29 APRIL - 5 MAY 1945

 

 MAY 1945

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29 April 1945

 

We are beyond the Army Maps available to us, and are working from aerial photographs.

S-E-C-R-E-T

 

HEADQUARTERS
503D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
Office of the S-3


          FROM:  281500 Apr.45

          TO   : 291500 Apr.45

S-3 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 20

MAP: NEGRITAS PHOTO:      1/25,000.

1. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See overlay for change.

2. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Warm, clear, visibility unlimited.

3. OUR OPERATIONS:

A.  Infantry:

(1) 1st Bn, "A" Co. had nil activity during the night 28-29, and no reported contact in patrolling on the B. left flank. "B" Co. advancing at 281500 received concentrated mortar (thought to be 90mm.), MG and rifle fire from the ridge (40.6-07.4) which inflicted heavy casualties. The company did not reach its objective until 291030. One 3" naval gun, one 76mm anti-aircraft gun, and two MG's were demolished during the advance. One platoon of "C" Co, advanced with "B" Co., see overlay. The remainder of "B" Co, displaced as shown on overlay.

 

(2) 2d Bn: "D" Co., with its objective (40.6-96.7) was halted at (40.5-96.7) by heavy mortar and MG fire that inflicted several casualties at 281715. During the night of 28-29, reported six rounds of mortar fire on its position at 280200 followed by an infiltration attempt by an estimated eight enemy; four were killed. "D" Co. made local security patrols throughout the day and closed 12 dugouts. Attempted infiltration cost the enemy. 3 dead in "E" Co's area during the night 28-29. Security patrols in the com­pany area on 29 Apr. closed 20 caves, killed eight enemy, found a 75-mm field piece (rendered unoperateably (sic)) and 2 U.S. heavy MG's. "F" Co. moving forward at 281500 killed 32 enemy at 281700and an additional 2 attempt­ing infiltration of its position at 290230. As the period closed, "F" Co. was advancing to (40.6-96.7) against long-range rifle fire." [Note: There is a mix up about D Company's and E Company's advances with the day before.]"

 

(3) 3d Bn.: A delay-released 500 lb. bomb fell in the vicinity of the Bn. C.P. at 281600, killing one and wounding eight Filipino Civilians Laborers and wounding five of our own troops. "H" Co. was the only 3d Bn. company having action during the night 28-29. At 282145 "H" Co. received MG and mortar fire which caused no casualties. Three "Bouncing Betty" booby traps were set off during the night. Blood in the area was the only evidence of enemy casualties. "G" and "I" Co's patroled the RCT flanks to the (39.6-98.0) and (39.1-97.8) areas. Caves in the (39.6-98.0) area showed signs of a recent enemy occupation but no contact was made on either flank."

 

[Note: The 500 pound bomb incident is also reported a day late here].

 

 

b. Artillery: Seventeen support missions and seven harrassing concentrations were fired by the Artillery during the period.

 

c. Engineers: Maintenance of .present supply route. Forward of our present front lines a supply road must be built to move vehicles. The Engineers began this task at 29110. Fifteen land mines were disarmed and dug up.

 

d. Air: Air strike of 281530 on target (40.8-97.1). One hung bomb fell in 3d B.C.P. area.  See Par. a. (3).

 

4.  RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Our advance progressed approximately 300 yds. on the left flank and 200 yds. on the right. No heavy concentrations of enemy has been met at close quarters as yet. Enemy action remains at long range except for small well emplaced delaying groups, well armed with automatic weapons, rifles and mortars.

 

5.                     CASUALTIES:

    a. Our casualties:

 

        (1) For the period: 10 KIA, 30 WIA, 5 IIA
    (2) To date          : 86 KIA, 239 WIA, 5 IIA.

 

    b. Enemy Known casualties:

        (1) For the period:     77 KIA

        (2) To date            : 392 KIA, 0 POW

 

 

CLARK
S-3

 

 

S-E-C-R-E-T

 

È

 

 

   

0730

Suffered our heaviest day yesterday for casualties, 8 KIAs, 17 WIAs. D having 9 casualties, E Co-7, Hq-5, and F Co-4. Bn strength by Co as follows, Hq Co-10-0,127-EM, D Co 3-0,88-EM, E Co 4-0,95-EM, F Co 4-0,104-EM. All companies reported attempted infiltration that was repulsed.

1000

Activities today confined to patrols from their respective perimeters. Bn C.P. moved forward at 0830 to (40.05-97.23).

1400

Demo section blew up total of 38 caves in which there were several dead bodies. 1630 F Co moved forward to secure high ground encountering sniper fire. Sniper fire accounted for most of our casualties of yesterday the 28th.

1700

No sir strikes today. All units were advised to use telephone when available for.. person to person transmissions, as many of our radio transmissions can be picked up by Jap Radio."

   

"E Co moved forward. The second platoon under S/Sgt Howard occupied the vacated position. Sporadic enemy sniper fire was received during the day but no casualties resulted.

"Remained in position. No enemy activity during the night. Two (2) squads of first Plt patrol out 600 yds from prem. No enemy contacted." The other E Company History entry: "S/Sgt Holder KIA and 1 man W.I.A by sniper fire.

During the night the 1st platoon's perimeter came under enemy mortar fire which resulted in the deaths of Pfc Ralph Iverson and Pvt Dallas Workman.

   

As previously said, two "F" Company platoons were dug in on the narrow ridge. One was the 1st platoon, as the history states. I believe the other was the 2d platoon. Dan Lee had returned from the hospital that day. He was sacked out near me at the company command post. He was the 3d platoon leader. One rifle platoon, as well as the mortar platoon, was in the draw with the company headquarters. Lee would have been up on the ridge had his platoon been up there. I am positive about Lee for a reason I will give in a moment.

Shortly after dark, or no more than an hour, a Jap suddenly came running down the trail which followed the narrow ridge heading south. He was waving a white "flag", but he was screaming and yelling to the top of his voice and jumping up and down as he ran. After a momentary pause the men realized this joker was marking our position. Unfortunately a large number of the men opened fire, sending the Jap to his ancestors, but also marking our position. We did not have to wait too long for verification of this, because mortar shells  soon commenced to raining down in the immediate vicinity.  This was by far the heaviest shelling we had experienced. Our mortar platoon sergeant, S/Sgt Johnnie "Red Horse" Phillips soon had his 60's in action firing counterbattery fire. Then the 81's from battalion joined in with Red Horse acting as their FO. We believe this action saved us from even heavier attack. Iverson and Workman were killed by a round that fell directly into their foxhole. Iverson was an old veteran and Workman was new. We usually put a veteran with the less experienced at night. The next morning when we could see the remains of these two men it was not a pretty sight.

 The reason I remember Lee so well is that when the Jap barrage started several rounds came in close together. Some of the rounds overshot the ridge and fell near us. I said "Uh-oh!" and Lee promptly countered with  "Uh-oh's right!"  The Jap mortar men did keep the ground rocking for a while. We were much relieved when silence once more returned.

 This was our last defensive perimeter on Tokaido Road. The company would remain here until 12 May, manning an outpost and doing extensive patrolling. About this time regiment sent us orders to send our 1st sergeants and company clerks back to the RCT headquarters for a day, in order to bring their morning reports up to date. This had not been done since we left Mindoro.    We established an outpost about a mile up in the heavy rain forest of the foothills. The trail which crossed our ridge led to a high, round top hill which was just right for 30-40 men to defend. We kept one rifle platoon reinforced with one LMG section up there and rotated them every few days.

Soon after the company got settled at and behind the ridge, farmers would appear early every morning selling eggs, onions, egg-plants, and tomatoes.  They did a booming business for several mornings. Then the powers that be noticed this unmilitary action, and there were no more farmer visitations.  I contacted amoebic dysentery from the onions, as did many others. Strangely, with all our instructions, none was ever given concerning nightsoil fertilized vegetables. Things that were cooked were safe, as well as vegetables with skins such as tomatoes, of course if they were washed, but onions - eat one and you'd had it. I received much instruction later in the 133d General Hospital on Leyte Island.

 Our rations had improved. We were issued 10-in-1 rations along with the improved C-rations. Two of the old C rations had been eliminated retaining only the meat and beans rations which were not bad. I believe seven more new C rations had been added. The very best ration, though, was the bacon unit of the 10-in-1 rations. This contained a can of bacon. A key opened the can length-wise and the bacon was fried in the half can.

I soon learned that the company commander had best be present when rations were issued out to the platoons. The best rations, such as the bacon, seemed to end up in Company Headquarters everyday. We had cussed base supply units so much and so long it damn sure was not going to happen in "F" Company.

During the last few weeks we were on this flank Thursday became a special day, because each man was issued a block of round baloney, an apple, a half loaf of bread, a quarter pound of butter, and four bottles of beer which was hot, but it went well with the feast. We always ate it all at one sitting. Earlier when we bought some eggs, one of the men chose not to eat his eggs then but to wait until evening when he got in from a patrol. He was killed, and no one tempted fate in that manner again. From that day, the philosophy of "F" Company was "Eat your eggs now."

 


No. 20
281500 April 45
to
291500 April 45

 
 

 

È

30 April 1945

 

 


No. 21
291500 April 45
to
301500 April 45

 
 

The 1st Battalion reported that B Company maintained their objective they had seized the day before despite a great deal of sniper fire. A B Company patrol ran into the enemy with two machine guns. A and C Company patrols made no contact with the enemy.  The 3d Battalion reported that they were continuing their patrols on the south flank. There was not much action there.

2d Battalion report: "D" Co. found a demolished 37mm field piece ay (40.7-98.4) upon reaching that position 291500. "E" Co. located a 75mm anti-aircraft gun and two MG's during the security patrolling. There was nil activity during the night 20-30 throughout the Bn. Extensive patrolling to the right of the Bn area during the day resulted in nil enemy contact; however, several enemy positions were located in that area."

 "RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: The probing effects of our patrols indicate the enemy is withdrawing his main force as we advance, leaving small dug-in delaying parties to delay the advance as much as possible. A few of these groups remain and fight to the death. Wire strung from strong points toward the rear indicate O.P.'s report on our progress to rear parties who engage in long range MG, rifle, and mortar fire and then withdraw as our artillery is brought to bear. Being deeply dug in on reverse slopes, our artillery apparently has little effect."

 

   

Phase X
30 April 45
0930

Straggler line established vic CP to keep natives from going forward.

 

   

0730

No enemy activity during the nite. We had six casualties yesterday, 3 being KIAs. 1200 No advance planned for today, companies sending out local patrols.

1400

Summary of Casualties by companies to date:

   

                     

    KIA & DOW           

WIA

Hq

12

17

D

 9

25

E

10

19

F

 9

20

Total

40

81

 

1800

No casualties today at this hour. All companies were alerted to the fact that today is the Emperor's birthday and to be on the look out for any fanatical plans of attack.

   

At 0900 the 3d platoon under Lt Watkins, recon­noitered the area 100 yds. to the right flank SE. Patrol discovered enemy bivouac area, but reported no enemy contacts. Patrol returned at 1500 and Bn. demolition squad destroye enemy positions in the bivouac area. Interdictory mortar flares were used during the night.

Remained in position. No enemy activity during night.-two-(2) squads of first plt patrol out 600 yds from prem. No enemy contacted.

No entry.

   

Some of the country is impassable. The walls of some of the canyons are high cliffs which cannot be climbed or descended.    We had reached the lower parts of the mountains.  In getting there, we had destroyed the miles of fortifications which had faced us as we attacked along the all weather road, then the railroad, and then finally a Caribou trail known as Tokaido Road.  All this was done by a parachute combat team of two reinforced battalions (less than 2,000 men) until 24 April.

While we were doing this a 5,000 man Infantry RCT sat in their fortified positions on our right flank firing their attached corps heavy artillery along with their own division artillery into the mountains, calculating their Japanese casualties by the number of rounds they fire, and allowing us to suffer for the very lack of artillery, mortars, and ammunition they were pumping into vacant real estate.

Our RCT had even suffered from non-supply of other weapons and materiel which, we discovered, would have furnished us great assistance.  Of particular hurt to us was the denial to us of battery operated magnesium flares, which the supply chains of the larger, more powerfully fostered units never delivered or shared with us.

However, our success would not go unnoticed.

Within two weeks two-thirds of us would be moved to the right flank to do the work for the 160th RCT who was forted up on the right of the 184th. The reason only two-thirds of us were sent is that our 3d Battalion had to stay and protect the 184th. Before we get to that move there was still lots to do where we were.

 

È

 
 

1 May 1945

 

 


No. 22
301500 April 45
to
011500 May 45

 
 

The 1st and 3d Battalions were patroling without much action.    

 

2d Bn: Nil activity throughout the night 30-1. Patrol activity to the south and southwest occupied all units during the day. An E. Co. patrol reported the only semblance of enemy activity. The patrol reportedly sighted eight or ten enemy in a small bivouac area vicinity (unreadable) was --(the rest is unreadable)."

 

   

0730

No enemy activity during the nite. We suffered no casualties yesterday. 0900 Recco patrols sent out by D, E, & F Co.

1300

No casualties reported for today.

1800

Capt Taylor & Lt LaVanchure made aerial recto flight over front lines.

   

At 0900 one squad of the 2nd platoon under S/Sgt Howard patrolled area 800 yds. to find route across Malaga River but returned at 1430 with a report that cliffs along the river were impassable. No enemy contacted.

Remained in position, 2 squads made a recon patrol 500 yds. to our front, sighted a small group of Nips who ran. Nips are on the move out of the area to our front.

No entry.

   

At this time intelligence believed that the enemy had withdrawn, so there is doubt expressed in the periodic report above of "E" Company's report, "The patrol reportedly sighted ..."   We would find plenty of Japs still in the region, but to the staff, "what did not suit could not be true."

   
 

È

 

2 May 1945

 

 


No. 23
011500 May 45
to
021500 May 45

 
 

The 1st Battalion was patrolling with few  contacts made. The 3d battalion was patrolling attempting to cut the enemy off from withdrawing south, but few contacts were made because the enemy was not withdrawing toward the 185th.

2d Battalion: Nil activity throughout the night (01-02). Patrol from "D" Co. working southwest along the road to establish RCT limiting point, was fired upon the vicinity (41.05-96.2) by at least two MG's and several rifles. Mortar fire was laid on the position with results undetermined at close of the period.    "F" Co. patrolled southwest to vicinity (39.5-98.?) with nil contacts.

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: The direction of the RCT advance changed from SE to NE and extensive reconnaissance of the route to be taken later in force was made. Nil contact has been established at close of period. Reconnaissance further SE established the fact that at least part of the enemy's forces are still in that direction. our immediate strategy is to split the enemy in the area from those in the SE. A holding force of one Bn. will be maintained at the RCT limiting point (41.4-95.9).

 

   

0730

No enemy activity during the hours of darkness. Nil contact yesterday.

0900

Aerial recco flights by CO's of E & F & Lt LaVanchure. Routine patrols sent out by companies.

1400

D Co C.P. group on recco for new site contacted enemy. We suffered 3 KIA & 1 WIA.

1600

Have been receiving 10 in 1 Rations almost everyday, occasionally we get C Rations. Beer being issued regularly.

1745

Capt Taylor attends meeting at Col Jones office.

   

At 0900 the CO, Lt. Collins, with Lt Watkins and seven men moved NE along the road for the purpose of locating a platoon outpost. Approximately 900 yds. from the perimeter the group was ambushed by several enemy armed with automatic weapons. S/Sgt. Wister, platoon sgt. of the attached machine guns, was killed and the intensity of the enemy fire did not allow the group to neutralize the enemy fire or recover S/S Wister's body. The group withdrew but were again fired upon at approximately 100 yds. along the road. Pvt. Buchanan of the attached machine guns was killed. A patrol of two squads under S/Sgt. Davis, which had left the CP at 0930 to reconnoiter the area to the north of the road, heard the firing and assaulted the enemy on the left flank. The attack was repulsed. and S/Sgt. Davis was wounded in the leg. The patrol reorganized under S/Sgt. Minor and again assaulted the position causing the enemy to withdraw. Reinforcements consisting of the 3rd platoon, mortar platoon, and one section of machine guns were ordered from the CP. Attempts to lay mortar preparation on the area failed because of the heavy rain ruining the available ammunition. The attack continued with one squad under S/Sgt. Howard and one section of light machine guns moving up the road to east and the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins moving up the ridge to the port. As the 3rd platoon moved thru the area as skirmishers an enemy automatic weapon opened fire on the right flank killing Pfc. Slowe, but because of the thick undergrowth and heavy rains the enemy could not be located. The platoon continued on until it joined the machine gun section on the road and then under covering machine gun fire and small arms fire the first squad under Sgt. Dablock advanced and recovered S/Sgt Wister's body. The enemy had stripped the body of all equipment and some clothing. The Co. returned at 1400.

Remained in position. No activity.

No entry.

 

È

 

3 May 1945

 

 


No. 24
021500 May 45
to
031500 May45

 
 

(1) 1st Bn: "A" and "B" Co patrols working toward MALAGO RIVER reached their objectives at (41.2-96.7) and (40.6-00.0) respectively at about 021600I with nil contacts. The "A" Co patrol reported a ford at (41.2-98.7) as having been well used. There was nil activity throughout the Bn during the night-of 02-03. "B" Co., remaining in the TAYAP area over-night, continued to patrol the MALAGO RIVER 03 May from (39.7-00.1) to (41.0-99.7) with nil contact. An "A" Co patrol exploited the draw from its position to the MALAGO RIVER (41.2-98.7) with nil contact. A "C" Co patrol penetrated the thick lantana weed to the MALAGI RIVER AT (41.4-97.1) with nil contact. "B" co was returning to the Bn area as the period closed. See overlay for positioning.

(2) 2nd Bn: A figure running toward "F" Co's position at 022230 was fired upon by "F" Co. At daylight a body of what appeared to be a half-cast Japanese 16-18 years of age, was found about 10 yds from the front line. A torn piece of white cloth tied to a branch was found near the body. It is believed the enemy was attempting to surrender.* No weapons of any kind were found on or near the body. No other activity during the night. A "D" Co patrol observed 2 bonfires and heard movement in a draw vicinity (40.4-98.4) at 03120 (?) hour. Surprise mortar fire was brought to bear on the area; however, torrential rains made entry into the draw impossible for investigation as period closed. "E" Co sent a platoon to (40.996.5) for the purpose of establishing a strong point and to patrol to the MALAGO RIVER. Nil contact to close of period. As the 02 period closed mortar fire was being placed in vicinity (40.0-96.1). An 'F" Co patrol sent to determine the results saw five enemy run from the area. Two were killed but the others escaped in the heavy underbrush. Reconnaissance of the position showed abandoned foxholes only.

 

(3) 3d Bn: Under cover of darkness "G" Co. moved to (38.5-00.1) in an attempt to surprise any enemy making an early morning move in the MALAGO RIVER area. There was enemy activity in the area during the night 02-03. "G" Co patrolled the MALAGO RIVER area in vicinity (40.4-99.8) without contact. An "H" Co patrol to vicinity of (39.3-00.5) received MG and knee mortar fire at 031100, One on our troops was slightly injured. Results of mortar fire laid on position had not been reported at end of period. Another "H" Co patrol to vicinity (38.8-03.0) made nil contact. An "I" Co patrol to vic­inity (37.4-00.5) reported nil contact."

 

"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Extensive patrolling with nil contact in The TAYAP area. Contact four hundred yards to the SE of our front lined indicate continuing withdrawing of enemy's main force leaving delaying parties along our route of advance."
 

* The battalion S-3 and the RCT S-3 account of the Jap with the white "flag" is out of place and fictitious as any "F" Company man who was up there that night will tell you.  As stated before, the incident of the 'white flag' occurred  the night that Iverson and Workman  were killed, namely the night of 29 April.  "F" Company occupied the narrow ridge the night of the 28th. The next night the Jap came running down the ridge. The next morning we examined the body of the body in a Jap uniform searching for papers as the SOP. We then threw the body down the steep slope to our front where it disappeared into the under-growth - another SOP. Battalion got the account from us and recorded it later and imperfectly, using their imagination to send an account to Regiment where the granddaddies of imagination resided.

   

0730

Our casualties for yesterday were 3 KIA & 1 WIA making our total to date 43 KIA & 82 WIA. F Co. 3d Plt reports [Note: This was the only rifle platoon in "F" Company which was not up on the ridge where the incident of the 29th happened.] firing at an object during the nite, which the(y) found this morning to be a Jap with a white flag.

Bn strength by companies

 

Hq

10 Off

127 Em

 

D

3 Off

93 Em

 

E

4 Off

92 Em

 

F

4 Off

112 Em

Total:

 

21 Off

424 Em

 

0900

Companies have routine patrols, F Co ordered to clear area wher D Co group contacted enemy yesterday.

1000

Engrs continue work on roads assisted by Demo Section blowing trees and stumps. 1200 Lt Col Lawrie has returned from C&G School and leave in the States

1500

F Co contacted enemy, suffered 1 KIA & 3 WIA. Bn C.O. ordered E Co to put 1 Plt forward and maintain position overnite as a strong point.

   

At 1300 one squad of the 3rd platoon under Pfc. Richard reconnoitered to the south approximately 300 yds. The patrol discovered two fresh cooking fires but could not locate any enemy. Heavy rains cut radio communications and the patrol returned at 1500. The 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins moved out to the same area but rains prevented the patrol from descending the slippery trail so that the platoon returned at 1630. no enemy contacted.

1st platt moved up 300 yd's to F Co's front and set up perimeter for the night. No activity during the night.

1st platoon moved up into the forest approx. 1000 yds. to set up a platoon outpost, where they contacted approx. 200 enemy and were surrounded. 2nd Platoon went to their relief and after fierce fighting both platoons withdrew leaving an unknown number of enemy dead. During this action Pfc. Jose Caldron was killed and Pfc Allen Martin was fatally wounded. Pfc.'s Perry Bandt and Phillip Smith were LWA.

   

For several days "F" Company had been maintaining an outpost, previously described, a mile or so up in the forest. The 1st platoon was manning this outpost with one section on LMG's attached. On the 3rd we sent the 2nd platoon up to relieve them along with the other section of LMG's. About the time the relief force arrived on top of the hill a large Jap force attacked from the southeast side of the hill employing a number of automatic weapons, a large volume of rifle fire, and heavy mortar shelling. Our force answered with fierce fire power. After about twenty minutes the Japs withdrew. The 1st platoon returned , and the 2nd platoon with their attached machine gun section stayed. Calderon from the 1st platoon was killed, and Martin from the 2nd platoon soon died of his wounds. Bandt from the 1st platoon and Smith from the 2d platoon were wounded. I believe there were casualties in the machine gun platoon. The battalion S-3 journal is incorrect in the number killed, so their wounded number may be incorrect.

 Although the S-3 journal made no reference to the allocation of replacement into "F" Company, Jose Calderon was in the assignment of replacements on 28 April.   There is more about this unfortunate young paratrooper who was to spend less than one week with his new company. The morning of the 3rd, after the 2nd platoon had left, a cablegram came in addressed to him informing him that his wife had given birth to a baby boy. The wife and baby were doing fine. We didn't know this boy, but it was a very sad group of us who viewed this message after we found out the young father was dead. During the period I commanded the company I wrote the letters of condolence to the next of kin. This was one of the most unpleasant tasks I ever had the responsibility to perform. The letter to Jose Calderon's wife still haunts me.

 The outpost was out of radio contact, so these men were cut off from support. I requested that in the face of such strong enemy activity the men be brought in. This was refused, and I was told that there were no strong enemy forces left in this area, that the enemy was withdrawing and that there were only small delaying parties were left in our sector.

 The Marine Corps' Corsairs had been supporting us with air strikes. We liked their support because they were specialist in ground support. They came in under guidance of their ground observer and, if they were off target, were careful to get in the proper place before they made their firing and bombing runs. We did receive some P-38 support. These "hot fighter pilots" seemed to resent  our ground support missions. They came in without caution, flew their mission without regard for the proper target, and left. A good example of this was a strike they made while "F" Company was holding the high ridge. The liaison team came up to the ridge, and I joined them. The team consisted of a lieutenant and a radio team of two men. We got situated in a couple of deep foxholes (since the night of the mortar shelling, the foxholes were plenty deep), because the lieutenant said we'd better, because P-38's were making the strike. He had a low opinion of their ground support work. Sure enough, soon we saw a P-38 coming straight at our ridge. The lieutenant was on the radio telling the flight leader that he was lined up on our positions. Suddenly the fifties in the nose of the plane started firing and he dropped his bomb aiming at us. Five planes followed him, strafing and bombing our lines despite the fact that the liaison officer was screaming to them to pull up, that they were on their own troops. They then flew on their way back to Mindoro, with the ground observer telling them in the most profane language he could muster what they were. Fortunately, although they raked is good, we had no casualties, thanks to our deep foxholes.

 A quad 50 caliber machine gun unit was brought up to our position and strafed some of the forest to our front. The destruction of these four machine guns was awesome. They literally seemed to eat up the trees. I wished we had one of the AA units at our outpost, but it was a towed unit and had to have a road to travel on.

 

È

 

4 May 1945

 

 


No. 25
031500 May 45
to
041500 May 45

 
 

(1) 1st Bn: All patrols had returned by 031700I with nil contacts. No activity throughout the night 03-04. "B" Co relocated at (40.4-97.0). An "A" Co patrol NE to MALAGO RIVER (40.3-00.2), a "B" Co patrol to (40.6-97.4) and two "C" Co patrols to the MALAGO RIVER at points (41.4-98.5) and (41.6-96.6). All reported nil contact or evidence of new enemy occupation.

 (2) 2 Bn: "F" Co, with a platoon at (40.9-96.1), sent a second platoon equipped to establish an overnight strong point in that vicinity. Enroute this second platoon was fired upon by a considerable force using MG's and rifles from vicinity (40.9-96.3). The forward platoon pulled back and in conjunction with the already engaged platoon fought off a heavy attack. An estimated twenty-five casualties were inflicted before the enemy retired. The two "F" Co platoons returned to the area. at 021815 a 4.2 mortar shell intended to fall in the vicinity (40.8-96.3) fell short in the vicinity (40.6-96.5). A ration detail, returning from "E" Co strong point position vicinity 940.9-96.6), heard scrambling, shouts and moans in the shelled area.    A patrol searching this area 040830I found only blood as evidence of enemy casualties. Subsequent forces advancing to the vicinity of the "F" Co engagement could locate no enemy casualties. (See 3d Bn activities). There was nil activity night 03-04. A "D" Co patrol, given the mission of making a reconnaissance for a possible trail into the PATOG area, reached the ridge vicinity (39.9-96.1). Enroute back the patrol reported on an abandoned bivouac consisting of some six grass and tin shacks and chicken coops. One shed was about 35 feet in length and twenty feet in width. A caribou carcass was found partly cut away apparently 2 or 3 days ago. Some MG parts also found in the area. A large cave discovered at (40.1-96.1) contained one enemy that escaped through a second opening or air shaft. A quantity of rifle ammo and hand grenades found in the cave was destroyed. At (40.6-96.1) the patrol drew fire from a shack. Return fire routed three enemy from the shack leaving one dead. "E" Co. advanced to (40.9-96.1) with nil contact. At 041000I "E" Co. reported automatic fire from 200 yds. to its front. "I" Co. advancing through "E" Co. proceeded forward to meet this resistance. At 041500I "E" Co. received 5 rounds of knee mortar fire and as the period ended was searching for the source. An "F" Co. patrol to the MALAGO RIVER vicinity (41.1-96.9) reported nil activity.

(3) 3d Bn: Nil activity throughout the Bn night of 03-04. "G" and "H" Co.'s returned from positions of 031500I to location shown on overlay. Heavy rains prevented their dis­placing forward as planned as supplies were unable to be brought up in time. After an 040730I air strike "I" Co. began advancing SE along the road beyond "F" Co.'s position and were immediately met with automatic weapons fire- including what was believed to be a BAR. 4.2 mortar fire was placed on the target before the Co. again pushed forward. This time eight rounds of knee mortar fire was received and MG fire opened up from ridge vicinity (40.6-96.1). At the close of the period "I" Co. was attempting to secure the high ground vicinity (41.1-95.8) against automatic and rifle fire."

"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Continued patrolling in the TAYAP area discovered no evidence of enemy activity south of the MALAGO RIVER. Our efforts to the SE met with enemy resistance in the form of knee mortar, automatic and rifle fire. this fire came from well emplaced, mutually supporting positions. Artillery and mortar fire seemed to have no apparent effect indicating the usual well dug-in positions."

 

"F" Company did not withdraw both platoons. The company continued to man this outpost holding the trail where it passed over the high hill until a few days before the battalion was withdrawn from this flank. At this time 1st Lt Roscoe Corder and his 2d platoon of "E" Company relieved "F" Company at the outpost. The "F" Company patrol to the Malago River mentioned in the PR is one that I took out, consisting of two platoons. We got to the headlands above the gorge and searched the area, but we could find no way down the cliffs to the river below.

   


0730

No enemy activity during the nite. casualties yesterday were 1 KIA and 3WIA all of F Co.

0800

Patrols sent out by all companies. F Co assigned mission of providing security for the bulldozer cutting road beyond our front lines.

1300

The men are inquiring as to when we are going to be relieved. They have varied rumors, that this division or that division is out in the bay. Rotation rumors also are numerous.

1500

E Co fired upon by knee mortar and MG fire, suffered 1 KIA & 2 WIA. We had one air strike today.

   

At 1000 2nd platoon under T/Sgt Howard moved out to patrol area approximately 500 yds. SE and to contact 185th TCT. Patrol discovered several small enemy bivouac areas but all had been vacated for several days. At 1130 the platoon surprised several enemy and opened fire killing one Jap. Other enemy could be heard talking excitedly in the undergrowth so no attempt was made to search the body. As the patrol was small no attempt was made to engage the enemy and the patrol returned at 1300." Note the new rank of Sgt Howard. He now holds the platoon sergeant's rank and rightly should, since he is leading the platoon.

Entire Co with LMG's moved up road past F Co 500 yds, picking up 1st platt at 0900 hr. For 1 hr. previous to 0900, area to be occupied had been dive bombed by Corsair's, plastered by 75's, 4.2 mortar's. Area was occupied, patrols sent out, men dug in, patrols returned without any Jap interference. At 1530 hr. Nips opened up from our rear with mortar and 1MG. One man KIA, 2 WIA. no activity during the night.

No entry.

   

The 3d Battalion had moved toward the Malago River and were in that area along with the 1st Battalion. As they moved east and southeast they came into our area of operations. As can plainly be seen the enemy was still here in strength. He seemed to lie low at times and then suddenly appear. He always had many automatic weapons with mortar support. He abandoned some weapons, but they seemed to be the heavier, more difficult weapons to move, such as 50 caliber heavy machine guns, 20mm, 37mm, and even a few 75mm multi-purpose guns. Keep in mind that the regiment was now operating in heavily wooded area.

   
 

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5 May 1945

 

 


No. 26
041500 May 45
to
051500 May 45

 
 

(1) 1st Bn: Nil activity during night 04-05. "A" Co moved across MALAGO RIVER to become RCT left flank protection and to patrol N side of MALAGO RIVER. The company had reached (39.6-003) with nil contact or new evidence of enemy occupation at close of period. A "B" Co patrol along the heavily wooded draw (40.7-97.4) (39.7-99.8) reported nil contact or signs of previous occupation. No trails were found in the draw area. A "C" Co patrol to the N reported a freshly dug grave at (41.3-98.4). Native fruit trees along the trail had been recently stripped of fruit. The patrol crossed the MALAGO RIVER at (41.4-98.3). two enemy were seen on the ridge (41.6-98.6). Investigation showed non-occupied positions along this ridge. Another "C Co patrol E to MALAGO RIVER at (41.5-97.1) thence N along MALAGO RIVER bank to (41.4-98.5) with nil contact. No trail exists on the western bank between these points.

 (2) 2d Bn: "D" Co reported seeing a presumed enemy bon fire vicinity (40.2-96.1) at 042030I.     Mortar fire caused the fire to disappear. No other activity in the Bn through‑out night 04-05. An "E" Co recco patrol followed the ridge line (41.0-97.1) S to (41.0-96.7) thence E to MALAGO RIVER at (41.5-96.7). No evidence other than old biv­ouac at (41.0-96.5) was found of enemy occupation. An "F" Co patrol towards the PATOG area reported a small evacuated bivouac and emplacement vicinity (40.2-96.3), a second evacuated bivouac vicinity (39.7-96.1). In this vicinity were also found three large caves containing discarded women's clothing, one sack of rice, 5-25 lb bombs, a damaged knee mortar, 11 American Carbine clips, 6 Jap gas masks and miscellaneous equipment. Continuing on mission the trail faded near (39.4-96.0), however, a trail near 185th Inf position was seen apparently leading into PATOG HILL area.

 (3) 3d Bn: The "I" Co action in progress at 041500 ended with "I" Co holding its pos­ition without further opposition. Nil activity throughout Bn area night 04-05. "H" Co moved to vicinity or (40.9-96.1) behind "I" Co thence W along ridge to (40.5-95.9). A dummy gun proporting to be a 75mm and many abandoned positions were found enroute. Nil contact. "I" Co moved forward to (41.5-95.9), the ridge from which all the 04 opposition had emanated. There was nil enemy resistance during this movement. An elaborate defense system was found consisting of an elaborate network of connecting trenches, barbed wire, bunkers and foxholes all showing evidence of very recent occupation, but no sign of the enemy."

 "There was no contact with the enemy within the RCT sector throughout the day; the enemy unaccountably having abandoned an elaborate defense system of bunkers, foxholes and trench net work. The strong positions straddled our route of advance. As a result of this withdrawal, our forward elements advanced approximately 400 yards."

   

0730

Our casualties yesterday were 1 KIA and 4 WIA. Easy company having four of the five casualties. No enemy activity reported during the nite.

0800

Extensive patroling continues.

1200

The Japs have retreated somewhere but no one knows just where. He has left behind some very good defensive positions, positions from which he could hold off a large force for sometime. They may be low on ammo.

1700

Patrols report bivouac areas that have not been occupied recently. Made no contact with enemy.

   
 

No air strike today.

   

No patrols. No enemy contacts.

Co H.Q., 1st platt. and 1 squad fr mortar platt pulled back of Fox Co, 2nd & 3rd platt, LMG's, and one squad of mortar's remained to support Item Co. No activity during night."

The other E Company history states: "5 May Company moved forward 500 yds., received mortar fire, P.F.C. Douglas K.I.A. 2 men W.I.A."

Obviously the two versions are a day apart. As previously stated these diaries were written some time after the action, so mistakes were made. Fortunately we have these recordings even if they do miss the correct date at times. Leabhart's medical log lists Douglas as being killed 4 May. There were mistakes made in the medical log, too, but it is relatively reliable.  It, therefore, is reasonable to accept the first history given above.

No Entry

   

"F" Company makes no entry and will not make another one until 23 May. Our patrols were going north and south - north to the Malago River and south to the Patog Hill area. The Patog Hill area was over near the 185th area. During this period Captain Taylor, Lt LaVanchure, S-3,  "F" Company 1st Sergeant Baldwin  and I went to the outpost. When we came back, one of the men in the attached machine gun section came back with us.  I believe he was sick. He was a gunner and wearing a holster containing a 45 caliber automatic pistol. The rest of us were carrying carbines or rifles. The machine gunner was last in the column an we walked along the narrow trail in the dense brush. A shot rang out, and the machine gunner fell dead. We surmised that the pistol had marked him as an officer to a well concealed Jap . I say he was an attached machine gunner, but my memory may be faulty. I do remember well that the irony of the happening was that the Jap killed the lowest ranking man in the column after letting all the others pass.

 

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