15 February 1945

 

 

"The RCT began drawing chutes and making final preparations for D+1 Day of Oprn 48 on 16 Feb 1945. Camp dismantled and policed up leaving only the minimum of details for the rear base. The parking of planes and spotting of trucks completed at 1800 hour the RCT unit commanders and air corps met to coordinate details for dropping. Morale seemed high and no tensity within the command."

 

The war tent was a buttoned-down pyramidal tent sitting in the open with the sun beaming down upon it. It quickly became a sweat bath when occupied by a small group - and we were a large group crowding into it it . As noted in the Company journal,   the briefings did not begin until 14 February, so large groups, such as all the battalion officers,  and later entire platoons, were necessary to give everyone some briefing. Of course these were not ideal conditions; however, there were only 850 Japanese defenders, so there was not too much to worry about. Every platoon leader had thirty minutes in the tent to brief his platoon.

 In some respects, the rush to complete the briefings was good. Not one hint of the operation leaked out. Had the information been disseminated earlier, there might have been a leak. The slightest forewarning to the Japanese that a paratroop unit was considering Corregidor would have resulted in a disaster for us.  As it was, the Japanese commander, Captain Itagaki, (Imperial Japanese Navy) had been warned of the possibility of a parachute attack, but being familiar with the island he ruled that out as an impossibility - or at least so improbable that a defense against airborne attack need not be planned.

 In reading intelligence reports on Corregidor-related  activities during the late fall and winter of 1945, one learns that Japanese shipping activities did increase during this time. Then why was it that our intelligence was so well deceived? It must have been because we observed so few signs of activity on the island. One lone set of foot prints across Topside parade ground would be deceiving. We know now they were holed-up, protected from our bombings and shelling, awaiting our amphibious landing. If we were on the receiving end of 3,128 tons of bombs plus heavy shelling from cruisers and destroyers, we'd have been holed up, too. This brings up an obvious question. If there were so few defenders, why was the fortress receiving such a record breaking pasting from B-24's and A-20's? I think the reason was that the retaking of our fortress was to be a picture book operation. Everything was to be perfect even though minimal resistance was expected. This operation was to receive maximum news coverage.

 We did not wear jump suits. I do not know if there was a shortage of jump suits or if someone used good sense. 'Fatigues were much more practical in the tropical heat. If we jumped in jump suits we would have been confined to wearing them for our stay on the island. There was a shortage of jump boots. Some had to wear the infantry combat boots. some even with WWI leggings. There weren't enough jump boots to supply all the rear base personnel and the people who required them. Bill McDonald never had a pair of jump boots issued him while he was overseas, and this was not our supply failure. He was not alone.

 Our parachutes and Mae West life preservers were issued in a large kit bag. The bag was canvas, had two large handles, and was closed by a zipper. When we jumped we put our musette bag in the kit bag. We placed the chest band of the parachute harness through the carrying handles suspending the kit bag in front of us. It hung low enough to bang our knees when we walked. When we put the reserve chute on, the broad belly band was over the carrying handles or straps holding the kit bag down so that it could not fly up into the jumper's face on the opening impact. It was difficult to walk. We shuffled, and even then, awkwardly.

 Rifles were slung over the right shoulder with the flat of the butt against the shoulder. The belly band was placed over the weapon to hold it snugly. The muzzle of the weapon hung near the ground when one crouched, so it was necessary to have the weapon on the right to clear the plane when we exited the door. We were also loaded with ammunition and grenades and, many of us, multiple knives.

 Our musette bags were packed with a poncho, weapons cleaning equipment, extra sox, underwear, four rations, toilet articles, cigarettes, and personal items. Add to this our entrenching tools, map cases for some, binoculars for some, and other necessary items; one could say we were loaded. The average equipment weight load was around ninety pounds.

We were so keen to get into action that I doubt if many of us paused to reflect upon what could be awaiting us had the Japs been preparing for a parachute attack.   I reflected only in passing upon how easily a relatively small Japanese force, with their lashings of automatic weapons fire and barrages of mortar rounds, could have cut through us on "A" Field, had they been dug in and waiting in some of the deep drains or shelters nearby. Nor would it have taken a great number of them to set a similar death trap around and overlooking the area of the old golf course which was to be our "B" Field.  We were not jumping en mass,   not even one aircraft load at a time, but only about sixteen men per pass, divided between two streams of aircraft separated by three or four hundred yards, and with the following aircraft fighting the gusts and headwinds to place over the jumping point a bare 25 seconds later. Some in HQ knew that it was mathematically impossible to place all of our stick within the landing zones available.  That's what it came down to , 16 to 20 men, every 25 seconds, spread over a rough half mile by gusty winds.  We were paratroopers, dammit, and Corregidor was the best shot at being Paratroopers that our training and years overseas could ever have afforded us, and wild horses would not have stopped us from it.

  with the Japs set up on the north side in the heavy masonry barracks, on the east in the post theater or post headquarters, on the south in the senior Officers Row, and to the west in Battery Wheeler. The same death trap would be present around "B" Field. The Senior Officers Row bordered the north side, the deep ravine on the west, Geary and Crockett (Batteries) on the south, and the drop off to Middleside on the east. As we were to learn later the Japanese had the troops to make this defense, too. A formidable force was hidden out on the west end of the island in several large bomb roof caves and tunnels. These troops could easily have defended the cliffs and deep ravines had we chosen foolishly to attempt a landing here, but their main mission was evidently to be held as a large, intact reserve force ready to hit our amphibious forces when they threatened Topside. Taking all this in cosideration makes one realize that this was absolutely a brilliant operation. It completely achieved that most sought after element, surprise. It was so successful that a smaller force attacked and defeated a larger entrenched in one of the world's greatest fortresses. Even more amazing is the casualty ratio. '209 Americans were killed, 19 missing, and 725 wounded. The Japs' total casualty list will probably not ever known exactly, but the official body count was 4,506, killed by the Army and 1,014 killed my the Navy. How many were sealed in tunnels and caves, blown to bits, or disappeared at sea will never be known. 

******

Meanwhile what were the Japanese doing on Corregidor as we prepared to attack? Don Abbott and John Lindgren were in contact with several of the surviving twenty Japanese who surrendered to our forces 1 January 1946 after Pfc. Kanehiro Ishikawa picked up an American newspaper with a picture of General MacArthur and the Japanese emperor on the front page. Fortunately Ishikawa spoke and read English.

 One Japanese who was not a member of the surrender group, but was stationed in Formosa has been writing a history of the Shin-Yo-Tai troops (suicide boats). He sent Don a paper he had written on Corregidor. He wrote that in "early October of the year of Shawa 19 (1944), an anti-aircraft troop was organized, then late that month crew of the warship which sank offshore Leyte joined them to restore American Batteries for the defence of the Corregidor Island. In November, construction units was sent over, and seven Shin-Yo-Tai troops, from the 7th to the 13th, were dispatched also to defend the island." He states the Shin-Yo-Tai men were moved to Corregidor between the period of November and the next January.

 He states (I am selecting statements and not attempting to give his entire writing) that: "On December 20th, with the reorganization of the Marines in the Manila region, Captain Itagaki was assigned as the director of the Manila Bay area defense troops, with Commander Oymada as director of marine special attack troops. Hence, the Corregidor attack force consisting of the 7 troops, or 300 Shin-Yo-Tai boats and 6 torpedo boats was born."

 On the 23rd of December, the message "the enemy fleet is moving up north from Mindoro area with possibility of attacking Corregidor was sent from Itagaki, and Shin-Yo-Tai was ordered to sortie". He says an on board explosion in a boat caused 50 boats to explode and 100 men were lost. On January 7th a similar explosion killed many more men. "By the end of January total number of men stationed on the Corregidor was about 4,500."

 "American fleet started shooting from ships on December 10, then added large formation airplane attacks from January 23." "On January 30, American troops landed on Spik (Subic) Bay area. On February 10, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines entered in the Manila Bay, then started attacks of the Corregidor."

 A member of the twenty who surrendered was Sadashichi Yamagishi. In a letter to Don Abbott, Yamagishi recalled that he entered the Marine Corps on 1 August 1944 and was assigned to a construction party consisting of 650 men. His party, the "333rd Construction Party" left Kure on 5 October aboard the Tatsu-ura Maru, which was damaged by torpedoes but limped into Manila and then to Corregidor.  Along with Army units they set out to build seven gunbatteries armed with guns of 14 cm. calibre (about 5.5 inches). These guns were taken from a Japanese warship which had been sunk in Manila Bay. The 332 Construction Party joined them about the middle of November, and they were combined as the "Yoshida Party" indicating they were under the command of a Colonel Yoshida". The number one, two, and three batteries were built in the area from Rock Point in an easterly direction towards James Ravine. The other four batteries were built from Wheeler Point in a westerly direction.  They successfully test fired the guns on 10 January. "We thought at this time that we would defeat the U.S. military with our underground batteries. We did not suspect that the U.S. military would attack using parachutes."

 He recalled that the first air attack occurred the morning of 16 January, when two planes strafed them. "It was a kind of notice that they finally began the battle against us. They started the full-scale attack from the following day."

 "A reconnaissance plane came at around 7:00 A.M. and, then five to ten formations of bombers strafed in zigzags. We had almost no place to hide. They came to attack every hour. We could hardly do our work because of these attacks."

 "The attack became more intense day by day. They dropped bombs from bombers from the following day. Especially the attack from the bomber's attack was terrible."

"Bombs exploded about 10 meters above the ground because they had the mechanical device called instant fuse. They broke up trees, grasses and buildings. We had to avoid enemy's attack, hiding in the caves because we could not go outside in the daylight." "(The) U.S. military continued their attacks from 7:00 in the morning till 5:00 in the evening every day like a scheduled flight.."

 "Most of the island became like a field, because the trees and grasses disappeared and the surface of the ground was exposed and was turned over." 

"A huge explosion occurred during the night of 28 January which caused a landslide that buried 100 men alive." Then he makes this strange statement: "Someone set this accident on purpose. We had dead before we fought the enemy." "I heard many petty officers were regretfully talking with each other that they wished they had not applied to come to the Philippines. Like them, we had thought that the Philippines was the safe place to go. But, since the Japanese militarily lost in the Leyte Battle, the war situation got worse. We could no longer expect the Japanese military would win. The dream has been killed. We had to be prepared for death." 

"Our party consisted of three squads and had 400 soldiers in total. We were living separately in two caves. We got accustomed to air raids when they lasted for almost one month. We went out between bombings and took outside fresh air."

 "On February 14, we felt something was wrong. The U.S. warships were offshore and reconnaissance airplanes were flying. Are they preparing for firing from warships? When will they start the attack? We felt weird. We were in great fear. The day ended with nothing happening. The night is the time when we should be active. There was no sign that the warships started moving."

"It was the time when special attack boats, which have been reserved in the caves, took action."

 "About 60 special attack boats from the Army and Navy rushed about 30 U.S. warships standing offshore. It was around 10:00 PM. The huge noise caused by engines of 60 boats made the enemy's warships think that it was an air attack. They started firing toward the sky but immediately they noticed the attack was from the sea. They attacked fiercely against our boats. Instantly we saw big pillars of fire shoot up. It was like seeing fireworks on the water. The pillars of fire shot up in several places. We thought we (had made) outstanding gains. Great shouts of joy were raised by our fellow soldiers."

 "The garrison for Corregidor Island consists of: ( ? ) party in the Navy, Kaneda air defense party, special torpedoes in which soldiers ride and operate in special attack parties in the Army, Kurata machine gun party and some crew (survivors) of the battleship Yamato in addition to the Construction party."    [ He is confusing the battleship Yamato with the battleship Musashi.] "Total number of soldiers was 5,500." 

 "(The next-morning they)  saw the U.S. battleships were laying offshore in the morning on February despite our attack yesterday. We fired No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 batteries which we constructed. We fired from underground, but the enemy found our position due to the powder smoke made by firing. The U.S. battleships delivered a volley of fire against us. We had a fierce exchange of fire. Our batteries were destroyed instantly. We could not get any gains like we did yesterday."

 "There was no contending against such heavy odds. Most soldiers who were in the battery were killed or seriously injured. They were put in the caves. Some of them had their skin torn by artillery bombardments. They asked for help but we could do nothing for them. They died suffering from pain.  It was as if a child were fighting a man."

 "The U.S. military, which was superior in numbers and arms, sent some reconnaissance air-planes over the island. When they found something was wrong, they instantly fired from the warships. "

"We could not move except at night".

 The next account, and last, is from Pfc K. Ishikawa. He was born in 1915 and drafted by the army on 15 July 1944. He had missed the draft up until this date because he was not qualified.  On 18 July,  after just a month in training, he was shipped out for Burma." Due to heavy damage the convoy was diverted to Manila. arriving 8 August. He landed on Corregidor 8 November.

"Heavy air bombing and bombardment from warships started Jan. 1945."

About the intelligence estimates of the numbers of troops on Corregidor, he wrote that "your computed strength of 850 on Corregidor, Is. may have been correct up to around Sept. 1. I think reinforcement of strength was made afterward. There were no Filipino working, as I have not seen any of them!"

"There were poorly armed Navy Soldier-group (one rifle for 4-5 men) landed in Dec. 44 and Jan. 45, survivors of warship Musashi which sunk at Leyte war".

The Musaski was one of Japan's new super battleships armed with 18-inch guns. Our planes sunk it in the Sibuyan Sea 24 October during the sea battle at Leyte. The largest battleship ever built sank at 1935 taking down with her over 1000 officers and men. She never fired her 18.1-inch guns at enemy ships. This ship was'slightly heavier than her sister ship, the Yamato,waa 20,000 tons. _heavier.than our largest. Of the 112 officers 39 were lost and 984 men were lost of the crew of 2287; therefore, some 1,376 officers and men were saved by destroyers.

There is no indication of how many of these survivors were carried to Corregidor. Ishikawa goes on:

"It is said to be total strength was 6850 when U.S. Army attacked." "We did not expect Parachute Troop attack on the small island top side but prepared for landing from North & South Dock and others area of seaport."

 Below is a copy of a captured document which gives a roster of the Japanese units defending Corregidor.

   
 

 

HEADQUARTERS

503d REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

Office of the RCT S-2

 

APO 73

5 March 45

 

ANNEX #1 to ENCLOSURE #2

 

Organizational chart of "Bay Entrance Defense Force, captured CORREGIDOR, 24 Feb. 1945. Document undated.

 

   Translation:.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unit

 

 

0's.

NCO&E

Army

Civilians

Total

No.

Hq. attchd.

 

 

17

98

-

115

1st Btry(Fort),

Lt.(Navy)

ENDO

1

43

-

44

2nd  "     "

Ensign

FUNAMI

1

29

-

30

3rd "     "

Lt(jg)

CAOTE

1

92

-

94

4th "     "

WO

YAMATO

1

34

-

35

HAAN "    "

Ensign

TAHAHASHI

1

98

 

99

CHYME "   "

           
1st Dual purpose gun            
Btry (Fort) Ensign ISHTGURO        

2nd "   "

Ensign

FURUTAMI

1

78

 

79

1st MG Battery

Ensign

TANURA

1

73

 

74

2nd "2 "

WO

ARAMI

1

66

 

67

3rd "  "

WO

TASHIRO

1

66

 

67

4th "  "

WO

HARATAME

1

68

 

69

Hq. P1. Suicide Unit

(SMIMOTAI)

 

 

18

-

18

9th Suicide Unit

Lt.(jg)

MAHASMERA

7

169

 

176

10th  "

Lt.(Navy)

ISITYNA

8

175

 

183

11th  "

Lt.  "

YAMASARI

7

194

 

201

12th

Lt.(jg)

MATSUE

7

192

 

199

13th  "

Lt.

NORYUCHI

6

181

 

187

Torpedo boat Unit

 

 

14

111

 

125

Water Patrol

 

 

14

257

93

364

"A" Guard Post

 

 

 

 

 

 

"B" Guard Post

 

 

 

 

 

 

?    Look out

 

 

 

 

 

 

183 Material Dept.

 

 

 

 

 

 

3rd Asalu Maru

 

 

 

 

 

 

17th   "     "

 

 

 

 

 

 

     Hakko Maru

 

 

 

 

 

 

     Sukuo Maru

 

 

 

 

 

 

Battery Eng. Personnel

 

 

 

 

 

Land Garrison Unit

Capt.  

?

25

792

5

822

Signal Unit

Maj.

?

 

 

 

 

      (Telephone)

 

 

-

23

-

23

      (Radar)

 

 

-

31

 

31

Ad. Unit

Lt.(Navy)

?

 

 

 

 

     (      ?      )

 

 

 

 

 

 

     (      ?      )

 

 

1

?

 

?

     (      ?      )

 

 

2

 -

27

?

     (      ?      )

 

 

 

 

 

 

Armament Unit

Tech. Lt.(Navy)

GOTO

2

 

58

60

Expeditionary Unit

 

 

 

 

 

 

Civil Eng. Dept.

 

 

 

 

 

 

219th Const.

Capt.

SHIDA

5

23

313

341

328th Const.Bn.

Lt.(Navy)

?

6

283

 -

289

331st Const. Bn.

Comdr.

YOSHIDA

16

816

 -

822

Medical Unit

Med. Lt.(Navy)

FUTABASMI

1

27

 

28

Paymaster Unit

Lt.(Navy)

?

 

 

 

 

Attchd. Unit

 

 

 

 

 

 

Material Dept.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Transport Dept.

 

 

-

-

7

7

Ordnance Depot

 

 

 

 

 

 

Signal attendant

 

 

 

 

 

 

111th Fishing Unit

 

 

 

 

 

 

Army

 

 

 -

4

66

70

Navy

 

 

-

16?

 

 

Searchlight Unit

WO

USUI

1

38

 

39

MARIVELES Laundering

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ex editionary Unit

WO

C?

1

150

-

151

   (TN Sic)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

 

 

151

4,344

576

5,062

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F.X. Donovan
Capt., 503d Prcht. Inf. RCT
S-2
 

Note: Captain Itagaki of the Japanese Navy was the commanding officer of CORREGIDOR. He is listed in other documents captured as CO 31st Special Naval Base CORREGIDOR. - POWs all state he was killed by a parachutist 16 Feb. and buried.