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503d P.R.C.T.
16
February 1945
WE'RE STILL
UNDER
CONSTRUCTION |
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Whereas each rifle company was assigned six planes, the larger battalion headquarters and headquarters company required nine planes. In order to balance the attacks on each jump zone, five of the planes carrying headquarters company and one plane carrying headquarters and demolitions totaling six planes jumped on "A" Field. The remainder of headquarters company in the other three planes jumped on "B" Field. Each of the planes assigned to the battalion carried two bundles to be shoved out on the first and second passes. The last three planes of F company (numbers 25, 26 and 27) were in the third flight.
Also in the third flight were four planes carrying part of regimental headquarters company and four planes carrying service company. There was no separation in the columns, i.e., the trail of planes was uninterrupted.
The 462d PFA in the 2nd lift all jumped on "A" Field, just as they did in the first lift. Four planes were assigned to the Battery D who jumped in the 2nd lift. Nine planes were assigned to Battery B, all of whom jumped in the second lift. Two planes carried the battery headquarters, who were in the second lift. Whereas the non-artillery planes in the second lift carried two bundles, each artillery plane carried nine bundles. Like E Company who also jumped on "A" Field, the 2nd Battalion HHC had many men and much equipment missing following the jump. As their journal states at this time they had only been able to recover one 8lmm mortar. Some of the light machine guns were probably missing, as well.
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It is well here to pause and clear up the jumpmaster question. In the 3rd battalion it was important that the officers be on the ground quickly in order to organize the defenses. Since the 2nd Battalion was jumping into a secured area there was much more importance attached to getting the men on the field. It is known in F Company that all platoon leaders stayed in the planes and jumpmastered each stick. The company commander, Bill Bailey, did lead the first stick out in F Company's lead plane. It was a battalion order for the platoon leaders to jumpmaster, but that does not make it a certainty that the other companies did. Evidently the company commanders all jumped first. As already stated, the 2nd Battalion company executive officers did jump that morning with the 3rd Battalion acting as jumpmasters of their sticks. This was done in order for them to have the areas reconnoitred, so that the company could proceed immediately with their mission. It went very well for all, except in F Companies where the executive officer, 1st Lt. William E. "Red" LaVanchure was taken out of action by two badly sprained ankles.
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1st Lt. Donald F. Abbott, was executive officer of E Co., 2d Battalion, and the writer of the official E Co. journal. Though E Co. did not arrive until the second wave, Abbott, along with the other executive officers of 2nd Battalion, jumped in the first wave so that they would be on the ground and aware of the tactical situation when their units arrived.
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The meaning obviously is that 11 men were injured on the jump, since that is the correct figure. The 'two EM killed' were Pfc. Albert Thomas and Pfc. Glenn Handlon, who were killed in an attempt to free themselves from Wheeler Battery, not capture it. This, written by their own company who certainly knew their names, and should have recorded the circumstances better, illustrates that even the official histories are not gospel. How easily legends become history.