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The
official estimate of 850 Japanese defenders as shown in 503d's Field Order 4#9
(the written orders for the Corregidor operation) was far wide of the mark.
Hr. K. Ishikawa, a former private first class in the Ichinosawa
battalion, one of only 40 Japanese known to have survived the 503d's 1945
assault, puts the strength at 6800 Japanese troops on the island during February
1945. All of the thinking was
conditioned by the fact that the regiment was facing a mere 850 troop garrison.
There simply was not that sense of urgency that should have been foremost
in the company plans and the execution of orders. They were misled.
This was part of the reason why regiment expanded the perimeter by moving
D Company to the western edge of Topside. After the banzai at Wheeler Point,
which was the only organized attack in any strength during the whole
campaign, the regimental commander drew in the perimeter and D Company took
positions at the western edge of the parade field.
D Company would never leave these positions until they rode down to
Bottomside in a few of Service Company's 2½ ton trucks and boarded LCI 545 at 3
o'clock Thursday afternoon on the 8th of March, bound for Mindoro.
The
intelligence error by 6th Army and MacArthur's headquarters, USAFFE, affected
the judgment of everyone from MacArthur down to the individual rifleman.
It affected the planning before the assault and the conduct of the battle
once they had landed there. That was the reason no one in D Company was unduly
worried as the officers and NCO's hurried to get the platoons in position around
Wheeler Point late in the afternoon of 18 February.
It was why an obvious route of attack, Cheney Ravine, was largely
ignored, why the perimeter was expanded by regiment and why the company couldn't
call out on their SCR 300.
There certainly was little risk involved facing a mere 850 Japanese
troops. The
ferocious attack that was mounted the night of the 18th and in the blackness
early Monday morning of the 19th of February came as a great and fatal surprise.
Had the true facts been known at the time the company probably would never have
been left out there in the first place.
Meanwhile,
the Japanese under Lieutenant Endo, who replaced naval Captain Akira Itagaki
(killed early on the 16th of February), had planned to attack and dislodge the
paratroops from Topside, a highly unlikely prospect.
His marines would strike at night from the western end of the Rock with
two columns. The eastern column
would attack first at Battery Hearn and as they stormed the Topside Barracks
area, the western column would take advantage of the confusion and attack from
the west to seize Topside from that direction.
At least one, and more likely three battalions of Japanese marines were
stationed on the western end of the island to provide the reserve for the
defense against amphibious landings expected on Bottomside.
The Special Naval Landing Forces, i.e. marines, had been safely sheltered
in bombproof quarters on the western side of Corregidor, well removed from the
tremendous aerial and naval bombardment preceding the 503d's assault.
The Japanese planned to man the fixed defenses near the invasion beaches
with army troops and provisional naval formations, comprised in part by sailors
whose ships had been sunk in Philippine waters.
These second-class troops were poorly armed and trained and were expected
to withstand the heavy bombardment certain to come on the beaches and contain
the landings as well as they could. Some
of these formations had one rifle for five men with the rest being armed with
spears. After the American
amphibious forces stalled, the well trained and well equipped marines waiting on
the western side of the island out of harm's way would swoop down from Topside
and finish off the American landing forces or push them into the sea.
The defense plan was unusable after the 503d seized Topside because the
Japanese reserves could not be moved or at least not until the Japanese cleared
Topside. D and F Companies faced
these elite SNLF troops on the 18th and 19th of February in the largest (and
only) planned attack of any size during the 503d's battle to regain the island.
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