THE OPERATIONS
OF THE 503d PARACHUTE
INFANTRY
REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK ON
CORREGIDOR
ISLAND, 16 FEBRUARY � 2 MARCH 1945
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal
experience of a Regimental Adjutant)
INTRODUCTION
An objective of this monograph is to
show how the first principle of war, mass, can be violated successfully despite
heavy odds in favor of a well protected, well entrenched, fanatical enemy. In
short, this study is an account of the parachute assault of the 503d Parachute
Infantry Regiment, known as the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) along
with its attachments, on Corregidor Island, Philippine Islands, 16 February to 2
March 1945, during the Luzon Campaign.A second objective is to point out that
when the principle of war, mass, is violated, compensation for the violation can
be obtained by a vigorous and aggressive exploitation of other principles. For
example, the principles of surprise, simplicity, and offensive were employed
with such telling effect, that the lack of mass was hardly a consideration. In
fact, the method of transportation for one third of the regiment to the target
area was ordered changed at the eleventh hour, which change resulted in an
intentional delay of twenty-four hours. Too, an attempt will be made to show
that the action on Corregidor might well have been labeled �Operation
Cooperation�, so ideal was the cooperation between the Army, Navy, and Air
Forces.
THE GENERAL SITUATION
Prior to a discussion of the assault
on Corregidor, it seems fitting to give a brief account of the action which
preceded that which took place on Corregidor. As a result of a decision reached
at the Octagon Conference, 15 September 1944, The Sixth Army, X and XXIV Corps,
under General Walter Krueger landed 20 October 1944 on the northeastern shores
of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, (see map A) for the invasion of that
archipelago, which contained about 260,000 enemy. XXIV Corps immediately began
pushing inland, while X Corps was making an assault on the south coast of Samar
(see map A) and a short amphibious move to seize the north coast of Leyte.
Bitter fighting for the island of Leyte ensued, and all the more so in that the
enemy was continually reinforcing his troops at the northwestern part of the
island in the vicinity of Ormoc. Although our Navy caused the enemy to take
heavy troop losses during his reinforcement operations, he was, nevertheless,
able to make sizeable gains in his troop strength. Added to this handicap were
violent rain storms and deep (and I mean �deep�) mud, which situation required
the use of hand-carry for all supplies. However, by 1 December seven American
divisions and the separate 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) were firmly
located in the mud at Leyte. Five airfields were in operation, and the
contiguous waters were controlled by our Navy. The 77th Infantry Division, after
taking off from the eastern side of the island, made an amphibious assault on
the west coast on 7 December, just south of the town of Ormoc. Finally, on the
night of 21 December, the last 500 exhausted, defeated enemy quit and fled.
Leyte was ours but we unwillingly shared the air overhead with the Kamikaze.
(1)
The next goal in the American advance
to recapture the Philippines was the ambitious one of Luzon Island (see map A).
However, the distance from Leyte, where we had our only airfields in the
Philippines, to Luzon was too great to expect satisfactory fighter-plane cover.
Consequently, the flat, smooth plains of southwestern Mindoro Island (see map A)
in the area of San Jose Beach, about 150 air miles from Manila (see map A) were
selected as the possible sites for fighter airstrips. The 503d Regimental Combat
Team (Parachute) was selected to jump in this ideal-for-jumping area, but the
airfields at Leyte could not support such an operation. As a result, the assault
was to be amphibious with two RCT�s -- the 19th and the 503d. (2)
Both RCT�s assaulted the island of
Mindoro on 15 December 1944 against no opposition. Within a matter of a few
hours a fighter strip was under construction; within twenty-four hours American
planes and PT boats were in operation against southern Luzon. The two RCT�s
established a strong perimeter around the town of San Jose to protect the
construction and operation of the airstrips. From the moment of landing until
the landing in Luzon itself took all their attention, Japanese planes bombed and
strafed the airstrips and other military Installations almost twenty-four hours
daily; but the construction continued, and our planes rapidly began to secure
air superiority. (3)
Elements of the Japanese navy
assaulted the installations on Christmas night 1944, but our own planes drove
them off just about the time that the supply of bombs became exhausted. As each
B-25 dumped its last load of bombs, it took off for Leyte, inasmuch as an
amphibious and/or airborne assault was expected to follow the naval shelling.
The 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, then on Leyte, was alerted to drop at San
Jose and reinforce our forces there, if the need arose. Fortunately, the enemy
did not follow up his bombardment with a landing. At any rate, airstrips had
been constructed and secured to assist in the invasion of Luzon island. (4)
By means of a series of feints and
guerrilla diversions, the enemy on Luzon was in a state of confusion as to when
and where the invasion would come. Two corps of Sixth Army, I and XIV, hit the
beaches at Lingayen Gulf (see map A) on 9 January 1945, and by nightfall 68,000
troops had developed a beachhead fifteen miles wide and 6000 yards deep. By
means of his deceptive measures, the confusing tactics of the guerrillas, and
the activities of our Air Force, General MacArthur had succeeded in the
diversion of every major, hostile, combat organization from the beachhead area
except one division and a mixed brigade. The enemy was in am impossible
position, in that other than the two exceptions, all his combat organizations
were in motion and were forced into piecemeal commitment. (5)
Sixth Army was quick to take
advantage of the confusion of the enemy, and the advance to Manila was launched.
Slight opposition only was encountered until the troops approached Clark Field
(see map A). At that point I Corps encountered heavy opposition from enemy
strongly entrenched on the high ground. In order to keep the supply lines from
the north open, I Corps held up where it was. (6)
The XI Corps, part of the Eighth Army,
landed on 29 January on the west coast of Luzon near Subic Bay (see map A).
Opposition was light, so that XI Corps pushed eastward and southward to cut off
the Bataan peninsula where USAFFE forces three years earlier had made such
desperate stands against the Japanese. (7)
The 11th Airborne Division, assigned
to Eighth Army, minus its parachute regiment, the 511th Parachute Infantry
Regiment, made an unopposed amphibious landing on 31 January at Nasugbu, south
of Manila (see map A). The 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment on 3 February
jumped on the high ground dominating the Cavite area (see map A), while on that
same night troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army, reached the
north-eastern portion of Manila. The situation in the city looked bad for the
enemy, especially so in view of the pressure of Sixth Army troops from the
north, northwest, and south. (8)
It is at this point in the situation
that the reason for the assault on Corregidor Island (see map A) becomes
apparent. Without Corregidor Island, the Port of Manila after its capture could
not be effectively utilized, as coastal guns on the island could hamper our
shipping. Too, Corregidor was believed to harbor so-called Japanese suicide �Q�
boats. (9)
The situation, briefly, is that the
time was early February 1945, the city of Manila was about to fall, and the
Island of Corregidor had to be taken before the Port of Manila could be
utilized. All that remained was the decision relative to the method of assault
and the organization which would be assigned the mission. A discussion of the
principles and considerations involved in the employment of parachutists will
follow to show the line of reasoning which might have been used in the selection
of the method of assault; all that remained, therefore, was the assignment of a
specific organization.
SELECTION
OF THE METHOD OF ASSAULT
Of primary importance in the ultimate
decision as to the feasibility, suitability, and acceptance of a parachute
combat mission is the availability of drop zones and their immediate
surroundings. A discussion, then, of the desirable features of a drop zone, as
well as the actual features of Corregidor at the time of subject parachute drop,
is in order at the outset of this study in order to present what might have been
the commander�s estimate of the situation. Jumping from planes which are flying
about 100 miles per hour, each paratrooper will land approximately forty to
fifty yards from any other individual, (10) and �sticks� form normally an
elliptical pattern on the ground. The interval between jumpers is increased as
the altitude above the ground becomes greater, in view of the drift of the
parachutes as a result of wind velocity and air currents. �A jump of regimental
size when placed on one DZ [Drop Zone] is best executed if the three (3)
battalions are dropped at intervals of sixteen (16) seconds. This [sic] will
result in three (3) separate battalion concentration areas totaling
approximately five thousand (5000) yards by twelve hundred (1200) yards�. (11)
Corregidor Island (see map B) is less
than two miles square, and presented but three possible drop zones. One zone was
the emergency landing strip located on the tail of the pollywog-shaped island,
but this strip could be immediately discarded, inasmuch as no advantage would be
gained which could not be secured by an amphibious assault. The assaulting force
would have to gain the topmost part �Topside�, initially, in order to prevent
the enemy from having the advantage of observation down on the assault force;
which advantage the enemy would have were the strip used, inasmuch as the
emergency strip is situated on the lower, tail portion of the island.
The other two possibilities were the
parade ground and the golf course on �Topside�. However, the parade ground was
250 by 150 yards, and the gold course was approximately 75 yards longer but the
same width as the parade ground. ��the two [parade ground and golf course]
combined provided the smallest area into which an air drop of combat troops in
any number has yet been made.� (12) As if the size of the contemplated drop
zones was not sufficiently discouraging, the actual condition of the fields
presented a very short future for the potential parachutists: splintered trees
surrounded the small drop zones, as did tangled undergrowth and wrecked
buildings; the areas themselves were both pocked-marked with bomb craters, and
littered with rocks, scrap iron, tin roofing, and all sorts of debris which all
together closely approximated natural and man-made, anti-parachute invasion
obstacles. To guarantee that there would be nothing favorable about either of
these drop zones, both fields are contiguous to precipitous cliffs 600 feet
high, which drop off abruptly to the boulder-strewn beach. Too, the prevailing
winds of 15 to 25 miles per hour are seaward and unless the proper exit point
was chosen, parachutists would be carried to their deaths over the edge of the
cliffs or, at best, dropped into the sea. Drop casualties alone were estimated
to run as high as 20 percent. (13)
Why, then, in view of all the
disheartening features of Corregidor, should a parachute assault be considered
feasible?
For one reason, the terrific toll that
the Japanese had had to pay in lives lost in their amphibious assault in early
1942 on the very same island was still well remembered. Especially did this
factor take on an added significance when it was realized that the enemy had had
almost three years of concentrated effort during which to refortify the island
against attack from the sea. Coupled with an amphibious attack was the necessity
of making an uphill attack, once the actual landing had been effected.
The estimated enemy strength was 850
(14) and, consequently, expected jump casualties of an airborne attack would
still not reduce an assault force composed of a parachute regimental combat team
below an effective strength, especially in the view of the anticipated surprise
which would be gained from a vertical descent. All in all, casualties from an
airborne assault would possibly be less than an amphibious assault. �It was
correctly assumed that the Jap was adequately prepared for the latter
[amphibious] assault but, in all probability, would be caught flat-footed by the
former [parachute]. All other factors considered, the parachute descent was
acceptable and the decision was made�. (15) In fact, later confirmation from
both a prisoner of war and a recovered Japanese diary proved that the Japanese
commander of the island had actually been warned of an approaching airborne
attack. The commander had made an estimate of the situation and after a careful
terrain analysis, decided that a parachute attack was not feasible.
Consequently, he made no preparations for one. Had he prepared strong defenses
against such an attack, to include anti-parachute obstacles originally rumored
to exist, this particular monograph might never have been written. (16)
The discussion just presented
indicates that despite the fact that Corregidor lacked every desirable
characteristic for a jump zone, vertical envelopment was nevertheless decided
upon as the type of assault to be attempted. In fact, the island by it�s vary
nature was considered immune to a parachute attack, and this consideration by
the enemy undoubtedly assured the success of the parachute attack against
tremendous odds. (17)
PHASE
I � PREPARATION
As has already been stated in the
�General Situation�, the 11th Airborne Division on 31 January 1945, made an
amphibious landing at Nasugbu south of Manila (see map A). On 3 February the
511th Parachute Infantry of the Division jumped on the high ridge dominating the
Cavite area (see map A). To assist these units in their attack on Manila, the
504d Parachute Infantry Regiment was alerted for a probable mission of jumping
on Nichols Field (see map A). (18) At the time this alert was given, the 503d
Parachute Infantry, a separate regiment, was located in San Jose, Mindoro,
Philippine Islands (see map A). The organization was the principal and infantry
element of the already-famous 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute), which in
addition to the Infantry included the 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion
and Company C, 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion (later redesignated 161st
Airborne Engineer Company). (19)
On 31 January 1945, the RCT had
concluded the Mindoro Island phase of the Western Visayan Campaign. Although the
phase extended officially over a forty-five day period and included an
amphibious assault (without too much prior training therefore), the operation
consisted mainly, as has been previously stated, of establishing and maintaining
an extended perimeter around the town, as well as absorbing daily enemy air
attacks and a surprise enemy naval shelling. The operation had not been costly
in men (only four KIA) or material, but, nevertheless, equipment had to be
checked and replaced, inasmuch as the alert was for a contemplated parachute
drop, which would in addition to other details require the fabrication of cargo
containers designed by one of Assistance Parachute Maintenance Officers of the
Regiment. Too, detailed planning for the airlift and resupply has to be
initiated, as well as the numerous other preparations which, of necessity, are
associated with any combat mission. However, no one in the 503d Parachute
Infantry was the slightest bit surprised when two days later, 5 February 1945,
with a target date of 8 February, the alert was cancelled: the Regiment had been
on and off an alert status many times prior to this one. (20)
The next day, 6 February, found the
Regiment again alerted, but the signs of the time appeared to indicate that
�this is it�, in that a few days earlier a topographic relief model of
Corregidor, Philippine Islands, had arrived. (21) Corregidor was to be the
target this time. (22) Needless to relate, the planning and preparations
continued on the basis of the new mission, with the target date set for 16
February 1945.
One of the most serious problems at
this time was the shortage of equipment containers and the lack of time to pack
personal parachutes. There was sufficient webbing available, thanks to excellent
cooperation of the Air Force, and, consequently, the Parachute Maintenance
Platoon began operations on a twenty-four hour basis to fabricate slings and
containers of a type designed by members of the platoon. This type container,
called AA6, was suitable for dropping much of the equipment, but, in addition,
considerable improvisation had to be affected. (The Parachute Maintenance
Platoon had just recently completed its move from Leyte to Mindoro and was in
the process of setting up its equipment at the time the alert was received. As a
consequence of the lack of shelter and ship-unloading facilities at the location
of the Regiment at Leyte, the weather, mud, and salt water had taken a heavy
toll of parachute supplies and equipment). There were, however, sufficient cargo
canopies. Nevertheless, the problem was aggravated by the fact that parachutes
and containers used for aerial resupply would have to be considered totally lost
during the operation. (23)
The second half of the problem
relative to parachute maintenance and supply, that is, the lack of time during
which personal parachutes could be packed, was solved in part by the cooperation
of the 11th Airborne Division. (As has been stated, the 503d Parachute Infantry
was a separate regiment, an organic part of no division). However, the 11th
Airborne Division gave the Regiment 1500 packed, personnel parachutes. (24)
The remainder of the required number of personal parachutes plus the usual 10%
allowance for faulty packcovers, webbing, and similar deficiencies was packed by
the Regiment�s own Maintenance Platoon, which was working on a twenty-four hour
basis. Long-range planning proved its worth at this time in that the many hours
previously spent by the platoon on the fabrication of �home-made� carrying
pouches of all types resulted in a sufficient supply of this type of equipment.
Supply plans included a detail of
three officers and fifty men who were to bring on D minus 4 supplies and
equipment to the airstrip in the Subic Bay area. (see map A). These supplies and
equipment consisted of the squad kit bags, one unit of fire of 75-mm ammunition,
flame-throwers, and communication equipment; from Subic Bay the detail was to
transport these items via water on D plus 2. The squad kit bags, actually Air
Corps parachute bags carefully labeled for rapid identification, contained for
each man in the squad a blanket, one pair of jump boots, one set of overalls,
fatigue cap, two pairs of socks, and one pair of drawers. (25)
Initial resupply, that is, resupply
after the jumpers had dropped with their accompanying bundles, was to be by air.
Twelve C-47�s were allocated for this purpose and were to begin discharging
their loads after the completion of the third lift, the scheduled drop of the
First Battalion (Reinf). (See Phase II-Plan of Assault). These twelve C-47
planes were to continue daily aerial resupply until such time as the situation
permitted the use of water transportation. As was customary in all operations
participated in by the 503d Parachute Infantry, direct radio communication with
the Rear Base would be established as early as possible. By means of this
communication, the Rear Base would be kept constantly advised of the unexpected
needs of the organization and would include the requested supplies along with
those which were to be dropped daily on an �automatic� basis. (26)
On 4 February 1945, just a few days
prior to the alert for the operation on Corregidor, about 250 replacements had
arrived from the Zone of the Interior. This personnel had to be integrated into
the units, indoctrinated, and prepared for the pending operation within a
relatively short time. Informal range firing and small unit problems were
initiated. With the arrival of these replacements, the Regiment was just about
up to T/O strength, and it is at this point that a comment relative to the
strength of an airborne infantry unit at the time of the operation (February
1945) is in order, in that such a unit differed so radically from conventional,
infantry units. (27)
The T/O strength of a parachute rifle
company was eight officers and 119 enlisted men; each rifle platoon had a
platoon leader and an assistant platoon leader. The organization of the rifle
company was an organization of three rifle platoons of the two rifle squads and
one 60-mm mortar squad in each platoon. However, experience had indicated that
the rifle company organization, as included in the then-current War Department
T/O, was inferior to the provisional one which utilized three rifle platoons of
three rifle squads each and a fourth platoon of the three 60-mm mortars. The
Regiment was organized on that latter basis and had been for fifteen months
prior to the operation. (28) There were no heavy weapons company; the 81-mm
mortars (four) were assigned to Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
as were the twelve light machine guns -- there were no heavy machine guns
authorized for use by the parachute infantry. In addition, there was no cannon
company nor was there an anti-tank company; in fact, the only anti-tank weapons
in the Regiment were the 2.36 inch rocket launchers. (29)
There was one part of the preparation
phase which actually took place, unwittingly and unintentionally for this
operation, during the preparation phase of the preceding operation-- the
amphibious assault on Mindoro Island (see map A), 15 December 1944. At that time
when the decision to employ the RCT in an amphibious rather than a parachute
role had been made, the First Battalion was given training in the use of assault
boats. As will be pointed out in Phase III, this prior training proved extremely
valuable unexpectedly. (30)
To return to the preparation phase for
the operations on Corregidor Island, the topographic relief model was set up in
a pyramidal tent and kept under constant guard. Briefings were given with the
aid of this model and were supplemented by the personal observations of
personnel (two officers and four enlisted men) who had previously been on
Corregidor and were, therefore, detailed by higher headquarters to work with the
Regiment. Beginning on 12 February these briefings were supplemented by actual
flights of all key personnel, especially jumpmasters, over the drop zones. These
flights were made in the bombers which were engaged in the Air Force phase of
the assault (see Phase III) and proved of inestimable value in the analysis of
the terrain. Too, a very prevalent rumor at this time was the report that the
enemy had erected sharp poles and other anti-parachute obstacles on the proposed
drop zones, which were already inadvertently prepared by nature and bombings to
resist parachutes. Very close scrutiny of the drop zones from the bombers, which
�buzzed� the island intentionally low, proved the fallaciousness of the rumor,
but did confirm the intelligence relative to the hazardous conditions to be
expected. (31)
Inasmuch as the RCT area on Mindoro
Island was located close to the departure airfields, it was not necessary to
move to a so-called marshalling area-- a term uncommon to the personnel of the
RCT. Colonel John Lackey, Commanding Officer of the 317th Troop Carrier Group,
which had transported the Regiment on other missions, was a frequent visitor
and, consequently, extremely close liaison with the Air Force was effected.
(32)
Although no wire fence was erected
around the camp site (a practice not used by the Regiment) as a prevention of
leaks in security (33), adequate security precautions were maintained. On the
afternoon of 15 February, the day before the jump, the RCT Commander, Colonel
George M. Jones held a formation of the entire command (less the Third
Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, which would not become part of the RCT until
that unit had arrived on Corregidor) and briefly explained the operation, wished
all �good luck�, and had the adjutant announce that all personnel were
restricted to the camp. That evening captured Japanese films of the enemy�s
attack on Corregidor in early 1942 were shown. (34) The ruggedness of the
terrain was again emphasized.
The 503d Regimental Combat Team
(Parachute) was ready to retake Corregidor.
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