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                      PHASE IV � THE SEIZURE

      1.   Western Sector: 

No time was wasted by the Rock Force Commander in his attempt to seize the island. At dawn on the next day, 17 February, after an unspectacular night of constant and heavy fire, which was merely harassing in nature inasmuch as the enemy was unable to reorganize, the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, with support from the 2d Battalion, began a coordinated attack on Morrison Hill, the high ground in the vicinity of Morrison Point (see map E). The high ground was a critical terrain feature which favored the defense, so that our forces were rather surprised when by 1000 hours they had secured the hill against light opposition.  (90)  Thus, the objective of a gradual enlargement of the perimeter with constant reduction of the enemy, while the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, contained the defenders in Malinta Tunnel, had been launched. Coincident with the attack on Morrison Hill, the 2d Battalion launched its first assault on Wheeler Battery (see map E), and not until late in the afternoon of 18 February was the position taken. The Japanese merely went below the ground into their recesses of the position; they would then reappear at another opening. The position was a former coast artillery, heave gun position, and the enemy had converted the installation into a strong fortress without visible evidence of the improvement. This position was one of the most difficult to subdue and typified the character of the installations which were to be encountered during the operation.

In accordance with previous plans, the third lift took off from Mindoro Island at 0700 hours, 17 February, but merely dropped its cargo bundles as it passed over Field �A� in a column of single planes at 0830 hours. As stated in the preceding phrase, this lift was to proceed to the Subic Bay area (see map A) where it would land and then be seaborne to Corregidor Island. it is interesting to note that this lift received the heaviest antiaircraft fire of all the lifts, as it passed over the �Rock�, as Corregidor was familiarly called. Several planes received bullet holes and five crewmen were wounded. The enemy was recovering from his surprise of the proceeding day. However, these gun positions were silenced by our artillery to such an extent that when the first resupply mission of thirty-three C-47 planes flew over the same field in the afternoon for a total of 191 passes not a plane was damaged.  (91)

James Ravine (see map E) controlled the road to the beach, so that after the seizure of Morrison Hill, this area received attention. Meanwhile, troops of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, continued with their primary mission by improving their position on Malinta Hill.  (92)

�Operation Cooperation� functioned even off the Island of Corregidor, for when the third lift (1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, with Battery �C� and one platoon �D� Battery, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion attached) arrived in the Subic Bay area, trucks rushed this personnel to the docks, where APD�s took them to South Dock, Corregidor Island. This phase of the operation was completely unscheduled and not anticipated, yet it was organized on the briefest of warnings and functioned smoothly. However, as the LCVP�s from the APD�s approached the Corregidor shore (see map E) at 1400 hours, the enemy in cave openings on the face of the �Topside� cliffs which looked down at the beach directed heavy, sustained, automatic fire on the paratroops-turned-amphibians. The entire beach area was under intense fire, and the cave openings were not in a position to be fired at by our weapons on the island. The LCVP�s pulled back from the beach, and destroyers moved in. Direct fire of five-inch gunfire into the mouths of the caves terminated the fire from these positions, and the LCVP�s were beached.  (93)

The 1st Battalion with its attachments landed at 1630 hours and made its way about 600 yards northwest from the beach (see map D). In that area the Battalion, under the Regimental Executive Officer, organized a perimeter for the night. The Demolition Section of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, had joined the waterborne, parachute battalion at Subic Bay; it will be recalled that this Demolition Section had had to bail out of its defective plane over Luzon on the preceding day.  (94)

The operations for the second day concluded with one company of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, occupying the high ground of Morrison Hill. The commanding ground was a critical terrain feature, in that the expansion of the perimeter could logically begin from this point. The main perimeter for the night was slightly larger than the one of the preceding night, in spite of the extensive patrolling and assaults of the day. The principle employed was to exploit during the day but withdraw at night. The enemy during the night would return to the locations at which he had suffered such heavy casualties during the day (cumulative total � 364), and the good hunting would commence in the morning.  (95)  It was evident, therefore, that the enemy plan of operation was to allow our forces to assault these well-defended and well-organized installations while he defended them. However, we lost eight men killed in action during the day and still could not evacuate any wounded.  (96)

In addition to the systematic reduction of the pill-boxes, bunkers, and underground installations in the vicinity of Wheeler Battery, artillery fire and infantry assaults had been utilized to secure equipment bundles and suppress enemy fire on the drop zones. Enemy fire from all sources now was moderate to heavy .  (97)

Two jeeps arrived from the beach area with trailers of loaded five-gallon water cans. As a result, water was now plentiful; two canteens a day instead of one! Only one jeep was suitable for use by the Regimental S-4 in the collection of scattered equipment bundles; the other had been rendered unserviceable by gunfire enroute.  (98)

The routine artillery and mortar fire was employed during the night in the role of harassing fire. As we customary, the night rule of �anything which moves is an enemy� was in effect as always, and on this night 200 such �anythings� moved west along the road from Malinta Hill toward �Topside� in order to launch an unexpected banzai attack. However, this unit was observed and taken under fire.  (99)

The road to the beach was fairly free of enemy fire by 18 February, so that evacuation finally began. To assist the RCT in the care of the sick and wounded, the 18th Portable Surgical Hospital was attached. That organization arrived from the beach area on the 18th, too, and set up its facilities adjacent to the Regimental Aid station on the first floor of the barracks. Too much praise cannot be given for the services provided by this medical installation and attached surgical teams.  (100)

On the same morning, 18 February, the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, was moved under enemy fire to �Topside� from its position near the beach. A rearrangement of parachute battalion sections was effected so that the 1st Battalion was given the responsibility of clearing the southern zone, the 2d Battalion from the north to the southwest, and the 3d Battalion from the north to the southeast. (see map E)  (101)  With this readjustments in sectors, the pattern of ground action became very familiar and effective, aided and abetted by the enemy�s own actions of blowing himself up in his underground arsenals.  (102)  Direct fire of the 75-mm artillery was used as the ground assaulting fire on enemy emplacements; this fire was frequently coupled with naval and/or aerial strikes. Immediately after the assaulting fire had lifted or were being lifted, the aggressive and vigorous ground assault began. This ground assault was conducted by patrols, supported by the battalion heavy weapons (60- and 81-mm mortars) and field artillery, 75mm howitzers, and accompanied by demolition personnel.  (103)

The patrols functioned as assault teams, inasmuch as the enemy generally followed the tactics of getting or remaining in his hole, be it pillbox, bunker, cave, tunnel, or underground installation of varying degree of elaborateness. Thompson sub-machine gunners and riflemen were stationed to cover the men armed with flame throwers and WP grenades who advanced toward the openings. The streams of flame and exploding white phosphorous either inflicted casualties and/or drove the enemy deep within his lair. Some enemy often ablaze or covered with burning phosphorous, would try to make an escape from the openings, but they were cut down by automatic or rifle fire. The final step in this assault procedure was to seal the openings by demolition. An interesting comment is in order at this point in the discussion relative to the use of flame throwers. Instead of the conventional system of projecting ignited fuel into a cave, unignited fuel was often sprayed into the cave, and then a WP grenade thrown in afterwards to ignite the fuel. As a result of this procedure, maximum distance into the inner recesses of the cave was obtained, as wall as an opportunity for both the flame thrower operator and the grenade-thrower to get back beyond the back-draft.  (104)

This system worked so well that by 2400 hours, 18 February, 1,090 enemy dead had been counted, and no prisoners of war had been taken.  (The number of enemy who were sealed in the tunnels and who later died will probably never be known.) The enemy, therefore, decided to change his tactic to the offence.  (105)

Consequently, at 0130 hours on 19 February the enemy exploded an underground arsenal in the vicinity of Breakwater Point (see map E), above which elements of the Regiment were in position in a perimeter defense. There were casualties on both sides. However, twenty enemy of the group of forty who had been there were not killed, but these survivors were not to be left behind by those who had joined their ancestors. The twenty Japanese formed a circle, simultaneously armed with grenades, held them to their stomachs, and joined their ancestors, too. That is, all twenty minus one who at the last moment got �cold feet�.  (106)

In the First Battalion area of responsibility, the southern part of the western sector, the cliffs were so steep that the hand-carrying of supplies and evacuation of personnel was not feasible. Here, again, naval cooperation came to the rescue. LCVP�s operating from South Dock (see map E) supplied the Battalion by water and evacuated dead and wounded on the return trip. Too, it is to be noted that SCR-300 radios were totally useless in the deep ravines, even for very short distances.  (107)

The change in enemy tactics was noted again when at 0300 hours that same morning, 19 February, 400 enemy launched in the vicinity of Cheney and Wheeler Batteries (see map D), the first coordinated, banzai attack against our perimeter. The attack was finally halted at 0845 hours, but not before enemy had reached the 2d Battalion Command Post located in the barracks along with the Regimental Command Post and other installations. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting developed in this attack, but the enemy suffered heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw before he could consolidate his temporary gains. We sustained heavy casualties, but far less than the enemy.  (108)

This change in enemy tactics was further evidenced by stronger resistance and a marked increase in the number of banzai attacks. Too, there were definite indications, such as the early-morning attack on the 2d Battalion sector, that coordination had at least been affected, as well as increased use of automatic fire. All units located on �Topside� reported infiltration during the night. At Malinta Tunnel, despite heavy fire placed on all exits, many enemy managed to leave the tunnel. At any rate, the total counted enemy killed had risen to 1583, and as further evidence of a change in tactics, three prisoners of war had been taken.  (109)

Our forces continued the pattern of patrol assaults on emplacements during the day, but withdrawal to the ever expanding perimeters at night.  (110)  Rock, Wheeler and Breakwater Points (see map E) were scenes of some of the heaviest and bloodiest fighting. �On 20 February, 53 caves and tunnels were sealed in the Breakwater Point area alone�.  (111)  Air and naval fire support was excellent and used extensively in the assaults on the northern portions of the western sector.  (112)

On the afternoon of 20 February during a naval strike, the eastern entrance to Malinta Tunnel was hit by shells from the destroyer bombardment, and the resulting landslide closed the tunnel from the east. This development may or may not have influenced the enemy�s next major action, but, at any rate, at 2130 hours, the next day, Malinta Tunnel was rocked by an internal explosion. �Not only did Corregidor roll like a ship at sea but the Bataan Peninsula verberated and trembled, so great was the explosion. Flames poured from all the tunnel entrances. There were landslides and casualties but the question that had been in the minds of all for days was answered, [sic] Malinta Hill survived�.  (113)

From prisoner of war statements as well as captured documents the fact had been established that the tunnel had contained huge quantities of ammunition, demolitions, and about 2000 enemy. After the explosion, later prisoners admitted that the explosion had been intentional, as well as controlled, but it had exceeded their own estimate in magnitude and had killed many inside. The purpose of the explosion was to destroy the troops guarding the western entrance and then launch an immediate attack in force against the paratroops on �Topside�. Many enemy were killed in the dash for escape, but several hundred did make their way to the eastern end of the island, when it was discovered that the resulting landslide had blocked the road on the south side of Malinta Hill. The group which had tried to attack around the north end ran into the mortar concentrations, heavy machine-gun fire, and tank fire of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment. The enemy withdrew, but not before he had suffered several hundred casualties. We, too, had lost some men in the landslide.  (114)

The last major enemy assault on the western sector occurred about 0930 hours, 23 February, at which time about 400 desperate enemy tried to penetrate our perimeter in the vicinity of Wheeler Point (see map E). He made temporary gains after a heavy fire fight, but was forced to withdraw. This drive marked the close of the concentrated effort of all our forces to seize the western portion of the island. The 2d Battalion was to continue to mop up in this sector, where some bitter and heavy fighting was yet to ensue, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 503d Parachute Infantry, began the task of seizing the eastern sector of the island. Up to 24 February, the enemy had suffered 2,466 counter dead, six prisoners of war, and untold numbers sealed in caves, tunnels, and other underground instillations.  (115)

    2.    Eastern Sector

On 23 February, the commanding officer of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 503d Parachute Infantry, went to Malinta Hill to observe the eastern sector of the island. With the Rock Force Commander, plans were laid for the seizure of this, the second half of the island. Aerial, naval, and field artillery bombardment had already begun to soften up this part of the island, so that on 24 February the attacks began. At 0830 hours the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, moved around the north end of Malinta Hill and secured the high ground in the vicinity of Engineer Point (see map E). Concurrently, one company from the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, moved down the east side of Malinta Hill to secure the road net, while the rest of the Battalion pushed through the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, and repulsed a heavy counter-attack in the vicinity of Engineer and Infantry Points (see map E). The two serviceable tanks worked with the 1st Battalion to form effective tank-infantry teams. The 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, followed very closely behind the 1st Battalion and mopped up the enemy who were left behind in the swift forward push.  (116)

The enemy realized he was being pushed closer and closer to the end of the island and eventually he would not only be at his wit�s end but also at the island�s end and his own. Consequently, he began to attempt to cross the two-mile stretch of water to Bataan via raft or logs. At first, attempts by the navy were made to pick up these men, but all courtesy was ordered ended when these man were found to be armed and to resist our hospitality. Consequently, to avoid loss of American lives in attempted rescues, strafing was authorized. Fighter planes, naval craft, and even liaison planes armed with hand grenades and rifles allowed few survivors to reach Bataan. About 200 enemy were killed in this fashion, but that number is not included in the RCT totals, in that the RCT neither killed or wounded them.  (117)

One of the potential threats of Corregidor Island was that the Navy feared that the island harbored the so-called �Q� boats. These were plywood craft, fifteen feet long, four feet wide, and powered by a four-cylinder engine. A Jap would plow these boats into the side of a ship, and the 600 pounds of picric acid in the bow would blow up both ships and the Jap. At any rate, on 24 February the fears of the Navy were justified when nineteen such suicide craft were found in caves just west of the beach at San Jose (see map E). However, all of these boats had had holes knocked into them.  (118)

Late that same day, 24 February, as the 1st Battalion was moving into favorable positions for the attack, the enemy contested this activity by heavy machine-gun fire, as well as mortar fire. At the same time, he, too, prepared for an attack on �Topside� by the concentration of approximately 600 troops about 300 yards south of Infantry Point. However, our field artillery massed its fires on this assembly area and sent half of the caught enemy forces to join its ancestors, while our small arms fire accounted for an additional 135 troops. The enemy attack about 2300 hours, although proceeded by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, needless to relate failed, and the remaining enemy withdrew to monkey and Cavalry Points (see map E).  (119)

During that same night, 24 February, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion was holding a meeting of his staff and Company Commanders relative to the attack next day, when a mortar round landed in the group. The Battalion Commander, the S-2, and two radio operators were killed, and of the thirteen present, only two were untouched. The Executive Officer, one of those who were unscathed, immediately assumed command.  (120)

The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, on 25 February was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment. The relieved Battalion had done a splendid job and had accounted for 815 enemy dead. The platoon of the Cannon Company which had landed with the original amphibious assault forces remained with the relieving unit and maintained its M-7, 75-mm, self-propelled, vehicles, and its two M-4 tanks. With the departure of the relieved unit, a total of 3,703 enemy dead had been counted, and a total of sixteen prisoners of war had been taken; the majority of the latter were picked up trying to escape from the island.  (121)

As can be seen from map E. Monkey Point is about the last point of favorable terrain on the route of withdrawal of the enemy to the east. Consequently, as our forces continued to push him to a last-ditch stand, he followed his usual tactics of destroying himself and trying to take as many of our forces as possible along with him. At 1100 hours, 26 February, he made his last act of desperation. While the 1st Battalion (about 500 troops), was in position on a hill near the underground radio installations in the vicinity of Monkey Point just prior to the attack, the enemy blew up the hill, an underground arsenal. �A ravine was created where a hill had been�.  (122)  One of the tanks was blown into the air and landed upside down; our men died without a visible sign of a wound or injury; in all, 196 Americans were killed, wounded, or injured, and the 1st Battalion was disorganized. The closely following 3d Battalion immediately lent aid to the survivors, as well as pushed forward to assume the lead position in the relentless drive to the east. This last act of the enemy eliminated the sole remaining concentration of his forces, along with 150 counted dead and many others mangled and buried in the debris.  (123)

The 3d Battalion on the next day, 27 February, reached the eastern tip of the island, after the final assault. The 1st Battalion returned to �Topside� to reorganize.  (124)

3.   Mop-up

Although the island was now occupied by our forces from tip to tip, a great many enemy still remained in the caves along the outer cliffs. The 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, continued the mopping up in its sector, �Topside� against very heave opposition especially in the vicinity of Wheeler Battery. The 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the eastern sector and continued with mopping up in that area.

For the first time since 23 January 1945 there were no aerial strikes after 26 February, in that our troops now occupied the entire island. Naval gun fire, however, was still used against the coastal caves. As was to be expected, assault patrols had to do this cleaning up of these remaining pockets of resistance. The familiar procedure of assault followed by blowing the cave shut was utilized. In all, over 400 caves were sealed by use of over seventeen tons of explosives.  (125)  The work of these patrols, as well as of larger attacks, had been enhanced by the translations of captured enemy documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war. Inasmuch as a Neisi interpreter at Regimental Headquarters translated the enemy documents and interrogated the few prisoners of war captured by the Regiment, the intelligence produced from these sources was often in the hands of the battalions within a very few hours of the capture of the documents or prisoners.

By this time, the island had become so infested with flies that to eat the usual type of emergency rations without flies was a feat in itself. The unsanitary conditions under which the remaining Japanese were living had aggravated the situation to such an extent that immediate action had to be taken. Despite the rigid control exercised by our forces, flies thrived wherever there were Japanese, and, naturally, spread all over the island. However, arrangements were made with the Air Force to spray the island on 1 and 2 March with D.D.T., and as improbable as it sounds, after the spraying all the flies had disappeared as if there had never been any on the island.  (126)

By 2 March 1945 the remaining enemy, (a total of 4,506 dead had been counted and 19 prisoners of war had been taken) was located in concealed water-line caves in the vicinity of Infantry, Cavalry, Engineer, and Wheeler Points (see map D). There were approximately 200-300 still remaining, but for all practical purposes the operation was officially over. On that day, the third anniversary of the activation of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, in the flag-raising ceremonies at the same flag pole from which the American flag had been hauled down on 6 May 1942, Colonel George M. Jones, Rock Force Commander, presented the island to the Commander-in- Chief, General Douglas MacArthur.  (127)

Thus, in twelve days Corregidor had been wrestled from approximately 6000 enemy, by 2700 parachutists (including 600 field artillery men and engineers) and 1100 standard infantrymen. The RCT suffered 165 killed, 615 wounded or injured, while the attached units lost 45 killed and 174 wounded or injured. The total casualties were 120 killed and 889 wounded or injured (in enemy explosions).  (128)  The operation may well be concluded by the following quotation:

�This strongly fortified, natural defensive area, defended to the point of annihilation by well equipped, numerically superior and fanatical enemy, was reduced in a period of twelve days. Careful planning, employment of the element of surprise, and the determined attack of skillful troops, perfectly coordinated with air and naval support, again proved an unbeatable combination�.  (129)CLICK TO TURN PAGE