D MINUS 4

 On D minus 4 the Regimental Operations Order was released, the "green light" for all personnel and units of the Regiment to establish a state of final preparedness for D day. (17)

The Regimental Parachute Officer was instructed to prepare twenty-two (22) parachutes with dummies attached to represent personnel, and twenty-two (22) colored aerial delivery parachutes with dummy supply bundles attached to represent equipment. These were to be used for a deceptive drop and were to be loaded, one of each, in the first twenty-two (22) planes that would transport the 3rd Battalion. Air Force crew personnel were assigned the responsibility of dropping the dummies at H plus six (6) minutes in the woods South of YALU. (See Map C) (18) 

The Regimental S-4 was responsible for the procurement and movement by air of a forty-eight (48) hour supply of ammunition and rations to the forward base at TSILI-TSILI. Additional supplies, if required during the operation, would be delivered from the Camp Base Supply at PORT MORESBY. (19) Aerial delivery containers and parachutes were supplied by the Parachute Maintenance Platoon and transported during the same period. Approximately thirty (30) officers and men assigned from the S-4 Section and the Parachute Maintenance Platoon took part in the movement. At the forward base they were to be responsible for the packaging of equipment and rigging of aerial delivery containers to load the supply planes and to ride the planes over to drop zones to discharge supplies to the combat echelon. (20)

The plan for the aerial supply of the combat echelon involved the use of three (3) modified B-17 bombers from the 43d Squadron of the 5th Bomber Command. In each B-17 a platform was built in one half of the bomb bay with the other half exposed to allow an exit for the supplies to be dropped. An anchor line was extended from the bomb rack to the radio compartment for the purpose of attaching the static line snap fastener of the aerial delivery parachute. In addition supplies were stored in the cabin of the plane and exited through the rear door by the handlers. The jumpmaster rode the bombadiers^' compartment and gave the order over the liaison radio set to discharge supplies when the plane was over the drop zone. This method was satisfactory and was the best that could be effected inasmuch as the B-17 obviously did not possess the desirable characteristics of the cargo aircraft for supply by air--which at that time was the C-47. (21)

The B-17^'s would be available on D minus 1 for loading and would be assigned for supply by air for the period D plus 1 and D plus 2. (22)

 

D MINUS 3

On D minus 3 the 54th Transport Wing of the 5th Air Force began practicing the formations to be used for the jump. The formation was to be of six (6) planes echeloned to the right with thirty (30) seconds between elements. Of particular advantage to the Regiment was the fact that all pilots were seasoned in combat and well acquainted with the jump areas.

 This allowed the maximum time to be spent in practicing formation flying which was to continue until D minus 1 and in which eighty-two (82) aircraft participated--the number required to transport the Regiment to the drop zone. (23)

Concurrently, the communications to be used between the forward base and the combat echelon was being established at TSILI-TSILI. The radio set to be used was the SCR-188. (24)

The Communications Officer, Captain (now Major) Lawson B. Caskey, coordinated with the Air Force for the air-ground net, i.e., between the combat echelon and the B-17 supply planes. The ground set to be used was the SCR-284. The frequency assigned this net was the fighter liaison frequency, this coupled with the inexperience of the radio operator in the aircraft resulted in extremely difficult transmissions during the operation. (25)

The alternate means of communication which the Communications Officer provided for was a system of panels. These were issued to the Battalion S-4's with instructions for their use and the meaning of the pre-arranged panel displays outlined in the Signal Annex. (26)

 

D MINUS 2

 By D minus 2 all personnel parachutes and aerial delivery parachutes and containers had been issued and the teams of parachute riggers had finished the fitting and adjusting of the parachutes to the combat equipped personnel.

Included in the plan for the utilization of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon personnel was a detail to accompany the combat echelon. These men were attached to the S-4 Section and would be responsible for retrieving parachutes and aerial delivery containers and preparing them for evacuation by plane to PORT MORESBY. In addition they would assist the combat S-4 in the securing of equipment and in the establishment of the supply dump. Their main effort, however, was to be with the recovery of parachutes.

A detail of parachute riggers was designated to report to the departure airfields on D day to assist the personnel with their parachutes, to make minor adjustments, and replace parachutes if necessary. Each rigger was equipped with the required tools and equipment and to each air field was sent additional replacement parachutes. Upon completion of the air lift these riggers would report back to the base camp and prepare to receive the parachutes that would be returned to PORT MORESBY after collection by the riggers who accompanied the combat echelon.

Thus, the personnel of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon were assigned to three echelons; combat, forward base, and the base camp supply, and as they were trained and equipped were assigned those responsibilities commensurate with their training and equipment. (27)

 

D MINUS 1

Early on D minus 1 the three B-17 supply planes reported for loading. Two (2) planes reported to the forward base at TSILI-TSILI and one (1) to PORT MORESBY. The B-17 at MORESBY was designated as plane No. 1 and would accompany the combat echelon to drop supplies upon radio order or signal from the ground after all troops had jumped. The supply planes to be loaded at the forward base were designated as planes No. 2 and No. 3.

Loaded on plane No. 1 were the first priority ammunition and supplies to be delivered--those to be used for the road block across the MARKHAM VALLEY ROAD--land and anti-personnel mines, concertinas, plus 60 and 81-mm mortar, machine gun ammunition, and hand grenades to augment that which the troops carried in on their person and dropped in aerial delivery containers.

At the forward base planes No. 2 and 3 were being loaded to be ready and waiting for the call from Regiment. The order for the planes to take off for the drop zone would be given over the SCR-188 net by the communications section with the combat echelon as soon as possible after landing and securing the radio equipment.

Plane No. 2 was loaded with the Battalion and Regimental Headquarters medical supplies and equipment needed to supplement that which was carried on the person of, and dropped in containers by, the medical personnel. Included also was additional ammunition for the Australian Field Artillery 25-pounders, more 60 and 81-mm mortar, 30 and 50 caliber ammunition, anti-personnel mines, hand grenades, and concertinas.

Plane No. 3 carried 60 and 81-mm mortar, artillery, 30, 45, and 50 caliber ammunition to again add to the initial load carried by the Regiment. (28)

It would be well to mention at this time that each man of the combat echelon carried his initial rations and ammunition requirements on his person. Machine guns, 81-mm mortars and ammunition were rolled in the A-5 aerial delivery containers, parachutes attached and loaded on the aircraft to be pushed out over the drop zone followed by the jumpers. (29)

By 1700 hours all units had submitted their plane loading lists to the Regimental S-3. One (1) additional copy was carried by the Officer or Non-commissioned Officer in charge of each plane to be turned over to the pilot upon loading. (30)

 

ENEMY SITUATION

The strength of the enemy at this time (D minus 1) was estimated to be 6260 at the LAE Garrison. Of this figure there were approximately 4620 combat troops and the remainder were base troops. Enemy activity in the area of NADZAB was limited and there were no known garrisons at GABMATZUNG or GABSONKEK.

A heavily armed patrol of one hundred (100) to two hundred (200) Japs from LAE had been patrolling the area daily, arriving at GABMATZUNG from the East just before noon and departing to the East again on the MARKHAM ROAD in the afternoon. Other patrols ranging from sixty (60) to one hundred (100) men were known to be operating up to the twenty-ninth of August. Permanent garrisons were known to be located: one, sixteen (16) miles Southeast of NADZAB at HEATH'S with a strength of two hundred (200); one, sixteen (16) miles North at BOANA also with a strength of two hundred (200); one, sixteen (16) miles North at BOANA also with a strength of two hundred (200), and one fifty (50) miles Northwest at KAIAPIT with an unknown strength. Of other forces stationed at LAE, MADANG, WEWAK, and RABAUL only a small number could be expected to reach the NADZAB area in time to effect the operation. (31)

The success of the attack by the 7th Australian Division on LAE, tying in with the 9th Australian Division, depended on possession of the strip at NADZAB. He who held NADZAB challenged the Valley. The Japs could not foresee the penetration of a seemingly impenetrable wall of miles of mountains and jungle--certainly not while they (the Japs) held LAE. (32)

 

D DAY

By H minus 5 hours on D day all aircraft were lined on JACKSON and WARD--the two (2) strips used as departure airfields. The planes were numbered one (1) through eighty-two (82) and each was assigned a definite location in the parking plan. Correspondingly, the trucks to transport the Regiment from the base camp were numbered in the same number with a block of numbers assigned to each Battalion, each Battalion constituting a serial. The trucks reported to the Regiment at 1500 hours on D minus 1, were numbered and loaded, and at H minus 7 hours the first serial departed for the airfield, followed by the two (2) remaining serials at thirty (30) minute intervals.

 

 

 

 

 

 

By H minus three hours all aircraft were loaded and take-off began. At H minus two hours, after the planes had assumed their position in the flight, the formation nosed toward the jump fields.

A total of three hundred and three (303) aircraft took part in the flight. Air cover included P-38's, P-39's, P-40's, P-47's, B-17's, B-24's, and B-25's. At' H minus 1 minute the B-25's began bombing and strafing the woods adjacent to the drop zones followed by the A-20's laying a smoke screen in front of the wooded areas. 

The C-47's carrying the paratroopers followed and in four and one-half (4-�) minutes eighty-one (81) transports had discharged their live cargo. Each Battalion and separate unit landed on its exact drop zone.

One (1) plane load did not jump. As the aircraft approached the jump field the door, which the crew chief was removing to allow the exit for the jumpers, blew off and hung on the side of the plane. The life of every man would have been endangered had the jump been made. (33)

The Detachment of the 2/4th Australian Field Regiment, which had been loaded on D minus 1 at PORT MORESBY and flown to TSILI-TSILI, would jump on Field F at H plus 1 hour. They would take off for the drop zone after the C-47's had unloaded the jumpers and made their rendezvous over TSILI-TSILI. In each of the four (4) planes rode one (1) officer from the 503d with the responsibility of jump mastering the Aussie artillery-men and Engineer stores that would be used in the preparation of the landing strip. Lieutenant Armstrong, who had conducted the jump training of the 2/4th Detachment, jumped with them. The other 503d officers had been ordered to return with the aircraft to PORT MORESBY. (34) The Australians jumped at the designated hour, retrieved their guns from the kunai grass, assembled them and were ready for firing in less than two and one-half (2-�) hours. This was extremely fast time considering the lack of experience of the men. (35)

All units that jumped were confronted by the very high and entangled kunai grass which was from six (6) to ten (10) feet high and extremely difficult to break through, resulting in impeding the assembly of the jumpers and equipment. (36)

At H plus 2 hours the 1st Battalion began preparation of the air strip. As planned in the operation the 2/2d Australian Pioneer Battalion was to join up with the 503d. The Pioneers crossed the MARKHAM RIVER upon landing of the Regiment, made contact, and immediately commenced work to complete the strip for operational use. (37)

According to their assigned missions the 2d and 3d Battalions moved out to capture their objectives and setup defense to deny the enemy access to the NADZAB area.

Immediately upon assembly of troops and equipment, radio contact was attempted with the supply plane hovering overhead. Contact was made, however the interference was too great to allow transmissions to be accurately identified. The alternate plan was immediately put into effect. All supply on the ground was conducted under the supervision of the Combat S-4. Supplies needed by the Battalions would be obtained by displaying the large circular panel which would indicate to the supply plane that supply was wanted. Next to the circular panel would be displayed the panel arrangement indicating the type supply desired. Each display indicated one unit needed. If more of the same unit was wanted the circular panel would be lifted and waved when the supply plane came overhead. If only one unit was needed the next panel symbol was already displayed when the plane came over to drop the first supplies requested. (38)

As soon as radio contact was made with the forward base, the order was sent for planes No. 2 and 3, which were on ground alert, to take off for the drop zone and there receive instructions for the delivery of supplies.

The three (3) B-17's, when each had delivered its supplies, returned to the forward base. Plane No. 1 was again loaded with pre-planned supplies and equipment to await the call from Regiment to take off. It was planned at this time, i.e., when plane No. I returned from the second drop, that the ground action would be stabilized and that normal plane loading would be accomplished. (39)

 

D PLUS 1

At 1000 hours on D plus 1, after working all the night of D day, the NADZAB strip was operational and the first transports began landing carrying the Australian 7th and their equipment. Lending material assistance in the preparation of the strip and in the unloading of aircraft were approximately two hundred (200) Boongs (New Guinea "Fuzzy-Wuzzy's"). As Engineers and equipment landed--planes were landing one (1) every fifteen (15) minutes--two (2) more strips were prepared. As soon as the 7th landed they passed through the 503d positions and pushed down the MARKHAM VALLEY to converge on LAE in conjunction with the Australian 9th which had established a beach head fifteen (15) miles East of LAE. (40)

Supply by air continued through D plus 1 delivering supplies as called for by Regiment, and at the end of D plus 1, as planned, the B-17's terminated their assignment as supply aircraft and returned to their home base. (41) Air supply, however, was on call to the end of the operation through the SCR-188 net. The aircraft that would be used were the C-47's based at TSILI�TSILI. Request to the Air Force for the planes would be made by the Forward Base Commanding Officer. (42)

 

D PLUS 2 TO THE END OF THE OPERATION

 The parachute riggers who accompanied the combat echelon had, by D plus 2, collected and assembled the majority of parachutes and aerial delivery containers. All used in the operation, however, were not collected because of a fire, the source of which cannot be authenticated, that destroyed a large percentage still not collected from the drop zones. Parachutes returned to PORT MORESBY were retained at the air fields for evacuation to the camp site in AUSTRALIA where facilities were available for proper inspection, disposition, and replacement. Upon inspection all personnel parachutes used in the operation were condemned for further use. (43)

On D plus 4 the surplus rations and ammunition at the forward base were moved back to PORT MORESBY. (44) 

Patrolling adjacent to and the security of the NADZAB area was continued by the Regiment. On 14 September 1943, the 1st Battalion was withdrawn to be returned to PORT MORESBY to prepare for another mission. On 17 September 1943, the 2d Battalion was evacuated to PORT MORESBY there to be joined by the 3d Battalion which had left the Valley on the 19th (45)--thus completing the first large scale employment of United States parachute troops in the Pacific and establishing the practicability in the use of airborne troops.

 

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1.    EMPLOYMENT OF THE REGIMENT VERSUS THE USE OF ONE (1) BATTALION

Considering the extensive front and the dense terrain to be covered, the decision to employ the entire Regiment rather than one (1) Battalion was wise. From the point of view of planning future operations the experience gained throughout was invaluable. The use of parachute troops against an objective such as the MARKHAM VALLEY with the mission of capturing and holding the NADZAB strip certainly followed the airborne concept of hitting quickly and surprising the enemy directly on the objective.

 

2.    SUPPORT OF THE REGIMENT BY THE PARACHUTE MAINTENANCE PLATOON

The Parachute Maintenance Platoon, assigned to Service Company, is composed of technicians who are highly trained in the packing, maintenance, and use of parachutes and parachute equipment. The MARKHAM VALLEY operation set the pattern for the support this platoon would provide the Regiment in future operations, and throughout the war this pattern was not materially changed. In each operation parachute riggers were assigned three roles: those assigned to the combat echelon to retrieve parachutes and parachute equipment, those who would prepare equipment for aerial supply and assist in the delivery of the supplies, and those who would remain at the rear base to begin preparing parachutes and related equipment in anticipation of the operation to follow. In the latter respect, it was always assumed that the Regiment would be called upon to execute a parachute mission immediately after relief from the current mission.

 

3.    COMMUNICATIONS

The establishment of communications between the aircraft and the ground and between the forward base and the combat echelon had been well prepared. The fact that the air-ground net was not used because of interference was no indication that it was not a good means of contact and would not have been satisfactory except for the duplication of the frequency. The alternate means, i.e., the use of ground panels, indicated foresightedness on the part of the Communications Officer to be prepared for any eventuality. The operation brought to light that communications had to be definite and that sole dependence could not be placed on a single means of communication. In jungle terrain it is very difficult to spot panel arrangements on the ground; therefore, a means of guiding the aircraft must be used--specifically, smoke. This expedites locating the panels and assures a prompt delivery of supplies. It is most desirable, however, that a combination of radio and smoke be used. Smoke to guide the aircraft to the drop zone, and radio as the direct means of communication. This was used in later operations and was extremely successful.

 

4.    CONTAINERS USED IN THE AERIAL DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES

The aerial delivery containers used to supply the Regiment were well suited. They had been perfected just prior to, and in the early stages of, the war. Used most extensively in the MARKHAM VALLEY operation were the A-4 for radio equipment and medical supplies, the A-5 for machine guns and 8l-mm mortars, the A-5 for rations, the A-7 for 30, 45, and 50 caliber ammunition, the A-9 for mortar ammunition, and the A-10 Cargo Net for irregular shaped equipment and supplies. A type container that had been thought of prior to the operation but had not been made by the Parachute Maintenance Platoon in any quantity, and one that could be used for almost any type supply, was the Double A-6. This container was conceived and perfected by the Parachute Maintenance Chief, Master Sergeant (now Warrant Officer, Junior Grade) Lloyd McCullough and was capable of accomplishing twice as much as most containers were, i.e., as far as the delivery of bulk supplies were concerned. Following the operation this container was massed produced in preparation for the mission to follow.

 

5. PERSONNEL PARACHUTES USED IN COMBAT

Before parachute troops were employed in World War II it was generally thought by many that the parachutes could not expect to be recovered after an operation--in effect, a loss of one hundred (100) percent. Various reasons were given to support this thought, however, for the most part, it was purely conjecture. A valid reason on why they should not be used again came out of the MARKHAM VALLEY operation, and this established a precedent for all combat jumps--at least as far as the 503d was concerned.

All parachutes that were returned from the drop zones were thoroughly inspected to determine the possibility of further use. Because of the length of time they were exposed to the elements, deterioration had set in throughout the parachutes, mostly in the harnesses which were constructed of cotton and nylon. After due deliberation it was decided that those personnel parachutes returned would be converted to equipment canopies for use in aerial supply. This was accomplished by cutting the harness from the canopy and attaching snap fasteners by means of webbing to the connector links of the canopy. A great many parachutes, however, were disposed of because of complete deterioration.

LESSONS

1.       Airborne troops play an extremely important role in employment against objectives difficult to reach by land, utilizing the principles of Mass and Surprise.

2.       The Parachute Maintenance personnel should be used to the fullest in rendering every possible assistance toward the success of the operation by assigning them effectively.

3.       Alternate means of communication must always be available between air and ground to resort to in the event of an emergency.

4.       The ingenuity of the soldier can never--and should never--be underestimated.

5.       The airborne soldier must have implicit faith in the parachutes he will use and that faith must be fostered by the personnel of the Parachute Maintenance who pack and maintain the parachutes.

6.       The best protection possible must be afforded the parachutes and parachute equipment, preferably by facilities at a permanent base, as long as that base can properly support the organization.

7.       It is not necessary that the airborne soldier, except in isolated cases, be basically equipped any differently than the non-airborne soldier.