"H" Co. RCT, left flank squad made no other contact with the enemy after 221500. "G" Co., on the right flank, made its third attempt of the day at 221530 to take the ground to its front and was again repulsed by flanking fire. The "I" Co. platoon to its left was held up in its attempt to cross to the intervening ridge by rough terrain. During the night 22-23 knee mortar rounds fell in the "F" Co. position and one enemy was killed attempting infiltration. No action in other company sectors. "H" Co. moved along RCT left flank meeting only long range mortar fire. A reconnaissance patrol to vicinity (40.8-97.5) reported abandoned enemy positions but nil contact. Other activities were seriously curtailed because of heavy rain throughout the day. A 75mm howitzer was moved to "F Co. sector as direct fire sup-port for planned assault 231600 to high ground forward. M•7's and tanks were placed to bring direct fire on suspected enemy positions. 1st Bn. Combat Team landed at Iloilo during the day and its arrival in RCT sector is expected to be completed by 241200I.

 Arty & 4.2 mortars laid harassing fire during the nite. No attempted infiltration of Bn C.P. perimeter. We had 5 KIA and 11 WIAs yesterday, Hq Co losing the most with 6 casualties from Schrapnel (sic) fragments. Our effective strength is now 26 and 450 enlisted men.

No air strikes, operations delayed because of heavy rains.

Two platoons of F co. assaulted hill to their fro:!t knocking out enemy MG position. 1600 Rain continues to delay assaults, our casualties are light today.

Bn C.O. informed that our 1st Bn is now at Bacolod.

At 0505 an enemy counterattack with covering mortar and HMG fire was repulsed by handgrenades and small arms fire. The Co. received no casualties and only one enemy officer confirmed dead. At 1100 the 3rd squad of the 3rd platoon under S/Sgt. William acted as security for mine detecting party going forward on the road. Security patrols from the 1st and 2nd platoons recovered an uniden­tified American soldier's body but nc, enemy was contacted. At 1400 small arms.'and MG fire dispersed what appeared to an assembly for an enemy "Banzai" attack. Pfc Kraus was wounded by enemy sniper fire at 1345. No enemy activity during the night.

No action, low ceiling, planes unable to give support. Fox Co. moved up on our left flank.

The rest of the ridge was taken by 1st platoon & secured by Company "F", this morning being the action (?) Pfcs. Richard Lampman and Earl Soucie were LWA.. The company captured 2 heavy heavy M.G.'s, 2 LMG's and (unreadable, but gives the number of killed)  definitely and unknown number was buried in bunker (unreadable) fire and demolitions. Also captured an unknown number of rifles carbines.

At dawn the first platoon attacked the hill to our northeast. This had been a thorn in our side as we had received machine gun and rifle fire from the enemy dug in there ever since we took the ridge the day before. The 1st platoon moved swiftly and was on the enemy before he could get organized. He had the weapons and the positions to put up a formidable defense, but these dawn attacks seemed to catch him off guard. Apparently the Japs felt that we would not move in the darkness, and we were surprising him. The 1st platoon damaged the enemy badly here and at light costs. Lampman and Soucie were wounded. Lampman's arm was shattered, and he went home. Soucie was less seriously wounded, and he later returned to duty with us.

We had been briefed that many of the Jap defenders were air force service troops. We felt that service troops were ill trained for combat. This was only partly true. These Japanese Air Force ground troops knew how to man a machine gun in a static pos­ition. Poorly trained for combat or not, they knew how to obey orders and this they did to the death. These were not the service troops from Korea and Formosa that we had encountered on Noemfoor. They gave us more trouble, and hurt us more severely than the elite marines. It does not take too much training for a man prepared to die to stay in a bunker firing his weapon until he is ordered to retreat or left to fight to the end.

The next big ridge lay several hundred yards to our front deadly menacing us, because we knew the Japs were there in as much, or more, strength than they had been on the ridge we presently occupied. Good fortune had been with us in this attack. What lay ahead?   The 462d PFA sent a 75mm pack howitzer to our ridge to give us direct fire support for the coming attack. They fire using their open iron sights as we did with our rifles.

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