27 May - 2 June 1945

2d Bn, 503d PARACHUTE INFANTRY

for the period

27 MAY - 2 JUNE 1945

◄ MAY 1945 ►
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31	1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9

27 May 1945


No. 47 261600 May 45 to 271500 May 45	"3. OUR OPERATIONS: a. Infantry: 1) 1st Bn: Nil activity night of 26=27. "B" & "C" Co's began an assault of the crest of HILL 3355 and secured the objective (16.05-10.7). Enemy resistance consisted of several MG's, one knee mortar and an unknown number of rifles. The enemy did not make a determined defense of the HILL, however, but contented himself with a delaying action, withdrawing as our troops advanced. "A" Co advanced behind "B" and "C" Co's and "A" Co replaced "C" on the crest. 2) 2d Bn: Nil activity night of 26-27. "D" Co displacing forward to (15.01-10.95) without contact. "E" Co engaged an estimated 25 enemy using 3 MG's, one knee mortar and rifles vicinity (16.7-11.15). fight eleven enemy were known to have been killed and four wounded during the engagement. "F" Co. displaced to vicinity 15.75-11.0) without contact. (3) 3d Bn: Completed its move from the PATOG area and was in bivouac 261630. Nil activity night 26-27. The Bn was given the mission of securing the supply route to the forward elements; disposition of units as shown on overlay. Nil contact during the period. b. Artillery: The artillery provided harrassing fire throughout the period-in addit�ion to fifteen times on target and two support missions. 730 rounds were fired by the battalion. c. Engineers: Construction and maintenance of supply route. the engineers are build�ing hand rails up the 70-80 degree inclines over which the supplies must be carried. 4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: HILL 3355 was seized and secured. Sufficient troops have gained ground to exploit the intervening ridge N to HILL 4055 and the addition of our 3d Bn insures protection of our supply lines. 5. INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR 28 MAY: 1st Bn to push toward the reported enemy hospital area vicinity (16.5-10.4). 2d Bn to seize ridges between HILLS 3355 and 4055. 3d Bn will safeguard the supply route with strong points and lateral patrols."
0630	Capt Taylor and advanced C.P. group moved out to take up new positions. 0900 D, E & F Co's moved out to new positions. No casualties yesterday. Fox Co reports one E-KIA at 0730I, this date.
1200	Companies now in new positions, forward C.P. located at (15.75-10.95).
1800	E Co met enemy at 1120I, engaged in fire fight. We suffered 1 KIA & 1 WIA.
	"Co. moved NE 1000 yds at 0930 and set up a perimeter 400 yds. SW of "E" Co. No enemy contacts were made."
	"5-27-45 Co. moved out at 0900 hr and moved up the trail, made contact with 1st Bn. on the high ground between Hill 4055 and_.3055. Dropped packs and moved along ridge north towards Hill 4055. At 1200 hr leading squad contacted NIPs. Fire fight until 1230 hr. Our casualties 4 men W.I.A., 1 K.I.A. Estimated 10 NIP's killed. NIP's had T.S.M.G., knee mortars and their own rifles, also two Nambu M.G.'s. We withdrew back up trail bringing wounded out. K.I.A. was impossible to get out. During night Japs infiltrated, threw grenades inside the perimeter, wounded 3 men, 1.I.A. Three NIP's K.I.A.
	"No entry.
	Finally Hill 3055 was taken. The 1st Battalion was successful. The Engineers' report in the PR above does not exaggerate the steepness of the mountainsides. In addition the rocks were covered with wet moss, which made them very slippery. Considerable grass grew between the rocks and boulders. Vines grew abundantly, but the undergrowth was not heavy. The trees were not large. Everything seemed slimy. F Company made the difficult climb on during the 27th. The 2d Battalion CP was set up right on top with the aid station housed under a canvas fly nearby. Clouds covered the top most of the day, or from about 0900 to 1000 on for the entire day. This foggy condition limited visibility. It was cold! Our wet fatigues did little to keep us warm. We wished for field jackets, but that was out of the question. Sickness had already depleted our ranks, and now this was accelerated, especially respiratory illnesses. The hot, steamy forest below were missed greatly. Old illnesses were aggravated. I had been suffering from dysentery for some time, and it really got bad up on the mountain top. In fact there were times when we were pulling ourselves up boulder by boulder in the worst places that I wondered if I could go on. I would have given a month's pay for a blanket.
Jim Bradley	"When we got back to Mindoro from Corregidor I was very sick with infectious hepatitis, so I went to the hospital in Leyte Is. I returned to Mindoro Is. but I was still suffering from malnutrition. Anyway we went to Negros Is. I was climbing a mountain to relieve some of our guys who were catching all kinds of hell. I remember the Filipino litter bearers carrying our wounded down the hill and how kind and gentle they were to our guys. I only made it a little over half way up the hill when I pooped out. I was just too weak to go further. I had temperature of 103 so they sent me to the little field hospital in Bacolod in a school building."


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28 May 1945


No. 48 271500 May45 to 281500 May 45	"3. OUR OPERATIONS: a. Infantry: 1) 1st Bn: Nil activity night 27-28. Bn activity consisted of reconnaissance patrols S & se. Only sniper fire was encountered. 2) 2d Bn; "E" & "F" Cos were subjected to mortar and grenade fire during the night 27-28. We suffered 4 wounded. Two enemy removed three booby traps and attempted to enter "E" Co's perimeter at 270330. Both were armed with rifles and grenades and both were killed. "F" Co advanced N after an artil�lery barrage and an "E" Co mortar preparation. The preparation did not neutralize the position as "F" Co encountered MG and rifle fire vicinity (15.7-11.15). ^"F" Co succeeded in forcing the enemy northward and establishing a strong point at the trail junction vicinity (15.7-11.3). This trail junction vicinity (15,7-11.3). This trail junction leads NW to HILL 4055 and N along ridge vicinity (15.7-11.3)-(15.5-12.5)." 3) 3d Bn:. The 3d Battalion was carrying out extensive patrolling, Some two and three day' patrols. The artillery fired 591 rounds during the period."
0730	E Co reports enemy activity during the nite, enemy removed booby traps. Casualties yesterday, 1 KIA- 4 WIA, all of Easy Co. In addition to our casualties, 135 EM to hosp, sick.
0830	Fox Co moved out to attack & secure higher ground to their front. 30 min arty bar-rage preceeded this assault.
1500	Fox Co completed their mission with no casualties.
1600	E Co's nite activity, (attempted infiltration) resulted in our suffering 5 WIA: schrapnel (sic) fragments and gunshot wounds.
1800	1800 Supply train of Filipinos set up to haul supplies to front tomorrow.

	"Small security patrols were sent out but no enemy contacts were made."
	"5-28-45 One man S.I. by accidentally discharging his weapon while on perimeter. Co. remained in position. No activity during night."
	"1st Lt Bailey assumed command and 1st Lt William Calhoun was dropped as company commander & resumed duties as ex. officer."
	Neither the PR nor the 2d Battalion S-3 Journal are correct in recording "F" Company's action. I remember it vividly. The 1st Battalion had taken Hill 3355. E company had been moved up and ordered to advance down the ridge from this hill to Hill 4055. They hit considerable resistance suffering one man KIA and four WIA. They had to withdraw, but they were unable to bring back the body of the man killed. Recovering bodies was a must. In fact sometimes we suffered because we attacked to recover a body when the attack had to be made which was advantageous to the enemy. Capt Taylor ordered me to advance down the side of the mountain along the ridge to a trail junction. I am sure this is the one located at (15.7-11.30) in PR above. He also said we were to recover the body of the E Company man killed yesterday. He definitely was not happy that the body had been left. I am sure he had to answer for this to RCT. We followed a well-marked trail down the steep slope of the mountain on the opposite side we had come up. Before we had travelled far, perhaps 300 yards, we came to an almost vertical drop-off about 25-30 feet tall. The only way down the face of this small cliff was to work down the boulders. There was a small ledge at the top of this cliff. Tall, slender trees growing at the base of the cliff formed a canopy above the ledge with their tops. The trunks of these trees were about 2-4 inches in diameter. The trail ran down to the ledge, snaked down the face, and then ran along the crest of a definite ridge. Vegetation was light. Rocks and boulders were plentiful. Visibility was good, because the fog had not come in yet. When our point came to the ledge I had the company hold up and deploy. I always had travelled behind my lead second scout when I was a platoon leader, and I liked to stay up near the front as the company commander. That was the only way I_ could stay up with the situation as it developed. I wanted a solid base of fire established before the company started climbing down that cliff in single file. Several of us were forward on the ledge visually searching down below when a few rifle shots rang out. In a short time several machine guns joined in, so that we were under heavy fire. The Japs, probably the ones "E" Company had tangled with the day before, had moved closer to our hill and set up near the base of the cliff knowing we would come down the trail. The slopes of the mountain were so steep that this ridge was the only way to the next mountain, Hill 4055. They thought they would let the leading elements of the company get down the cliff, open fire killing the men on the face and cutting off the men who had already made it down the cliff. Actually, even with all the heavy fire coming in we were in no danger. The fire was passing over our heads. In fact it was quite comfortable on the ledge. The tree leaves had formed a thick mat so that it was like a nest. The first Jap I saw was about 50 yards below by the trail. He squatted and pulled his pants down. With my dysentery I could understand the urgency of his call. About that time he tumbled over and did not move. One of our men with an Ml had seen him, too. The tree tops over the ledge started shaking, so we knew there were Japs down there probably trying to climb the trees. We dropped a few grenades over the edge, and the shaking stopped. The firing was heard up at battalion headquarters, and soon here came Capt. Taylor with a artillery lieutenant who was attached as a FO. They joined me in the nest. Taylor ordered me to move the company back up the hill so the artillery could be brought to bear._, There was some delay in getting artillery support, so Taylor told me to reoccupy our positions of the night before and be ready to move back the first thing next morning after a heavy barrage finished shelling the area. After complying it was mid afternoon. The supply train came in and with our long lost company commander, Bill Bailey. After a short time I went to the aid station and asked for something to stop the dysentery. Our battalion surgeon, Capt. Charles Donus, put me on massive doses of sulfa and paregoric-acid, and told me "You stay right here in the aid station, I am going to send you to the hospital, but tyou are too sick to walk down. Stay there a couple of days until you gain some strength." So the PR seems to be a day ahead in the "F" Company action. The 2d Battalion S-3 journal was also wrong but on two counts. "F" Company was not attacking high ground in front, nor were we successful."
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29 May 1945

No. 49 281500 May 45 to 291500 May45	"3. OUR OPERATIONS: a. Infantry: (1) 1st Bn continues patrolling and has some troubles with infiltrators. 2) 2d Bn: Nil activity during the night. "D" Co sent out some security patrols with nil activity at close of period. "E" & "F" Cos moved out to attack enemy bunker positions vic (15.7-11.4) at 0800 hr. "F" Co moved in a frontal attack & "E" on the right flsnk of "F" Co. "F" Co drew heavy fire consisting of knee mortars, MG & rifle fire from two enemy bunkers vic (15.55-11.1) approximately 200 yds left of trail lead�ing to Hill 4055. "E" Co returned the fire killing two enemy. "F" Co engaged the enemy killing two.. Both Cos withdrew and brought arty & mortar fire to bear on the position fr 1130 to 1140. Both Cos move in and engaged with enemy at close of period. "E" Co killed two more enemy as period closed." 3) The 3d Bn was busy patrolling. b. The artillery battalion fired 352 rounds during the period.
0730	No nite activity reported.
0830	E & F Co moved out to assault enemy bunker position.
1000	"Air strike (4 P-38's) in support of the 185th Inf. Strike on Sulphur Springs cancelled because of overcast.
1115	E & F Co withdrew from fire fight and requested arty fire.
1200	Companies assaulted again after arty barrage of 10 minutes.
1530	2 0's & 21 EM arrived from rear base.
1630	At 1415I Fox Co engaged in fire fight with enemy (15.75-11.4). No casualties. 1800 E & F Co withdrew from attack on bunker positions.
1830	Div, 462d and 4.2 Chem. mortars laid fire on enemy bunkers. 1/2 hours.

	"Lt. Gifford assumed command of the company. One squad of the 3d plt and one squad of the 2nd plt set up a strong point at water hole 250 yds SW of Co. perimeter."
	"5-29-45 Co. minus mortar platt moved out at 0800 with the mission of moving around Fox Co's left flank and to come in from enemy's rear. Nip's were well dug in. Pill boxes, fox holes, and trenches. One pillbox knocked out. 5 Nip's K.I.A. Co. withdrew to original position and set up perimeter. No activity during night."
	"During the day, the company attacked position & was forced to withdraw & bring in artillery. During this action Pvt Frank Siket was LWA."
	The next morning Lt Bailey moved the company back to the position they had occupied the day before. The Japs were stiLl in the same defensive positions and took them under fire. Leaving the company a little further up the hill, Bailey, Taylor and the artillery officer worked their way down to the nest in order to be in a position to bring in the artillery concentration oh target. The FO was in between the other two. They were all on their knees in order to see down the hill. When the FO called for the first adjusting round, or one of the first rounds, it hit the tree tops above their heads and exploded. Bailey and Taylor were untouched, but the FO groaned and fell forward face down. A large piece of shrapnel had split the front of his helmet and penetrated his skull. They brought him to the aid station, and I could see the large piece of shell still embedded in his forehead. He lived until the next day groaning continuously. It was an unnerving experience to all of us there, but he was beyond help. Pvt Frank Siket was wounded in action after the company began their attack. It was miraculous that there were no more casualties in this area because the volume of enemy fire was so heavy. I think this was because our troops were above the enemy on steep irregular terrain, and the enemy could not see us.
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30 May 1945

No. 50 291600 May 45 to 301500 May 45	MAP: Negros I. Photo # 28: 1/25,000" (Unfortunately we have been unable to obtain a low res scan of this photo which is used for so much of the mountain campaign). "2. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Cloudy, with limited visibility and intermittent rain." (Most of the weather conditions have been omitted because of so little change.) ^"3. OUR OPERATIONS: Infantry: 1) 1st Bn: "B" & "C" Co's nil activity during the night. "C" Co. killed one enemy attempting to infiltrate their position this morning at 0930. "A" Co received harrassing fire during the night consisting of knee mortar, rifle, & MG fire. One WIA resulted from this fire & no known enemy killed. An "A" Co patrol encountered enemy sniper & MG fire when they entered the enemy defensive area running fr vic (16.3-11.2) to (16.33-10.9). The position consisted of one heavy strand of barbed wire, fox holes &-numerous tracks. During the recco a patrol received MG fire fr vic (16.25-11.2) & (16.3-11.05). The platoon withdrew & placed 60mm mortar fire in the area. The patrol killed 2 enemy & suffered 2 KIA at approximately (16.2-11.2). After the mortar barrage a "B" Co patrol moved to Vic (16.2-11.5) & had not returned at end of period. 2) 2d Bn: Nil activity during the night. "D" Co sent out local security patrols with nil activity. "E" & "F" Co's continued fire fight against enemy bunker positions at vic (15.55-11.15)-(15.7-11.4) after ferocious barrage 4.2 mortar. Our arty & Div Arty both fired heavy concentrations on the area. The enemy held bunker position was then secured. 11 enemy dead found in area. Some believed to have been killed during the-arty firing. Both Co's then sent out local security patrols. While investigating vic of (15.6-11.25) 2 more enemy dead found. 5 air corps MG's were found of which 3 were destroyed. The other two are usable and are being used by our troops at end of period. Sacks of ammunition were found containing 30 & 50 cal & knee mortar ammo. Six rifles were also found and were destroyed. Estimated 50-70 enemy defended the area as a result of the number of dug-in positions that were found. Documents also fold and forwarded to Regt'l S-2. 3) 3d Bn: Nil activity during the night. A "G" Co overnight patrol to vic (14.7-11.3) reported nil activity. "H" CO sent out local security patrols and reported nil activity. An "I" Co patrol bivouaced overnight vic (11.3-09.3)-re�turned to Bn perimeter at 1230 reported nil activity. Another "I" Co overnight patrol to vic (13.4-09.7) reported their position at 1200 to be vic (11.7-09.?) and nil contact. b Artillery: fired harassing fire throughout the period. Marked air strike target and fired direct fire support mission on call. 385 rounds expended during period. c. Engineers: Continued maintenance and building of supply route. 4. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: Enemy strong point on axis of approach to RCT objective were secured, five enemy air corps MG's captured. Continued extensive systematic patrolling. 5. INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR 31 MAY: Continue recco toward HILL 4055 and N along HILL 3355. Systematic patrol of RCT sector. 6. CASUALTIES: a. Our Casualties for the Period: 3 WIA. b. Enemy Known Casualties for the Period: 15 KIA.
0730	"No nite activity. Our casualties to date: 39 KIA, 12 DOW, 108 WIA
0800	E & F Co moved out again to attack Bunker position.
0900	Arty & 4.2 Chem Mortar fire laid on enemy position. Companies forced to withdraw as barrage was too close to their position.
1500	1500 After arty & mortar fire, E & F Co's moved dut up to secure positions. Positions taken with one WIA, found air corps machine guns, ammo, mortars and food.
1800	E & F Co's sent out patrols from new positions.

	""Security patrols active with no enemy contacts.""
	""Co. minus mortar pit. moved out at 0900 hr. with same mission r. as day before. Ridge was taken, then entire Co moved down and set up for the night. No activity during night."
	""Company made a successful attack today and counted 11 enemy dead and captured 2 LMG's. It is believed that the enemy pulled back many of their dead with them as they withdrew. During this action Pvt. Robert Hahn was LWA."

	The 4.2's got into action and delivered a '"ferocious" barrage along with our 75mm pack howitzers and 49th Div 105mm howitzers. As I stated before, we really came to believe in the 4.2's as the ideal weapon in this mountainous terrain. This morning fortified our belief. The position encountered was based upon two well built bunkers well situated. The steep sides of the ridge made flanking movements virtually impossible. The position had to be neutralized by supporting fire and then taken by frontal assault. Anytime the enemy was forced to abandoned his dead along with five machine guns and ammunition the bombardment had to have been terrible. In addition to the bunkers the enemy rifleman were dug-in in deep fox holes connected by trenches. This was the first time in the battalion's history when the two former 501st Battalion companies made a joint attack. D and E Companies had made a joint attack 28 April, and now A and B Companies, 501st", joined together in an assault. The RCT S-1 Journal made an interesting entry under 301455 May; "Regt Mail clerk: Check registry for package for Lt Wm G. Campbell." "1725- Rear: Package has not been received.. check with Robson." Willam G. Campbell, 3d platoon leader, F Company, had been killed 17 February on Corregidor. He had a wife and a young son. I suspect the APO thieves stole the package. Possibly his wife had sent him something of value such as a silver identification bracelet, a desirable and popular gift at the time, and she wanted it back.
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31 May 1945

No. 51 301500 May 45 to 311500 May 45	"3. OUR OPERATIONS: a. Infantry;_ (1) 1st Bn: "B" & "C" Co's had nil activity for the_. night. "A" Co had an attempted infiltration of their perimeter at about 0400.. Estimated enemy strength to have been 4-6. One round of knee mortar landed in the perimeter. Enemy dispersed as they received fire. Results of enemy suffered casualties unknown. At 0830 one enemy scaled cliff on "A" Co's left flank. He was killed in the attempt. "B" Co to S went 75 feet beyond their perimeter & received fire fr two enemy. The fire was returned and one enemy killed. The patrol then continued SE to vic (16.1-11.0) and received fire fr three enemy. The patrol returned the fire and killed two enemy. Five or six enemy were observed attempting to encircle the patrol on the surrounding high ground. The patrol fired on the enemy killing one then withdrew & placed 60mm mortar in the area to force them into the draw & then place(d) 81mm mortar into the draw. This action was taking place as the period closed. (2) 2d Bn: Nil activity for the night. "F" Co security patrol vic (15.11-11.4) reported five recently built & evacuated 6'xlO' frame shacks believed to have been used as aid stations. Another "F" Co patrol reported a well beaten trail running N & S. Yellow communications wire running along the trail. the patrol cut the wire in several places. The patrol observed 4 enemy vic (15.16-11.45)' fired on them killing one. The patrol withdrew because of receiving heavy M6 & rifle fire fr remaining three enemy. This position believed to have been an OP. Another "F" Co Patrol observed & fired on three enemy & believed they killed one. During the fire fight much movement in the undergrowth & shaking of trees indicated that several more enemy were in the area. The three above mentioned patrol actions took place fr 301500 May until darkness set in. A "D" Co local security patrol reported nil activity. "E" Co set up two ambushes at (15.8-11.25) & (15.5-11.20). Seven enemy KIA found in that vicinity believed to have been killed during yesterday's arty fire in this area. Four rifles were found near the bodies and destroyed by our troops; "F" Co observed enemy fires approximately 200 yds E of their position. They could not investigate because of our air strikes that were taking place. An arty concentration was laid on ridge (15.75-11.5)-(15.6-11.9). At close of barrage "F" Co advanced one platoon into the vic. They estimated 20-25 enemy encountered in a brief fire fight vic (15.65-11.4). Three enemy were killed.
0730	Nil activity during the site. 0900 Troops in hills hurting for water. Water being carried up on supply trains. It is cold in the hills, combat jackets have been ordered. Rations (still 10 in 1) with issue of fresh bread everyday.'
	[Note: The line companies got no fresh bread, nor do I believe anyone else up on the mountain where everything was packed up on back packs. The compact packing of the field rations was difficult enough to pack up]. .
1400	462d & Div Arty fired on ridge (15.65-11.5) to (15.6-11.9) from 1200 to 1230 hrs. Patrols moved out after barrage.
1600	Had four air strikes today ob Sulphur Springs by P-38's.
1800	Patrols made contact, we suffered no casualties."

	"Security patrols active with no enemy contacts."
	"Two patrols moved out at 0700 to set up ambush. Patrols returned. Sgt Hylton patrol saw nothing. Sgt R patrol found three nips killed by arty. No activity during night.."
	"No entry.
	Doc Donus sent me down today with instructions to go to the field hospital in Bacolod and have a stool test made. As I descended the temperature rose, and I felt better all the time. The great joy, however, was walkig out of the rainforest into the grass covered fields. Our minds play tricks. I remember I walked out into the brilliant sunshine, but our PR weather for this day says cloudy and threatening rain. The day before was rain, and the following day was rain, so there probably was no brilliant sunshine, but getting out into the open made it seem so. I felt completely cured and remained at the RCT rear until the company came down. I had tried to find out for years the name of the 462d PFA officer who was fatally wounded on the morning of the 29th. Dude (George) Aubry remembered him but not his name. Dude was on an FO team_., too. None of the other artillery people with whom I have spoken remembered the incident. Dude could even remember that the lieutenant was a replacement and the approximate date he was hit. I found the man's name in Leabhart's medical journal. He was 2d Lt Joseph J. Parma, and he died 30 May.
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1 June 1945

Phase X 1 June 1945	"Br., seperate units CO's and staff meet with CO: Sanitation and health of command will be focal points of emphasis; rigid measures. Guerrillas to replace RCT here, but one company of your troops will back up each of three guerrilas regts. Rest of command will bivouac in Bacolod on this island. 40th Div. moves out by 1 July and we will assume full control of Negros, Occidental, P.I. Will have rest and recuperation with emphasis or health and administration. All enlisted men over critical score will be determined surplus and sent home upon arrival of replacements. All officers desiring to get out of Army will be surplus all others will be given YDY." Someone must have been drunk when they wrote this.
No. 52 311500 May45 to 011500 June 45	"3. OUR OPERATIONS: a. Infantry: 1) 1st Bn: Nil activity during the night. A "B" Co patrol to vicinity (16.1-10.95) had not returned at close of period. Nil activity for all other Bn patrols. 2) 2d Bn: Nil activity during the night. "D" Co made local security patrols with nil activity. An "E" Co advance was delayed until 1400 because of poor visibility and air strikes. Upon completion of Arty barrage vicinity (15.7-11.4) the advance got under way & was still advancing at close of period with nil contacts. 3) 3d Bn: Nil activity during the night. Bn patrols to S & E of RCT sector reported nil contacts." The artillery fired 460 rounds of ammunition. The "RESULTS" and "INTENDED" same as for 31 May.
0730	No action during the nite, we suffered no casualties yesterday, tho we are losing men, sick to hospital. Fever, jungle rot and dysentery are the most prevelant complaints.
0800	Air strike.
0900	Hq Co Mortar Platoon, 81mm furnished guards for supply trains. F.A. 50 dal and Hqs mortar men have been used both for supply guards and evacuation parties companies moved forward in the hills.
1500	Overcast pre0ted Arty fire in support of E Co forward movement earlier. Companyy moved on strong position at 1500 hr, located at (15.7-11.4).
1800