2d Bn: Arrived amphibiously at PALUPANDAN, NEGROS from ILO ILO, PANAY 071800I. Convoyed to present bivouac area, arriving 081800I after overnight bivouac at PALUPANDAN. Began preparations for 090730I attack.

Company moved from PULAPANDAN to NAPILES RIVER  by truck.  A perimeter was set up in the morning and the afternoon security patrols were sent out approximately 1,000 yards. No enemy contacted..”

0001 - Intermittent mortar and rifle fire from enemy thru the nite. One enemy tried penetration but was stopped.

0830

Col Jones left on reconnaissance. We'll stay in present location for about 2a hours; setting up a few CP tents.

0900

Native reported Japs in his home 2.5 kilometers N. Sent patrol to investigate.

1100

Col Jones returned. Third Bn to move to foothills about 1500.

1105

Five tanks reported for duty with the RCT.

1130

Ccl. Jones in conference with Lt. Dean, Major Knudson, Capt. Donovan and Capt. Byers: Enemy situation, use of Artillery.

1200

Still awaiting arrival of 2d Bn. I Co made contact with Jap patrol; all automatic weapons. We had 2 KIA, 4 LWA.

1220

Col. Jones left to check turn around.

1255

2rd Bn arrived; moved out by truck immediately with Col Jones in the lead. They will assume the offense at once. Division attack schedule for a.m. Enemy well entrenched in the foothills, have elaborate defensive set-up."

The following entries are a continuation of the "History" for 8 April,  but the dates and times in the original documents are confused.

061600

To CO 503d RCT: Details of plane schedule and request for info about contem-drop. (24th Division) [note: this is dated 6 April].

1040

To S-2: Enemy auto fire at (33.6-04.7)-(33.0-04.4). Enemy firing on us. No arty casualties. Our casualties: 2 KIA, 4 WIA; enemy unknown (3d Bn.) [This obviously refers to message of 1200 above].

1315

Serv Co arrived. Setting up vicinity of CP.

1400

Col Jones arrived back.

1530

Gen Brush here to discuss tactical situation. "Old" msgs pertaining to flight over here TOO 06 April: TOR 08 April. To CO 503 RCT: No authority at 310 Bomb Wing to release C-46 for resupply. (CO, Rear Base)

071619

To CO Rear Base: Request for 1200 blankets, med supplies, water trailers. No immediate use yet for 1st Bn. (Jones)

1121

To CO Rear Base: Infro re watches. (S-4)

1610

To CO Rear Base: Prepare eligibility list for arrowhead. Forward to 40th Division prior to 14 April 1945. (Levine)

1722

To CO, 3d Bn: Air Ln party will report to you immediately, have guide. (Clark)

1750

To S-3 3d Bn: Location Co H?  Contact 185th? Casualties? (Clark)

1730

Reached mortar impact area occupied by Nips; 5 enemy KIA; 8 cars; 6 trucks;2 motor cycles. living in small huts.

071205

Instructions from Col jones to Capt Taylor to follow in wake of 3d Bn from Mindoro.

(Captain Neil Taylor was the 2d Battalion commanding officer.)

There are five more messages before the next series begin 10 April,
 but none of the five add anything of importance.

1450 - Arrived at forward position and established Bn C.P. at (32.1-305.4) Ref. Imbang I 1:50,000.

1500

Bn C.O. held meeting with Co C.O.'s , establishing perimeter. E company covering direct front, D Co on right flank, F co on left flank. E Co maintaining road block. 3d Bn to our direct front 2000 yards.

1600

Daily strength reports must be at Regt'l S-1 by 0630 for period ending 2400 previous day. Have been issued 10-1 rations.

1610

D Co C.P. (31.9-04.9)

1617

E Co C: P. is located at (31.9-04.9)

1715

F Co C.P. Located at (33.1-305.09) [Note; obviously -05.09]     0utpost 300 yds North. Report no sign of enemy. Will pull in outpost to perimeter at dusk.

1800

 Total blackout, all personnel dug in for the nite.

Company moved from Pulapandan to Napilas River by truck. A perimeter was set up in the morning and the afternoon security patrols were sent out approximately 1000 yds. No enemy contacted.

Broke camp at 0830 hr. Departed PuluPandan
at 1000 hr by truck and arrived at (32.3-03.6) Imbang SHI, P.I. Distance by truck 33 mile. Set up perimeter and dug in for the night.

No entry.

We loaded on trucks early the next morning and moved out on the coastal highway, Highway #1, which went around the northern end of the island. This was a good, asphalt surfaced highway. Almost all the Japs had retreated to the hills well before we landed. A few suicide parties had been left. Pulapandan was about 60 miles from Fabrica where the large saw mill was located. After moving about fifteen miles we came to the capitol, Bacolod. This was a fair size city, by far the largest we had seen since leaving Australia.

 Before we reached the downtown area we passed an old frame automobile repair shop located at an intersection of two streets. The building constructed so that the corner facing the intersection was cut off at a 45 degree angle. This wall contained two large double door. They, like the building, had once been painted white. Now the doors were blackened and stained. We were told that as the tanks with the 40th came through, two Japs ran out from behind the building and rammed one of the tanks on its slope plate with a shape charge on a pole. The resulting explosion spattered the Japs over the garage doors. The tank moved on.

 As we passed through the city large crowds lined the streets waving and cheering. On the east side of the town the concrete power poles had been cut off two or three feet above the ground. This was to enable the Japs to taxi planes down the street and park them between the houses, hiding them under the trees. Some Jap planes were still there where they had been destroyed by our planes. The Japanese had a large airdrome here and a large air force. Our carrier strikes had destroyed most of this force. The Japs would shift their planes from base to base trying to evade our attacking forces. We caught them here. Our forces came in during a heavy overcast which cleared while they were overhead. There the Jap planes were sitting on the ground.

 We traveled on the flat coastal plains which had been great sugar cane growing plantations. This area of Negros, the western portion of Cebu, and southern Panay were called "the breadbasket of the Philippines." Traveling along Hwy. #1 we could see the mountains 10-12 miles inland and the plains gradually rising toward them. Many large rivers had their origins in the foot hills. There were a number of large steel bridges spanning these rivers along the highway.

 We passed through Silay, which was a town of about 20,000 people. As we moved through the business section we passed several two story buildings. Some of these had balconies hanging over the sidewalks. These balconies were packed with Filipinos who were waving and cheering. On one balcony among the people was a fair skinned woman with bright red hair. Later in June when we were garrisoning. Victorias,  I was in Silay on several occasions and met a pharmacist named German Gaston, nephew of Jose Ma Gaston. His home and former pharm�acy was in one of the buildings where I had seen the red head. I inquired about the woman, and he told me she was an American who had been hidden out during the war. I believe he said she was from St. Louis and had taught school in Silay before the war. He said our authorities had picked her up soon after we passed through Silay on 8 April and sent her home.

 After proceeding east on Hwy. #1 several more miles we turned off on a gravel surfaced road and headed toward the mountains. We moved through the old sugar cane fields several miles,  fording a broad,  shallow river, the Imbang River, and stopped and detrucked at our first bivouac area. There was an old thatched covered house built on stilts about three feet off the ground in our area. The road we were on is Tokaido Road. This is shown on the Imbang River map as a railroad.

�

The third platoon under Lt. Watkins patrolled area for 1500 yards south of Co. perimeter from 0900-1145.  No enemy contact. At 1735 seven rounds of enemy 40 mm AA were received.  Pvt. Macke was slightly wounded by shrapnel..”

Phase I of the 503rd's Negros operation began with its leading elements of crossing the initial point at 0800 on 9 April 1945.  We entered with a force numbering 116 officers and 1670 enlisted men.

�F Company was given the mission of going to and patrolling the area of SAN ISIDRO, which was about 4-5 miles away as the crow flies . . . and then moving south towards SINAYPANAN..”

I remember this very well as it was the first time I had ever been under artillery fire.  The fire may have been heavier than 40 mm.

0830 F Co with attached units left F C.P. on petrol. Capt Brazil, FA Ln Officer Accompanied patrol.

0832

We have a local patrol for 1000 yards on azimuth 2100 E Co.

0850

Dog Co has a patrol out 500 yards on azimuth 183�.

0930

We are at the river impossible to cross with tanks. F Co

1111

We are going on without tanks. F Co

1115

Four overhead bursts of enemy artillery fire at (33.5-04.2), one casualty from "G" Batt Arty, attached

1430

 Have reached San Isidro. No enemy, have patrols combing river valley. Will start for camp at 1530. F Co

1600

Have been fired on by enemy from vicinity of Sinaypanan, 1 KIA, 3 WIA. Will have to break contact to evacuate wounded. F Co

1730

More enemy arty bursts directly overhead.

1745

D Co reports 1 schrapnel (sic) casualty, slight, from arty fire.

The third platoon under Lt. Watkins patrolled area for 1500 yds. south of Co. perimeter from 0900 to 1145. N, enemy contacted. At 1735 seven rounds of enemy 40 MM AA we4e received. Pvt. Macke was slightly wounded by shrapnel.

The Co is held inreserve for 3rd Bn. and F Co. One squad from 2nd patt patrolling for 1000 yds on a 210� azimuth. They report no enemy activity. We received artillery fire timed to burst overhead. One man L.W.A."

The men had breakfast & company moved out at 0830 to attack San Isidro which was the foothills of the mountains. For the mission we were assigned 2 M-4 tanks and a demolition section. unable to cross the Imbang River, the tanks turned back 7 the Irfantry went on. The 2nd platoon contacted the enemy in Sinapanan. After the company had been repulsed. We returned to our previous positions which we had occupied the night before. During this action S/Sgt. James Jackson was fatally wounded & 1st Lt. Lee & Sgt. LeRoy Eide were slightly wounded.

F company was given the mission of going to and patrolling the area of San Isidro which was about 4-5 miles away as the crow flies. Most of the locations were named for the plantations ,e.g., Hacienda San Isidro. After reaching the this objective on a northeast line of march we were to move south along the bank for a half mile to Sinaypanan. Some enemy activity was suspected in this area. A company of Filipino "Regulars" from the 74th Infantry (Philippines) was attached to us to move on Sinaypanan from the south. Two M-4 Sherman, tanks from the 2d platoon, C Company, 716th Tank Bn. were also attached to F Co. A forward observer, Capt. William P. Brazil from our 462d PFA, and his radio operator were also attached. The other attachment was a demolition section. We had never operated with tanks. With all this fire power we felt invincible. Since we had all this fire power and a lot of distance to cover in one day's time I don't think we took our 60mm mortars.

Our powerful force moved out about 0830 with the tanks following the lead platoon. We'd find the enemy, blast them, and then over run them; however, our feeling of euphoria did not last long, because soon we approached. the broad, shallow waters of the Maglago River. The water was about ankle deep, and the bed was of small rocks and gravel. The tanks stopped and held a conference. Then they announced that the crossing was too dif�ficult to attempt. The platoon leader told us that his commanding officer had told him not to cross and streams or obstacles which might endanger his tanks, and in his judgment this crossing would endanger his tanks. He turned around and left. We were of the opinion that these guys were afraid and looking for a reason to quit.  Most of us had operated with tanks on problems back in the States in much worse terrain than this. We were disgusted and formed a distrust of the tanks which supported us that would last throughout the entire operations.

This was not all. After we left the river we were walking through grass about three feet tall. Visibility was excellent. The guerrillas should be visible on our right rear angling off from our line of march. They never appeared from the trees along the low river banks. In a short time we we had lost tanks and Infantry support. Even though they were guerrillas 200 men would help. Our orders were to go to the objective so on we went, help or no help.

The fields were broken by tree-lined streams. Most of the stream beds were dry. It was hot now, and we were sweating. Our progress was slow. The trees and brush around the draws had to be searched. We moved on until near noon we could see a big house off to our left as we approached the bluffs along the river delta. This was Hacienda San Isidro. It was partly wrecked along with a number of buildings around it. We reached the bluffs and fairly tall tree growing there. The bluffs were about twenty to thirty feet tall. At their base was a flat delta about a half mile wide. On the far side of the delta the terrain rose sharply. The vegetation and trees were heavy: here. We found a small, unoccupied, frame house almost hidden by the vegetation and trees. The back of the house was bordering the bluff. We sent out patrols. One went to the hacienda several hundred yards away. There were no signs of the enemy.

After thoroughly searching the area we moved south toward Sinaypanan. The bluffs were on our left. Not far from the bluffs was a shallow river. Across the delta near the foot-hills was another shallow river.

Sinaypanan was in view all the way. The land rose here, and there was a grove of trees where a house had once stood. When we were within about 300 yards of the trees the enemy entrenched there opened up with heavy automatic and rifle fire. We were caught out in the open open field and under intense fire. Fortunately a broad drainage ditch, some fifteen feet wide and four feet deep, was nearby.   *re made it into the ditch by running a few steps, hitting the ground, crawling a few steps, and then running again. After everyone was in the ditch we assessed the damages. S/Sgt James Jackson had been hit in the body and was paralyzed from his waist down. 1st Lt Dan Lee, 3rd platoon leader, had been hit in his thigh. Sgt LeRoy was, also, wounded, also hit in the left thigh.

Now we were in a bad situation and needed fire support. Capt Brazil said right off that he was afraid the artillery might not reach Sinaypanan. He called for a registering round at extreme range. We waited expectantly, hoping the artillery would be able to place effective fire on the Japanese position. To our great disappointment the first round was well short of the target. We could see the round burst out in the open field at least a quarter of a mile short. Capt Brazil had them try several rounds, but to no avail. We were beyond our artillery's range. We felt isolated and alone. Usually a light machine gun platoon from 2r Battalion Headquarters Company was attached, but in this instance battalion had not done so. To get to the Japs we had to cross several hundreds yards of open field. To do this without support was suicide.

I do not know what Bill Bailey had in mind, and before we could discuss it someone called out that the Japs were running. Unbelieving I stood up looking at the position the Japs occupied. I could see a miracle happening. The Japs were running through the trees to the bluffs. We moved to the former Jap positions and the buffs. There they were far out on the delta crossing the most distant stream and disappearing into forest. We could see a good size force of fifty or more men with several machine guns. They were carrying the guns still mounted on their tripods, the carriers on each side carrying a leg. The aerial machine guns mounted on fabricated tripods were-hard to separate, so the crews carried them in one piece.

We were sure that our artillery had frightened    them, and they were getting out before a heavy barrage struck them. After the war while we guarding the Jap prisoners at Fabrica, I asked the Japanese major in command to see if he could find anyone who had been at Sinaypanan that day, and if he could I wanted to talk to him. He found a lieutenant who had, indeed been there that day. I had him brought up with a warrant officer to interpret. The Jap said they were well dug in and expected artillery fire. They had received word that a large force with two tanks were coming their way. They had no anti-tank weapons, and knew that with the broad river delta behind them, they would be trapped when the tanks arrived; therefore, they got out while they could. I was amazed.

It was now past mid-afternoon, we had three wounded men, so we did not tarry. Litters had to be fashioned out of staves and ponchos. Lee, although the bullet had gone through the upper inside pert of his thigh, insisted on walking. He made it, but in much pain particular toward the end. Bill Bailey was also suffering. We did not know it but he was sick with hepatitis (they called it "infectious hepatitis" back then). Both he and Lee staggered in on guts. Sergeant Eide's wound was such that he had to be carried on one of the improvised litters. Jackson, of course, had to be carried. He was in good spirits laughing and joking with us, telling us that he didn't have to walk back like the rest of us. He was a small man with sandy colored, wavy hair, and a mustache. He was always in good spirits, and well liked by the entire company. Even though we were forewarned of the prognosis, we were stunned to receive the message that this brave brother died three days after he was wounded.

Now every squad leader in the 2d platoon who had jumped on Corregidor was dead: S/Sgt Charles Hoyt, S/Sgt Donald White, and S/Sgt James Jackson.

We got back to our perimeter of the night before about dark. Bill Bailey and James Jackson were evacuated. Bailey's illness would hospitalize him for almost two months. As executive officer I would assume command of the company in Bill's absence. 1st Lt William C. Mathers commanded the 1st platoon, 1st Lt Robert L. Clark commanded the 2d platoon,  2d Lt Chalmers Fennel commanded the 3d platoon,  2nd Lt Leroy T. Elliott commanded the 4th (mortar) platoon, and 2d Lt Milton Walker acted as executive officer.

Thus F company entered into the Negros fray, and after one day had one experienced combat officer, two newly commissioned officers who had combat experience as non commissioned officers, three replacement officers fresh from the States. We had lost some good non-commissioned officers and some good men who would have made good non coms.

�

Col Jones left for usual morning recco.

Div ordnance here to pick up recovered Jap automobiles and trucks, 0908- To CO, Rear Base: Adm re Rotation, (LeVine)

To CO, 503 RCT: Adm: Rotation, (Rear Base)

Col Jones returned from his recco trip. Rcn patrols out; no contact; slow progress; many casualties for us- not so many for them. Terrain is contin�ous series of ridges, heavily defended, and positions well dug. Unsuitable for our five tanks, which have been firing at 3000 yds.

326 guerrilas attached for tactics and rations.

20th Portable Station Hospital joined the RCT: 23 EM, 3 Officers.

0745- To S-2, RCT: 091530 E Co patrol fire vicinity SINAYPANAN . 1 enemy KIA, i HMG and small arms fire. About 200-250. (C), 2d Bn)

To CC, RHQ Co:: No casualties (Cornett)

To CO, 185th: 3d Bn 503 advancing as planned. Co to MALISBOG on lookout for donald patrol, your situation: (1N 0 185th)

To CO 503: Will arrive beach 1500 with 3 water trailers. (Holm)

To CO Rear:Request for resupply. (Atkins)

To CO Rear: Adm Re: Rotation. (LeVine)

This is enough of the RCT S-1's history to give a good idea of the great amount of administrative detail involved each day. I shall discontinue transcribing this document except for items of interest.

-o-0-o-
 

0800 - D Co moved out on recco patrol to vicinity of (35.5-00.2)

0822

10  C.O. D Co. Be on the alert for the 185 Inf patrol near point 5. 1125 Nine bursts of overhead enemy arty fire over CP & F Cp area, 2 WIA 1200 Received orders to move Bn forward.

1345

 All units moved put for new positions (35.4-04.6) with exception of D Co out on all day patrol. D Co will return to old CP site and join Bn in the morning.

1600

 Bn CP area received enemy small arms from in front of "G" Co position. 1730 More enemy arty fire overhead, four bursts, no casualties.

1840

11  To Hq, E, F Cos. Put your booby out- advise when they are armed. CO 2d Bn

10 April- We were taking it easy after leisure breakfast of field rations (10-in 1). Suddenly several artillery rounds bursts overhead about the height of the coconut trees. These shells had proximity fuses and were fired from a dual purpose 75mm gun. Pvt Anderson (Private Donald S. Anderson) was struck by shrapnel and fatally wounded.

�

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS

FROM: 101600 Apr 45.

TO : 111600 Apr 45.

S-3 PERIODIC REPORT

No. 4

MAP: NEGROS, 1/50,000

1. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See Overlay.

2. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Very warm and partially overcast.

3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry:    After a night of nil activity, our assault Bn. resumed the attack behind artillery and mortar barrage. As the advance progressed it was met by MG fire at 36.7-00.3. A fire fight ensued. The positions were silence, and two machine guns and one 20 MM were found demolished. Two enemy dead were found. "E" Co. was brought up on the right flank and the attack continued with three companies abreast. The advance had been a continued fire fight against pillboxes and entrenched riflemen on both sides of the route of advance. As the period closed, the fire fight was continuing. Our troops are employing tanks and artillery where ever practicle (sic. The 3d Bn 74th (Philippine) Infantry made a reconnaissance patrol to the left flank to point (36.6-04.0), returning with the information that a native reported approximately 40 enemy were bivouaced at (37.0-03.0). This will be investigated. Our left flank patrol con�tacted a patrol from 185th inf. at (33.3-01.3) 1130I.

b. Artillery: The Artillery supported our advance with fire on points (37.3-00.9), (37.6-99.5), (38.6-98.6), (37.3-99.0).  Interdictory fire was placed on (37.6-99.3) during the night 10-11.

c. Tanks: Out attached tanks advanced along with our leading elements and gave direct fire support where needed.

d. Engineers: Maintained supply route road and surveyed for lateral routes for future operations to out flanks.

 4.  RESULTS OF OUR OPERATION: Our advance has continued slowly against a well entrenched enemy heavily armed with automatic weapons. By using all weapons at our disposal the enemy is slowly retreating into the hills. As yet we have had no artillery fire returned. A few rounds of 40 MM at various intervals have been employed by the enemy.

5. CASUALTIES:

a. OUR CASUALTIES: Today, 3 KIA 13 WIA. To date: 10 KIA (incl 1 DOW), 26 WIA

b. ENEMY KNOWN CASUALTIES: Today: 2. To date: 16

(Signature)

  CLARK
S-3

�

No.5
111600 Apr 45
to
121600 Apr 45il 45
 

Our Inf resumed the southeasterly attack after a heavy artillery barrage with three companies abreast on parallel ridges. Mortar barrages from the 4.2 chemical mortar platoon preceded each advance, which though slow was steady. Enemy mortar, rifle, and MG fire was encountered during prac�tically the entire advance. One .50 cal. MG was demolished (37.1-99.3). Two enemy dead found at this position. One .50 cal. MG and one 37mm antitank gun were demolished at 937.4-99.8)." Results: Enemy to evacuate casualties, so we cannot count."

1430 -  D Co moving abreast with "G" Co met enemy small arms fire, one WIA.
 

1800

Night fighters bombed enemy positions with napalm bombs.

Co advanced on foot approx 1000 yds. and received enemy automatic fire. Pvt Ross wounded in leg. At 1300 LMG's fired on enemy position without visible effect.

Local patrols by 1st platt.

Company attempted to attack an enemy held ridge.
1st Lt Wm. Bailey went to the hospital & command of Co. was temporarily taken over by 1st Lt. Wm. Calhoun."

When someone was recording the history about two months later they must have been confused about this date, because F Company did not attempt to make any attack during this time.    I think they are confusing this date with 9 April when F Company attempted to drive the enemy from the slightly higher ground (certainly not a ridge) at Sinaypanan.  9 April was also the day Lt. Bailey went to the hospital.

�

E Co. reinforced with K Co., 74th (Philippine) Inf., began a two day reconnaissance patrol in SINAYPANAN (36.6-07.5) area. Arriving at the area at 1330I, evidence of recent enemy occupation were found in burnt ammunition dumps, 2 destroyed .50 cal. aircraft MG's and 300 rds. of knee mortar ammunition which was destroyed. The vicinity was searches without contact. The patrol will remain in SINAYPANAN during the night 13-14 and resume its reconnaissance 14 April. A one squad patrol from E Co. making a left flank reconnaissance encountered enemy automatic fire at (38.7-00.9). The patrol patrol withdrew and called for Bn. mortar support on the position. report of the mortar fire effectiveness had not been received at close�of the period. A one squad reconnaissance patrol from F Company searched the right flank area to the south to MALISBOG RIVER at (33.8-06.2) with nil contact. A red smoke signal of a 185th Inf patrol was sighted, but physical was not made. D Company was withdrawn from the right flank position. One platoon of F Company took up position on ridge (37.5-98.7). I Company patrolled the draw on the right flank 927.8-99.00). No enemy was encountered by either. Twenty-five enemy dead were counted daring the period (16 reported by telephone to 40th Div 121800I). One dual purpose 3 inch gun, one 29mm, one American BAR, two Scheeser automatic pistols, two modified 7.7mm MG's, one knee mortar plus rifles found vicinity (37.7-99.4).   2d Bn, 74th (Philippines) Inf. provided Regt. C.P. perimeter and supply route defense during period.

Results: Due to airstrikes no forward effort during the day. Flank patrol with one enemy contact (38.7-00.9). The vicinity of SINAYPANAN (36.6-07.5) was established as a point of exit or entrance to enemy's main position from the north.

One sq of E co moved out to patrol area of (38.7-00.1) legt from Bn C.P.

2nd Bn C.P. moved forward to establish Hqs at (36.2-00.2).

To C.O. 2d Bn- We are 200 yds due north of check point #1. Have observed activity on high ground to North. searching area. Sqd. C.O. E Co.

To C.O. 2d Bn.- now at (36.0-05.5) heat is bad, resting & getting

water above Calaptan river, no enemy encountered. Sqd C.O. E Co.

 to CO 2d Bn. Have one (1) WIA and no aid man with patrol. Can

you offer assistance. Sqd C.O. E co.

To C.O. 2d Bn- Pinned down by automatic fire need reinforcements. Sqd C.O. E Co.

 E Co Squad patrol withdrawn after contact with enemy, with loss of one (1) KIA & one (1) WIA. Unable to recover body of KIA at this time. Mortar fire ordered to neutralize target. Two (2)enemy KIA.

 To C.O. 2d Bn- Recon shows Japs force of undetermined size de�ployed along this line (37.7-07.8) to (38.8-07.2) Will recon that area in the morning. Sqd C.O. E co.

 E Co. with company of guerillas atch found evidence of recent evacuation, burned ammo dumps, two well oiled 50 cal aircraft MG (destroyed), 300 rds knee mortar ammo not destroyed in vicinity of Sinaypanan. Trails into hills traveled this morning. F Co patrolled vicinity of (33.2-00.2) reported no activity. D co. thoroughly patrolled draws & ravines forward of D Co C.P. (36.2-99.3). Enemy had well defended positions on trails with foxholes averaging 3 ft. depth.

Co was relieved by F Co. and moved approximately 900 yds north and set up perimeter."

The entire co minus one squad from 3rd platt attch. L.M.G. section and a co. of 110 guriellas (sic) moved out at 0800 hr with the mission of patrolling the area north to Sinaypanan. No resistance encountered. Japs had evacuated. Mortar and 3 50 cal M.G. in working order. Set up perimeter and prepared to hold area.

No entry.

�