PHASE IV � THE SEIZURE
1. Western Sector:
No
time was wasted by the Rock Force Commander in his attempt to seize the island.
At dawn on the next day, 17 February, after an unspectacular night of constant
and heavy fire, which was merely harassing in nature inasmuch as the enemy was
unable to reorganize, the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, with
support from the 2d Battalion, began a coordinated attack on Morrison Hill, the
high ground in the vicinity of Morrison Point (see map E). The high ground was a
critical terrain feature which favored the defense, so that our forces were
rather surprised when by 1000 hours they had secured the hill against light
opposition. (90) Thus, the objective of a gradual enlargement of the perimeter
with constant reduction of the enemy, while the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry
Regiment, contained the defenders in Malinta Tunnel, had been launched.
Coincident with the attack on Morrison Hill, the 2d Battalion launched its first
assault on Wheeler Battery (see map E), and not until late in the afternoon of
18 February was the position taken. The Japanese merely went below the ground
into their recesses of the position; they would then reappear at another
opening. The position was a former coast artillery, heave gun position, and the
enemy had converted the installation into a strong fortress without visible
evidence of the improvement. This position was one of the most difficult to
subdue and typified the character of the installations which were to be
encountered during the operation.
In accordance with previous plans, the
third lift took off from Mindoro Island at 0700 hours, 17 February, but merely
dropped its cargo bundles as it passed over Field �A� in a column of single
planes at 0830 hours. As stated in the preceding phrase, this lift was to
proceed to the Subic Bay area (see map A) where it would land and then be
seaborne to Corregidor Island. it is interesting to note that this lift received
the heaviest antiaircraft fire of all the lifts, as it passed over the �Rock�,
as Corregidor was familiarly called. Several planes received bullet holes and
five crewmen were wounded. The enemy was recovering from his surprise of the
proceeding day. However, these gun positions were silenced by our artillery to
such an extent that when the first resupply mission of thirty-three C-47 planes
flew over the same field in the afternoon for a total of 191 passes not a plane
was damaged. (91)
James Ravine (see map E) controlled
the road to the beach, so that after the seizure of Morrison Hill, this area
received attention. Meanwhile, troops of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry
Regiment, continued with their primary mission by improving their position on
Malinta Hill. (92)
�Operation Cooperation� functioned
even off the Island of Corregidor, for when the third lift (1st Battalion, 503d
Parachute Infantry Regiment, with Battery �C� and one platoon �D� Battery, 462d
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion attached) arrived in the Subic Bay area,
trucks rushed this personnel to the docks, where APD�s took them to South Dock,
Corregidor Island. This phase of the operation was completely unscheduled and
not anticipated, yet it was organized on the briefest of warnings and functioned
smoothly. However, as the LCVP�s from the APD�s approached the Corregidor shore
(see map E) at 1400 hours, the enemy in cave openings on the face of the
�Topside� cliffs which looked down at the beach directed heavy, sustained,
automatic fire on the paratroops-turned-amphibians. The entire beach area was
under intense fire, and the cave openings were not in a position to be fired at
by our weapons on the island. The LCVP�s pulled back from the beach, and
destroyers moved in. Direct fire of five-inch gunfire into the mouths of the
caves terminated the fire from these positions, and the LCVP�s were beached.
(93)
The 1st Battalion with its attachments
landed at 1630 hours and made its way about 600 yards northwest from the beach
(see map D). In that area the Battalion, under the Regimental Executive Officer,
organized a perimeter for the night. The Demolition Section of the 3d Battalion,
503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, had joined the waterborne, parachute battalion
at Subic Bay; it will be recalled that this Demolition Section had had to bail
out of its defective plane over Luzon on the preceding day. (94)
The operations for the second day
concluded with one company of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry,
occupying the high ground of Morrison Hill. The commanding ground was a critical
terrain feature, in that the expansion of the perimeter could logically begin
from this point. The main perimeter for the night was slightly larger than the
one of the preceding night, in spite of the extensive patrolling and assaults of
the day. The principle employed was to exploit during the day but withdraw at
night. The enemy during the night would return to the locations at which he had
suffered such heavy casualties during the day (cumulative total � 364), and the
good hunting would commence in the morning. (95) It was evident, therefore,
that the enemy plan of operation was to allow our forces to assault these
well-defended and well-organized installations while he defended them. However,
we lost eight men killed in action during the day and still could not evacuate
any wounded. (96)
In addition to the systematic
reduction of the pill-boxes, bunkers, and underground installations in the
vicinity of Wheeler Battery, artillery fire and infantry assaults had been
utilized to secure equipment bundles and suppress enemy fire on the drop zones.
Enemy fire from all sources now was moderate to heavy . (97)
Two jeeps arrived from the beach area
with trailers of loaded five-gallon water cans. As a result, water was now
plentiful; two canteens a day instead of one! Only one jeep was suitable for use
by the Regimental S-4 in the collection of scattered equipment bundles; the
other had been rendered unserviceable by gunfire enroute. (98)
The routine artillery and mortar fire
was employed during the night in the role of harassing fire. As we customary,
the night rule of �anything which moves is an enemy� was in effect as always,
and on this night 200 such �anythings� moved west along the road from Malinta
Hill toward �Topside� in order to launch an unexpected banzai attack. However,
this unit was observed and taken under fire. (99)
The road to the beach was fairly free
of enemy fire by 18 February, so that evacuation finally began. To assist the
RCT in the care of the sick and wounded, the 18th Portable Surgical Hospital was
attached. That organization arrived from the beach area on the 18th, too, and
set up its facilities adjacent to the Regimental Aid station on the first floor
of the barracks. Too much praise cannot be given for the services provided by
this medical installation and attached surgical teams. (100)
On the same morning, 18 February, the
1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, was moved under enemy fire to
�Topside� from its position near the beach. A rearrangement of parachute
battalion sections was effected so that the 1st Battalion was given the
responsibility of clearing the southern zone, the 2d Battalion from the north to
the southwest, and the 3d Battalion from the north to the southeast. (see map
E) (101) With this readjustments in sectors, the pattern of ground action
became very familiar and effective, aided and abetted by the enemy�s own actions
of blowing himself up in his underground arsenals. (102) Direct fire of the
75-mm artillery was used as the ground assaulting fire on enemy emplacements;
this fire was frequently coupled with naval and/or aerial strikes. Immediately
after the assaulting fire had lifted or were being lifted, the aggressive and
vigorous ground assault began. This ground assault was conducted by patrols,
supported by the battalion heavy weapons (60- and 81-mm mortars) and field
artillery, 75mm howitzers, and accompanied by demolition personnel. (103)
The patrols functioned as assault
teams, inasmuch as the enemy generally followed the tactics of getting or
remaining in his hole, be it pillbox, bunker, cave, tunnel, or underground
installation of varying degree of elaborateness. Thompson sub-machine gunners
and riflemen were stationed to cover the men armed with flame throwers and WP
grenades who advanced toward the openings. The streams of flame and exploding
white phosphorous either inflicted casualties and/or drove the enemy deep within
his lair. Some enemy often ablaze or covered with burning phosphorous, would try
to make an escape from the openings, but they were cut down by automatic or
rifle fire. The final step in this assault procedure was to seal the openings by
demolition. An interesting comment is in order at this point in the discussion
relative to the use of flame throwers. Instead of the conventional system of
projecting ignited fuel into a cave, unignited fuel was often sprayed into the
cave, and then a WP grenade thrown in afterwards to ignite the fuel. As a result
of this procedure, maximum distance into the inner recesses of the cave was
obtained, as wall as an opportunity for both the flame thrower operator and the
grenade-thrower to get back beyond the back-draft. (104)
This system worked so well that by
2400 hours, 18 February, 1,090 enemy dead had been counted, and no prisoners of
war had been taken. (The number of enemy who were sealed in the tunnels and who
later died will probably never be known.) The enemy, therefore, decided to
change his tactic to the offence. (105)
Consequently, at 0130 hours on 19
February the enemy exploded an underground arsenal in the vicinity of Breakwater
Point (see map E), above which elements of the Regiment were in position in a
perimeter defense. There were casualties on both sides. However, twenty enemy of
the group of forty who had been there were not killed, but these survivors were
not to be left behind by those who had joined their ancestors. The twenty
Japanese formed a circle, simultaneously armed with grenades, held them to their
stomachs, and joined their ancestors, too. That is, all twenty minus one who at
the last moment got �cold feet�. (106)
In the First Battalion area of
responsibility, the southern part of the western sector, the cliffs were so
steep that the hand-carrying of supplies and evacuation of personnel was not
feasible. Here, again, naval cooperation came to the rescue. LCVP�s operating
from South Dock (see map E) supplied the Battalion by water and evacuated dead
and wounded on the return trip. Too, it is to be noted that SCR-300 radios were
totally useless in the deep ravines, even for very short distances. (107)
The change in enemy tactics was noted
again when at 0300 hours that same morning, 19 February, 400 enemy launched in
the vicinity of Cheney and Wheeler Batteries (see map D), the first coordinated,
banzai attack against our perimeter. The attack was finally halted at 0845
hours, but not before enemy had reached the 2d Battalion Command Post located in
the barracks along with the Regimental Command Post and other installations.
Fierce hand-to-hand fighting developed in this attack, but the enemy suffered
heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw before he could consolidate his
temporary gains. We sustained heavy casualties, but far less than the enemy.
(108)
This change in enemy tactics was
further evidenced by stronger resistance and a marked increase in the number of
banzai attacks. Too, there were definite indications, such as the early-morning
attack on the 2d Battalion sector, that coordination had at least been affected,
as well as increased use of automatic fire. All units located on �Topside�
reported infiltration during the night. At Malinta Tunnel, despite heavy fire
placed on all exits, many enemy managed to leave the tunnel. At any rate, the
total counted enemy killed had risen to 1583, and as further evidence of a
change in tactics, three prisoners of war had been taken. (109)
Our forces continued the pattern of
patrol assaults on emplacements during the day, but withdrawal to the ever
expanding perimeters at night. (110) Rock, Wheeler and Breakwater Points (see
map E) were scenes of some of the heaviest and bloodiest fighting. �On 20
February, 53 caves and tunnels were sealed in the Breakwater Point area alone�.
(111) Air and naval fire support was excellent and used extensively in the
assaults on the northern portions of the western sector. (112)
On the afternoon of 20 February during
a naval strike, the eastern entrance to Malinta Tunnel was hit by shells from
the destroyer bombardment, and the resulting landslide closed the tunnel from
the east. This development may or may not have influenced the enemy�s next major
action, but, at any rate, at 2130 hours, the next day, Malinta Tunnel was rocked
by an internal explosion. �Not only did Corregidor roll like a ship at sea but
the Bataan Peninsula verberated and trembled, so great was the explosion. Flames
poured from all the tunnel entrances. There were landslides and casualties but
the question that had been in the minds of all for days was answered, [sic]
Malinta Hill survived�. (113)
From prisoner of war statements as
well as captured documents the fact had been established that the tunnel had
contained huge quantities of ammunition, demolitions, and about 2000 enemy.
After the explosion, later prisoners admitted that the explosion had been
intentional, as well as controlled, but it had exceeded their own estimate in
magnitude and had killed many inside. The purpose of the explosion was to
destroy the troops guarding the western entrance and then launch an immediate
attack in force against the paratroops on �Topside�. Many enemy were killed in
the dash for escape, but several hundred did make their way to the eastern end
of the island, when it was discovered that the resulting landslide had blocked
the road on the south side of Malinta Hill. The group which had tried to attack
around the north end ran into the mortar concentrations, heavy machine-gun fire,
and tank fire of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment. The enemy withdrew,
but not before he had suffered several hundred casualties. We, too, had lost
some men in the landslide. (114)
The last major enemy assault on the
western sector occurred about 0930 hours, 23 February, at which time about 400
desperate enemy tried to penetrate our perimeter in the vicinity of Wheeler
Point (see map E). He made temporary gains after a heavy fire fight, but was
forced to withdraw. This drive marked the close of the concentrated effort of
all our forces to seize the western portion of the island. The 2d Battalion was
to continue to mop up in this sector, where some bitter and heavy fighting was
yet to ensue, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 503d Parachute Infantry, began
the task of seizing the eastern sector of the island. Up to 24 February, the
enemy had suffered 2,466 counter dead, six prisoners of war, and untold numbers
sealed in caves, tunnels, and other underground instillations. (115)
2. Eastern Sector
On
23 February, the commanding officer of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 503d
Parachute Infantry, went to Malinta Hill to observe the eastern sector of the
island. With the Rock Force Commander, plans were laid for the seizure of this,
the second half of the island. Aerial, naval, and field artillery bombardment
had already begun to soften up this part of the island, so that on 24 February
the attacks began. At 0830 hours the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, moved
around the north end of Malinta Hill and secured the high ground in the vicinity
of Engineer Point (see map E). Concurrently, one company from the 1st Battalion,
503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, moved down the east side of Malinta Hill to
secure the road net, while the rest of the Battalion pushed through the 3d
Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, and repulsed a heavy counter-attack in the
vicinity of Engineer and Infantry Points (see map E). The two serviceable tanks
worked with the 1st Battalion to form effective tank-infantry teams. The 3d
Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, followed very closely behind the
1st Battalion and mopped up the enemy who were left behind in the swift forward
push. (116)
The enemy realized he was being pushed
closer and closer to the end of the island and eventually he would not only be
at his wit�s end but also at the island�s end and his own. Consequently, he
began to attempt to cross the two-mile stretch of water to Bataan via raft or
logs. At first, attempts by the navy were made to pick up these men, but all
courtesy was ordered ended when these man were found to be armed and to resist
our hospitality. Consequently, to avoid loss of American lives in attempted
rescues, strafing was authorized. Fighter planes, naval craft, and even liaison
planes armed with hand grenades and rifles allowed few survivors to reach
Bataan. About 200 enemy were killed in this fashion, but that number is not
included in the RCT totals, in that the RCT neither killed or wounded them.
(117)
One of the potential threats of
Corregidor Island was that the Navy feared that the island harbored the
so-called �Q� boats. These were plywood craft, fifteen feet long, four feet
wide, and powered by a four-cylinder engine. A Jap would plow these boats into
the side of a ship, and the 600 pounds of picric acid in the bow would blow up
both ships and the Jap. At any rate, on 24 February the fears of the Navy were
justified when nineteen such suicide craft were found in caves just west of the
beach at San Jose (see map E). However, all of these boats had had holes knocked
into them. (118)
Late that same day, 24 February, as
the 1st Battalion was moving into favorable positions for the attack, the enemy
contested this activity by heavy machine-gun fire, as well as mortar fire. At
the same time, he, too, prepared for an attack on �Topside� by the concentration
of approximately 600 troops about 300 yards south of Infantry Point. However,
our field artillery massed its fires on this assembly area and sent half of the
caught enemy forces to join its ancestors, while our small arms fire accounted
for an additional 135 troops. The enemy attack about 2300 hours, although
proceeded by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, needless to relate failed, and
the remaining enemy withdrew to monkey and Cavalry Points (see map E). (119)
During that same night, 24 February,
the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion was holding a meeting of his staff
and Company Commanders relative to the attack next day, when a mortar round
landed in the group. The Battalion Commander, the S-2, and two radio operators
were killed, and of the thirteen present, only two were untouched. The Executive
Officer, one of those who were unscathed, immediately assumed command. (120)
The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry
Regiment, on 25 February was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry
Regiment. The relieved Battalion had done a splendid job and had accounted for
815 enemy dead. The platoon of the Cannon Company which had landed with the
original amphibious assault forces remained with the relieving unit and
maintained its M-7, 75-mm, self-propelled, vehicles, and its two M-4 tanks. With
the departure of the relieved unit, a total of 3,703 enemy dead had been
counted, and a total of sixteen prisoners of war had been taken; the majority of
the latter were picked up trying to escape from the island. (121)
As can be seen from map E. Monkey
Point is about the last point of favorable terrain on the route of withdrawal of
the enemy to the east. Consequently, as our forces continued to push him to a
last-ditch stand, he followed his usual tactics of destroying himself and trying
to take as many of our forces as possible along with him. At 1100 hours, 26
February, he made his last act of desperation. While the 1st Battalion (about
500 troops), was in position on a hill near the underground radio installations
in the vicinity of Monkey Point just prior to the attack, the enemy blew up the
hill, an underground arsenal. �A ravine was created where a hill had been�.
(122) One of the tanks was blown into the air and landed upside down; our men
died without a visible sign of a wound or injury; in all, 196 Americans were
killed, wounded, or injured, and the 1st Battalion was disorganized. The closely
following 3d Battalion immediately lent aid to the survivors, as well as pushed
forward to assume the lead position in the relentless drive to the east. This
last act of the enemy eliminated the sole remaining concentration of his forces,
along with 150 counted dead and many others mangled and buried in the debris.
(123)
The 3d Battalion on the next day, 27
February, reached the eastern tip of the island, after the final assault. The
1st Battalion returned to �Topside� to reorganize. (124)
3. Mop-up
Although the island was now occupied by our forces from tip to tip, a great many
enemy still remained in the caves along the outer cliffs. The 2d Battalion, 503d
Parachute Infantry, continued the mopping up in its sector, �Topside� against
very heave opposition especially in the vicinity of Wheeler Battery. The 3d
Battalion assumed responsibility for the eastern sector and continued with
mopping up in that area.
For the first time since 23 January
1945 there were no aerial strikes after 26 February, in that our troops now
occupied the entire island. Naval gun fire, however, was still used against the
coastal caves. As was to be expected, assault patrols had to do this cleaning up
of these remaining pockets of resistance. The familiar procedure of assault
followed by blowing the cave shut was utilized. In all, over 400 caves were
sealed by use of over seventeen tons of explosives. (125) The work of these
patrols, as well as of larger attacks, had been enhanced by the translations of
captured enemy documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war. Inasmuch as
a Neisi interpreter at Regimental Headquarters translated the enemy documents
and interrogated the few prisoners of war captured by the Regiment, the
intelligence produced from these sources was often in the hands of the
battalions within a very few hours of the capture of the documents or prisoners.
By this time, the island had become so
infested with flies that to eat the usual type of emergency rations without
flies was a feat in itself. The unsanitary conditions under which the remaining
Japanese were living had aggravated the situation to such an extent that
immediate action had to be taken. Despite the rigid control exercised by our
forces, flies thrived wherever there were Japanese, and, naturally, spread all
over the island. However, arrangements were made with the Air Force to spray the
island on 1 and 2 March with D.D.T., and as improbable as it sounds, after the
spraying all the flies had disappeared as if there had never been any on the
island. (126)
By 2 March 1945 the remaining enemy,
(a total of 4,506 dead had been counted and 19 prisoners of war had been taken)
was located in concealed water-line caves in the vicinity of Infantry, Cavalry,
Engineer, and Wheeler Points (see map D). There were approximately 200-300 still
remaining, but for all practical purposes the operation was officially over. On
that day, the third anniversary of the activation of the 503d Parachute Infantry
Regiment, in the flag-raising ceremonies at the same flag pole from which the
American flag had been hauled down on 6 May 1942, Colonel George M. Jones, Rock
Force Commander, presented the island to the Commander-in- Chief, General
Douglas MacArthur. (127)
Thus, in twelve days Corregidor had
been wrestled from approximately 6000 enemy, by 2700 parachutists (including 600
field artillery men and engineers) and 1100 standard infantrymen. The RCT
suffered 165 killed, 615 wounded or injured, while the attached units lost 45
killed and 174 wounded or injured. The total casualties were 120 killed and 889
wounded or injured (in enemy explosions). (128) The operation may well be
concluded by the following quotation:
�This strongly fortified, natural
defensive area, defended to the point of annihilation by well equipped,
numerically superior and fanatical enemy, was reduced in a period of twelve
days. Careful planning, employment of the element of surprise, and the
determined attack of skillful troops, perfectly coordinated with air and naval
support, again proved an unbeatable combination�. (129)
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