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e. Jump Control:
A control plane was on station above the drop zones. This plane employed
voice radio in the clear with the troop carriers and was charged with
the missions of correcting the line of flight and/or altering the count
of the jump masters based on observations of sticks already dropped. The
"Go" point for each field had been preselected as a distinct ground
feature and pilots, co-pilots, jump masters, and other personnel
carefully instructed. The procedure to be followed in each troop carrier
was:
(1)
Red
light by pilot five minutes before arrival at "GO" point.
(2)
Green light by pilot at �Go� point
(3)
Jump
masters to count from 4 to 8 counts from �Go� point and take out the
stick.
(4)
Sticks to be limited to from 6 to 8 men maximum.
The hazardous
nature of the drop. and the casualty expectancy for this phase alone was
common knowledge, yet only one refusal occurred. This was on the first
pass and turned out to be judgment and not fear, "I want to be in the
fight, not on the rocks." The attitude and degree of mental conditioning
achieved by this unit is worthy of note.
f. Amphibious
Assault: As an integrated and coordinated part of the assault on
CORREGIDOR was to be an amphibious lancing at SAN JOSE beach by the 3d
Battalion 34th Infantry, This landing was scheduled for 1030 16
February. Its purpose was to contain and destroy enemy forces on the
TAIL and in the MALINTA HILL area, secure a beach head for amphibious
supply and. evacuation, and assist the 503d in establishing road
communications between the beach and TOPSIDE. Plans for the ensuing
ground action could not be precise, inasmuch as the conduct of the fight
would be materially influenced by enemy strength, disposition, and
reaction. The mission was simply to seize CORREGIDOR and destroy the
enemy force:
8. Execution:
In the early dawn of 16 February, two widely separated forces, one at
SAN JOSE, MINDORO, the other at MARIVELES, LUZON, were engaged in the
final preparations for the assault. The amphibious element, embarked in
LCM's, was under way at an early hour, due at SAN JOSE BEACH,
CORREGIDOR, at 1030. The 503d, completing emplaning for take-off at SAN
JOSE, MINDORO, was to begin the drop on TOPSIDE at 0830. Both elements
met this schedule exactly.
a. Aerial
Assault: Two USAFFE Board observers in the persons of Lt. Colonel
ROBERT ALEXANDER, CE (Prcht), and Major WAYNE O. OSMUNDSON, Sig; C,
emplaned in C-47 No. 31 of the first lift. Lt. Colonel ALEXANDER dropped
from this plane, landing at a point just east of the ruins of the
swimming pool. Major OSMUNDSON, not a parachutist, had the mission of
observing the drop only and returned to MINDORO with the plane.
The drop proceeded
on schedule. The element of luck, very evident throughout the operation
was working in our favor. The enemy was not present in any strength on
TOPSIDE and was not organized for counter attack.
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Drop casualties,
previously estimated at 20%, ran 10.7% as follows:
Total
personnel making jump |
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2065 |
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Injured on
landing |
203 |
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Killed; chute
malfunction |
3 |
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Killed, striking
buildings |
2 |
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Killed by enemy
just prior to or on landing |
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Actual
casualties: killed, injured or wounded, and missing |
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222 |
Of
the total number of men who dropped over the cliffs, nine made their way
to the beach and were taken off by naval craft, making the actual loss
on the jump 11.2%. 180 of the jump casualties had to be evacuated.
Twenty odd of the men incurring injuries from the jump stayed in action
for a day or more before being hospitalized. In addition, the troop
carriers had been taken under fire upon approach to the drop zones and
some men hit by missiles or fragments. Nevertheless, all made the jump
and engaged in the ground action.
Attached personnel included 10
officers and 33 enlisted men of a JASCO, a SAP, and some combat
photographers. Of this group 6 were making their first parachute jump.
It is noteworthy that, of this 6, only one man was slightly injured in
the jump.
In any airborne operation the
principle of maximum force on the ground in minimum time is recognized
as basic. Violation of this principle was forced by condition that
obtained as it was not until 0945 that the last stick of the first lift
was on the ground and in action, with drop zones secured. About 750 of a
total of 1000 officers and men in the first lift were initially
effective, approximately 75% of the jump casualties suffered were in
this lift. In addition, many men were engaged in the recovery of
equipment preparatory to entering combat. Thus, for 4 hours or more,
until the second lift was in, this Battalion CT sat in the center of
3000 foe. However, lack of reaction soon made it evident that the
surprise had been complete and that the confused enemy had lost any
chance to inflict heavy losses and that the confused enemy had lost any
chance to inflict heavy losses that he may have initially possessed.
By 1430 on the 16th the second lift
was in and on the ground. (See Overlay 4). By this time it was evident
that a further delay of a few hours or even a day in the arrival of the
third lift would in no way endanger the operation and it was therefore
decided to avoid further drop casualties by air landing the third lift
at SAN MARCELLINO and to employ truck and landing craft movement via
SUBIC BAY to SOUTH DOCK, CORREGIDOR. The third lift flew over CORREGIDOR
and dropped equipment bundles on �A� field, the personnel eventually
joining on TOPSIDE at 1100 18 February.
b. Amphibious
Assault: It was assumed prior to the amphibious assault on the SOUTH
DOCK area that stiff resistance would be encountered at this point. This
did not prove to be the case and the troops landed easily and, within 30
minutes, held the crest of MALINTA HILL in sufficient strength to ensure
its retention. Some loss of vehicles ensued from contact with land mines
in the beach area, resulting in congestion which was cleared later.
Immediately upon securing MALINTA HILL the systematic reduction of enemy
positions and the destruction of his forces was initiated, with greatest
attention being given to a link up with the forces on TOPSIDE.
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9. The Ground Action:
a. 503d RCT:
The plan of initial action to be taken upon landing was drawn with great
attention to detail. Each rifle squad was assigned an objective and
given the mission of seizing this objective and organizing it for
defense. These objectives were selected with a view to establishing the
initial perimeter on the 500 foot contour line. (See map and Overlay 1)
The organization of the perimeter was assigned to "G", "H", and "I"
Companies while the mop�up of the interior of the perimeter was
given to the Headquarters Company 503d, Headquarters Company 3d
Battalion 503d, and 161st Engineer Com�pany, all arriving in the first
lift. The detachment, Headquarters Company 503d and the Engineer Company
operated in the northern portion and barracks area while the
Headquarters Company 3d Battalion 503d cleaned out the southern portion
of the perimeter. This mission had been effectively completed by 1100 on
the 16th and the drop zone area was reasonably free of enemy fire by
this time.
Coincident with
the clearing of the perimeter was the positioning of .50 cal HMG'$ and a
75mm Howitzer to give fire support to the landing to be made at SOUTH
DOCK, SAN JOSE, at 1030. These positions, situated in the building area
at the east end of "B" field, were secured and occupied by 1000. By this
time two .50 cal HMG's were in position and, by 1100, these guns had
been supplemented by one 75mm Howitzer.
The arrival of the
second lift found all initial objectives secured and, as soon as the 2d
Battalion had assembled, the next phase of the ground action was begun.
This consisted of the take over by 2d Battalion units of the initial
objectives and the movement of the 3d Battalion to key terrain features
covering the route to the SOUTH DOCK area. (See Overlay 4) "H" Company,
having encountered no opposition in their zone of action, killed three
sentries in the main barracks and energetica1ly pushed a platoon on to
the knob 700 yards south and a little east of BATTERY POINT. This
terrain feature was secured by 1000 with the capture of a prepared enemy
position thereon, taken in reverse. By 1500 "G" and "I" Companies were
in position at the old American AA emplacement area about 500 yards west
and north of SOUTH DOCK. This latter move gave control of the routes
from BOTTOMSIDE to TOPSIDE. During this phase of the operation occurred
an incident which added to the already complete confusion of the enemy.
Captain ITAGAKI, IJN, commanding the Japanese forces on CORREGIDOR,
having been informed of the approaching amphibious assault, went to an
OP near BREAKWATER POINT. A group of from 25 to 30 paratroopers who had
been carried over the cliff assembled in this area. In the ensuing
skirmish the Jap commander was killed.
By sundown on the
16th, the situation was as shown on Overlay 6. It had been decided that
"G" Company could effectively maintain control of the route to
BOTTOMSIDE and that the main Jap strength lay south and west of the
perimeter. "I" Company was brought inside the perimeter, preparatory to
employment in aggressive action the following day, while "H" Company
established a covering perimeter in the Infantry Barracks area. The plan
for the first day of operation had been well executed. Artillery was in
position (See Overlay 5) and communications within the command and with
higher headquarters were in full operation.
The casualty list
for the
day had been heavy but was half of
that which had been anticipated. It was now fully evident that
the Jap had been completely surprised and disorganized and that, while
he might attempt a coordinated counter-attack in time, the success of
our operation was assured.
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