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The
10-inch disappearing guns as installed at Fort Wint were model 1895 guns manufactured in
1903 and 1906 by the Army's Watervliet Arsenal in New York and were mounted on model 1901
carriages. The 6-inch guns were model 1905 while the 3-inch guns were model 1903. The
10-inch and 6-inch guns were never removed during the life of Fort Wint but four of the
3-inch guns were removed during the 1930s. Only one of these 3-inch guns was ever replaced
and that was with a naval 3-inch gun. To properly operate these guns at Fort Wint and the
proposed defensive mine field in front of Subic Bay, the Army in 1915 stated that Fort
Wint's wartime complement would be 22 officers and 448 men of whom 19 officers and 319 men
would man the fort's guns.
Grande
Island lying at the mouth of Subic Bay divides the entrance in half. The main ship channel
lies to the west of the island and is 3000 feet wide with a minimum depth of 60 feet. The
other channel to the east is 2000 feet wide but has only a minimum depth of 12 feet,
making it passable only to small craft. Except for this shoal water to the south of Grande
Island the minimum depth of the water almost to the shore line was 60 feet.
Fort
Wint when activated was considered a hardship outpost, each tour of duty being for six
months. This was due to the fact that the only means of communication with Manila was by
radio or a once-a-week 75 mile boat ride. At the end of the six-month tour at Wint the
remainder of the soldiers' tour in the Philippines would be spent at Fort Mills on
Corregidor. The normal garrison of Fort Wint was one of the batteries attached to the
Coastal Defense of Manila and Subic Bay. The troops assigned to the Coastal Defense of
Manila and Subic Bay in 1918 were the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th
and 13th companies of the U.S. Coastal Artillery. Headquarters for coastal
defense of Manila and Subic Bay was located at Fort Mills in Corregidor.
During
the decades of the 1920s and thirties Fort Wint was maintained only on a caretaker basis.
This was the result of a 1921 cut in personnel of the Philippine Coastal Defense from
3,600 to 800 men; but the force was later increased by 1,600 Philippine Scouts, native
Filipinos serving in the U.S. Army. To train these men Fort Wint was reactivated in 1936
as a Coastal Defense School.
During
these two decades no program of modernization was carried out at Fort Wint to update its
defensive works in the face of the threat of airpower and improvements in warship
construction. This failure was a result of the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty in
1922 which forbade the updating of American outposts in the Pacific. It was only in 1940
that the U.S. Congress, reacting to deteriorating relations with Japan authorized funds to
modernize coastal defense of Manila and Subic Bay. As the Navy had failed to develop Subic
Bay and the money appropriated by Congress was not enough even to undertake improvements
planned for Manila Bay little work was done on Fort Wint. The major project undertaken
there was in the summer of 1941 when a telephone line was run from Wint to Olongapo using
salvaged telephone cable from Manila. By this time however Olongapo had lost much of its
importance for on July 22, 1941 the Navy had towed the dry-dock Dewey from Olongapo around
to Mariveles in Manila Bay. Subic Bay was thereafter used only as a base for a portion of
the seaplanes of Patrol Wing 4 and for some of the Asiatic Fleet's patrol boats.
Increased
appropriations for the coastal defense of Manila and Subic Bay also meant an increase in
personnel for the command. By mid-1941 the Coastal Defense command in the Philippines had
grown to 150 officers, 2,000 American enlisted men, 1.200 Philippine Scouts and 700
Philippine Army trainees. These personnel were organized into five regiments - 59 CA, 60
CA (AA), 91 CA (PS), 92 CA (PS) and 200 CA (AA). The 200 CA (AA) was a New Mexico National
Guard Regiment that had been called into federal service and shipped to the Philippines.
As a result of this increase in personnel the coastal defense of Manila and Subic Bay was
upgraded in August, 1941 being designated the Philippine Coast Artillery Command (PCAC),
although the command because of its short life never adopted a distinctive insignia nor a
shoulder patch and had only one commanding officer, General George F. Moore. On December
8,1941 three additional regiments were added to the PCAC, the 515 CA (AA), 1 CA (PA) and 2
CA (PA). The 515 CA (AA) was formed by splitting up the personnel of the 200 CA (AA) to
make use of some redundant anti-aircraft guns and reinforcing them with other personnel.
The 1 CA (AA) and 2 CA (PA) were formed out of the Philippine Army troops training at Fort
Mills and Fort Wint. The troops at Mills were assigned to the 1 CA (PA) and those at Wint
to the 2 CA (PA).
At
the outbreak of the war between the U.S. and Japan on December 8, 1941 (Philippine time)
Fort Wint was under the command of Colonel Napoleon Boudreau. The fort's armament
consisted of the following:
Number of Guns |
Type |
Range |
Battery |
Troops |
2 |
10"
Disappearing |
13,500
yds |
Warwick |
2 CA
(PA) |
4 |
6"
Disappearing |
14,000
yds |
Woodruff
and Hail |
2 CA
(PA) |
4 |
3"
Disappearing |
10,000
yds. |
Jewell
and Flake |
2 CA
(PA) |
2 |
155
mm. |
17,000
yds. |
Subic |
92 CA
(PS) |
4 |
3"
AA |
27,000
Ft. (vert.) |
CEBU |
91 CA
(PS) |
2 |
75mm. |
7,000
yds. |
Beach
Defense |
92 CA
(PS) |
4 |
60"
searchlight |
- |
- |
91 CA
(PS) |
In
addition to the guns at Fort Wint, Subic Bay also was defended by a mine field laid off
its entrance. Laying of the minefield had started July 22, 1941 with both the Army and
Navy engaged. The Navy mines were self-activating, non-recoverable and were laid to each
side of the shipping channel.
The
channel was itself being mined by the Army with shore activated recoverable mines. Due to
bad weather, inexperienced personnel, lack of maines, mine laying gear and spare parts the
"integrity of the minefield was considerably deprediated". The Marine Corp's 4th
Regiment, newly arrived from Shanghai was assigned to provide the landward defense of
Olongapo.
Fort
Wint, while not attacked on December 8, 1941 during the initial Japanese assault on the
Philippines had been on a war footing since November 29. The fort's first taste of combat
came on December 12 at 10:15 when six Japanese planes commenced to bomb and strafe
Olongapo and Wint. No injuries were suffered by Fort Wint personnel and it claimed one
plane shot down. The planes of the Navy's Patton 10 however suffered considerable material
damage. From this day on Fort Wint was subjected to a number of Japanese air attacks,
which proved ineffective; the fort did not suffer its first casualty until December 21.
With
the American-Philippine forces in retreat to Bataan, Fort Wint was ordered abandoned on
December 24, the evacuation completed on Christmas Day. Evacuated from Wint were 34
officers and 505 men along with two 10-ton tractors, two 155 mm. guns, four 3-inch AA
guns, one 60-inch searchlight and associated fire control gear and ammunition. All of the
fixed coastal defenses were rendered useless and left in place. How much and what kind of
ammunition was left is uncertain, conflicting statements reporting that all, most, some or
little was removed to Bataan.
The
reason for abandoning Fort Wint and who ordered it is one of the minor mysteries of the
war. General George F. Moore, former commanding officer of the Philippine Coastal
Artillery Command stated in a report written in December 1945 that United States Armed
Forces Far East (USAFFE) ordered by telephone the fort abandoned. He fails to state who
sent the order or why. Brigadier General Steve Mellnick, who served as a major on General
Douglas MacArthur's staff in 1940-1942, in his book "Philippine Diary 1939-1945"
reports that Fort Wint was ordered evacuated by a "Northern Luzon Force (NLF)
commander contrary to the plans of USAFFE." This order to evacuate was a result of a
failure by USAFFE to define the NLF troop commanders area of authority. The NLF commander
was ordered to withdraw all troops north of the main battle position on Bataan to this
line. This order as issued by USAFFE was to refer only to ground troops assigned to NLF
and not to Coastal Artillery personnel. The NLF commander however understood the order to
refer to all troops north of the battle line on Bataan. Seeing that the personnel at Wint
were not falling back to Bataan he ordered them to abandon the fort. All he saw was a
garrison guarding an empty abandoned port which apparently had failed to get the word to
move to Bataan. The first indication USAFFE had that Wint had been abandoned was when its
garrison reported to Fort Mills on Corregidor for assignment. General Meilnick states:
The
loss of Subic Bay seriously undermined Bataan's previous inaccessibility. The enemy could
now be transported directly to Olongapo - only five miles from our defensive position.
While
the U.S. Army's official history "The Fall of the Philippines" says:
While
the support or retention of Ft. Wint was probably impossible once the decision had been
made to fall back on the Mabatang - Mauban line, its evacuation without a struggle gave
the Japanese an important objective at no cost. The American garrison on Grande Island,
even if it was ultimately lost, might well have paid substantial dividends and certainly
would have given the Japanese many uncomfortable moments. From Ft. Wint the Americans with
their large guns could have disputed Japanese control of the bay and of Olongapo, which
later became an important (main) enemy supply base, and would have constituted a threat to
the flank of any Japanese force advancing down the west coast of Bataan.
That
the guns would have posed a threat to the Japanese attack on the Bataan position is
demonstrated by the fact that Fort Wint's two 10-inch guns and two of the 6-inch guns
could cover the reverse slopes of Mounts Silanganan, Natib and Santa Rosa. The two 155 mm.
guns' range would allow them to reach the tops of Mounts Silanganan and Santa Rosa. While
it is true the 10-inch and 6-inch guns only had armor piercing ammunition which would do
little damage to land targets, the 155 mm. could have been used effectively against land
targets.
While
the Americans had abandoned Subic Bay on December 25, 1941, the Japanese did not occupy it
until January 10. 1942. This failure to seize Subic Bay earlier was due to demolition of
roads, failure of the Japanese to locate American positions and a desire to seize Manila
first. Fort Wint itself was not occupied until January 12 when units of the 122nd Infantry
landed on Grande Island. Once the Japanese had gained control of Subic Bay they were not
slow in realizing its potential. Instead of having to haul supplies from northern Luzon to
support their Army around Manila they could unload them at Olongapo. This put their port
of entry for supplies only twenty miles from the fighting front. To protect their newly
acquired harbor the Japanese garrisoned Fort Wint with anti-aircraft guns and automatic
weapons. No efforts were made then or later to repair the American guns or to build new
permanent fortifications.
On
January 18, 1942 Lt. Bulkeley, commanding Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3. was ordered to
attack and destroy a Japanese armed merchant cruiser which was shelling American shore
positions. The ship, located in Subic Bay, was to be attacked by PT 31 and PT 34. The
boats entered the bay separately, PT 31 along the east shore and PT 34 along the west
shore. Both boats were challenged from Grande Island while shell fire was directed at PT
31. While dodging this shell fire PT 31 suffered an engine casualty and grounded on a
reef. Here she was abandoned by her crew and destroyed. PT 34, having entered undetected
located, attacked and sank a merchant ship.
She
then made good her escape back to Corregidor. While this sinking was confirmed by Army
troops ashore. Japanese postwar records do not record a sinking in the area.
Six
nights later, on January 24, it was the turn of PT 41 to enter Subic Bay. Passing Grande
Island successfully she attacked and claimed to have sunk a 5,000 ton transport loading
supplies. Immediately taken under fire by shore batteries after the torpedo hit, PT 41
managed to withdraw without receiving any damage.
The
next naval action in Subic Bay took place on February 1 when PT 32 attacked and hit with a
torpedo what her crew believed to be a light cruiser. Taken under heavy counter battery
fire, PT 32, with only a top speed of 22 knots managed to withdraw safely. While Japanese
records show no light cruisers damaged on this date they do show the minelayer Yaeyama to
have been damaged on this day at Subic.
A
final naval attack took place on February 17 when PT 35 passing Grande Island fired a
torpedo at a 400-ton trawler but failed to score a hit. Farther in the bay she fired a
torpedo at a ship tied up at Olongapo Pier but again failed to register a hit. With her
machine guns firing at Fort Wint PT 41 safely cleared Grande Island.
With
the fall of Manila the Japanese forgot their own method of conquest and abandoned Subic
Bay, for Manila. Thus in December, 1944. when the U.S. returned to the Luzon they first
captured Subic Bay without firing a shot. It was then developed as a supply base to
support the advance on Manila. Olongapo, by January 1945, was designated Naval Advance
Base Unit No.6. It housed an Advance Submarine and Motor Torpedo Boat Base and served as a
major repair station for naval craft up to destroyer size. Fort Wint was reoccupied and
garrisoned with 155 mm. guns and anti-aircraft guns. It however was not redeveloped as a
permanent coastal defense fort.
In
1946 with the granting of independence to the Philippines the U.S. finally moved its naval
facilities from Manila to Subic Bay, where was established the U.S. Naval Station Subic
Bay. On October 1 1954, the command was renamed the U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay. The
importance of the base increased in July, 1956, when Naval Air Station, Cubi Point was
opened. Subic Bay now stood as one of the U.S. Navy's main bases. The ship repair
facility, in 1973 alone employed more than 6,000 men and with the addition of floating
drydock AFDB-1 it could drydock almost any ship in the Navy.
During
the post-World War II period Grande Island was first abandoned and then rediscovered by
countless sailors and marines as a rest and recreation center. Fort Wint now echoed to the
sounds of baseball and basketball, its guns forming a romantic backdrop to beer and hot
dog parties.
In
1960 fate intervened to bring the guns of Wint back into news headlines. The state of
Washington, having acquired Fort Casey and Fort Flagler, two old coastal defense forts
guarding Puget Sound for development as parks, set out to rearm some of the old
fortifications for historical purposes. A thorough search of the United States failed to
turn up any surviving coastal defense guns suitable for mounting. The only guns in
existence contemporary to Fort Casey and Fort Flagler were in the Philippines. While those
on the islands in Manila Bay were deemed historical treasures those at Fort Wint were
declared surplus by the Philippine government and the U.S. In 1963 the state of Washington
began to move the four remaining 3-inch guns stateside. Two of them were mounted at Fort
Casey and the other two at Fort Flagler. These were followed in 1967 by the 10-inch guns
which were mounted at Casey. Fort Wint, stripped of all but its 6-inch guns continued
however to serve the Navy. Its gun batteries may be without armament but its grounds still
serve a major function as a rest and recreation center.
Charles Bogart
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