USAFFE HEADQUARTERS ON BATAAN, FEBRUARY 1942. Left to right: Brig. Gen. Spencer B. Akin, Maj. Paul R. Wing (photographic officer), Lt. Col. Nicoll F. Galbraith, and Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall.

The shortage of supplies of all types, and especially of food, had a greater effect on the outcome of the siege of Bataan than any other single factor. "Each day's combat, each day's output of physical energy," wrote one officer in his diary, "took its toll of the human body-a toll which could not be repaired. . . ." When this fact is understood, he added, the story of Bataan is told.

General Homma and the majority of the 14th Army staff believed that American resistance on Bataan would be weak and that operations there would be quickly concluded. The plan for the attack, therefore, was conceived of as a pursuit rather than an assault against a strongly fortified position in depth.

This conception was confirmed by intelligence reports. The 14th Army staff estimated that MacArthur had 40,000 to 45,000 men, about 40 tanks, and a few fighter planes on Bataan and Corregidor. On Bataan alone, Homma was told by his intelligence officer, there were only 25,000 men. The American "regular" 31st Division and the "fortress unit" on Corregidor were believed to total 35,000 while the remnants of the Philippine Army units altogether comprised 5,000 to 10,000 more. Reports received from air reconnaissance gave no reason to believe that the Americans and Filipinos had constructed any strong installations on Bataan.

The physical condition of the troops on Bataan was believed to be poor. All units in combat had been badly cut up, rations had been reduced by half, and the entire American-Filipino army was on a skimpy two-meals-a-day diet. Desertions by Filipino troops were believed to be heavy and the Japanese fully believed that the Americans had taken strong measures to halt these desertions and the surrender of individuals. In support of these conclusions they pointed out that the bodies of Philippine soldiers had been found tied to trees.

With this picture of the enemy, it is not surprising that General Homma believed the capture of the peninsula would be an easy task. His estimate of the American scheme of defense was that MacArthur's forces would make their strong stand around Mariveles and then withdraw to Corregidor. Seizure of the island fortress would not be easy and a "sea blockade" might be necessary before the island would be reduced. On the whole, "the threat of enemy resistance was taken lightly" by 14th Army.

On the theory that the campaign would be a light one, Homma assigned the seizure of Bataan to the inexperienced and untrained 65th Brigade. His plan was to have the brigade advance in two columns, one along the east coast through Abucay to Balanga and the other down the opposite shore through Moron to Bagac. Once these objectives had been taken, Nara was to send the main force of his brigade south from Balanga, while a smaller force drove on from Bagac. Both were to push towards Mariveles, the 14th Army operation order read, "with the annihilation of the enemy on Bataan Peninsula as their objective."