf�iltration. Our superior numbers - air power & naval support
handled all situations. Plans made to complete mopping up all heavy
enemy concentrations on 20 Feb 45." |
The notation "our superior numbers"
indicates that our Regimental S-3 still was under the illusion that
we had more troops on the island than the Japanese. Clearly, we were
able to bring more force to bear at any designated point or across
any area, even though numerically there were still more Japanese on
the island. It was their mindset and the failure of their command
structure which placed them in tactical positions where they could
not take advantage of their numbers. The action at the
Ordnance Machine Shop is a typical example. One trooper (Fred
Morgan) was killed when he discovered that the area contained an
active Japanese force, but in fairly quick time there were at least
27 Japanese killed inside the Shop after the we withdrew to relative
safety and were able to bring in a 75mm howitzer and a 60mm direct
fire mortar. It took cold steel, though, to finish what had been
started. |
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2nd Battalion S-2 messages sent to the Regimental S-2 on 19 February
1945:
No. 3 |
1818301 |
(310.8-405.8) |
Easy Co
reports thirty-one (31) additional enemy K.I.A. accounted for
from yesterday afternoon action in that area. It is also
estimated that at least three hundred (300) enemy are holding
that position. Enemy K.I.A. cannot be searched until the
position is taken." |
These coordinates
place "E" Company in James Ravine which is correct. |
No. 4 |
1910151 |
(315.1-400.2) |
"Intelligence scouts have counted & searched a total of eight
(8) enemy K.I.A. in front of our Bn C.p. (315.1-400.2).
Documents, insignia, diaries, etc. found on enemy K.I.A. are
enclosed with this report. |
No. 5 |
19025I
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(310.5-400.5) |
Fox Co.
reports one (1) enemy K.I.A. Name, stamps, photos etc. are
enclosed with this report. |
No. 6 |
191200I |
(31.4-40.9) |
one (1)
enemy P.O.W. taken by Easy Co. and turned over to Reg'l. S-1
with this message. |
No. 7 |
191310I |
(310.8-395.8) |
Five (5)
enemy K.I.A.'s reported by Easy Co. documents, diaries,
insignia, etc. enclosed with this report." |
The second
coordinate, 395.8 does not fit "E" Company's position. This would
place them on the south~ side of Topside. |
No. 8 |
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A summary
of the enemy attacks on our perimeter and installations in the
vicinity of (305.6-400.4) and (310.1-400.7) During the early A.M
of 19 Feb. 45 between the hours of 190330Iand 190745I. The
enemy broke through our perimeter in the vicinity of
(305.6-400.4) and (310.1-400.7) at frequent intervals until
190745I when finally the last assault was repulsed at 190745I.
All of our positions were held. Enemy K.I.A.'s counted total
sixty-six (66) also ten (10) probables." |
This is the "F"
Company vicinity. The body count of the enemy "F" company KIA
was not made until 20 February. |
No. 9 |
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" A summary
of the enemy attacks on our perimeter and installations in the
vicinity of (310.5-395.1) during the early A.M. of 19 Feb 45
between the hours of 190530I and 190730I. The enemy attempted
three (3) separate banzai attacks on our perimeter at
(310.5-395.1). The first two (2) attempts to break through our
positions were repulsed but the third attempt the enemy made
they broke through our defences at (310.5-395.1) After fierce
hand-to-hand fighting the enemy was repulsed at 190730I. All of
our positions were held. K.I.A.'s counted totaled ninety-five
(95) and an estimated thirty (30) more that fell over the cliff
due to our heavy concentration of fire." |
This is "D" company's
vicinity. Although his starting times are late for both
companies, exact details are missed. Barry did get a report in
of the two pronged attack, which is more than can be said for
Regiment. |
No. 10 |
1915001 |
(310.7-405.5) |
an estimate
of twenty-five (25) enemy K.I.A.'s were reported by Easy Co.
C.O. INF Barracks at (310.7-405.5) were reported to be blown up
& caved in. |
No. 11 |
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No. 12 |
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No. 13 |
1915451 |
(310.7-400.5) |
"F" Co
reports seven (7 Enemy K.I.A.") |
This is the
location of the Ordnance Machine Shop, and the time fits with
the attack described below. |
No. 14 |
1917301 |
(310.7-400.4) |
Fox Co.
reports twenty~one (21) enemy K.I.A. '5 Search of bodies will be
made as quickly as possible." |
This the
completion report of the attack on the Ordnance Machine Shop. |
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SIDE NOTE
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THE
REGIMENTAL MESSAGE CENTER LOG FOR 19 FEB |
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"Morning of 19th.
There was plenty of action tonight - more than we'd like to see again.
The early morning hours had sporadic firing all around. About 0230
there was a tremendous detonation that shook the whole island - we
suspected that it came from Breakwater Point and that it was a Nip dump.
From that time there was no sleep. Firing opened up from 360 degrees.
The 1st Bn, covering the South was strongly attacked and so was the rest
of the perimeter. The little yellow men started infiltrating into the
parade ground. Shots were going through the C.P.- it was still dark.
Everyone was up and in position for the expected attack. A few mortar
shots landed just about 10 yards to the north of our barracks. There
were hand grenades being thrown from the South. We had no way of
telling how many there were - pitch dark and gunfire all around. Our
own men were on the other side of the parade ground - some of our own
artillery men were in the middle of the parade ground - we darned sure
couldn't fire unless we were sure of our target. These Nip marines wear
green coveralls similar to our own; its difficult to distinguish them
at 50 yds. Dawn was breaking (for which we were very thankful) and I
think that's when the Nips started withdrawing. We saw a dead Jap ten
yards in front of our barracks (south). He had flung a few hand
grenades into the Bn C.P., injuring four S-2 men. He must have been
ready to throw another when he was shot; his right arm was blown off.
There was still plenty of firing - mostly to west in the valley. The
Japs had fixed a strong point in two concrete houses at the south end of
this valley. At 0900 plans were being made for attacks on strong
points. Help was being secured from air corp and navy. Right now at
1050 hour there are concentrated fires on Breakwater Pt., Morrison Pt.
and to the south around Geary and Searchlight Pt. Our casualties have
been heavy - the regiment is so short of men that we can't hold
positions we take. It seems we can't fill our perimeter at night. We
could use some replace�ments - and quick. Reports came in that P.F.C.
Robert Dunn was killed on D Co.perimeter�, also that two men were
seriously wounded.
The "D" Company commander was killed. A brief resume of our action
since we're on the island would run something like this - we take some
positions during the day & withdraw; the Nips reoccupy them at night and
next day we're fighting for them again. At 1110, right now, there's
just sporadic firing mostly to the northwest. Resuming at 1815- this
has been a hectic day. There's a good solid war going on here in
Corregidor all by itself. There have been attacks all day long. This
is the first five minutes it has been quiet - no, there goes some firing
again. There were Japs found all over the area in hiding. They
wouldn't open fire against a single Yank - they'd wait for a group.
About 1650 they opened up from the tunnels we blew yesterday with two
machine guns - and they really bounced the bullets off our C.P I
repeat, we just don't have enough men to hold what we take during the
day. They turn up again in the places they're flushed out. About 1750
another ammo dump blew up - we don't know the cause. Our losses have
been terrific. "D" Company had 25 casualties during the night. Three
of those were from our 2nd L.M.G. Platoon; They were completely
surrounded and had a tough night - gruesome. I should say our perimeter
will be a little tighter tonight. The break thru that came through the
1st Bn. chewed up one of their companies. Three prisoners were taken
to�day - and from different people I gather their story was something
like this - there were five thousand of them on the island (I know
there're less than that now). They have enough ammo and food for three
and a half years. Sounds pretty permanent. One of them said they were
intending to storm this place tonight with 1000 men. If its true, let
'em come. We'll get it over with in one big banzai. It's quiet again,
no I'm wrong. I'll close this journal down for the night." |
It is obvious that the war from the
higher headquarters back at Topside Barracks was that of the closer
units which they could observe. I do not know of any breakthrough in
the 1st Battalion lines that night. C Company defending Battery Wheeler
lost one man - a staff sergeant killed by his own men.*
[S/Sgt Herbert A. Thomas]
They never seemed to realize that F company was engaged. Only after
they got the casualty reports did they realize that D Company fought a
battle.
The information from
the prisoners was wrong. The one thousand men had already tried to storm
Topside, only it was probably fifteen hundred. Either the interrogator
misunderstood, or the prisoner misunderstood, or the prisoner was
blowing smoke. |
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" At 0430 Japs made "Banzai"
attack on Co. CP. Japs came out of caves along the shore and came up
thru ravines. They took high ground above the CP and started
charging. About half the men on the perimeter were killed by
infil�trating Japs. The rest of the perimeter withdrew closer to the
Co. CP which was set up in a plotting room. This plotting room was on
Wheeler point and had observation on three sides overlooking the water
and no point of observation overlooking the land. To observe what was
taking place to the front the observer either had to be along side the
plotting room or on top of it. When Japs came up the ravine the CP was
cut off from supporting fire of the LMG's which were in a big gun
position (Battery Cheney) with the second and third platoons. Lt.
Turinsky, Schmidle, Arnold, Wenditz, Seal, Foley, Leshinski, Madsy,
Schwartz, R. Keller, Brachlein, Marsh and Golonka were killed in action
and Lantis, McDonald, Brown, Dolan, Larcher, Majda, Sanchez, Weber,
Gorlinski, Howell, Hugart and Martinez were wounded during the attack.
The Co. moved the perimeter to a spot in ravine 50 yds below western end
of drill field. While setting up this perimeter Arbuckle was wounded by
a Jap who crawled from beneath a parachute and fired at him." |
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" 0700. Two nips KIA as they
were approaching the mortar platoon position. Lt Whitson and six men
were sent to the water point to investigate the damage done to the
underground barracks in James Ravine. P-47's dive bombed the position
with 500lb bombs and they returned with �Napalm� bombs. The patrol
reported heavy damage to the barracks either as a result of the bombing
or demolition by the Nips. One prisoner was captured and brought in for
questioning." |
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"Fighting was bitter during the night as the enemy attacked time & time
again, resulting in the death of Sgt. Donald White & lightly wounding
Pfc. Aimers, Albersman, Lloyd McCarter, and Benedict Schilli. During
the day heavy enemy sniper fire resulted in the death of Pfc. Pasquale
Ruggio, & lightly wounding Pfc Eugene Rasey & Lawrence Rainville. Pfc
Fred Morgan was killed by enemy sniper fire, when the third platoon &
company headquarters took a short break before a powder magazine. One
man happened to look in the magazine and saw 20 or more Japs. The
company laid down fire while the remainder withdrew under the direction
of Lt. William LaVanchure. In withdrawing Pfc Morgan was shot through
the head. Company strength was now 3 officers & 105 EM. "
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As stated before Lt
LaVanchure was at the Topside Barracks with two badly sprained ankles. |
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During the afternoon I received orders to move our
platoon up the road by Grubbs Railroad and to follow the rest of the
company to Topside. I believe the 2nd platoon squads and the mortar
platoon squads had already moved back. We had counted the Jap bodies
around the trolley cars in front of McCarter's position and some bodies
on our east side where the Japs had attacked three times. I believe
this is where the S-2 count of 65 came from.
Bailey had moved the company with him
out when he sent orders for me to follow, so we were about thirty
minutes behind them. As they skirted the base of Way hill the road ran
near the Ordnance Machine Shop. Two railroads also were laid here.
This building is #63. They halted here, probably to let us catch up.
Things were quiet, and they were resting and taking it easy. But this
was Corregidor where typically all hell would break loose at any
moment. When things were the quietest, Japs popped up out of nowhere.
No less happened now. Fred Morgan looked through one of the doors into
the building and was instantly killed by a bullet in his head.
There was an artillery battery
nearby, and they opened up on the openings in the vault-like building
buried in the base of the hill. They fired direct fire using the open
iron sights on their 75mm pack howitzers. The mortar platoon unlimbered
their flat trajectory mortar under Pfc Henry McCrory, and fired
directly into the openings. Since they had not fired the night before
they still had 40-50 rounds, and they fired all these rounds into the
openings. Lt. Lee led a force into the building as soon as the fire
ceased. Turning to the right they found the Japs huddled up in a room
with concrete walls. The Japs were so dazed from the concussion that
they did not seem to know Lee and his men were there. Redhorse Phillips
and Burl Martin claim the credit for the most of this fire. They say
the artillery was having trouble getting their rounds into the openings;
whereas, the mortar squad was at a much closer range and put every round
into the openings.
When Lee's force got inside they
realized that it was too dangerous to fire within the vault-like room
because of the danger of ricochets; consequently, they attacked with
trench knives and bayonets killing about 27 Japs in the room. They came
out with very bloody fatigues. When our platoon arrived the action was
over but smoke was still coming out of the openings. There were
billions of flies on the island by this time (bloated corpses
everywhere) covering every square inch. The poor guys in the bloody
fatigues looked like they were wearing a mat of flies.
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Bill Bailey |
"When we came off the high ground we held up the
head of the column to wait for the tail end of the company to catch up,
since we were loaded with ammo and there were also walking wounded.
Somebody went poking around in those concrete abutments and drew fire
from what proved to be, I believe, 27 Japs holed up in there. I don't
remember if your half of the company was involved in that little fire
fight. We were able to get the 75mm pack howitzers to fire point blank,
over open iron sights, flat trajectory right into each opening and that
cooled them off in a hurry." |
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An Army photographer made a picture of this assault
and it is filed in the National Archives as photo 111-SC-380674.
(see above) The
Signal Corps caption is wrong in that it states that it is an attack on the Telephone
Exchange Building. In this photo the unmistakable outline of Ordnance
Machine Shop is shown along with loading frames in front of the north
end. These frames show up in other pictures such as slides which Bill
Bailey made. The pictures also show the two parallel railroad tracks
and the road, just as they appear on the big map of Corregidor. Way Hill
rising above the building is also very visible. The telephone ex�change
with one rail track in front in no way fits this photo.
As can be seen in the SC photo, some of the men
attacking did not have their webbing on. They evidently, as we usually
did, slipped it off when they stopped to rest. After Morgan was shot
the Japs opened up on the resting F Company men and there was quite a
bit of confusion for a short time. Dan Lee received a scalp wound
somewhere during the action and was evacuated to the portable surgical
hospital. He had quite a long talk with Doc Bradford while he was
there, because Dec records this in the manuscript he wrote of the
Corregidor action.
We were extremely thirsty. Our last water was the
canteen we received yesterday-morning before leaving 28-D. This had
stopped the eating, too. When you are very thirsty you don't eat. We
heard that the Japs had the road blocked to Bottomside. They had
converted the power plant and the adjoining refrigeration plant into a
fortress.
We moved out for Topside Barracks. On the way we
crossed a couple of streets. One I remember well. It was paved with
curbs and guttering. Bordering this street was a tall, thick hedge. We
stopped and sat on the south side of the hedge for what seemed to be a
very long time. The reason time passed so slowly was that it was most
uncomfortable sitting here, because bullets kept cracking through the
hedge. A stray bullet can kill you just as dead as an aimed one. In
any event one seems called upon to sit stoically and display no concern,
and this we did. |
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Finally we moved up to the barracks and were
overjoyed to find lister bags full of water hanging in front of the
south side of the barracks. Now we had all the water we wanted to
drink. For the next hour or so we sat on the veranda on the north side,
second floor, and did nothing but eat K rations and talk. How great can
things be. A person has to experience a prolonged period of great
danger with death popping up on every side to know how much a period of
sitting in complete safety with nothing to do can be appreciated.
Possibly the greatest satisfaction of all was the freedom from the
constant pangs of thirst. Once the pangs of thirst are gone the pangs
of hunger appear, but this too, is quickly satisfied by a K ration. As
much as we complained about the unappetizing K rations at times such as
these the ration seemed to improve greatly in taste. |
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The attack on the Ordnance
Machine Shop started when Fred Morgan attempted to took a look inside.
Below. the same scene in 2010.
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Bailey's view from his CP
on Way Hill, looking down Sunset Ridge. Battery Smith can be
seen, just barely. What we called Grubbs Road, which was more of
a trail, branches off up to Battery Sunset. Soon after the trail
disappears into the trees, there was a convoy of vehicles. The
building on the right is the BC Station for Battery Grubbs.
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This is Corregidor
where, typically, all hell would break loose at any moment. When
things were the quietest, Japs popped out of nowhere. Bailey had
moved the company with him out when he sent orders for me to
follow, so we were about thirty minutes behind them. As they
skirted the base of Way Hill, the road ran near the Ordnance
Machine Shop. Two railroads also were laid there. They halted
there, probably to let us catch up. Things were quiet, and they
were resting and taking it easy. Many of them got out of their
equipment belts. Fred Morgan looked through one of the doors of
the Machine Shop and was killed instantly by a bullet in his
head. There was an artillery battery nearby, and they opened up
on the openings in the vault-like buildings buried in the base
of the hill. They fired direct fire using the open iron sights
of their 75mm pack howitzers. Redhorse Phillips and Burl Martin
say the artillery was having trouble getting their rounds into
the openings. The mortar platoon unlimbered their flat
trajectory mortar under Pfc. Henry McCrory, and they too fired
directly into the openings. Being at a closer range, they were
able to put every round through the openings. Since they had not
fired the night before, they still had 40-50 rounds, and they
fired them all into the openings. Lt. Lee led a force into the
building as soon as the fire ceased. Turning to the right they
found the Japs huddled up in a room with concrete walls. One
shot proved it was too dangerous to fire inside the room, for
danger of ricochets. It required trench knives.
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Grubbs Ravine, from towards
the top. Corregidor in February '45 was pretty dry, and the dry
stream bed can be seen in the left foreground. Towards the right
is the Rock Point Trail.
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"At dawn of the 19th I reported our situation to Bailey.
We were cut off to the east by the Japs in the railroad cut, and to
the north by Japs under and around the trolley cars. They had a Nambu LMG.
Any movement drew fire from them and the riflemen. We were out of
ammunition. We had several wounded who were in real need of medical
attention. Pasquale Ruggio, of the 2nd platoon, was hit by rifle fire from
the direction of the rail-road cut and killed. Pfc
Lawrence Rainville, mortar platoon, was wounded too. The mortar men, Sgt.
Phillips, Burl Martin, George Montoya, the young Richard "Tropical" Peterson▼,
Virgil Short, and others searched through the dozens of empty mortar shell
cartons and found 5 or 6 rounds.
After Ruggio was killed they fired these rounds at
the "ditch", or railroad cut. They thought they'd put every round in it. Even the .50 cal was fired towards
the cut. In truth, there was a crater against the railroad
cut which we could not see, and there were over a dozen Japs taking very
effective shelter in it. These were the Japs who were firing at us. Those in
the cut were unable to climb the high, sheer walls to get into position to
fire at us.
The sun was up now, and
the SCR 536 radio was powered up. At this point the CO of D Battery
contacted me by radio. His thin radio voice was quizzing
me,
"I can see about 300
yards to the east north-east of your position, looking straight down the
cut, and see a group of men in the cut. Are they enemy?"
"Affirmative. They have
us cut off from Topside," I responded.
"Well, we'll soon take
care of that," was his assurance.
Only when the D
Battery's 60 mm mortar battery delivered an awesome amount of fire down the
cut, where it created a carnage exploding between the concrete walls, was
the problem eliminated. Later we would find the bodies
so heaped up and mutilated that we could not get an exact body count.
We evacuated our
wounded. Pvt. Lloyd McCarter, Pfc. Benedict Schilli, Pfc. Richard Aimers,
Pfc John Albersman, Pfc. Lawrence Rainville, and one of the LMG section men,
possibly two, were wounded. All the wounded were litter cases, which gave us
some problems. S/Sgt Donald E. White from the 2nd
platoon had had moved his position on the southeast corner forward several
yards in order to better see the enemy and to control his squad.
For this act of bravery he lost his life. Pfc. Pasquale A. Ruggio,
also of 2nd platoon, was a fatality. The casualty list belied the serious
situation we had been in, and how close the Japanese had come to defeating
us.
The ground is littered
with Japanese weapons and one of our conventional 60 mm mortars. We had both
of them out there. The direct fire 60 was over with Bailey's force on Way
Hill. From left to right are Richard "Tropical" Peterson (15 years old),
Bill Calhoun, George Montoya holding a Jap 50 cal. MG, Virgil Surber, and
Burl Martin holding a Jap 50 cal, MG. All the men with me are in the mortar
platoon.
The Japanese had suffered dearly for their Bushido. The next
day, the 20th, we counted and estimated about 315 corpses, including about
200 dead along Maggot Valley. We had to use some estimates, because the Japs
had dragged many bodies into craters, and we were not about to remove them
just to count them. There ere two very large craters on Grubbs Road which
were filled to the top, as well as several small ones. There were 70 bodies
in between our east defenses and the crater, about 30 down in the railroad
cut, and 15 in the crater adjoining the cut. Bill Bailey estimated that his
force on Way Hill had accounted for 135 more.
We
destroyed or captured at least 13 machine guns. We
destroyed a HMG (Schilli's the afternoon of the 18th at the wooded knoll, we
brought six 50 cal HMG's from the valley to the top of the hill along with
five 30 cal LMG's ( three Lewis type and two Nambus) and one Nambu was
destroyed under the trolley cars. In addition there was
a probable. Jack Mara tells me of a machine gun located
up on Way Hill behind the trolley cars some distance.
This gun opened up on us during the night. Qur LMG's
soon silenced this gun. We did not get up there so we
did not know if the gun was still there.
In addition to John Bartlett
and Perry Bandt bringing up guns, some of the mortar platoon brought up
guns. It took two men to carry the HMG's.
The Japs tied wire or cloths around the barrel near the muzzle so the
man in front would have something to carry the gun by. I
have no memory of how we disposed of these guns. We
probably carried the LMG's with us, but I doubt if we carried the HMG's.
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Our platoon had
prevailed against a multitude of attackers in exchange for relatively few
casualties on our side. This was due to several factors. Firstly, we held a
formidable position. Secondly, our men were placed to take the best
advantage
of their position. In
the face of an overall laxness, Bill Bailey had
exercised great foresight in taking precautions, seeing
that both strong points were adequately manned and supplied with extra
ammunition. Fourthly, we had to
thank the mindset of the Japanese officers, who simply failed to comprehend
that the principles of Bushido were no substitute for the principles of a
good offensive action. Their staggering incompetence to the task still
stupefies me, and the waste of the duteous servitude of their lower ranks
appalls even all these years later. Fifthly, the �lan of
the U.S. paratrooper, as finely attuned to the necessities of close combat
as our years in training had been able to make us � the best! " |
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