The condition of the troops was not yet
desperate. Morale was still high and most men thought they could give a
good account of themselves if the Japanese should attempt to take the
island by assault. Some even believed they had an excellent chance to
beat off an attack. "The marines can't see how the Japs can take
Corregidor," wrote an artilleryman. "I hardly can either!"32
The men talked about the possibility of reinforcement, about food,
liquor, and women- "the things that soldiers have always talked
about-but never," wrote a marine, "about the hopelessness of our
position. Never once did I hear anybody despair."33
The health of the command was generally
good. The casualties from the bombings had not been severe and the
effects of a limited diet were not yet apparent. Mild respiratory
diseases caused by confinement in the damp, dust-laden tunnel were the
most frequent reasons for hospitalization. Diarrhea and food poisoning
were fairly common, but dysentery and malaria, the twin scourges of
Bataan, were rare on Corregidor. Hospital facilities in the tunnel,
though not ideal, were far superior to those on Bataan and there was an
ample supply of drugs for the small number of patients.34
Malinta Tunnel was still the focus of all
activity on Corregidor and became after 9 April even more crowded and
hectic than before. A newcomer from Bataan, Capt. John McM. Gulick,
described it as "a gigantic beehive" over which neon lights "cast their
bluish glow." Along its sides the crates were piled higher than ever and
the double and triple deck bunks were more numerous; overhead was a maze
of wires, pipes, and ducts. The number of men in the tunnel had
increased and a steady stream, which Captain Gulick described as "dense
crowds," moved up and down the main axis and into the many laterals on
various errands. The dust was thicker than ever, the odors more
pronounced and disagreeable, the vermin more numerous, and the hum of
the auxiliary diesel power plants and ventilators more penetrating.
Everywhere were "cryptic initial signs" describing the activity of each
cluster of desks. The ambulance siren sounded more often now but a hush
still fell over the tunnel when a jeep carrying a wounded man drove
through.35
The power plant on the island had been hit
occasionally during the aerial bombardment but the Japanese had not made
any systematic effort to destroy the plant itself or the power lines
that led to the cold-storage plant and the water pumps that kept the
reservoir filled. There had been some damage, and the danger of a
complete breakdown in the power system was a source of constant concern.
But there was still enough fuel for the portable diesel engines in the
tunnel to last at least until the end of June.36
Corregidor's water supply, because it was
dependent upon the power plant, was perhaps the most vulnerable point of
Corregidor's defense. Even before the surrender of Bataan there had been
frequent periods when water was not available because of power failures
or damage to the pumps. When the water lines were damaged, water was
distributed at various points on the island and each unit sent its own
trucks for the day's supply. The water was carried in 12-inch powder
cans, two by five and a half feet, ideal for storage but heavy when full
and difficult to handle. The water crews normally made the trip at night
over the crater-filled roads to the distribution points. There they
might have to wait for hours to draw their supply. "It was a ticklish
job."37
By the beginning of April the supply of
water had become a real problem. On the 2d of the month Colonel Bunker
noted in his diary that "our water situation is getting critical,"38
and on the 3d, in anticipation of the fall of Bataan, all units were
directed to lay in a reserve supply. At that time there was in the
reservoirs a total of 3,000,000 gallons, but that would not last long if
the pumps or power plant failed.
The men on Corregidor ate two meals a day.
The morning meal, prepared the night before and served before daylight,
usually consisted of toast and coffee, when there was coffee, and
occasionally a piece of bacon or sausage. Supper was served after dark,
about 2000, and consisted of salmon, canned vegetables, and rice
pudding. Sometimes there was fresh beef or stew. Most units were able to
serve half a sandwich and a cup of hot beverage or soup during the noon
hour, but many men kept pieces of bread in their pocket to gnaw on
during the long interval between meals.
The ration, though adequate to maintain
health, did not provide sufficient bulk to satisfy the appetite. Men no
longer had the "comfortably full" feeling provided by the peacetime
ration, and missed certain foods such as sugar, canned milk, coffee, and
canned or dried fruits, which were by now extremely scarce.41
Rice had become an increasingly important part of the ration and, though
it was not favored by the Americans, it did provide bulk in the diet.
Fortunately there were always enough other foods on hand to add flavor
and variety to the rice dishes. But the American soldiers never became
fond of rice and complained frequently. "This rice diet fills you up
temporarily," wrote Colonel Bunker, "but it doesn't stick to your
ribs."
When Wainwright came to Corregidor on 21
March to assume command of USFIP he found that food was more plentiful
and the men better fed than on Bataan. With the plight of the emaciated
troops there still fresh in his mind, he requested permission from
MacArthur to reduce the carefully hoarded reserves by an amount equal to
a month's half rations for the planned garrison of 20,000 men. Approval
was granted at the beginning of April and Wainwright was able to send
additional food to Bataan during the last days of the battle. It was
"little more than a crumb," he wrote later, but it reduced Corregidor
reserves "to a point where I figured . . . that our 11,000 defenders
would consume it all by June 20, 1942, on less than half rations."
It was to be more than enough.
