The artillery
round that killed Virgil Surber was fired early that morning while
the men were heating their 10 in 1 rations. The mortar platoon
was about 40-50 yards
from the company C.P. They were down the ridge and below us, and I could
see them plainly The round burst in the air, and there seemed to be no
unusual activity such as yelling "medic". As a consequence I was stunned
to learn that Surber was dying. Just one single air burst that seemed so
insignificant.
Soon after this the 1st platoon reported a Jap digging a hole at a long
distance to , their front. Their M-1 did not disturb him, and they
wanted the sniper rifle - the Springfied 03-A3 with telescope. I had
been carrying the rifle, since my weapon did not matter much. I took the
rifle to them along with some Blue Goose ammunition. (These were
incendiary bullets used by the air corps, specifically the Australian
Beaufighters, which still numbered 30 caliber machine guns in
their armament. These bullets were excellent to spot the point of impact
because you could see
a
point of flame there.
We
set the scope at zero windage and 1000 yards range. Bill McDonald was
selected to be the shooter. The Jap had his back to us and was about
knee deep in the hole he was digging. He would straighten up throwing
the dirt over his shoulder and then bend forward away from us as he dug
in with his shovel. Bill fired and the Blue Goose flamed a couple of
inches above where the Jap's suspenders crossed. The body lay there for
days and could be seen from the road after it was extended up into that
area. The body lay on the side of the hill with the feet still in the
hole, indicating our enemy had died instantly.
We received orders to move across the road to the south side. AA guns
were being emplaced in forward positions to give us direct fire support.
A quad fifty mounted on a trailer (four .50 caliber machine guns) and a
90mm were attached to our battalion. The 90 was emplaced on a high
prominence on the south side of the
road.
A revetment consisting of several rows of sand bags was built around the
gun. This gun faced a
deep valley
with the ridges running to the southeast. We moved down into this
valley and up on to two parallel
ridges to the southeast of the gun, about three hundred yards away.
Tokaido road had been completed to the gun, and the trail continued on
along the north side of the north ridge of the two parallel ridges we
were occupying. We set
up a perimeter defense here.
That afternoon
I was called to report to the battalion command post. It was located
near the 90mm gun. "F" Company was given the mission of taking the high
ground. The ridges led to some 400-500 yards to our front. We were to
dig in immediately upon seizing the objective, preparing to repel a
counterattack. The position was a very strong defensive position. The
armored vehicles could not be used in this rugged terrain, so we would
have strong artillery and mortar support. A battalion of corps
artillery, 155mm rifles (Long Toms), would be used to support us along
with 4.2 mortars, battalion 81mm mortars, and our own 60mm mortars would
be take part in the supporting fires. This was the first time we would
have such support. Even so, we knew how deep the Japs dug in, so we were
not expect-miracles. I personally would have much rather had an M-7, but
that was out.
After being
briefed and receiving my orders I took the shortest route back to the
company, which was down the trail into the valley, up the valley
crossing under the 90mm (perhaps 100 feet above), and on to the ridge
where our C.P. was located. Just as I got in front of the 90, it
fired. Although it was far above me the concussion almost knocked me to
my knees. I would never walk in front of one of those things again.
About this
time the mystery of the Jap dual purpose gun was solved. The Jap crew
made the fatal error of firing at the 90, and they were only 600-700
yards away. The HE shell hit the outer wall of the revetment protecting
the 90. Aside from throwing up a lot of sand and damaging some of
the outer rows, no real damage had been
done. But someone in the 90
crew had seen the muzzle flash in the side of the hill. The 90 fired
several rounds, and
the side of the hill seemed to explode with dirt, logs and debris flying
through the air. Lying among the logs was the gun barrel on the
lower slope of the hill. Several feet were missing from the muzzle. The
remaining barrel was split and spread out like a blunderbuss. Looking
west toward the sea we could see all the way to the coconut grove,
several miles away, where Donaldson was killed 10 April. We never found
another gun in this area and felt this was the gun that had been firing
on us and the tank.
Several days
before this, while we were still a mile or so away, our artillery and
mortars had caught a resupply train of mules bringing in supplies to the
Japs. This was in a draw not far to the north of the 75mm dual purpose
gun. After we had begun our advance against the Japs every few days the
Japs would rake our front lines with intense machine gun and mortar fire
for 15 to 20 minutes. These sudden attacks would put us down deep in our
foxholes. There had to be a reason for these outbursts so during one of
the attacks, someone keet a close observation of the enemy lines. Sure
enough, a good distance to the east a mule train was spotted coming over
a ridge. In a short time our
artillery and mortars rained in on the draw into which the train was
heading. This stopped Japanese resupply. I was later told that
our troops who went into that draw found a lot of dead mules. Nothing is
mentioned in the periodic reports, so maybe it had been just us who had
thought that the Japanese efforts had been hurt.
But then, what
do front line soldiers know?
