BRIG. GEN MAXON S.
LOUGH, left, with Col. Harrison C. Browne (CofS Phil Div)
and Capt. Joseph B. Sallee (ADC), near the front lines. |
|
On 3 January an inventory of the food in
the hands of the quartermaster on Bataan was prepared. This inventory
revealed that there was only a 30-day supply of unbalanced field rations
for 100,000 men, including a 50-day supply of canned meats and fish, 40
days of canned milk, 30 of flour and canned vegetables (string beans and
tomatoes), and 20 of rice, the most important element of the Philippine
diet. There were some staples such as sugar, salt, pepper, lard, and
syrup, but almost no fresh meat or fruit and only limited quantities of
canned fruits, coffee, potatoes, onions, and cereals.
The necessity for drastic action was
apparent. On 5 January MacArthur approved the recommendation of his
quartermaster, General Drake, that the troops and civilians on Bataan
and Corregidor be placed on half-rations, and the necessary instructions
were issued to the local commanders.
The half-ration, containing about 2,000
calories, half the normal requirements of an active man, was obviously
inadequate to the needs of fighting troops who had to work as much as
twenty hours a day, under the most difficult conditions and in the worst
kind of climate and terrain. Fortunately many of the men had accumulated
food during the withdrawal and this supply was used to supplement the
meager diet. Colonel Mallon�e, instructor of the 21st Field Artillery
(PA), for example, had a case and a half of mixed canned goods,
forehandedly purchased before the withdrawal. On his way past Fort
Stotsenburg he picked up another half case. Although he gave part of his
private stock to some of his fellow officers, he kept a large portion of
the two cases for himself. Yet, with this additional supply of food, he
wrote, "I had to do a tailoring job on my waistband twice. . . ."
Heroic measures to augment the food supply
were obviously necessary if the troops on Bataan were to hold out for
the required six-month period. No sooner had the withdrawal been
completed than the quartermaster began to exploit every possible
resource on the peninsula to increase his stores. Fortunately, it was
the harvest season and the rice stood ripe in the fields. It was only
necessary to bring it to the mills, which the engineers were ordered to
build near Limay. Plans were made to secure fresh meat by slaughtering
carabao, the Philippine draft animal, and a large abattoir was
established by the veterinarians. In addition, the units in the field
butchered whatever carabao or other animals they could capture. A
fishery was established at Lamao, and plans were made to utilize the
catch of the local fishermen who went out each night until prevented
from doing so by Japanese fire. Salt was secured by boiling sea water in
large iron cauldrons. Before the troops had been on Bataan long, no
local resource that would yield any additional amount of food was being
overlooked.
So serious was the shortage of food after
the first few weeks on Bataan that the search for food assumed more
importance than the presence of the enemy to the front. Every man became
a hunter, and rifle shots could be heard at all hours far from the
Japanese lines. Lt. Col. Irvin Alexander, a quartermaster officer,
wrote:
Any carabao which was encountered
in the jungle was classed as wild and neither his ancestry nor
his ownership was investigated. The wild game was not too
numerous and it was very shy so that only the cunning and lucky
hunters were successful in bringing in meat. Lack of success did
not discourage the hunters. . . . One Filipino . . . caught a
snake and ate it one day to die unpleasantly the next. There
were always plenty of experimenters ready to try any kind of
native flora or fauna which might prove edible ... although the
experimenting individual frequently paid a high price. |
The supply of clothing on Bataan, while
not as alarming as the shortage of food, was just as limited. It had
been scanty at the beginning of the war and was almost gone by the time
the men reached Bataan. The regular garrison of U.S. Army troops and
Philippine Scouts had been comparatively well clad when they took the
field, but the Philippine Army had been only partially clothed and
equipped. Those who had been inducted before the war were far more
fortunate than the Filipinos mobilized after hostilities began. The
uniforms and equipment of these men consisted of odds and ends, whatever
was on hand for issue and whatever they could salvage or buy. Early in
January the Quartermaster had only 10,000 pairs of trousers and shorts
and an equal number of shirts and blue denim suits. Obviously this
amount of clothing was hardly enough for 80,000 men fighting in heavy
jungle and mountains, in a wet climate where days were hot and nights
cold, and where tangled vegetation quickly tore shirts and trousers. The
army service shoe, of which there were 50,000 pairs on Bataan, was of
little use to the Filipino soldier whose feet were too narrow for
footgear built on American lasts.
The absence of mosquito netting, shelter
halves, blankets, and sun helmets was as serious as the shortage of
clothing. The physical deterioration of the troops and the high
incidence of malaria, hookworm, and other diseases were caused as much
perhaps by the lack of proper protection against the weather and the
jungle as the unbalanced and deficient diet.