HEAVY
CLOUDS OVER
CORREGIDOR. "With the southern tip
of Bataan in their possession they could now emplace artillery on
the heights of the Mariveles Mountains and along the shore near
Cabcaben, only two miles across the channel from Corregidor." Arrows
indicate planned Japanese landings. |
|
For the men on Corregidor it seemed as
though they were living "in the center of a bull's-eye." During the last
week of March there were about sixty air-raid alarms lasting for a total
of seventy-four hours. Bombings begun in the morning were usually
resumed in the afternoon and again at night. Since the Japanese planes
were now based on Clark Field or near Manila, they were able to remain
over the target for longer periods than they had during the first
bombardment in December.
The effect of so heavy a bombardment over
the period of seven days might well have been disastrous had not the men
profited from the earlier air attacks and built underground shelters.
They had also learned how effectively sand could cushion the blow from a
bomb and had made liberal use of sandbags. "It used to be hard to get
the men to fill sandbags," wrote one officer. "Now it is hard to keep
them from laying hands on all the sandbags available and filling them
when those to whom they are allotted aren't looking." The small number
of casualties is ample evidence of the thoroughness with which the
Corregidor garrison had dug in since the first attack on 29 December.
Installations of all kinds and critical
supplies had also been placed under bombproof protection, and these
suffered little damage during the bombardment. The few remaining surface
installations, however, and supplies in open storage did not fare so
well. On Bottomside, the theater, post exchange, and bakery were leveled
to the ground and the Navy's radio station damaged. Wainwright's house,
inherited from MacArthur, was destroyed on the first day of the attack.
"I picked up the light walking stick which MacArthur had left for me,"
wrote Wainwright, "and walked down to Malinta Tunnel to live there the
rest of my time on Corregidor." Several ammunition dumps were hit,
exploding the shells in storage, and a quantity of TNT blown up. But
losses, on the whole, were small and were quickly repaired by crews
which cleared the roads and cleaned out the debris left by exploding
bombs.
The Japanese, too, seemed to have profited
by their earlier experience and had "learned," Captain Ames observed,
"to dodge AA fire." They came in at higher altitudes than before,
between 22,000 and 28,000 feet, in formations of nine planes or less.
During daylight they made their bombing runs out of the sun, changing
course and altitude immediately after the moment of release. Earlier the
antiaircraft gun batteries had been able to get in about ten salvos
before the Japanese flew out of range, usually bringing down the lead
plane of the formation. When the enemy changed his tactics, the
antiaircraft guns could get in fewer salvos and could no longer count on
the lead plane maintaining the same course.
The most serious limitations on the
effectiveness of the 3-inch guns arose from the shortage of mechanically
fuzed ammunition, which could reach to a height of 30,000 feet. There
was an adequate supply of ammunition with the powder train fuze,
effective to a height of about 24,000 feet, but only enough of the
longer range type for one of the ten antiaircraft batteries. On 3
February a submarine had brought in 2,750 more rounds of mechanically
fuzed ammunition, and it became possible to supply an additional
battery. Thus, when the enemy planes came in at an altitude of more than
24,000 feet, only two batteries could reach them. The remaining
batteries of the antiaircraft command, equipped with powder train fuzes,
could only watch idly while the Japanese leisurely dropped their bombs.
Nonetheless, the contribution of these batteries, though negative, was a
valuable one. By forcing the enemy to remain at extremely high altitude,
they decreased his accuracy and diminished the effectiveness of the
bombardment.
From the outset it had been necessary to
conserve even the powder train fuzed shells, 30 percent of which were
duds. This had been accomplished by limiting each gun to six rounds for
any single target on any given course. The opening weeks of the war
proved the most expensive in terms of rounds fired to planes destroyed,
500 rounds being required for each plane. This inaccurate fire was due
to inexperience, the irregular functioning of powder train fuzes, and
variation in the muzzle velocity. Between 8 December and 11 March the
3-inch gun batteries in the harbor defenses expended over 6,000 rounds
for a total of 52 aircraft knocked down, or about 120 rounds per plane.
With increased experience of both fire control crews and gunners and
improved fire discipline, this average was steadily bettered until, by
the beginning of April, the expenditure rate went under 100 rounds per
plane, an excellent score even under the most favorable conditions.