COORDINATION

To borrow a phrase from Lt Colonel Posthlewaite, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, " this operation could well have been called 'Operation coordi�nation'^'. This was evident in the planning as well as the execution phase. We have mentioned that personnel from the RCT flew over the island to make a visual reconnaissance of the drop zones. A scale model of the island was flown to the RCT from GHQ. Extensive aerial photo missions were flown. Personnel who had served on the island in prewar days were made available for questioning. These were only part of the examples of willing cooperation. Every member of the ROT was briefed on the operation, and each knew exactly where he was to land and what he was expected to do. This system of briefing afforded the RCT the best they had had for any operation to date. (19)

Additional cooperation and coordination was evidenced by the fact that the staff and pilots of the 317th Troop Carrier Group, which was designated by 5th Air Force to furnish the air transportation, practically ^"lived^" at RCT headquarters. They attended every briering and offered ,comments and suggestions, many or which later proved to be highly beneficial to the actual execution of the drop. The Group Commander, Lt Colonel John Lackey suggested the em�ployment of a command ship to control the drop. This was accepted. (The role or the command ship will be discussed later in this monograph).

THJ ENEMY SITUATION

Little was known about the strength of the enemy on Corregidor. Intelligence estimated that the minimum strength was 850. The defenses of the island were set up to repel an amphibious, assault. (See Map C) Later events revealed that the Japanese commander had been informed that he should prepare a defensive plan to repulse an airborne assault on the island. After a reconnaissance, he decided such an attack was virtually impossible and did nothing antiairborne defenses. This proved his undoing. (20)

Although we find the amphibious defense set up, the success of the airborne drop still depended entirely on surprise. When you visualize the size of the drop zones, and realize that it would be possible to drop only six or eight men at a time, the reader can readily see the truth in this statement. Normally airborne drops strive for the maximum men on the ground in the minimum time. This would certainly not be true in this case. (21)

THE COMMANDER'S PLAN

Tactical Plan

Based on the information available to him, the RCT Commander outlined his plan for the operation. (See Map D) On D plus 1 elements of the 5O3d ROT would drop on Corregidor, utilizing Fields "A" and ^"B", and seize and secure ^"Topside^". The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry (reinforced), would by shore-to-shore assault from Mariveles, seize and secure Malinta Hill. Upon link-up of these two forces, the high ground on the island would be in the hands of U. S. Forces. Upon landing, these units, and remainder of troops participating, would become the ^'Rock Force^'. As mentioned previously, Malinta Hill was the highest terrain on Middleside. The primary reason for occupation of this terrain feature was to contain the enemy on the eastern part of the island until the numerous caves and tunnels could be cleared on Topside. The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry would not come under control of the RCT until landing. Plans were made for this reinforced battalion to stage in the Subic Bay area and follow the 151st Infantry Regiment on the landing in the Mariveles area on D Day. On D plus 1, it would make the shore-to-shore assault on Corregidor from Mariveles. (See Map D) (22)

This shore-to-shore operation would also open an overwater supply route for the Rook Force. This would simplify, to a large extent, the supply problem for it was realized that only a small number or planes would be available for aerial resupply. I have stated that an amphibious assault on the island was not considered feasible, however, this did not apply to the proposed landing of this infantry battalion inasmuch as plans called for this landing to be supported by fire from the airborne units already landed. To my knowledge, this is the first time an amphibious landing had been accomplished under cover of an airborne operation. If it had been necessary for the airborne forces to seize Malinta Hill after the drop, it is believed it would have been many times the actual cost of the amphibious assault. (23)

The overall plan called for a systematic reduction of the island i.e., clear Topside, move to Middleside, repeat and then move to Bottomside, clear and mop up.

Landing Plan

Due to the fact that insufficient aircraft were available to lift the RCT at one time, the Rock Force Commander set up the RCT as battalion landing teams. This was necessary to maintain tactical unity and to insure that troops on the ground would have the necessary support to continue operations while the remainder of the airborne forces was being dropped. Three of the factors to be considered in planning an airborne operation are (1) number of planes available, (2) number of troops to be transported and (3) distance to drop or landing zone. There was a total of fifty one C-47 type aircraft available for this drop, approximately 3000 men to be transported and the drop zone was approximately 140 miles away:^- These factors also dictated that the RCT be transported in three lifts. The Rock Force Commander ordered that one battalion landing team would be dropped in the morning of D plus 1, one in the afternoon and the third landing team in the morning of D plus 2. (24)

The landing plan was set up as follows:

 ^"a. First lift, 31 C-47s to be over the objective at 160830 February 45:

3d Bn 503d Prcht Inf

Det Hq 503d Prcht Inf

161st. Engineer Co

Det Hq Btry 462d Prcht FA Bn

Btry A 462d FA Bn (75-ml How)

.50 Cal MG Plat, Btry D, 462d FA Bn

b. Second lift, 51 C-47s to be over the objective at 161215 February 45:
 

Det Hq 503d Prcht Inf 2d Bn

503d Prcht Inf Ser Co 503d Prcht Inf

.50 Cal MG Plat, Btry D, 462d FA Bn

Btry B, 462d FA Bn (75-mm How)

c.  Third lift, 43 C-47s to be over the objective at 170830 February 45:
 

Balance Hq 503d Prcht Inr

lst.Bn 503d Prcht Inf

.50 Cal MG Plat Btry D 462d FA Bn Btry C 462d FA Bn (75-mm How)'. (25)

As can be seen from above, each battalion landing team was capable of supporting itself until the entire RCT was on the ground and operating as such. The remainder or the troops to comprise the Rock Force (mainly supporting troops) would land amphibiously after Malinta Hill had been secured and the road to Topside had been opened.

Fire and Air Support Plan

A detachment or the 592d JASCO (Joint Assault Signal Company) would drop with the airborne assault and furnish communications for naval support. A detachment of the 98th Signal Battalion would land with the 3d Battalion, 34th - Infantry and provide signal communications with higher headquarters. A detachment of 6th SAP (Support Air Party) would drop with the airborne assault units and furnish liaison for aerial support. Air support would be furnished by 5th and 13th Air Forces. Fire support, other than or�ganic artillery, would be furnished by elements of 7th Fleet, These naval forces would support this operation in much the some way artillery supports infantry in normal ground operations. The JASCO detachment handled the communications and, liaison for fire missions in much the some way as a Field Artillery Liaison Officer does in normal ground combat. (26)

In order to prevent any enemy movement to ^"Topside^", during daylight and immediately following the drop, plans were made for an intense aerial and naval bombardment. A bomb line was established (See Map D) and was not to be crossed prior to 161030 February. Continuous bombing and strafing would take place east or this line before, during and after the drop. It would be lirted at 1030 hours which was the scheduled landing time of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry. The-planned-air support ror this period was as follows from H-45 to H-30 minutes one group or heavy bombers would pound the island, mainly the drop zone. They were scheduled to drop approximately 125 tons or bombs. Immediately following, one group of A-20s would bomb and strafe the island. During and after the drop, strafing outside the drop zone would take place until 0930 hours or H plus 60. After that, 3 squadrons of A-20s would remain on air alert. The naval support, consisting of cruisers and destroyers, was at strategic locations off the coast and prepared to deliver ^"artillery support^" on call. There was a naval gunfire liaison section scheduled to go in with the RCT which would work through JASCO and furnish fire support. Patrol Torpedo boats were spotted around the island to pick up any troops who drifted over the side. {27)

The Plan for the Drop

In most or previous airborne operations, especially in Europe, a mass of planes would fly over an enormous drop zone and thousands of parachutists would drop at one time. That was not the case for the capture or the ^"Rock^". As stated before, the selected drop zones were the smallest this ROT had ever used. To utilize these drop zones, it would be necessary for the planes to fly in trail (one behind the other) instead or the normal prescribed formation of "V". The flight would be divided into two columns, one over each field. The planes in the left column would fly over Field ^"A", drop eight (8) jumpers, circle to the left, join the tail or the column and in a "round robin" fashion continue this until all men and equipment were dropped. The planes on the right or eastern side would fly over Field "B", circle to the right and do the same as the left column until all men were dropped. The reader can readily see that this method would require quite some time and actually did require a little over an hour for the drop of one lift to be completed. It would be necessary for each plane to make three passes over the drop zone. A "GO" point was selected for each drop zone. This was a clearly defined point. Upon reaching this. point, the pilot of the aircraft would turn on the ^"Go Light^" which would indicate to the jumpmaster in the rear of the ship that he was over the point. Due to velocity and direction of the prevailing winds, instructions were issued for each jumpmaster to count to three (3) after passing the "GO" point and then jump his men. The men would actually be jumping after passing the DZ but the wind would drift them back on to it. Each plane carried twenty-four (24) jumpers and three (3) equipment bundles and would drop eight (8) men and one (1) bundle on each pass or the field. This was the largest number deemed advisable due to the size or the drop zone. A command ship would be employed in controlling the drop. The command ship would precede the planes carrying personnel to see if the drop zone was clear from the dust and smoke which would follow the bombing and to make any corrections in the drop. Plans were that this command ship would circle the island at a greater altitude than the jumpers in order to observe the jump and make any corrections necessary. Jumping altitude was set at 1150 feet above sea level. Since the DZ was 550 feet above sea level, (See Map D) this made the actual jumping altitude 600 feet. It was predicted that the wind would range from 15 to 20 knots. (28)

Little opposition was anticipated from enemy anti-aircraft fire since the bombing and strafing was expected to keep the Japanese down during the drop. Jump casualties were expected to be high due to the condition of the fields and the prevailing winds. (29)