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20 April 1945


No. 12
191600 April 45
to
201600 April 45 |
"a. Infantry: During the night 19-20 the
enemy subjected our forward elements to mortar fire killing one and
wounding three. An infiltration attempt cost him 3 KIA. An airstrike at
200730 was relatively ineffective as five of six bombs failed to
detonate; the sixth did fall and explode in the target area, enemy dug
in positions (40.9-97.3). In its forward effort
our leading elements met with fierce machine gun, mortar, and rifle
fire. This resistance was continuing as the period closed. "E" Co.
releived from RCT left flank by "H" Co., in turn replacing "D" Co in the
forward central position, A 3d Bn OP discovered a cave in the vicinity
(37.7-96.4) in front of 185th Inf. sector. 105mm fire from M-7's were
brought to bear and several direct hits were scored. This position will
be kept under harassing fire during the night 20-21. "H" Co.,
patrolling the RCT right flank reported nil contact after having
searched the NW-SE ridge in the vicinity (37.6-02.5). Other 3d Bn.
patrols searching adjoining ridges to the route of advance reported nil
contact. 3d B^., 74th G-F, patrolling the NW-SE ridge (36.5-01.4)
reported nil contact."
Results: "The known results of our operations for the period was
continued heavy pressure against the strongly held and entrenched enemy
MLR."
"CASUALTIES:
a. Our Casualties:
(1)
For the period: 8 KIA,
12 WIA
(2) To date: 39 KIA, 105 WIA
b. Enemy Known Casualties:
(1) For the period: 3 KIA
(2) To date: 89 KIA, 0 POW"
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0100 |
During the nite, the enemt attempted infiltration of F Co.
perimeter. We suffered one KIA & ooe WIA, 2 enemy KIA. |
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0800 |
Air strike by six Corsairs. |
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10OO |
E co joins battalion. G Co reverts back to #d Bn control,
tho they are still covering our right flank. |
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12.00 |
D Co given the mission to take the hight ground to their front. |
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1503 |
To C.O. 2d Bn. Our C.O. Nickel was just KIA. Sgd D Co. Lt
Collins now new commander "D" Co. |
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1600 |
F Co reports five enemy arty shells landed in their area beleived
to be 90mm. 1630 E Co moved out to take position on rt. flank of D Co.
Lt Corder in command. Capt Hill duty to Sk. Hosp. |
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1700 |
Lt David, Hq Co LMG Plt Ldr killed in action, body cannot be
recovered at this time |
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1800 |
'Bn area under small arms fire beleived to be spent missies. |
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3d platoon under
Lt. Watkins, attacked and secured ridge to left front of company. No resistance encountered but
intense mortar fire
was received killing platoon sgt. Rabe, wounding Lt. Preston in the leg,
and Pvt Ladig suffered shell shock. The platoon was forced to withdraw.
At 1330 the 1st Platoon,
under Lt Nikle and the platoon leader Lt. Mara secured the hill and
advanced to the next hill on the
right front. Only mild resistance was encountered on the assault but as
soon as the hill was secured
the enemy countered with very intensive machine gun and small arms fire from the front and both flanks supplemented by accurate mortar fire.
A mortar shell killed LT. Nickle, amputated T/4 Upchurch's leg causing
him to bleed to death, and slightly wounding Pfc. McLaughlin. Pfc
Huerter was lightly wounded in a few minutes by mortar fragments, and
Lt. David, in command of attached MG platoon, was killed by an enemy
sniper. Lt David's body was on the forward slope in an exposed position
and Pfc Schupp and Pfc. Fisher were wounded by enemy fire while trying
to recover the body. Pvt. Lapidus received a bullet wound in the neck
causing his death two days later. At 1400 the 2nd platoon joined the
1st; one squad under Sgt. Minor aided in securing the ridge acid
the other two squads under Sgts. Evleth and Stowe acted as litter
bearers. Lt Collins assumed command
of the Co.
At 1430 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the 1st to strengthen up the position. Enemy mortar fire with sporadic machine gun
and
small arms fire continued throughout the day. At 1700 one platoon of "E"
Co advanced to forward position as support of "D" Co. but was repulsed
by hand grenades and small arms fire. At 1800 Pfc. Lovgren was wounded
in the shoulder by enemy sniper fire. At 2100 in an unsuccessful attack
on a machine gun position one enemy was killed. Mortar fire throughout
the night." |
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The entire Co. moved out at 0900 hr to rejoin the B.N. which releived the 3rd Bn 4-19. At 1500 hr. joined Dog
Co. Thwlst platt moved o')t to take Hill 458 on Dog Co's left flank.
Hill was taken, four men W.I.A. 1st Putt withdrew to rear of D Co.and
set up perimeter. Rest of Co. took
up
positions along ridge 300 yds west of Hill 458. 14 NIP's counted KIA. 3
Prob. |
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No entry |
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The 2d Battalion having replaced the 3d Battalion was now moving
forward. "E"
Company's left flank was on Tokaido road.
"D" Company was on "E" Company's
right flank. "F" Company was
moved north of Tokaido road to prepare to attack a fortified position
commanding two ridges which ran parallel to the ridge which Tokaido Road
followed.
The northern slope of the most northern ridge dropped off into the chasm
of the Mulago River. One of the companies of the 3d Battalion had been
stopped cold there. Another company had been moved over to make the
attack. The officers and N.C.O.'s of this company ware gathered with
the company commander behind a forward knoll near the line of departure
for a briefing. This was on the most northern ridge. Suddenly a shell
burst among the group, killing several and wounding several. "F" Company
was moved over to position during the latter part of the afternoon of
the 20th and prepared to attack the next morning. A narrow dirt road
with deep ditches on the sides climbed up to the top of the ridge at an
angle. Near the top of the hill where the round exploded the arm of an
American soldier, still covered with a fatigue jacket sleeve, lay in the
ditch.
"F" Company was to attack along the two parallel ridges and seize a
fortified defensive line on a ridge formed by the convergence of the
two east-west ridges, and this ridge ran more north-south. Thus the
ridge "F" Company was to attack was higher in elevation and at an almost
right angle to the line of approach. This was one excellent defensive
position, but it was typical of the entire enemy defensive positions,
i.e., the enemy held the higher elevations and dominated the line of
approach. A flanking movement around the left was impossible because of
the cliffs as already explained. We decided to attack with three
platoons abreast. The mid platoon, under Lt. Clark, was to attack along
the crest of the southern ridge. The 1st platoon, under Lt. Mathis, was
to attack along the crest of the northern ridge. The 3d platoon, under
Lt. Fennell, was to attack up the draw between Tokaido Road ridge and the
southern ridge. This draw
was chosen because there was more vegetation and cover, and there was a
chance that they could flank the southern end of the enemy held ridge. Bill Calhoun,
accompanied the 1st platoon, which was
in the middle of the attack, and attached the flat trajectory mortar
squad (under Pfc. Henry McCrory as the squad leader) to the 1st platoon. The
other two 60mm mortars were left in position at our line of departure. They
had no ammunition, but it was hoped
that might become available.
[Note: This was the same conditions of 9
April when our mortar platoon was left behind because there was no
ammunition. What a difference it would have made had we had mortars and
ammunition when we were pinned
down out in the field at Sinaypanan. I stated my views of the 8th
Army previously, so I will not bore you with redundancy..)
Our other attachments were two artillery sections, one .50 caliber
machine gun from D Battery, 462d P.F.A. Bn. This was
emplaced at the line
of departure to be used for direct fire support if the opportunity
arose.
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