SAN
FERNANDO, looking northwest. Route 3
from Calumpit runs diagonally through the photograph; Route 7
leading to Bataan is in upper left. Zambales Mountains are visible
in background. |
|
By the first day of the new year the bulk
of the American and Filipino forces had escaped from the enemy pincer
movement designed to trap them on the plain before Manila. Calumpit had
been passed successfully and the troops from the south had side-stepped
the Japanese and withdrawn in good order across the Pampanga.
MacArthur's men no longer faced the main strength of Homma's 14th
Army, which was pushing rapidly toward Manila.
San Fernando, nine miles north of Calumpit,
was as vital to the successful completion of the plan of withdrawal as
Plaridel. Not only did the South Luzon Force have to pass through it
before turning southwest to Bataan, but almost the entire North Luzon
Force would funnel through that town also.
Thirty-five miles northwest of Manila, and
strategically second in importance only to the capital, San Fernando is
an important road and rail junction. It is there that Route 7, the main
road to Bataan, joins Route 3. The troops from Calumpit would have to
travel northward along Route 3 to reach San Fernando; those on the D-5
line would withdraw south along this road and Route 10. At San Fernando
both groups would pick up Route 7 for the final lap of their journey to
Bataan.
The 21st Division on the west flank of the
D-5 line was the only unit which could escape into Bataan without going
through San Fernando. At Angeles, midway between Bamban and San
Fernando, it would leave Route 3 and follow Route 74 to Bataan. All
other units north and south of San Fernando would reach Bataan via San
Fernando and Route 7.
Even if the enemy did not impede the march
to Bataan, the roads over which the tired soldiers must travel to reach
the peninsula would present many obstacles. From Calumpit north to San
Fernando, and from there south to Bataan, the road was packed with a
"solid stream of traffic," military and civilian. Vehicles of all
types-cars, buses, trucks, artillery, and tanks-filled the center of the
road. In some places, there were stretches of several miles where the
vehicles were lined up almost bumper to bumper. On each side was an
endless line of pedestrians, mostly civilians fleeing from the invading
army.
The enemy air force could hardly be
expected to overlook so obvious and inviting a target on their way to
other, more important military missions. The primary objective of the
thirty-two light bombers of the 5th Air Group that day was
ammunition dumps, but the Japanese pilots reported that they also
dive-bombed American vehicles and "motorized units." Colonel Collier
noted that "hostile bombers, with the rising sun glistening on wing
tips, flying at low and high altitudes, crossed and recrossed the road."
But he saw no dive-bombing or strafing attacks. "Had the bombers struck
the jammed columns with bombs and strafing," he wrote, "our withdrawal
into Bataan would certainly have been seriously crippled."
Since 30 December General Homma had been
strengthening his forces in front of the D-5 line. By New Year's Eve he
had on Route 3, in and around Tarlac, the entire 9th Infantry
Regiment, the Kanno Detachment (3d Battalion, 2d
Formosa), 8th Field Artillery (less one battalion), two
batteries of the 22d Field Artillery, and a battalion of the
48th Mountain Artillery. The mission of this force was to drive
south toward Bataan.
Along the D-5 line stood two Philippine
Army divisions, the 11th on the right and the 21st on the left. Between
the high ground on each end of the line the terrain was flat, the
vegetation consisting of cane fields and uncultivated grassland. As the
troops reached this position they began to clear fields of fire and,
when they could get the wire, erect barbed-wire entanglements.
The 21st Division held the left (west)
portion of the flatlands along the south bank of the Bamban River from
the Magalang- Concepcion road to the Zambales Mountains/ On the right
was the 22d Infantry; to its left was the 21st Infantry, with the 3d
Battalion on the right and the 2d Battalion on the left. Along the
front, between the two battalions, were two high multiple-span steel
bridges (one railroad and one highway) fording the Bamban River. The
engineers had destroyed both bridges, but the river, practically dry at
this season of the year, presented no obstacle to advancing infantry and
only a slight one to vehicles. To strengthen the river line, therefore,
Company C, 23d Infantry, was posted on the high ground north of the
Bamban River and west of Route 3, in position to dominate the road and
railroad south of the town. The 21st Field Artillery was in general
support.
The wisdom of placing Company C in this
position was soon confirmed. At about 0130 New Year's Day, a Japanese
force mounted on bicycles and estimated as of company size was observed
pedaling down the road from Bamban toward the destroyed bridge between
the 2d and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry. The enemy troops were part of
the Kanno Detachment, which had been caught in the open by
American tanks at Zaragoza two days earlier. Their reception at Bamban
was no less warm. As the Japanese cyclists advanced along the short
stretch of road paralleling the river east of the bridge, Company C
delivered a punishing fire in their midst. After some minutes of
confusion and milling about, the surprised and badly hit Japanese force
retreated, having suffered thirty-five casualties. Company C gained an
assortment of bicycles, swords, and miscellaneous equipment, as well as
a wounded Japanese noncom. Since he spoke no English and no one present
understood Japanese, he proved useless as a source of information). By
the time he had been evacuated to the rear he had died of his wounds.
By 0900 the remainder of the Kanno
Detachment had reached Bamban. The infantry soon began an attack
against the river line and Company C; the artillery joined in the action
about noon. That afternoon the fighting was brisk, with heavy shelling
on both sides and with Japanese aircraft participating in the action.
But all efforts by the Japanese to cross the river met with failure and
Company C was still in position late in the day.
At division headquarters reports of
Japanese troop movements south from Tarlac to Bamban had been received
earlier in the day, one scout noting "that one of our own tanks was
being driven around Tarlac to the hilarity of the enemy troops." These
reports were accurate. The 9th Infantry and supporting troops
were moving forward to reinforce the Kanno Detachment. As the
Japanese came within artillery range they were brought under fire by
guns of the 21st Field Artillery. Although suffering losses in
personnel and equipment, the 9th Infantry by 1600 had joined
the Kanno Detachment on the north bank of the river.
But the Japanese for some inexplicable
reason failed to attempt a crossing. At nightfall the 21st Division
began to move out, Company C wading the shallow Bamban to rejoin the
division. The entire division withdrew down Route 3 to Angeles, then
turned southwest along Route 74 to Porac. The enemy followed cautiously
and it was not until 1130 of the 2d that the Kanno Detachment
reached Angeles. The Japanese now had possession of the Clark Field
area.