The 1st Battalion reported that B Company maintained their objective they had seized the day before despite a great deal of sniper fire. A B Company patrol ran into the enemy with two machine guns. A and C Company patrols made no contact with tthe enemy.            The 3d Battalion reported that they were continuing their patrols on the south flank. There was not much action there.

2d Battalion report: "D" Co. found a demolished 37mm field piece ay (40.7-98.4) upon reaching that position 291500. "E" Co. located a 75mm anti-aircraft gun and two MG's during the security patrolling. There was nil activity during the night 20-30 throughout the Bn. Extensive patrolling to the right of the Bn area during the day resulted in nil enemy contact; however, several enemy postitions were located in that area."

 "RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: The probing effects of our patrols indicate the enemy is withdrawing his main force as we advance, leaving small dug-in delaying parties to delay the advance as much as possible. A few of these groups remain and fight to the death. Wire strung from strong points toward the rear indicate O.P.'s report on our progress to rear parties wgo engage in long range MG, rifle, and mortar fire and then withdraw as our artillery is brought to bear. Being deeply dug in on reverse slopes, our artillery apparently has little effect."

Straggler line established vic CP to keep natives from going forward.

Some of the country is impassable. The walls of some of the canyons are high cliffs which cannot be climbed or descended.    We had reached the lower parts of the mountains.  In getting there, we had destroyed the miles of fortifications which had faced us as we attacked along the all weather road, then the railroad, and then finally a Caribou trail known as Tokaido Road.  All this was done by a parachute combat team of two reinforced battalions (less than 2,000 men) until 24 April.

While we were doing this a 5,000 man Infantry RCT sat in their fortified positions on our right flank firing their attached corps heavy artillery along with their own division artillery into the mountains, calculating their Japanese casualties by the number of rounds they fire, and allowing us to suffered for the very lack of artillery, mortars, and ammunition they were pumping into vacant real estate.

Our RCT had even suffered from non-supply of other weapons and materiel which, we discovered, would have furnished us great assistance.  Of particular hurt to us was the denial to us of battery operated magnesium flares, which the supply chains of the larger, more powerfully fostered units never delivered or shared with us.

However, our success would not go unnoticed.

Within two weeks two-thirds of us would be moved to the right flank to do the work for the 160th RCT who was forted up on the right of the 184th. The reason only two-thirds of us were sent is that our 3d Battalion had to stay and protect the 184th. Before we get to that move there was still lots to do where we were.

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The 1st and 3d Battalions were patroling without much action.    

2d Bn: Nil activity throughout the night 30-1. Patrol activity to the south and southwest occupied all units during the day. An E. Co. patrol reported the only semblance of enemy activity. The patrol reportedly sighted eight or ten enemy in a small bivouac area vicinity (unreadable) was --(the rest is unreadable)."

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The 1st Battalion was patrolling with few  contacts made. The 3d battalion was patrolling attempting to cut the enemy off from withdrawing south, but few contacts were made because the enemy was not withdrawing toward the 185th.

2d Battalion: Nil activity throughout the night (01-02). Patrol from "D" Co. working southwest along the road to establish RCT limiting point, was fired upon the vicinity (41.05-96.2) by at least two MG's and several rifles. Mortar fire was laid on the position with results undetermined at close of the period.    "F" Co. patrolled southwest to vicinity (39.5-98.?) with nil contacts.

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: The direction of the RCT advance changed from SE to NE and extensive reconnaissance of the route to be taken later in force was made. Nil contact has been established at close of period. Reconnaissance further SE established the fact that at least part of the enemy's forces are still in that direction. our immediate strategy is to split the enemy in the area from those in the SE. A holding force of one Bn. will be maintained at the RCT limiting point (41.4-95.9).

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(1) 1st Bn: "A" and "B" Co patrols working toward MALAGO RIVER reached their objectives at (41.2-96.7) and (40.6-00.0) respectively at about 021600I with nil contacts. The "A" Co patrol reported a ford at (41.2-98.7) as having been well used. There was nil activity throughout the Bn during the night-of 02-03. "B" Co., remaining in the TAYAP area over-night, continued to patrol the MALAGO RIVER 03 May from (39.7-00.1) to (41.0-99.7) with nil contact. An "A" Co patrol exploited the draw from its position to the MALAGO RIVER (41.2-98.7) with nil contact. A "C" Co patrol penetrated the thick lantana weed to the MALAGI RIVER AT (41.4-97.1) with nil contact. "B" co was returning to the Bn area as the period closed. See overlay for positioning.

(2) 2nd Bn: A figure running toward "F" Co's position at 022230 was fired upon by "F" Co. At daylight a body of what appeared to be a half-cast Japanese 16-18 years of age, was found about 10 yds from the front line. A torn piece of white cloth tied to a branch was found near the body. It is believed the enemy was attempting to surrender. No weapons of any kind were found on or near the body. No other activity during the night. A "D" Co patrol observed 2 bonfires and heard movement in a draw vicinity (40.4-98.4) at 03120 (?) hour. Surprise mortar fire was brought to bear on the area; however, torrential rains made entry into the draw impossible for investigation as period closed. "E" Co sent a platoon to (40.996.5) for the purpose of establishing a strong point and to patrol to the MALAGO RIVER. Nil contact to close of period. As the 02 period closed mortar fire was being placed in vicinity (40.0-96.1). An 'F" Co patrol sent to determine the results saw five enemy run from the area. Two were killed but the others escaped in the heavy underbrush. Reconnaissance of the position showed abandoned foxholes only.

(3) 3d Bn: Under cover of darkness "G" Co. moved to (38.5-00.1) in an attempt to surprise any enemy making an early morning move in the MALAGO RIVER area. There was enemy activity in the area during the night 02-03. "G" Co patrolled the MALAGO RIVER area in vicinity (40.4-99.8) without contact. An "H" Co patrol to vicinity of (39.3-00.5) received MG and knee mortar fire at 031100, One on our troops was slightly injured. Results of mortar fire laid on position had not been reported at end of period. Another "H" Co patrol to vicinity (38.8-03.0) made nil contact. An "I" Co patrol to vic­inity (37.4-00.5) reported nil contact."

"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Extensive patrolling with nil contact in The TAYAP area. Contact four hundred yards to the SE of our front lined indicate continuing withdrawing of enemy's main force leaving delaying parties along our route of advance."
 

The battalion S-3 and the RCT S-3 account of the Jap with the white "flag" is out of place and fictitious as any "F" Company man who was up there that night will tell you.  As stated before, the incident of the 'white flag' occurred   the night that Iverson and Workman  were killed, namely the night of 29 April. "F" Company occupied the narrow ridge the night of the 28th. The next night the Jap came running down the ridge. The next morning we examined the body of the body in a Jap uniform searching for papers as the SOP. We then threw the body down the steep slope to our front where it disappeared into the under-growth - another SOP. Battalion got the account from us and recorded it later and imperfectly, using their imagination to send an account to regiment where the granddaddies of imagination resided.

Our casualties for yesterday were 3 KIA & 1 WIA making our total to date 43 KIA & 82 WIA. F Co. 3d Plt reports [Note: This was the only rifle platoon in "F" Company which was not up on the ridge where the incident of the 29th happened.] firing at an object during the nite, which the(y) found this morning to be a Jap with a white flag.

Bn strength by companies

At 1300 one squad of the 3rd platoon under Pfc. Richard reconnoitered to the south approximately 300 yds. The patrol discovered two fresh cooking fires but could not locate any enemy. Heavy rains cut radio communications and the patrol returned at 1500. The 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins moved out to the same area but rains prevented the patrol from descending the slippery trail so that the platoon returned at 1630. no enemy contacted.

For several days "F" Company had been maintaining an outpost, previously described, a mile or so up in the forest. The 1st platoon was manning this outpost with one section on LMG's attached. On the 3rd we sent the 2nd platoon up to relieve them along with the other section of LMG's. About the time the relief force arrived on top of the hill a large Jap force attacked from the southeast side of the hill employing a number of automatic weapons, a large volume of rifle fire, and heavy mortar shelling. Our force answered with fierce fire power. After about twenty minutes the Japs withdrew. The 1st platoon returned , and the 2nd platoon with their attached machine gun section stayed. Caldron from the 1st platoon was killed, and Martin from the 2nd platoon soon died of his wounds. Bandt from the 1st platoon and Smith from the 2d platoon were wounded. I believe there were casualties in the machine gun platoon. The battalion S-3 journal is incorrect in the number killed, so their wounded number may be incorrect.

 Although the S-3 journal made no reference to the allocation of replacement into "F" Company, Jose Caldron was in the assignment of replacements on 28 April.   There is more about this unfortunate young paratrooper who was to spend less than one week with his new company. The morning of the 3rd, after the 2nd platoon had left, a cablegram came in addressed to him informing him that his wife had given birth to a baby boy. The wife and baby were doing fine. We didn't know this boy, but it was a very sad group of us who viewed this message after we found out the young father was dead. During the period I commanded the company I wrote the letters of condolence to the next of kin. This was one of the most unpleasant tasks I ever had the responsibility to perform. The letter to Jose Caldron's wife still haunts me.

 The outpost was out of radio contact, so these men were cut off from support. I requested that in the face of such strong enemy activity the men be brought in. This was refused, and I was told that there were no strong enemy forces left in this area, that the enemy was withdrawing and that there were only small delaying parties were left in our sector.

 The Marine Corps' Corsairs had been supporting us with air strikes. We liked their support because they were specialist in ground support. They came in under guidance of their ground observer and, if they were off target, were careful to get in the proper place before they made their firing and bombing runs. We did receive some P-38 support. These "hot fighter pilots" seemed to resent  our ground support missions. They came in without caution, flew their mission without regard for the proper target, and left. A good example of this was a strike they made while "F" Company was holding the high ridge. The liaison team came up to the ridge, and I joined them. The team consisted of a lieutenant and a radio team of two men. We got situated in a couple of deep foxholes (since the night of the mortar shelling, the foxholes were plenty deep), because the lieutenant said we'd better, because P-38's were making the strike. He had a low opinion of their ground support work. Sure enough, soon we saw a P-38 coming straight at our ridge. The lieutenant was on the radio telling the flight leader that he was lined up on our positions. Suddenly the fifties in the nose of the plane started firing and he dropped his bomb aiming at us. Five planes followed him, strafing and bombing our lines despite the fact that the liaison officer was screaming to them to pullup, that they were on their own troops. They then flew on their way back to Mindoro, with the ground observer telling them in the most profane language he could muster what they were. Fortunately, although they raked is good, we had no casualties, thanks to our deep foxholes.

 A quad 50 caliber machine gun unit was brought up to our position and strafed some of the forest to our front. The destruction of these four machine guns was awesome. They literally seemed to eat up the trees. I wished we had one of the AA units at our outpost, but it was a towed unit and had to have a road to travel on.

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