MEDICAL
CARE ON BATAAN
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As time passed, uniforms became more
ragged and threadbare, offering little protection against the cold
nights and the cruel thorns so abundant on Bataan. Unit commanders were
instructed to limit their clothing requisitions "to minimum replacement
requirements" without regard to normal army standards. Most did not
secure even this minimum. In one unit, comparatively well clad, the
uniforms were considered 90 percent unserviceable. Less than 25 percent
of the enlisted men in this unit had blankets, shelter halves, or
raincoats. Fully one quarter of the command was without shoes; the rest
went about in shoes so badly worn that under normal conditions they
would have been considered unfit for use.41
For a time the most desperate needs were met by a salvage unit which
"renovated, repaired, washed, and ironed" the clothing taken from
patients in hospitals.42
Such a measure merely robbed Peter to pay Paul.
n the wake of starvation and want came
dread disease. Malaria, dengue, and the evil consequences of
avitaminosis (vitamin deficiency)-scurvy, beriberi, and amoebic
dysentery-made their appearance soon after the troops reached Bataan. On
10 January General King's aide wrote prematurely in his diary that the
effects of the enforced diet of half rations was already becoming
evident in the condition of the men. Two weeks later he thought he saw
signs of emaciation and nerve fatigue. The ration, he believed, had so
reduced the stamina of the men that they were "being incapacitated by
minor sickness they [formerly] had been able to throw off without
medication."48
Another layman described the symptoms of malnutrition he had noticed
about the middle of February. In the morning, he observed, men's legs
"feel watery and, at intervals, pump with pains that swell and go away
again." Rapid movement brought an attack of vertigo and a thumping of
the heart "like a tractor engine bogged in a swamp." For an hour after
breakfast a feeling of normality was restored, followed by lassitude.
The hour after noon, when men doubled up with intestinal pains, was the
worst of the day.49
Unknowingly, this officer was describing incipient beriberi resulting
from the absence of fresh meat, vegetables, and dairy products- all rich
in Vitamin B-from the diet.
Medical men began to warn commanders of
the effects of the inadequate diet at the end of January. The caloric
content of the ration then being issued, one medical officer reported,
was "well under the requirements for the physical work demanded," and
was resulting in serious loss of weight. In one unit, composed of
Americans, the men had lost 15 to 25 pounds since the start of the
campaign. The absence of fats and juices, as well as Vitamins A, B, and
C, was evident, this medical officer declared, in "varying degrees of
apathy, depression, lack of aggressiveness and irritability."5The
alarm of medical and combat officers became so great during the next few
weeks that Lt. Col. James O. Gillespie, the medical officer in the
Bataan echelon of USAFFE, told his chief on Corregidor, Col. Wibb E.
Cooper, that "it appears to be the consensus of surgeons attached to
American front line troops that the diet provided is inadequate for the
maintenance of health and combat efficiency." The lack of protein, fat,
minerals, and certain vitamins, he pointed out, was resulting in common
diarrhea and dysentery.
The number of men brought down by
malnutrition and vitamin deficiency diseases increased in geometric
proportion with the passage of time and the successive cuts in the
ration. During January, the ration had provided, in terms of energy,
approximately 2,000 calories a day. The next month the figure declined
to 1,500 and during March it was only 1,000 calories daily. Defense of
the line on Bataan, Lt. Col. Harold W. Glattly, the Luzon force surgeon
estimated, required an expenditure of energy of at least 3,500 to 4,000
calories a day for each man. He found the results of this caloric
deficit alarming in the extreme. Serious muscle waste and depletion of
fat reserve were evident everywhere and beriberi in its incipient stages
had become almost universal throughout the command. Moreover,
malnutrition had so weakened the troops that they were particularly
vulnerable to even the most minor ailment. The spread of any disease, he
warned, would be of epidemic proportions. Men's physical reserves had
disappeared by early March; at the end of the month the men were
deteriorating rapidly.54
Even more serious than malnutrition and
avitaminosis was the spread of malaria. This disease had made its
appearance shortly after the troops reached Bataan, but was kept under
control by prophylactic doses of quinine. There was a small supply of
atabrine but it was quickly exhausted. A malaria control program such as
existed later in the war was not possible on Bataan. Most of the
Filipino troops were never issued mosquito nets, and those who had them
left them behind during the withdrawal for they were of a bulky and
heavy type. The area occupied by the troops contained native villages
where mosquitoes could breed freely, and there were always large numbers
of Filipino civilians behind the lines. These civilians were "a
reservoir for malaria," and nullified the effect of any limited control
program adopted by the troops.
Malaria did not affect the efficiency of
the troops until the beginning of March, but at the end of January most
of the men were already infested with malarial parasites. Medical
officers made gloomy predictions for the future, when the supply of
quinine would give out. "If all troops take the prescribed 5 grams
prophylactic dose," wrote a medical officer to General R. J. Marshall on
26 January, "the supply will be exhausted in a month." As early as the
beginning of February there were signs that the disease would soon
increase at an alarming rate. Only the regular dosage of quinine kept
the disease in check that month, but the supply of this drug dwindled
rapidly. During the first week of March, its use as a prophylactic in
most units was discontinued. Thereafter the drug was administered only
to those actually ill with the disease.
The consequences were frightful. The
number of daily admissions to the hospitals for malaria alone jumped to
500 during the first week in March. After an inspection of
fortifications on Bataan, General Casey reported that the incidence of
malaria was as high as 35 percent among front-line units. Two weeks
later Colonel Cooper declared that already there were 3,000 active cases
of malaria among the troops on Bataan and that the disease was spreading
with appalling rapidity. Colonel Glattly took an even more pessimistic
view of the situation. The relapse rate, he noted, was high and since no
quinine was available for any but active cases, the command could expect
a frightful increase in the morbidity rate.60
By the end of the month the number of daily admissions to the hospitals
was approaching the fantastic figure of 1,000, and 75 to 80 percent of
the men in front-line units had the disease.