5

 

e. Jump Control: A control plane was on station above the drop zones. This plane employed voice radio in the clear with the troop carriers and was charged with the missions of correcting the line of flight and/or altering the count of the jump masters based on observations of sticks already dropped. The "Go" point for each field had been preselected as a distinct ground feature and pilots, co-pilots, jump masters, and other personnel carefully instructed. The procedure to be followed in each troop carrier was: 

(1)  Red light by pilot five minutes before arrival at "GO" point.

(2)  Green light by pilot at �Go� point

(3)  Jump masters to count from 4 to 8 counts from �Go� point and take out the stick.

(4)  Sticks to be limited to from 6 to 8 men maximum. 

The hazardous nature of the drop. and the casualty expectancy for this phase alone was common knowledge, yet only one refusal occurred. This was on the first pass and turned out to be judgment and not fear, "I want to be in the fight, not on the rocks." The attitude and degree of mental conditioning achieved by this unit is worthy of note. 

f. Amphibious Assault: As an integrated and coordinated part of the assault on CORREGIDOR was to be an amphibious lancing at SAN JOSE beach by the 3d Battalion 34th Infantry, This landing was scheduled for 1030 16 February. Its purpose was to contain and destroy enemy forces on the TAIL and in the MALINTA HILL area, secure a beach head for amphibious supply and. evacuation, and assist the 503d in establishing road communications between the beach and TOPSIDE. Plans for the ensuing ground action could not be precise, inasmuch as the conduct of the fight would be materially influenced by enemy strength, disposition, and reaction. The mission was simply to seize CORREGIDOR and destroy the enemy force: 

8. Execution: In the early dawn of 16 February, two widely separated forces, one at SAN JOSE, MINDORO, the other at MARIVELES, LUZON, were engaged in the final preparations for the assault. The amphibious element, embarked in LCM's, was under way at an early hour, due at SAN JOSE BEACH, CORREGIDOR, at 1030. The 503d, completing emplaning for take-off at SAN JOSE, MINDORO, was to begin the drop on TOPSIDE at 0830. Both elements met this schedule exactly. 

a. Aerial Assault: Two USAFFE Board observers in the persons of Lt. Colonel ROBERT ALEXANDER, CE (Prcht), and Major WAYNE O. OSMUNDSON, Sig; C, emplaned in C-47 No. 31 of the first lift. Lt. Colonel ALEXANDER dropped from this plane, landing at a point just east of the ruins of the swimming pool.  Major OSMUNDSON, not a parachutist, had the mission of observing the drop only and returned to MINDORO with the plane. 

The drop proceeded on schedule. The element of luck, very evident throughout the operation was working in our favor. The enemy was not present in any strength on TOPSIDE and was not organized for counter attack.
 

 

6

 

Drop casualties, previously estimated at 20%, ran 10.7% as follows:
 

         Total personnel making jump

 

2065

 

 

 

 

 

Injured on landing

203

 

 

Killed; chute malfunction

3

 

 

Killed, striking buildings

2

 

 

Killed by enemy just prior to or on landing

 

 

 

Actual casualties: killed, injured or wounded, and missing

 


 222

 Of the total number of men who dropped over the cliffs, nine made their way to the beach and were taken off by naval craft, making the actual loss on the jump 11.2%. 180 of the jump casualties had to be evacuated. Twenty odd of the men incurring injuries from the jump stayed in action for a day or more before being hospitalized. In addition, the troop carriers had been taken under fire upon approach to the drop zones and some men hit by missiles or fragments.  Nevertheless, all made the jump and engaged in the ground action.

Attached personnel included 10 officers and 33 enlisted men of a JASCO, a SAP, and some combat photographers. Of this group 6 were making their first parachute jump. It is noteworthy that, of this 6, only one man was slightly injured in the jump.

In any airborne operation the principle of maximum force on the ground in minimum time is recognized as basic. Violation of this principle was forced by condition that obtained as it was not until 0945 that the last stick of the first lift was on the ground and in action, with drop zones secured. About 750 of a total of 1000 officers and men in the first lift were initially effective, approximately 75% of the jump casualties suffered were in this lift. In addition, many men were engaged in the recovery of equipment preparatory to entering combat. Thus, for 4 hours or more, until the second lift was in, this Battalion CT sat in the center of 3000 foe. However, lack of reaction soon made it evident that the surprise had been complete and that the confused enemy had lost any chance to inflict heavy losses and that the confused enemy had lost any chance to inflict heavy losses that he may have initially possessed.

By 1430 on the 16th the second lift was in and on the ground. (See Overlay 4). By this time it was evident that a further delay of a few hours or even a day in the arrival of the third lift would in no way endanger the operation and it was therefore decided to avoid further drop casualties by air landing the third lift at SAN MARCELLINO and to employ truck and landing craft movement via SUBIC BAY to SOUTH DOCK, CORREGIDOR. The third lift flew over CORREGIDOR and dropped equipment bundles on �A� field, the personnel eventually joining on TOPSIDE at 1100 18 February.

b. Amphibious Assault: It was assumed prior to the amphibious assault on the SOUTH DOCK area that stiff resistance would be encountered at this point. This did not prove to be the case and the troops landed easily and, within 30 minutes, held the crest of MALINTA HILL in sufficient strength to ensure its retention. Some loss of vehicles ensued from contact with land mines in the beach area, resulting in congestion which was cleared later. Immediately upon securing MALINTA HILL the systematic reduction of enemy positions and the destruction of his forces was initiated, with greatest attention being given to a link up with the forces on TOPSIDE.

 

 

 

7

 

9. The Ground Action:

a.  503d RCT: The plan of initial action to be taken upon landing was drawn with great attention to detail. Each rifle squad was assigned an objective and given the mission of seizing this objective and organizing it for defense. These objectives were selected with a view to establishing the initial perimeter on the 500 foot contour line. (See map and Overlay 1) The organization of the perimeter was assigned to "G", "H", and "I" Companies while the mop�up of the interior of the perimeter was given to the Headquarters Company 503d, Headquarters Company 3d Battalion 503d, and 161st Engineer Com�pany, all arriving in the first lift. The detachment, Headquarters Company 503d and the Engineer Company operated in the northern portion and barracks area while the Headquarters Company 3d Battalion 503d cleaned out the southern portion of the perimeter. This mission had been effectively completed by 1100 on the 16th and the drop zone area was reasonably free of enemy fire by this time.

Coincident with the clearing of the perimeter was the positioning of .50 cal HMG'$ and a 75mm Howitzer to give fire support to the landing to be made at SOUTH DOCK, SAN JOSE, at 1030. These positions, situated in the building area at the east end of "B" field, were secured and occupied by 1000. By this time two .50 cal HMG's were in position and, by 1100, these guns had been supplemented by one 75mm Howitzer.

The arrival of the second lift found all initial objectives secured and, as soon as the 2d Battalion had assembled, the next phase of the ground action was begun. This consisted of the take over by 2d Battalion units of the initial objectives and the movement of the 3d Battalion to key terrain features covering the route to the SOUTH DOCK area. (See Overlay 4) "H" Company, having encountered no opposition in their zone of action, killed three sentries in the main barracks and energetica1ly pushed a platoon on to the knob 700 yards south and a little east of BATTERY POINT. This terrain feature was secured by 1000 with the capture of a prepared enemy position thereon, taken in reverse. By 1500 "G" and "I" Companies were in position at the old American AA emplacement area about 500 yards west and north of SOUTH DOCK. This latter move gave control of the routes from BOTTOMSIDE to TOPSIDE. During this phase of the operation occurred an incident which added to the already complete confusion of the enemy. Captain ITAGAKI, IJN, commanding the Japanese forces on CORREGIDOR, having been informed of the approaching amphibious assault, went to an OP near BREAKWATER POINT. A group of from 25 to 30 paratroopers who had been carried over the cliff assembled in this area. In the ensuing skirmish the Jap commander was killed.

By sundown on the 16th, the situation was as shown on Overlay 6. It had been decided that "G" Company could effectively maintain control of the route to BOTTOMSIDE and that the main Jap strength lay south and west of the perimeter. "I" Company was brought inside the perimeter, preparatory to employment in aggressive action the following day, while "H" Company established a covering perimeter in the Infantry Barracks area. The plan for the first day of operation had been well executed. Artillery was in position (See Overlay 5) and communications within the command and with higher headquarters were in full operation.

The casualty list for the day had been heavy but was half of that which had been anticipated. It was now fully evident that the Jap had been completely surprised and disorganized and that, while he might attempt a coordinated counter-attack in time, the success of our operation was assured.