August 1941 |
During August the guns and range equipment arrived and intensive
artillery drill became the order of the day.
When the sections had become proficient in the duties of all
members of their section, training of alternate sections was commenced.
The machine gun section was trained as a gun section, a gun section as a
range section, etc.
Training in fortification of a position was undertaken, and a training
position was fortified by digging in the gun emplacements and
construction of approach trenches.
The position was camouflaged as a matter of training.
No tactical position was built for the battery as part of the 2nd
Bn, 60th CA (AA) was to move to the Bataan Peninsula for permanent
station at an early date and the training position was deemed suitable
for an emergency.
|
November
28/29 1941
|
On
the night of November 28, 1941, the Harbor Defenses were placed on an
alert status due to the international situation.
This facilitated plans for the proposed change of station, and
the 2nd Bn, less Batteries "P" and "H", was ordered
to prepare to move at once.
|
December
2, 1941
|
It
was decided to move the Bn en-masse.
On the morning of December 2, 1941, about 7:00 AM, the first
barges left Corregidor for Cabcaben bearing the Bn transportation, the
guns and tractors, kitchens, and organizational equipment.
Subsequent trips of the barges during the day brought over
personal equipment (footlockers and barracks bags, etc.), bedding, S.L.
equipment, and ammunition (3” and small arms). The rest of the day, part of the night, and part
of the next day were devoted to unloading equipment and transporting it
to the campsites. We were
delayed by the limited dock space for unloading and by the limited Bn
transportation.
The
Bn Hq., Hq Btry, and Battery “E” went into their permanent base-camp
sites on the AA-Trail near KP169 on the Cabcaben-Mariveles Road.
Battery “G” moved
into a temporary camp at Little Baguio near KP 167 on the same road.
By nightfall the battery kitchen was set up and a hot supper
served. Bedding and
equipment was move in, but no tents was set up that night.
|
December
3, 1941
|
Next
day the unloading and movement of supplies and equipment was completed,
and a tent camp pitched. The
guns and range equipment were emplaced and oriented in a temporary
position and communications established with the AA Command Post at
Corregidor. The battery
immediately took up the alert status of the Harbor Defenses and the
report "Globe/Battery "G" communications code
designation/in position and ready for action" was sent to the Bn Hq. The Battery Commander, battery officers, and chiefs of
section of a future permanent position to be hewn from the jungle on the
hill devoted the next two days to improvement and further camouflage
of the battery position, organization of the camp, and reconnaissance.
Later this position was known as Globe Hill, at the terminus of
the AA Trail in the Mariveles Naval Reservation.
The next day, December 6, clearing of the hill commenced.
The following day being Sunday, the personnel was given a well
earned day of rest.
|
December
5, 1941
|
Early
the following morning, about 4:l5 AM, the B.C. was called by the air
guard and informed that, shortly before, warnings of aerial activity
over northern Luzon had been received by the "Flash" operator
and that the AA OP had ordered air guards and alerts doubled.
The battery was immediately alerted and placed in readiness for
possible action. Shortly, a
general air alert was ordered from the MOP and maintained until
daylight. About 6:30 AM the
B.C. was informed by the Bn Cdr of the attack on Pearl Harbor and of the
existence of a state of war.
This
information was immediately transmitted to the battery personnel.
The reaction of the men to the news indicated favorable morale
and an excellent fighting spirit.
|
"This
is our distinctive insignia of the 60th Artillery Regiment. The 60th had
been organised 23 December 1917, and the motto "COELIS IMPERAMUS"
means 'We Rule the Heavens.'
|
The
battery organization at this time was as follows:
Captain
Aaron A. Abston, B. C.
1st
Lieut. Joseph D. Kwiatkowski, Ex.O, S.0.
2nd
Lieut. Leslie L. Peterie, Rn.O.
2nd
Lieut. Francis LeClear, Ass't. Ex.O. (MG.O.), Mess 0.
1st
Sergeant Arthur G. Kendal, 1st Sgt.
Staff
Sergeant Charles R. Feaueyear, Electrical Chief
Staff
Sergeant Harold F. Huffman, Chief of Firing Section
Sergeant
Paul P. Verdi, Chief of Range Section
Sergeant
Theodore H. Vetter (D.S. with the PA.), Chief of
Sergeant
Charles L. Kudie, #1 Gun Cmdr
Ser2eant
Hulen U Goodnight, #2 Gun Cmdr
Sergeant
John E. Cheesman, #3 Gun Cmdr
Sergeant
Clifford R.White, #4 Gun Cmdr
Sergeant
Cread E. Shuey, Chief of MG Section
Sergeant
John H. Yocum, Mess Sgt.
Sergeant
Robert M. Murdock, Sup. Sgt.
Corporal
Ralph D. Vesper, Chief of Communications.
Corporal
George K. Haren, Clerk.
Total
enlisted strength: 113 (see
roster)(roster unavailable-Ed)
|
December
10th 1941
Gun
drill at an AA Battery.
(National
Archives)
|
On
Dec. 10 (?), 1941, due to misinformation and a confusion of orders
issued to the Bn, the Bn was alerted and turned out as infantry to
combat enemy parachute troops, supposed to be landing near Cabcaben,
Finding no enemy troops in the vicinity of Cabcaben, Battery
"G" personnel, under command of 1st Lt. Kwiatkowski, returned
to their guns. Further
confusion of orders and misinformation caused the Bn Cmdr, about 10:45
AM, to order the battery to proceed with its guns to the Lomas (?)
airfield. The battery convoy was formed ready to move at 11:30 AM when
orders were received to remain in its present position.
The
position at Little Baguio was a temporary location pending the
construction of a permanent position on the AA-Trail, and it had several
disadvantages. Principally it had a poor field of fire and was too far from
the permanent tactical location to give maximum protection to
Corregidor. Permission was
requested by the BC to move the battery to a banana plantation along the
AA trail a short distance from the proposed permanent and offering a
better field of fire and a better tactical location.
The area was not available previously as it was held in lease by a civilian. Permission
was granted and about 12:15 PM the battery was ready
to move. Just as the convoy
was getting ready to leave, the rumble of heavy motors was heard.
Soon a flight of 27 Japanese heavy bombers were sighted out over
Manila Bay coming directly towards the position.
Trucks scuttled for cover under the trees.
The planes passed directly overhead in line, wing tips almost
interlocked--an antiaircraft artilleryman's dream--at an altitude of
about 5000 yards. It was
the battery's first target, and the guns were in March Order position.
After
the planes had passed out of sight, the convoy took the road.
The B.C. and gun commanders preceded the convoy and had the gun
positions staked out when the guns arrived.
The sections were turned to and commenced digging in their
emplacements. Care was
taken to remove just one banana plant for each pit so as not to spoil
the natural camouflage. Pits
were dug about four feet deep and the spoil used to fill sandbags and
revet a wall about two feet higher around the pits.
Trenches were dug for the outriggers.
Camouflage nets with holes in the centers for the guns to fire
through were thrown over the pits to hide the new- turned earth, break
up the outlines of the pits, and hide the guns.
The director and height finder were treated in a similar manner.
By 9:30 PM the range equipment and three of the guns were
emplaced, fortified and orientation completed.
The communications were installed and the battery was again
“Ready for Action.”
|
|
December
10 - 14, 1941
|
The
next few days were dedicated to improvement of the position laying out
and digging communication trenches, digging in the local defense machine
guns, construction of a command post, and moving the camp to the woods
just beyond the position on the AA Trail.
At least two gun sections were kept always at the guns in
readiness for alerts. When the position had progressed sufficiently, one gun
section was detached daily under the immediate supervision of the chief
of the firing section, Staff Sergeant Huffman and the direction of the
Executive Officer, 1st Lieut. Kwiatkowski, to continue the work on the
permanent position on Globe Hill. A number of civilians were made
available by the engineers to aid in the clearing.
During
this period, flights of enemy planes over Manila Bay to and from raids
on Manila, Nichols Field, and Cavite were a daily occurrence, but no
other planes came within range of the battery after the incident of the
10th. Sounds of bombing to
the northward in the direction of Clark Field were frequently heard.
On the afternoon of Dec. 13 a flight of 17 planes were sighted
over the North Channel flying west toward the battery position.
The battery was alerted and all sections reported for action
promptly except No. 2 gun section, which was at work on Globe Hill.
Batteries on Corregidor opened fire and split the formation of 17
into two flights, of 8 and 9. The 8 turned south over the South Channel
and the 9 turned and passed just north of our position.
The battery fired 54 rounds and split up the formation.
Observers from the Bn Hq and from Corregidor called the B.C. and
congratulated him on the results. Two planes were officially reported by the AACP as downed by
Battery "G". The only criticism of the initial action of the
battery (only about 25 EM of the battery had ever seen the guns in
action before) was the failure of the gun commanders in their
excitement to limit the number of rounds to be fired on any one target
as directed by the B.C.
|
December
14 - 23, 1941
|
The
period Dec. 14-23 was one of daily enemy activity over Manila and
Cavite, but the planes were careful not to take too many chances in
coming within range of the AA Defenses of Corregidor.
During this interval the battery received a ratio director, a SCE
268 unit and the range section was reorganized to man the instrument and
get it into operation. On
the 15th the battery went on field rations along with the garrison at
Corregidor. The troops now
were well shaken down in their new life in the field and morale was
high.
|
Christmas
Day 1941 |
On
Dec. 25 planes appeared over Mariveles and bombed tile Naval Base and
the dry dock "Dewey". The
battery engaged the enemy but without results.
Thus far no serious threat had been made against Corregidor.
|
December
29, 1941 |
About
10:00 Noon, on Dec. 29 the first aerial attacks were launched against
the fortified islands. For
several hours flights of 9 or 8 planes were constantly under observation
coming and going from thrusts at Corregidor and its outposts. Altitudes
varied from 5500 to 7200 yards. The
fire from the AA Defenses smashed several attacking formations.
Battery G was in action several times and was credited when the
attack was over, with destroying one plane.
Batteries on Corregidor were credited with several more.
Attacks
against the Naval Base at Mariveles on New Years Day burned the barrio
and damaged the Naval Base. AA
fire by Battery G was handicapped by clouds and was ineffective.
Interruption of the battery's new years' day dinner by the attack
at noon time and the frequency of air alerts at noon time previously led
the B.C. to order a two-meal a day mess service for the battery.
|
January
2, 1942 |
Attacks
were resumed against Corregidor on Jan 2nd with a "sneak
raid." Battery G picked up the planes--36 of them--far out over the
China Sea flying south and circling Corregidor to attack it from the
northeast. Communications
with Corregidor were at that time interrupted by submarine cable trouble
and an air raid warning could not be sent in.
Therefore, the B.C. ordered a warning shot to be fired in the
direction of the planes to attract attention to them from Corregidor.
Apparently the device failed, for the first wave of 9 was almost
over Corregidor before batteries there could get into action.
Other flights, after the initial assault, came within range of
our Battery and were immediately taken under fire by the battery;
destruction of one plane was credited to the battery this day.
|
January
3 - 6, 1942 |
Intensive
attacks were continued on the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th against Corregidor
and the fortified islands, Mariveles, and Cabcaben.
Battery G was in action on each of these dates and was credited
with destroying two planes on the 3rd and three planes on the 5th.
During the firing on the 4th, the bursts were noticeably
ineffective. The B.C.
diagnosed the cause as a loosening of rate clutches in the M4 Director
(one of the older instruments with smaller and less effective clutches)
and ceased firing. He and
Staff Sergeant Charles R. Feaueyear opened the instrument and made the
necessary adjustments but were too late to get back in action against
the attack that day. The
results on the following day (3 planes) confirmed the diagnosis of the
B.C. and the adjustments made.
|
|
On
Jan 4, 1942, Second Lieutenant ________ McDaniel’s and Frank M.
Bryant, AC, were attached by USAFFE from the 34th Pursuit Squadron as
observers. On Jan 6 Battery C, 91st CA (PS) (Code designation Cebu)
moved into position west of Mariveles and Corregidor; and was
particularly welcomed by Battery G for it gave the battery supporting
fire. About the same time Battery G was able to procure 4 .50 cal.
machine guns to replace the 4 .30 cal. local defense guns.
As a consequence the batter~ felt more secure against dive-bomber
attack.
|
|
The
ten days following the intensive raids over Corregidor commencing the
New Year showed a considerable slackening of activity against the
fortified islands. However, frequent raids by heavy bombers and
dive-bombers and frequent reconnaissance by observation planes were
carried out over the Bataan Peninsula by the enemy, and Battery G was
frequently on the alert and in action.
On Jan 9 destruction of one Dive bomber was credited to the
battery.
|
January
15,
1942
Japanese
Heavy Bomber
Mitsubishi Type 97
"Sally"
|
On
Jan 15 a flight of 6 heavy bombers attempted a raid on Corregidor but
was foiled by an overcast sky. After cruising about for a time the
formation came into a hole in the clouds directly over Battery G, flying
east. The flight wheeled to
the north and was visible just long enough for the instruments to get
"On Target." The Battery Commenced firing just as the
formation disappeared from view. No
bursts were visible, but shortly the O.P. on Barbarri Hill reported that
one of the bombers crashed nearby.
This
bit of blind firing brought the total of planes credited as
"destroyed by Battery G" to eleven (11).
The battery was not only leading the regiment in planes downed;
but its record of approximately 75 rounds fired per plane destroyed was
accredited by USAFFE as a world record for similar weapons. As a result,
Mr. Clark Lee, associated (?) Press war correspondent, came over to
Bataan, on Jan 16, for a story on Battery B, which was sent back to his
papers in the States. The record of the battery was recognized in
broadcasts from radio KGEI in San Francisco and from a radio station in
Randon (?). Mr. and Mrs. _____Jacoby, war correspondents representing
... and members of the USAFFE staff on Bataan visited the battery
on the behalf of General McArthur, commanding USAFFE, to congratulate
the battery on its splendid record.
|
|
The
following month saw an increase of dive-bomber activity, particularly
over Cabcaben where our forces had an airfield, and air alerts were a
daily occurrence, though comparatively few planes came within range of
our battery.
Battery
G was credited with the destruction of two dive bombers--one on Jan 17
and one on Feb 14--and several more were seen to have been damaged,
though never confirmed as being destroyed because they were able to get
back across the infantry front lines which were now stabilized on the
Peninsula. On Jan ... the
battery engaged a flight of 9 enemy heavy bombers in conjunction with
Battery C, 91st CA CPS) (AA). Of the flight, which was approaching
Corregidor, Battery C-9lst set on fire one plane, which crashed north of
Little Baguio. Our battery
secured a direct hit on the flight and exploded one plane in midair and
damaged a third, which crashed just beyond the enemy lines. The remaining 6 planes turned away from their objective and
jettisoned their bombs over Manila Bay just off Cabcaben.
|
February
13, 1942 |
On
Feb 13 3rd Lieutenant ______ Rimando, CA (PA), and 50 enlisted men of Battery "F",
2nd Bn, 1st CA (PA) was attached to Battery G for duty.
The gun and machine gun section assimilated these men and trained
them as integral parts of their gun crews.
3rd Lieut. Rimando was assigned to duty as Ass’t
Executive Officer and Assistant Range Officer.
These additional personnel facilitated work on the position at
Globe Hill, which had been handicapped by frequent air alerts and
shortage of labor. The
completion of the Mariveles airfield made it imperative that our battery
occupy Globe Hill by the time the field was placed in operation.
Due to our limited field of observation in the direction of this
airfield, dive-bomber activity there would be obscured.
|
February
22, 1942 |
On
Feb. 22 the movement to our new position commenced.
Two guns were emplaced and then the range equipment was moved. The remaining guns were then moved in and emplaced, thus
putting the battery out of action a minimum period of time. Movement was made in the late afternoon rather than night due
to the difficult terrain of the new position, which was on a steep,
wooded knoll, the top of which was cleared.
The
old emplacements were disturbed as little as possible. Very ingeniously,
dummy, guns, and instruments which were built by the chiefs of section
were installed and camouflaged. An
official signal corps photographer who visited the new position for
photographs was very much interested in the dummy positions and
requested permission of the B.C. to photograph the "Charlie
McCarthy Battery" as he called it and as the Banana Ridge dummy
battery was subsequently known.
The
new position was practically completed prior to occupancy.
A communication trench around the periphery of the knoll
connected the gun and machine gun pits.
The range equipment was inside the gun quadrilateral, by
necessity, with communicating laterals to the periphery.
The emplacements, except the range section, were dug-in to the
maximum depth as which the guns could be emplaced (6-7 feet). The range
equipment to avoid cutting all small underbrush was fortified with
massive double wall of sandbags and earth.
The
bivouac area was located in the heavy woods surrounding the knoll.
The cool, pleasant breezes constantly blowing over the ridge
caused the area to be called "Greater Little Baguio." The
kitchen remained in its previous location.
|
February
22 - March 24, 1942 |
The
period Feb 22 to March 24 saw very little activity over the Bataan
Peninsula. Dive-bombing attacks over South Bataan had been effectively
broken up by Battery G-60 and Battery C-9lst CA (PS) antiaircraft
artillery. Only one dive
bomber attack was made on Mariveles Field after it was put in operation,
although our P-40's, operating from this field had conducted a
devastating raid on enemy naval units and shipping at Olangapo.
Only an occasional observation plane made a reconnaissance flight
on the area. Personnel at
Battery G spent their time monotonously improving the new position,
revetting emplacement walls, and constructing crew shelters in
contemplation of the coming rainy season.
During
this period 2nd Lieut. LeClear was relieved from duty with the
organization
and assigned to Hq Battery 60th CA (AA) at Corregidor.
2nd Lieut. Bryant, AC, succeeded him as Ass't. Ex.O. (M.G.O.)
with additional duties as Ass't Range Officer 2nd Lieut. McDaniel’s,
AC, followed him as Mess Officer. With
additional duties as Ass't. Rn.O. until his relief shortly thereafter
from attachment to the battery and assignment by USFIP to the 5th
Interceptor command at Cabcaben Field, at which time 2nd Lt. Bryant in
addition to his duties became mess officer1
Lieutenant (j.g.) _____ Abhramsen, U.S.N.R., who had been
attached in January from the U.S.S. Canopus to assist in training
of personnel in operation of the SCR 368, was relieved from attachment
and assigned to duty in Australia.
Other
personnel changes since the beginning of the war on Dec, 8., 1941, were
the promotion of 2nd Lieut. Peterie to First Lieut. on Dec.19, 1941, and
First Lieut. Kwiatkowski to Captain (without change of duty) on Jan. 20,
1942: Sergeant Theodore H. Vetter, on detached service with the
Philippine Army since September 1941, was discharged in January and
commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry, P.A., and assigned to 71st
Division, P.A. Private,
Specialist 1st Class, Edward R. Wright was promoted to Sergeant as Chief
of Height Finder and Stereoscopic observer server Private Richard A. Whitney
was assigned and joined from the Med. Dept., Fort Mills. Sergeant Robert M. Murdock, Supply Sergeant, was
reduced to Private, and Private 1st Class Wallace R. Timmans,
promoted to Corporal as Acting Supply Sergeant, while Corporal Ralph
D. Vesper, Chief of Communications, was promoted to Sergeant. Privates 1st Class Oscar Baier and Fred Patten,
formerly members of the battery when it was activated, were attached for
duty from the 808th Military Police Company in March.
At
this point it is appropriate to mention “Butch.” Butch was a black
and white smooth haired fox terrier belonging to the B.C., who
introduced him to the battery in August 1941, as a timid, wobble-legged
puppy. When the battery
moved into the field on December 2, Butch was more or less adopted by
the battery as its mascot and while he remained forever loyal to his
master, he became quite friendly with everyone.
He was by nature very sensitive and nervous and was possessed
with an unusual intelligence.
The
first time the battery went into action, Butch, who always faithfully
followed the B.C. everywhere he went was in the O.P with his master.
When the first round went off, he became almost insane with fear.
He jumped out of the O.P pit ran to the director pit and jumped
on the director, fell off, and raced td No. 2 gun and then in to No. 1
gun, arriving at each just as it was fired. He returned madly into the
C.P. where he jumped over the telephone operator's back and clambered
into a corner where two circular walls of sandbags touched, thrusting
his head into the crevice thus formed so that the bags protected his
ears from the infernal roar of the guns.
He remained there until the firing was over, and the B.C. called
him out and quieted his trembling. After that when the gong was struck
signifying an air alert, he immediately went into the C.P. and crawled
into his corner, where he would remain until the B.C. called him.
He
soon realized, however, that not every air alert resulted in firing!
Then he would wait outside the CP or in the OP with his master
and take his cue from his master 5 voice.
If the B.C. in "flashing" an approaching flight of
planes exhibited by the inflection of his voice the tinge of excitement
of an approaching engagement, Butch would edge toward the entrance of
the C.P. At the warning command, "Stand by to fire," he would
immediately go to his haven. The command of "All Clear" was
sufficient to call him back. The
Bn Cmdr who frequently visited our position when action was imminent
spent many hours laughing at these antics.
If
he were away from the C.P. when an air alert was sounded, Butch would
become very excited. Torn
between loyalty to his master and fear of the sharp blast of the guns,
he would hesitate for a moment before dashing wildly for the C.P.
While away he was a constant and sure air guard, displaying his
characteristic nervousness at the faintest sound of airplane motors.
Visitors
to the position were impressed by the friendly little mascot.
Mr. Clark Lee when he visited the position and saw the battery in
action thought Butch's actions were quite as interesting as the battery
itself and expressed a desire to include him in his story if he had the
space; Mr. and Mrs. _____Jacoby were also expressed interest in his
intelligent antics.
Unfortunately
Butch fell victim to his fear of gunfire later, when the enemy was
pressing our retreating troops back, in his victorious drive down the
Peninsula the cannonading was sufficient to drive Butch almost wild.
In the excitement of the evacuation of the battery, he
disappeared and could not be found when the last of the men were forced
to leave.
|
March
24, 1942 |
On
the morning of March 24 the battery was alerted by the sound of motors
in the southwest. A flight
of 9 enemy heavy bombers at very high altitude was seen approaching
Corregidor followed by a flight of 8 more.
The B.C. immediately "flashed" the planes to
Corregidor, who opened fire. Soon
a flight of 27 came over Corregidor from the east.
Intensive attacks on Corregidor continued the rest of the day and
the three succeeding days. The
planes were a new type, seen only once or twice in January, and very
fast (300 miles per hour). They
came over at altitudes from 7500-9700 yards but generally above 8000
yards. The batteries on
Corregidor that were equipped with mechanical fuses took their toll even
at these extreme ranges.
The
enemy then shifted the brunt of his attack to Bataan--Mariveles, Little
Baguio, Sisiman, and Cabcaben. Battery
G was equipped only with 21-second powder train fuses; it was unable to
reach the highflying enemy except on rare occasions when a flight would
venture barely within the maximum range of their ammunition. Their fire
was ineffective. While many
bombs landed in several hundred yards from the battery in attacks on
Mariveles and Sisiman, only one string actually hit near the position
and that along the ridge and apparently directed at the Banana Ridge
position. No damage was done except for one ammunition dump which was
set on fire. Staff Sergeant
Charles R. Feary (?) and Private 1st Class Delbert R. Thomas, Specialist
4th Class promptly put out the fire, for which both were awarded the
Silver Star.
|
April
1, 1942 |
About
the first of April the attack shifted to our infantry and artillery on
the front line. The planes
hammered incessantly at our troops from the air while the enemy launched
a ground offensive, which culminated in the surrender of the forces on
Bataan on April 9.
During
the attacks on Corregidor, the Bataan Peninsula, and our front lines the
enemy employed over 900 heavy bombers in flights of 27, 18, 9, 6, or 3
and many dive-bombers. Altitude varied from 9709 yards over Corregidor
to 2800 yards over the front where there was no A.A. protection.
|
Japanese
Heavy Bomber
Mitsubishi Type 96
"Nell"
|
On
the afternoon of April 1st the B.C. made a reconnaissance with the Bn
Cmdr and the C.O., Corregidor Gun Defense Command, for a position for
Battery G. The Corregidor
Golf Course was selected as the best available site since it offered
mask against enemy artillery observation, even though it was in close
proximity to Batteries Geary and Crockett, likely enemy aerial and
artillery targets, and was so recommended to the Regt'l. Cmdr.
The
recommendation was approved and the B.C. ordered to proceed in digging
emplacements for the battery with two guns. Work was commenced the
following evening. It proceeded very slowly.
The ground was hard and dry and full of large boulders. Frequent
enemy activity during the day made it imperative to work only at night,
and the nights were very dark, as a result several nights were required
to complete the pits and emplace the guns. When the guns were in
position, one was found to be damaged and in need of repair. The burden
of work piled on the Ordnance personnel by the damages resulting daily
from enemy shellfire and aerial bombardment delayed the repairs.
Necessary repairs occasioned further delays to the director,
which went out of operation shortly after being emplaced, so that
Battery G was not able to report finally ready for action until April
22. In the meantime, on
April 1… during an intensive enemy artillery bombardment of Battery
Geary by240 mm cannon, shell fragments destroyed the height finder.
It had been emplaced when the director was installed the night
before, in preparation for action.
As no replacement was immediately available, arrangements were
necessary to secure altitude data from other organizations.
The
emplacements on the open golf course were camouflaged as bomb craters.
The deception was. Enhanced by numerous actual craters over the course,
to which new craters were added by daily bombardment to eradicate or
conceal evidence of activity'.
|
April
8, 1942
The
12" coastal rifles in action
|
On
the afternoon of April 8, about 3:15, the B.C. was called to Bn Hq and
informed of a break-through at the front.
He was told that the Bn Cmdr had offered the Bn as Infantry to
help stop the enemy. He was ordered to prepare his battery to move as infantry and
stand-by for further orders. No
movement orders came; but, instead, about 8:15 PM the B.C. was ordered
to evacuate his battery to Corregidor. He was ordered to move all range
section equipment and as much ammunition as possible.
His guns were to be left and four guns belonging to the 200th CA
(AA), which were to be delivered to Bn Hq Btry, were to be taken. The
B.C., acting on his initiative, undertook to remove two of his guns from
the pits and did remove the data receivers, fuze setters, and
breechblocks from the other guns. With
sounds of artillery fire coming closer and closer, about 12:00 N, the Bn
Cmdr ordered the B.C. to move the battery out immediately, destroying
the equipment left behind. By
the time the destruction was completed shells were occasionally landing
along the ridge near the position or whistling overhead into Mariveles.
Arriving
in Mariveles the troops loaded the range equipment, supplies, machine
guns, ammunition, and kitchen on the Ilocano and all except the B.C. and
twenty-five men crossed on that ship, leaving about 5 AM.
The
B.C. and detail remained behind and loaded two guns, one prime mover and
one ST-tractor on a barge. One
or two of the guns supposed to be delivered from the 200th CA (AA) were
to be found. Inquiry later revealed that two had been parked at Little
Baguio and left there. The
M.P.'s would not permit Hq Btry personnel to go search for them. The barge left the dock at 6:10 AM just as it was beginning
to get day light and arrived at Corregidor about 7:30 AM On arriving at
Corregidor we were met by the Regimental Executive Officer and
Regimental ... While the barge was being unloaded an air raid was
sounded. Work was directed and continued by the B.C. until the guns
were safely ashore and parked in a concealed position.
All
the personnel of the battery were safely evacuated to Corregidor except
three men who were sick in No. 1 Hospital at Little Baguio.
They were: Corporal
Taube,
Private Harvey Hunter, and Private Ernest E. Wheeler.
3rd Lieut. Rimando and his men were attached to the 91st CA (AA)
on arrival at Corregidor.
The
battery was able to save most of its equipment except as follows:
4
- 3" AA guns, less breechblocks, fuze cutters and data indicators
1
- SCR 268, less modulator and keyer, and other essential parts.
1
Power Unit, M4
3
or 4 reels of cable, data transmission
4
- Liners, spare
6
miles field wire, W 40
600
to 700 rounds ammunition, 3" AA
6000
to 10000 rounds am., .50 cal.
12000
rounds am., .30 cal.
Engineer
tools and supplies
Part
of telephones
1
- Tractor, M1, 1OT
1
Sedan, Ford
1
Truck, 3/4T, Cargo (cam.)
1
Truck, 1 l/2T, Cargo, Dodge
The guns and SCR 268 unit were effectively destroyed by dynamite
and removal of parts. Other equipment was abandoned due to lack of time
and shortage of transportation. Much personal equipment of the men was
lost due to lack of time to collect and load it and the dispersion of
the troops in their work of evacuating essential organizational
equipment.
Back
on Corregidor the battery was assigned the old Battery "K",
60th CA (AA) barracks at Middleside as temporary quarters until the
disposition of the organization. Naturally the B.C. and the officers and
men expected to be assigned a tactical position on Corregidor with the
two guns or with perhaps a third taken from one of the other batteries.
The B.C., consequently, made several reconnaissances’ of possible
positions, including the old training position, in order to facilitate
putting the battery back in action when the orders came.
|
April
9, 1942 |
The
battery personnel spent the greater part of the night of April 9
unloading equipment and supplies from the Ilocano.
The Ilocano had been anchored between Corregidor and Fort
Hughes as soon as all personnel were disembarked upon arrival from
Mariveles.
|
April
10, 1942
|
The
next afternoon at a conference with the Bn and Regt'l Qmdr, the B.C. was
informed much to his disappointment that the battery would be dispersed
to the other A.A. gun batteries on Corregidor to provide relieve
sections. It was decided that the Range 0., 1st Lieut. Peterie and the
Range Section should go to Btry "C", No. 1 Gun Section to Btry
11B", the Ex.O., Capt.
Kwiatkowski, and No. 2 gun section to Btry "D", the Ass't Ex.O.,
2nd Lieut. Bryan, A.C., Staff Sgt. Flanigan and No. 3 Gun Section to
Btry "F1', the B.C., Btry
Hq., Sup Sgt., Mess Sgt.', Chief of firing Section, and No. 4 Gun
Section to Btry "H". The
machine gun section, a communication section, and cooks to be
apportioned among the batteries. The
sections were dispersed, much to the chagrin and disgust of the men
who were still imbued with a notable battery fighting spirit, to the
various organizations late on the evening of the 11th.
The
next few days were a period of frequent aerial attacks over Corregidor.
Too, the enemy artillery was pouring into the Bataan Peninsula, and
artillery fire was becoming more and more formidable in intensity and
frequency. A Battery G personnel was glad to get into the activity again
even if fighting with other organizations. The men while detached
suffered several slight casualties.
|
April
22, 1942 |
Globe
engaged its first target, a flight of dive-bombers, from the new
position late in the afternoon of the 22nd of April.
Next morning heavy bombers were engaged, with other Corregidor
batteries. After that, five or six attacks over Corregidor were a daily
occurrence, and Battery G was frequently in action, though many of the
flights were out of range of the 21-second fuses, and many other flights
could not be picked up in the glaring, tropical haze of the dry season.
Batteries Crockett and Geary were a particular target of many of
these attacks and Battery G caught many bombs in its position as a
result.
Enemy
artillery from Bataan subjected Corregidor to intensive area barrages
and destructive fire several times daily.
Our own artillery replied but feebly to the guns massed along the
Bataan Coast. Battery Geary, a 12" mortar battery, was apparently
particularly effective against the enemy, for they endeavored to destroy
the battery by daily aerial bombardment and frequent artillery fire.
|
April
29, 1942
|
On
the afternoon of April 29 the battery position, though torn many times
previously by bombs, received its first serious damage.
About 3:30 after the smoke and dust of bombing had cleared away,
the position was hit unusually hard. One bomb, and the power plant pit
covered a communication trench in which two men were seeking cover by
another. The battery under the direction of the B.C. and the Range
Officer immediately commenced rescue operations and continued digging
until the two men, Private 1st Class, Specialist 5th Class Kenneth 0.
Smith, and Private Charles R. Tolbert, were uncovered, safe, but
suffering from shock. The power plant operator was safe, escaping
entombment add injury by having taken cover in another communication
trench. Two other men, Privates 1st Class Hobart A. Trout and George A.
Middleton, part of a party en-route along Geary Trail to Battery Geary
for the evening meal (the battery was rationed there), were seriously
injured and covered. They were rescued by other members of the party
under the direction of First Sergeant Kendall and evacuated to the
Battery Geary aid station. Several
dumps of 75 mm ammunition standing along Geary Trail were ignited.
First Sergeant Kendall, Private 1st Class Malcolm L. Wascan,
Private Robert R. Craig, Private Leland Crummet, and Private Bert E.
McCune succeeded in extinguishing the most threatening of the fires.
During this while a second flight of bombers came over on the same
course, but fortunately all the bombs fell over, near Topside.
|
30
April, 1942 |
Next
morning, April 30, the battery met with its first major catastrophe.
Since only two guns were being manned, approximately half of the
personnel was off duty each day, changing shifts after breakfast,
usually about 8:00 A.M. Since the battery had no bomb proof shelter near at
hand--disaster had been twice narrowly averted during intensive
artillery bombardment by 240 mm cannon of Battery Geary and Battery
Crockett while the men had been taking cover there--members of the off
duty crews who were not able or did not desire to go to Battery Wheeler
or Wheeler Tunnel, some distance away, to take cover during aerial or
artillery bombardment by scattering in the drainage ditch along Geary
Trail. The road lay along the fact of a very steep slope, just below
the Golf Course, and was reasonably safe from all except a direct hit in
its narrow ledge.
About
8:15, just after the change of shifts, a flight of 9 planes came over
with Battery Geary the target as usual.
When the dust cleared away, the position was turn and plowed but
no damage was evident. A
shout for help sent members of the gun crews down to Geary Trail.
Here six lay dead, a seventh dying, and four so seriously injured
that they died at the hospital that afternoon.
The eleven were:
Corporal
George H. Walker, Privates First Class (?) Joe Huntley, Francis J.
Skatula, Anderson W. Smith, Frank A. Sybert, and Ward M. Stevens and
Privates (?) Jesse M. Beale, _____Deo,
O.D. Hacker, Jose Sausa; and James Stagner.
Several others were slightly injured.
Investigation
by the B.C. showed that a group had been caught by surprise near a dump
of ammunition not far from their designated area and not had time to
scatter. A bomb made a direct hit on the dump, exploding part and
setting fire to the rest.
The
rescue party had to scatter the ammunition and extinguish the fire
before the wounded and dead could be evacuated.
Staff Sergeants Charles R. Feangear (??) and Harold F. Huffman,
Privates 1st Class Fred Patten, Mendel Threatt, and Major Stevens, and
Privates Thomas N. Birdsong, Lea land Crummett, James A. Handlin, Sam
Stephenson, Silas J. Whaley, and Richard A. Whitney performed notable
service in the evacuation of the wounded to a place of safety.
No
ambulance was available to remove the seriously wounded men to the
Malinta Hospital, so Corporal Dumont F. Wade went voluntarily through
shellfire to Middleside where he appropriated a truck, which he brought
back for an ambulance. He and Sergeants .
. . (Read E. She. . .) and Paul P. Verdi, and Private 1st Class Elroy
Thomas performed extraordinarily duty in evacuating the men to the
Malinta Hospital. They encountered shell swept roads at Middleside and
traversed an intense artillery barrage at Bottomside.
They returned to Middleside where they picked up a second load of
men wounded by the artillery bombardment in that area and evacuated them
to the Hospital before returning to Battery G. position.
The
battery was broken up by the disaster but was promptly reorganized by
the B.C. The battery was again in action next morning with fighting
spirit of the men high and a desire prevailing to revenge their fallen
comrades.
|
May
2 - 4, 1942
On May 2,
Battery Geary, 12-inch Seacoast Mortar Battery, was blown up due to the enemy artillery
fire penetrating the powder magazines. This Japanese photograph gives
the best view of the desolation remaining.
|
On
the afternoon of May 2nd, there occurred the most demoralizing incident
of the war for Battery G. About
3:00 PM, the enemy commenced a determined artillery bombardment of
Battery Geary, which continued for over an hour.
Just about 4: 00 PM there was a terrific explosion as the enemy
scored a direct hit in one of the powder rooms, The entire center
section of reinforced concrete powder and shot rooms were completely
demolished and seven of the eight 12" mortars were blown out of
their emplacements, so powerful was the force of the explosion. Masses
and chunks of the broken concrete were rained over the surrounding area.
At least 55 unexploded 12" shells were strewn over the
Battery G position on the Golf Course.
Twenty-seven of the Battery G personnel were wounded in their
open pit emplacements by falling debris, several seriously.
One man, Private Loris A. Thering, died shortly after reaching an
aid station. No. 2 gun was
placed out of action by a 12" shell falling on it, and all the pit
revetments were collapsed.
All
personnel was evacuated by the B.C. to Battery Wheeler and Wheeler
Tunnel for treatment of wounds and bruises and for rest and relaxation
from shock and nervous tension. The
B.C. went to Battery Geary to aid in the evacuation of the wounded.
From there he went to C-1 Tunnel for assistance in freeing four
men trapped in a wrecked powder room on the end of the emplacement.
That
night the battery repaired the damages to their emplacements and
completed the emplacement of No. 3 gun, which had been secured several
days previously from Battery "F", 60th CA (AA). The director
and ammunition was exchanged for that of Battery "C", 60th CA
(AA), which was equipped with 30-second mechanical fuses. Eight men were
attached to the battery from the USAMP Harrison to augment the
gun sections now seriously depleted by casualties. The battery was
reorganized and ready for action next day, though many of the men were
so sore and stiff from bruises and jittery from nervous strain as to
render the battery somewhat ineffective They soon recovered, however,
and fought as determinedly as before.
The
next few days were a continuation of the daily aerial bombardment, but
now the target was shifted to other portions of the island and Battery G
was no longer on the bull's eye. However,
the enemy artillery, though unable to see the battery and direct
observed destruction fire against it, located the Battery area and laid
down several intense barrages. The
most severe of these occurred on the afternoon of May 5th.
The battery had just fired, with other batteries, on a flight of
9 heavy bombers, one of which was reported by the Corregidor AA Gun
Defense Command as being destroyed (the plane was not credited to any
particular battery, the B.C. felt safe in claiming it for Battery G). A
second flight was picked up about 3:30 PM, and the battery reported
"on target." Simultaneously, a devastating barrage fell on the
battery and swept back and forth over the area for an hour and a half,
completely neutralizing it. The
organization was fortunate in that all personnel was already on the
alert and in their emplacements so that no casualties resulted.
|
May
5 - 6, 1942
|
The
intense enemy activity of the week preceding the fateful night of May 5,
1942, presaged a "Big Push" by the enemy at an early date, and
the moon was right for a night attempt, being on the wane and~ rising
about 11:00 PM.
So when the enemy artillery preparations for the attack began
about 8:00 PM on that night, the thought in every mind and the question
on every lip was, "Is this it?"
That
night, the fateful May 5th, Battery G heard the barrage commence against
Kindley Field, heralding the landing attack on Corregidor.
The battery was alerted and placed in readiness to move as
infantry if ordered (the battery was assigned duty as infantry reserve
in the beach defense plan). No
orders came, and the battery
was
in action at the break of day, firing on enemy dive-bombers harassing
our defending troops at Kindley Field and Malinta Hill.
The battery continued in action intermittently until 11:00 AM
when the organization commenced the destruction of materiel preparatory
to the surrender at noon. During this time, Battery G alternated with Battery “B”,
60th CA (AA), in firing at numerous flights of enemy planes. Several
were seen to have been damaged, and the B.C. and battery officers agreed
that two and possibly a third plane had probably been destroyed by
Battery G.
The
personnel of the battery was in high spirits.
That afternoon we had engaged a flight of nine enemy heavy
bombers with "Boston" and "Hartford." We fired one
string of bursts and suspended fire as the flight turned. . The bursts
of all batteries appeared to be good. We resumed fire as soon as the
flight straightened out on its course and continued as long as they were
in range.
Our bursts obscured the target.
They were the bursts last fired.
Shortly afterwards the AA Defense Command announced that one
plane had been seen to fall out of formation and disappear at sea.
Naturally we attributed this plane to our battery action, as we
had been the last in action, and we gloried in our success.
The
men were now scattered about the battery emplacement, lounging in the
cool comfort of evening and discussing some mysterious lights which had
been seen flashing at sea about 7:00 PM at a low elevation, and cringing
between the freight train-like roar of 14" shells from Fort Frank
passing directly over our heads, as experience had taught them the dire
necessity for it, particularly during an artillery action. About 8:00 PM
we heard the guns from Bataan open up with the rapidity of machine gun
fire. A
cry of alarm was sounded, and everyone dived for cover to wait for the
bursts to determine where the barrage was laid.
Soon we had our answer -- Kindley Field and Bottomside. We heaved a
sigh of relief, and I sat on the edge of my command post pit listening
to the rumble of the artillery. It was thrilling in its ferocity.
Suddenly without warning there was a blinding flash and a roar as
a large caliber shell, presumably a 240 mm, exploded about 100 yards
away. At
irregular intervals during the bombardment these large shells landed
about the Golf Course and our position, many being duds, shaking nerves
with their jarring thumps.
About 10:15 PM after two duds had landed in rapid succession on
the upper part of the golf course, shouts, sounds of running feet, and
then curses as men hit barbed wire entanglements in the dark were heard
from the machine gunners manning the anti-paratroop machine guns in that
area. Soon
the two gunners fell gasping into my pit and requested permission to
remain. After they caught their breath, I got their story.
One dud had gone through a tree over their heads and landed a few
feet behind their pit; the other landed at the foot of the tree just a
few feet in front of the pit.
Brave men can stand only so much.
I had seen these same two men only a few days earlier laugh as
they picked bomb fragments from their position, and repaired their
machine gun and a rifle, which had been damaged in the small open
emplacement while they took shelter therein.
Now their nerves were gone; I gave my permission for them to
remain with me.
Sometime
around 10:00 PM (time is so meaningless and interminable when you are
pinned to the ground by artillery fire) we heard the first staccato
rattle of machine guns from Kindley Field and the artillery began to
slack off.
We guessed then that the "big push" was on.
Soon reports over our "flash" line verified this. About
11:00 PM Lt. Col. Breitung, the AA Gun Defense Commander, called me in
person and confirmed these reports.
He said that the battery should be prepared to move as infantry
reserves on call." meanwhile our previous mission would be
unchanged.
The necessary orders were issued and the preparations promptly
completed.
Personnel was enthusiastic over the possibility of a chance to
meet the enemy in close combat. As the night wore on the machine gun
fire slacked off after 1:30 AM, and only an occasional burst was heard.
The battery turned to get what little sleep was possible. Most of
the personnel slept fitfully in their foxholes, fearing to sleep above
ground because of the danger of a sudden artillery barrage on our area.
The
battery was aroused about 4:30 AM by mortar fire from Batteries Way and
Craighill.
From the battlefield came the crackle of rifle fire. We
breakfasted on our emergency rations and prepared for action. Action
came at about 5:00 or 5:15 AM when the enemy commenced an aerial attack
on Kindley Field.
It was still so dark that the observers had difficulty in
locating the planes.
However, as many flights were taken under fire as possible.
"Boston" was also in action and alternated with
"Globe" in engaging the flights.
The two batteries succeeded in breaking up several formations and
diverting them from their missions. We believe that we brought down two
out of three planes in one formation and possibly one out of another
formation. However, we were not able to confirm this due to the lack of
communications.
On several flights we were unable to pick planes up with our
height finder due to the fact that the instrument was dug in for
protection against shelling and bombing and not emplaced for employment
against dive-bombers at extremely low altitudes.
On these flights we fired with estimated altitudes and with
remarkable success for the most part.
On one formation, though, we almost met with disaster. A flight
of six enemy seaplanes approached from the west.
We opened fire with an estimated altitude but it was far
underestimated due to the new type of plane, and our fire was ineffective.
The planes spotted our position from the dust and smoke of
firing. The
flight turned sough, and the planes peeled o-f on us one at a time,
coming down in an almost vertical dive as compared with the shallow
swooping dive of the other dive-bombers.
I watched the bomb separate from the leading plane and come
closer and closer.
I rose in my position and watched the bomb disappear over the
cliff and hit in Geary Trail less than 75 yards south of the battery
emplacements.
Bombs from the other five planes struck almost at the same point.
In the mean time the battery .50 caliber AA machine guns were
having a field day.
The machine gunners fired at each of the planes as they came down
in rapid succession.
Two of the air-cooled guns became so hot that they jammed, and we
were never able to get them to fire again.
At
about 8:15 AM looking down the road I saw two men approaching.
I recognized the two as Staff Sergeant Huffman and Private Beason
from the organization and who had been in Malinta Hospital.
Sergeant Huffman reported to me with the remark, “Wel1,
Captain, I thought the battery might have to go out as Infantry, and I
knew the Battery Commander would need all the old heads that he had with
these recruits, so I came back.
Besides, I want to try out my new M1 /rifle/." He had braved
an artillery barrage at Bottomside and dive-bombers near Middleside to
return to his organization, and he with a nice piece of shrapnel through
his right arm and with a weak left wrist so that he was unable to fire a
rifle or a pistol.
Staff Sergeant Huffman had had some notoriety as a fighter in
garrison before the war.
At
about 10:45 AM, Lt. Col. Breitung, the AA Gun Defense Commander, called
me and said that he "had refused an order to lower the national
colors" and that he, personally, preferred to continue to fight
until engaged and was defeated by the enemy at Topside in hand to hand
battle. I
agree; and I believe that this fighting spirit dominated all the
officers and men of the Sixtieth Coast Artillery to the end.
A
few minutes later, I was warned to be prepared to destroy all equipment
on receipt of orders. At 11:00 AM I was told that the garrison battle
flag would be lowered at 12:00 Noon by the Seaward Defense Commander,
and that I should execute the destruction of materiel.
I immediately transmitted this information and order to the
battery. The disappointment of every man at our defeat was obvious.
However, every man proceeded to execute this final order with all the
vigor and enthusiasm with which they were accustomed to executing my
orders.
The
destruction of materiel, equipment, and supplies was accomplished as
completely as time and circumstances would permit.
The guns were fired after the recoil and counter-recoil
mechanisms had been damaged with armor piercing rifle fire, and the fuze
cutters and electrical data transmission systems chopped up and beat up
with axes.
The director and height finder were as completely destroyed as
delicate instruments may be with rifle and pistol fire, and pickaxes.
Machine guns and small arms were dismantled and parts damaged and
scattered.
Small equipment, personal equipment except that to be carried by
individuals, small arms ammunition, and supplies were burned.
The small amount of 3” AA ammunition remaining after the
prolonged action of the morning was left undamaged due to lack of time
and the fact that personnel was to remain in the vicinity.
A
few minutes before noon from our position we witnessed the lowering of
our battle flag and the hoisting of a white flag of truce.
The end of the battle had come.
We
ate a disconsolate lunch of our emergency rations, and prepared our
field bags and rolls to take with us into the unknown future.
Our last instructions had been to remain in the vicinity until
further information was received so we disposed ourselves as comfortably
as possible near our foxholes and pits.
During the afternoon the enemy continued to dive bomb various
installations and areas on Topside, coming lower and lower as they
gradually lost their fear of positions, which no longer offered
resistance.
Several sticks of bombs struck the upper edge of the golf course
and the officers’
quarters above.
Not desiring to expose defenseless men to needless danger to
requested, and was granted, permission to evacuate the area and go to
Wheeler Tunnel for shelter.
The last man left the emplacements at approximately 3:00 PM.
We spent some time in the tunnel and then went on to the Battery
Cheney emplacements where we spent the night.
We were aroused at 4:00 AM next morning and proceeded to
Bottomside where we placed ourselves in the hands of the enemy.
We
continued to engage the enemy in the air at every opportunity.
About 9:30 AM the Gun Commander of No.3 gun reported his gun out
of action with a broken equilibrator.
After examination of the piece I decided that it could be fired
with some difficulty in elevating and ordered it back into service where
it continued to function as long as needed.
Our last course was fired a few minutes before
11:00
AM.
|
May
6, 1942
This is a fake
photo. The real flag had been lowered and destroyed by Colonel
Bunker. See Article
|
12:00
NOON. Throughout
the campaign Battery G had maintained an indominitable fighting spirit
and esprit de corps. Though,
in the brief period April 11 to May 6 while fighting on Corregidor the
battery had suffered many casualties- -12 killed and 59 wounded--morale
remained high. When at noon on May 6, 1942, the garrison battle flag was
lowered and a white flag of truce hauled up, there were tears of
disappointment in many eyes. Battery
G was still undefeated.
/s/
AAron A. Abston
Captain, 60th C.A. (A.A.)
Commanding
|
EPILOGUE
Once fresh
Japanese troops landed after the surrender, they
marched through Malinta, with arms shouldered, whilst surrendered troops
stood by attempting to come to terms with the unthinkable.
The true circumstances of the surrender
will not be known in the West for until 1943-44, and are even now subject
of much debate.
Dispirited
and directionless, many not knowing why they have been surrendered, groups
of men stand around waiting for orders. Some units maintained
cohesiveness due to strong leadership, but others fell apart from
lacklustre officers more interested in themselves than the welfare of
their men.
|
|