SEEKING
COVER IN
A TRENCH NEAR
LAMAO during an air attack. |
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Since early January strenuous attempts had been made
to get food and medical supplies to the men on Bataan and Corregidor.
General MacArthur, and later General Wainwright, urged constantly and
persistently, in the strongest terms, that the Japanese blockade must be
broken, that greater efforts must be made and more drastic measures
taken to relieve the Philippine garrison. These requests were received
in Washington with the greatest sympathy. Despite the fact that Allied
strategy called for the defeat of Germany first, the bulk of the troops
and supplies sent overseas during the early part of 1942 went to the
Pacific. A blockade running program was organized, first in Australia
and the Netherlands Indies, and then in the United States. Surface
vessels, combat aircraft, and even submarines were dispatched to the
Philippines in the hope that some would get through with supplies for
the weary and hungry men. No expense was too high, no effort too great
to relieve the embattled garrison.
The total result of these activities was negligible.
The Japanese hold on the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia was too
firm, their victories too rapid to allow the poorly prepared Allies time
to organize the resources necessary to come to the aid of the Philippine
garrison. The story of the attempt to break through the Japanese
blockade, like the entire story of the campaign in the Philippines, is
one of heroic efforts and final failure.
General MacArthur was kept fully informed of the
plans to break the Japanese blockade, but still felt that stronger
measures were required. On 4 February, in a message to General Marshall,
he called for a more aggressive strategy in the Far East and expressed
the hope that his views would be presented "to the highest authority."16
The message opened with the startling statement that Allied strategy,
aimed at building up forces before the Japanese advance, was "a fatal
mistake on the part of the Democratic Allies." He urged that the
Japanese line of communications, "stretched over 2,000 miles of sea," be
attacked instead. To counter the argument that naval forces for such
attacks were not available, he pointed out that a great naval victory
was not necessary; "the threat alone would go far toward the desired
end." He predicted that the plan to build a base and acquire supremacy
in the Southwest Pacific would fail and that the war would be
indefinitely prolonged. The only way to defeat the enemy was to seek
combat with him. "Counsels of timidity," he warned, "based upon theories
of safety first will not win against such an aggressive and audacious
adversary as Japan."
This was bold counsel indeed and was carefully
considered in Washington from where the effort to send MacArthur the
supplies he needed was being pushed with vigor and determination.
General Marshall replied that he welcomed and appreciated MacArthur's
views and "invariably" submitted them to the President.
Summarizing the considerations which had determined
Allied strategy, Marshall went on to explain that everyone recognized
the advantages of an attack against Japan's line of communications. Two
grim disasters had prevented the adoption of such a course. First, the
Japanese had achieved flank security at the start of the war by seizing
Wake and Guam and additional protection by their control of the Marshall
and Gilbert Islands. At all these places they had strong air protection.
Secondly, by their initial attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had
virtually eliminated the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet. Much of the
remaining naval strength of the Pacific Fleet was required to keep open
the Allied line of communications to Australia and to assist in the
establishment of bases in the South Pacific.
But rather than do nothing at all, the Allies had
decided to oppose Japanese expansion along the Malay Barrier simply
because that was the only area in which they possessed the necessary
bases from which to launch an attack. "The basis of all current effort,"
the Chief of Staff went on, "is to accumulate through every possible
means sufficient strength to initiate operations along the lines you
suggest. ... In the meanwhile we are endeavoring to limit the hostile
advance so as to deny him free access to land and sea areas that will
immeasurably strengthen his war making powers or which will be valuable
to us as jump off positions when we can start a general offensive."