THE SIEGE OF BATAAN AND MANILA BAY

Early on December 9th, a formation of three Japanese bombers came across Manila Bay toward Corregidor and were dispersed by AA fire from Battery Denver, on Monkey Point, Again on December 15, a large formation of 18 bombers flew into Corregidor from the east at about 5500 yards altitude. They came in between Fort Hughes and Monkey Point in a bombing formation with bomb bays open. All AA guns, small and  large calibre, opened fire on these planes. A bedlam reigned. Men fired 30 and 50 calibre machine guns, 30 calibre rifles and 45 calibre pistols. Most of the 3 inch AA fire was too low and short in range. Wild firing by personnel who were not deployed as antiaircraft personnel did not harm the planes, but they made havoc with utility wires, poles and other low structures on the post.

We fired 159 rounds of 3 inch ammunition at the courses of these planes on December 15th. We got no direct hits and no impact upon the planes other than the fact that all fire changed the course of the bombers away from Corregidor. This firing did a lot for the battery personnel. It gave them the baptism to actual warfare with the enemy and some good experience. They had serious practice in coordination of action, as well as very useful information in the operation of the various equipment, under some duress other than peace time drill.

The fact that all AA fire that day was short in range and ineffective, caused the belief that possibly the muzzle velocity used on the ammunition was in error due to the age of the ammunition we were using, and it was decided within the regiment to hold a test firing to determine the actual developed muzzle velocity. This text was made on No 1 gun of Battery Hartford, some time during the period December 15 to 24. Four powder lots of ammunition were fired. It was found that for powder lots 8118-4 and 8218-5 , the developed muzzle velocity was 2690 f/s. For powder lots 6339-15 and 2727-1, the developed muzzle velocity was 2740 f/s. Most of the ammunition at Battery Hartford was the latter lot, so a muzzle velocity of 2740 was used in lieu of the listed 2800 f/s on the ammunition. We had good results with this corrected MV later.

These first planes flew across the island, made no bomb drops, and it was assumed that the planes were empty, coming from a mission on Manila and Cavite, and wanting to fly across the "Rock" to test the AA defenses of that fortress. These planes must have gotten a poor impression of our AA defenses, from the first ineffective fire upon them. I believe, however, that this later stood us in good stead by misleading them into coming in at low elevations on subsequent flights and making some good shooting for us. They probably underestimated the effect our our defenses, which I believe cost them dearly later on.

During the period December 15th to 24th, three planes which looked like German Messerschmitt type fighter planes operated around the Manila Bay area. They flew low altitudes, but out of range. These planes were very fast and maneuverable. (Capt. Starr is mistaken - there were no Messerschmitts - Ed)

Again in December a flight of heavy bombers came over Corregidor, Batteries Denver and Hartford opened fire, effectively enough that they split their formation and two groups flew either side of Corregidor out of the North and South channels without any attempt at bombing.

The field kitchen area was 50 to 75 yards removed from the gunnery position and sleeping area of the men. It had to be included in the night perimeter guard system that was mounted around the battery position for security purposes. Since the enemy were in the Bay area, in Manila and in the Bataan area and at Cavite, it was very possible to have sabotage or other enemy purpose accomplished by the enemy in small numbers landing on the "Rock " at night. While the "Rock " was an island, in the bay, the business of perimeter guard was a serious business and subject to all security regulations pertaining to war combat zones.

A Private was on guard duty at the kitchen area on December 27th, on a "graveyard " shift. I as battery commander always made two inspections of the perimeter guard. One was prior to midnight and the other was one between midnight and morning sunrise. On this night I came to the guard position of the Private on the midnight to morning inspection. I expected a challenge from the guard. None came. I prowled through the kitchen area and came upon the Private. He was sitting on boxes of supplies, leaned up against a field kitchen stove, sound asleep. His rifle was leaned on his shoulder, butt on the ground. His web belt was around his waist as usual with the bayonet attached. In wartime, sleeping on guard duty is a court martial offense and equal to desertion, subject to the death penalty in some cases. Depending upon local circumstances it can have a variable degree of impact upon local security. However, to confine a person for such an offense in this particular situation would reduce battery strength, require additional time of someone to care for the prisoner and the arrangement of a confinement area on "Rock". The "Rock" was not equipped for protection against bombardment from the air or from shelling from Bataan or Cavite, for local prisoners. Arrest and confinement would punish the man, but it would not teach him anything about the possible consequences of his dereliction of duty.

My action against the Private this night was to first quietly remove his rifle from inside his arm and place it 15 or 20 feet away where he could not feel or see it. Secondly, I very carefully removed the web belt from his waist, removing his bayonet. Then I placed my .45 calibre pistol at aim at his face and shook his arm to awaken him. Well, I felt very sorry for the man. He came out of a deep sleep clawing for his rifle and staring at that pistol. The rifle was not there. He clawed at his waist for his bayonet. Then he looked up at the pistol and then at me with a bewildered doomed look on his face. Then I spoke to him and asked "Where the hell would you have been had I been a Japanese?" He got the message loud and clear. Some might say that that was a dirty trick to pull upon any man. My contention is that he learned more and was punished more by this insult and the realization of his predicament than he would have been in a month or 6 months of confinement.

On December 26th, we were working on our positions, putting revetment around guns and foxholes and placing pyramidal tents in the best possible protected positions for sleeping. We moved our field kitchen from in front of the Post Incinerator to the rear of the RDF storage shed at the head of Ramsey ravine. We constructed trails around Ramsey cliff from the kitchen area to the gun positions.

On December 24th, there was no aerial activity over Corregidor but frequent flights of planes were seen circling the Manila Bay area, maneuvering to and from Manila City. Three planes considered to be German Messerschmitt type 109 fighter planes operated for a short while over the South channel area, two of them strafing the ration boat Neptune, between Fort Hughes and Fort Drum. Battery Hartford and Battery Boston fired on these planes flying out of the South channel with good results, causing the planes to do some very fast maneuvering. It was evident at that time that the equipment we had to use was very effective and efficient, and if operated correctly would give very accurate fire on any target within range and within the tracking limits of the M-4 Director. Later this day a flight of 18 enemy heavy bombers, type 98, with twin tail assemblies and twin motors flew to Corregidor from the east, between Monkey Point and Fort Hughes. Battery Denver and Battery Hartford fired on these planes while they were over Caballo Bay, Battery Denver from the right flank and Battery Hartford from the front. This fire caused the formation to break their shallow V bombing formation. They split into two flights, taking flight formation, one group flying clear of Corregidor to the north down the North channel and one flying clear of Corregidor to the south and out the South channel. Battery Hartford continued to fire on the latter course. The fire was effective, close enough to cause their change in course. One plane was observed to be hit by fire of Battery Hartford. It trailed smoke as long as it was observed in flight. They had bomb bays open and if they intended to bomb, their mission was destroyed. They were at 6100 yards altitude. All batteries on Corregidor fired on the planes as they flew past the "Rock". Some fire was effective, as one or two planes trailed smoke and one was seen to lose altitude and leave formation.

At this time the battery was able to observe fire closely enough to determine some corrections needed to bring fire more closely on target.

A lateral lead of 12 mils and a vertical lead of 4 mils were placed in the Director as a flat correction. These leads were later increased with continued observation of fire. Battery Hartford fired 98 rounds of ammunition at this flight, the fire very close into the point of their flight and causing a change in their course.

During the period December 24th to 29th, there was no aerial activity over Corregidor. There were continued bombings of Manila and vicinity. The battery worked on the defenses of our emplacement, at gunnery drill, and at airplane identification.

On December 25th, Christmas day, we were at war and although Corregidor had not been attacked as yet, we observed heavy bombing of Manila and Cavite across the bay most every day. We expected to be attacked at any time. We had a turkey dinner which was interrupted by two air raid alerts, but we finally got the turkey down late in the evening.

 

The Guard Incident

When Battery Hartford was first located in field battle position at Battery Ramsey, we located our field kitchen, serving and eating area under the rubber trees at the Post Incinerator. We later moved this facility to the rear of the RDF storage shed at the head of Ramsey Ravine. Here, we could route the men all the way from the gunnery positions by brush covered trails to the eating area. However, there was a great deal of Ordnance Explosives stored in the RDF building, added to by surplus ordnance jettisoned from the Cruiser USS Huston when she went south to her doom in the battle of Macassar Straights. We had been complaining to Ordnance to move these explosive materials before they were exploded by shelling or bombing and decimated our battery personnel and equipment.

We had a partial barricade built around the M-4 Director, but none for the Battery Commander's Observation and Control Center. We had no camouflage prepared up to this time. We had no trial fire nor any calibration fire. We had fired 4 settling shots and the rounds fired at the flights of planes on the 15th and 24th of December.

As of December 29th, I had still kept my quarters at Topside for bathing and changing clothes. At 9:30 AM I went up and took a shower and changed uniforms for the day. We four battery officers took turns during the day, each had a two hour period for leaving the battery and going to quarters to clean up. At 11 AM I was back at the battery position. At 11:30 AM from 74 to 100 Japanese bombers attacked Corregidor for the first time. The raid lasted until about 3:30 PM. The first flight of 18 fighter planes came around the "Rock" through the South channel, split into two flights of nine each, coming from the east over Caballo Bay, and split into three flights of three each, coming over Corregidor low, 700 to 1000 feet elevation from several directions, bombing and strafing. We tried to track them with the three inch guns, but they were too low and too fast and we could not track fast enough to keep up with their low incoming course. At this time I did not have sense enough to be scared. We were standing at the Battery Command tracking scope, exposed, without any protection on the open parapet. I remember them coming in just over the tree tops, and I remember now of seeing the machine guns winking in the wings. We gawked with no thought of taking cover. They were thought to be German Messerschmitt 109 fighter types coming in low to dive bomb and strafe. Their strafing fire cleared us, and was clipping the leaves off the rubber trees over our heads, but at the time we did not have sense enough to be scared -we were really having an air show. They passed on over our heads, their bombs and strafing blew up the Quartermaster sheds and the 60th CA (AA) motor pool sheds behind us. They completely demolished these buildings with small bombs. I remember hearing the men screaming in that direction. Afterward we found that two men had sought cover in the steel bed of a dump truck and were literally cut to pieces with the machine gun bullets ricocheting around in the truck bed. Later, the report of the first dead men really sobered us up about warfare.

There were these three planes, two of which were crippled by machine gun fire and one which got away after they had passed through the withering fire of small arms and machine guns the length of Corregidor. However, the planes did considerable damage to personnel and installations at Middleside and Topside with their bombing and strafing.

Heavy bombers then followed in flights of seven and nine from all directions of the compass. Each flight made two to three runs over the island, making bomb drops each time. We had no trouble finding a flight to fire upon. There was some destruction of buildings at Topside. The Theatre, Officers Club, Officers Quarters were all hard hit. Corregidor Club was demolished. Courses were many and varied in azimuth. Forcing their higher elevation caused bombing to become less effective.

I went back to my quarters later and found a 300 pound rock in the bathtub where I had showered less than an hour before the raid began. It had come from above on the hill, through the roof of the quarters. There was no other damage to our quarters. We then abandoned these quarters and moved entirely to the "field".

Battery Hartford fired 77 rounds of ammunition, damaging three planes and causing disruption of several formations, as observed from the battery. The regimental fire was very effective on the bombers. They were approx­imately 54 twin tailed type ₉₇ and 98 twin-engined bombers, flying at altitudes of 6000 to 7500 yards. This was a very good range for our guns. Many were hit and had to leave formation, smoking. At least three were observed to go down within sight of Corregidor. AA fire caused their altitudes of flights to increase from 6000 to 7500 yards.

The 18 fighter planes did considerable damage to personnel at Topside, with their strafing and use of small bombs. Heavy bombers then came in flights of nine and crisscrossed the "Rock " many times. We fired at one who came in range but with no positive results. Due to the high speed and maneuverability of such types they were hard to hit. More tracking on such targets would develop technique for use to handle such fire with leads and spot corrections.

On the days of January 2 to 7, there were heavy two to four hour raids made on Corregidor by planes from 18 to 100 in number. They were 97 and 98 type heavy bombers, with altitudes generally between 2800 and 8500 yards. These bombers continually increased their altitude due to our heavy, accurate AA fire. No strafing or dive bombing planes were present. During these raids bombs set fire to the freighter Don Jose, sank President Quezon's yacht, and disabled minesweepers and one destroyer of the Navy at the North and South Dock areas. Some damage was done to the docks at Bottomside, a large fuel dump at Kindley Field was destroyed and several ordnance buildings, barracks and officers quarters at Topside were destroyed. The Topside water tower and some buildings at Bottomside were wrecked.

Damage to defense positions on the island were not heavy. Battery Hartford had no damage or casualties up to this time. We fired normally about 75 rounds of ammunition each day. On the 4th of January, this battery did no firing. The first wave of bombers set fire to the oil stores at Bottomside and an intense black smoke blew southwest and enveloped the battery position during the entire raid. We were in our revetted positions, hearing the droning of the planes above and hearing the explosions of the bombs all around us and we could not see a thing or know when any flight menaced our position. This was one of the worst days of the war for us. It was not so bad when you were busy firing and getting back at the enemy, but to sit there, inactive, without being able to fire and to see what was happening was very nerve wracking.

Flight altitudes were increasing every day. The enemy were evidently realizing the inadequacy of the smaller type of 98 bombers. This type soon ceased to come over, and the altitudes of the courses were reaching the extreme range of the 21 second fuzed ammunition which we used. For this reason, firing courses were short and usually at very extreme vertical elevations. Many of the courses were straight over head, incoming, allowing only four rounds per gun to be fired before the guns and director would be in vertical lock and have to be traversed 180 degrees. Accomplishing this would some times cause the flight to be lost for further fire, when the tracking was resumed. Sometimes 4 rounds per gun would be fired incoming and 4 rounds outgoing. The type 98 bomber was very vulnerable to our fire, as its extreme altitude seemed to be less than 7000 yards with a full load of bombs -about 2200 pounds. Their cruising speed in bombing formation appeared to be much slower than the type 97 which was about 175 to 200 miles per hour compared to the 150 to 175 miles per hour of the 98 bombers. Later in the siege, the type 97 bomber was improved and flew very high altitudes and cruised in excess of 200 miles per hour.

During the January 1st and 2nd raids, altitudes flown were 7800 to 8300 yards. They continually used the formation of an extended, shallow V, the planes flying about 80 yards apart. Flights usually were nine planes, which first appeared in flights of three, echeloned to the rear. When they approached the target , they would draw up into the shallow V formation for bombing. Some flights were observed to lose 100 to 300 yards in altitude in flying a bombing course across the island. It appeared that they came in in a sort of glide, presumably to surprise by the lessened motor noise, to gain flying speed, and to add that much maneuverability to their course.

On January 15, a Private, a machine gunner, was wounded slightly in the left arm by a bomb fragment. He was treated at the Medical Aid Station and his case went on record. During these six days, fire of H battery obtained hits on four planes and fired about 350 rounds of ammunition.

During the period January 8 to 15, there was no aerial activity over Corregidor, except for high, fast observation planes and patrol planes around the bay area-out of range of our guns, The enemy had diverted his attention to aerial and dive bombing of the Bataan front lines. We were constantly improving our position, principally the protection around it.

We were a well organized battery. The men had good morale and good fellowship. We had a practice of gathering in the evenings when things were clear and discussing events in general. I used to read the daily radio news and discuss our actions with the men. I knew all of the men very well and we had good rapport and cooperation. I was eternally answering the question: "How long are we going to be in this mess, Captain?" with the standard answer of "three months."

About this time the Japanese had positioned artillery in Ternate across the bay in the Cavite Province and began shelling Corregidor from that location. We were forced to stop assembling the men in large groups for any purpose. We could not take the chance of a lucky shot killing several peo^ple. We kept the men well dispersed at all times, and ate our meals in shifts. We went to eat in sections of about 15 men at a time. We had two pyramidal tents destroyed by shelling. Fortunately we had no casualties yet. I took all of the tents down and had the men deploy into the brush in smaller groups for sleeping. The artillery shelling added to the strain on men. We now could not be relaxed at any time, for we could be shelled without warning.

One morning about, January 15th, we were assembled at breakfast when they shelled the vicinity of our position, placing 16 rounds into the area before we could move. Had any of those shots registered in the exact spot where we were at it would have been very disastrous. It was certainly a worry to me to get the men to the kitchen for meals and get them fed. There was the constant worry about sudden shelling of the position. On this particular morning the "creep" Lieutenant was deployed on his stomach behind cover blowing his whistle, which was a very silly thing to do as this was the signal to get the men to the guns for firing action. The men were running up over the parapet of Battery Ramsey to the gun position, exposing themselves while the shelling was going on. It was funny, however, to see the "creep" Lieutenant, who prior to the war was a 245 pound Master Sergeant, and now as a 2nd Lieutenant during the siege shrunk to a mere 180 pounds, through fear and sweat.

We were eating two meals daily, food was slim, one half field rations, with no noon meal. We surely used to get hungry. I was sleeping on the walls of the Battery Commanders Station at night. I only left this station to eat day or night. I had promised the men that regardless of how much action there was, to sleep at their positions between actions, and that I would for sure get them awake in time to secure safety if anything happened. I kept that promise and never let them down.

Many days during this period we worried out flights of planes which never came. We would be notified of flights in the air by the Naval Off Shore Patrol and the Air Warning Service. The whole day might pass and they did not appear. They were hectic days of suspense all the time. I used to get these reports and keep them to myself for the good of the men. I frequently had to replace men on the flash warning phone, since they would have to keep these reports in their minds also.

During the period January 15th to 19th, there were no air raids on Corregidor. Occasional flights of Japanese reconnaissance and observation planes operated in the bay region. Regular daily flights of Japanese patrol planes operated around the bay. By this time the enemy had located several batteries of guns in Cavite Province at Naic, Ternate and Marigondon Point. Corregidor was shelled lightly at intermittent periods. Boats in Caballo Bay were shelled quite heavily. Fort Hughes, Fort Drum and Fort Frank were shelled frequently and heavily. Thirty seven men at Frank were killed or injured one day when a shell went through a ventilator shaft and exploded in a day room of the underground tunnel system. The enemy were using 105, 150 and 240 mm guns. Fort Frank and Fort Drum were shelled all day long on three different occasions.

On January 17,1942, A Private First Class was wounded accidentally in the left foot, in line of duty. He accidentally discharged his rifle into his foot at the top of the instep, while he was on guard duty. He was cleared by a line of duty board. I was on duty within 50 feet of him at the time it happened and was at the spot immediately. If this were deliberate injury to allow removal from battle status, the man would pay for it the rest of his life in the pain and incapacitation that it would give him.

On January 19th, two flights of planes came over. The first of nine were at the highest elevation to date, 9100 to 9500 yards. They were 97 type bombers. They were too high for us - to fire, Batteries Boston and Chicago who had 30 second fuzes, fired. These planes did scattered bombing from Mona (sic - probably Monja) light in the sea across Corregidor eastward to Fort Hughes. Three bombs landed near our position. One destroyed the field kitchen, destroying 2 of 3 gasoline field ranges, another destroyed the RDF storage shed. Only a few days before I had finely convinced the Ordnance to move a large amount of explosives, fuzes and ammunition out of this building. I was surely glad the stuff was gone when the building blew up. The building was blown to bits, with two direct bomb hits, one which partially covered our kitchens. The building was about 50 yards from our position, The third bomb did damage to one of our 3 inch guns and destroyed some sleeping "shacks" some camouflage and fragments burred the barrel of No 4 gun. One bomb very nearly got the 1st Sergeant who jumped into a trench 10 feet away just as it landed.

The second flight of bombers, 98 type , flew from Mariveles up the North channel and were flying low at 6400 yards altitude, making a very good firing course. We all fired upon them. They did not bomb. Batteries Chicago fired first, then Hartford and then Cebu. Hartford and Cebu both made hits and one plane was seen to go down in the vicinity of Nichols Field. The rest of the flight soon disappeared towards Pampanga Bay, very hard hit. Three planes had been damaged. This was the first real serious damage to our battery. Our camouflage was destroyed. After this we moved our field kitchen into the parados of Battery Ramsey.

During the period January 19th to 24th, there were no aerial attacks on Corregidor. There was occasional artillery shelling of the position from Cavite which did very little damage. Occasional dive bombers came over the island. One day, two of these strafed Topside, coming out of the low cloud cover over the island. Observation planes were active. Patrol planes daily flew around the "Rock", in and out of the South channel to the South China Sea. Due to the high maneuverability of these single planes -they were not our normal target - little firing was done during this period. We used the height finder and azimuth instruments at Battery Ramsey to observe artillery fire from the Cavite shoreline at Ternate attempting to aid Harbor Defense in locating the enemy batteries in that area.

During the period March 24th to April 1st, Corregidor was raided heavily most every day. The 50 to 100 planes were now operating out of bases on Luzon Island, P.1. and they were running short shuttle hops to Bataan and Corregidor from (I assume) Clark and Nichols Fields. They appeared at any hour of daylight, but more frequently from 10 to 11 AM and from 3 to 5 PM, taking advantage of the sun glare. They were very well camouflaged and in this manner were over us before we could pick them up with the tracking equipment. They used a plane, a modified type of the 97 heavy bomber, which was faster, flew higher and had a much larger bomb load capacity than any they had used before. According to a Colonel of Harbor Defense Command, the information was that this plane was their new Sleek Naval Bomber. It had tail turrets, cruised about 200 to 250 miles per hour loaded, and flew loaded at altitudes up to 9500 yards. However,generally, the altitudes were 7900 to 9100 yards. Most of the courses were too high for effective fire by the 21 second fuzed powder train ammunition which we used at Battery Hartford. Our effective limit of altitude was about 8000 yards. But, on a crossing course, using lateral leads of 6 mils for a .1 second fuze spot, we could fire up to 8400 yards of altitude. On incoming courses, the 6 mils vertical lead caused a more rapid vertical lock on the guns and director and the range was therefore limited. The enemy's intensified raiding action during this period, caused severe damage to Corregidor, destroying virtually all of the Bottomside Barrio area, the James Ravine Pump works, the Cold Storage Locker area, and damage to gun installations at Bottomside.

On March 27th, two planes appeared to the east, flying west. They were two type 97 two motored bombers, flying altitudes of 6800 yards. Battery Hartford began tracking these planes. They flew a course westward out of the South channel, reversed and flew east to the Fort Drum area. They then turned abruptly and flew directly north toward Corregidor Dock area. Their maneuvering was strange. The battery had been tracking their full flight, and as they came in at 6600 yards altitude we were ready for them. Their course was a crossing one, at a little above optimum range, our director data was okay, and the rates were settled down for very effective opening fire. An AA battery could not have obtained a better firing course. These planes came into range of our battery first. We had fired about 12 rounds of ammunition, had both planes smoking when Battery Denver opened fire, and almost immediately Battery Chicago opened fire as did Battery F from the west end of the island. When we had fired about 32 rounds, there was a terrific barrage of fire around the planes and both were on fire. We ceased firing. Soon one plane exploded in the vicinity of the right motor and the end section of the wing and the motor came off. The plane immediately went into a spiraling nose dive into the North channel. The second plane was on fire, losing altitude and came down in Manila Bay towards the Pampanga area.

This incident was very gratifying and fulfilled an AA artilleryman's best hopes of shooting planes down actually within the near vicinity. Battery Hartford had fired 32 rounds and obtained effective hits on both planes.

One of the planes which went down in the North channel, dropped into the bay just adjacent to a Yangse River Gunboat. This gunboat had retreated from China when the Japanese invaded, and had sailed to the Philippines at the time that the North China Marines came to Corregidor. There was a Chinese cook on this gunboat, who had had so much grief from the Japanese in China, that he was overjoyed to see some defeat of them, in a small way, when the plane plunged into the bay, practically in his lap, so to speak. He was so overjoyed that he baked many pies and sent them along with some cartons of cigarettes over to the "Rock" to the 60th CA (AA) regiment, as an appreciation of the fine antiaircraft shooting.

About the 1st of April, the enemy attempted night bombing with incendiary bombs. They began with 5 planes coming in from the east over Monkey Point. This activity met with little success. Intermittent lighting with searchlights allowed our AA fire to be effective enough to cause them to alter course and not be able to place bombs accurately. We were able one night to track the planes and fire upon them by tracking the exhaust flare of the plane motors, without the use of searchlights. They generally came in flights of three but soon cut down to a single plane. This single plane on one night dropped three incendiary bombs at Middleside, setting fire to one officers quarters building and one other building just off from Herring Field. Another night one plane flew across from Bataan, south-ward to Fort Drum. Several incendiaries were dropped from the North channel across Corregidor through the South Channel and the last bomb landed on the Cavite shore line south of Fort Drum.

This action at night was erratic and did practically no damage, It was apparent that they respected our AA fire and tried to fly above range and harass us at night with ineffective, promiscuous bombing. At any rate the last night of these "lone ranger" attacks, I was so dead for sleep that I fell asleep on the BC pit earthen wall, with him still cruising around above us.

Also, about the 1st of April, aerial activity over Corregidor ceased. Bombing of Bataan increased heavily. The purpose of the enemy seemed to beto have a big drive on the Bataan front line. Aerial bombardment continued all day long. Limay, Cabe Cabe (Cabcaben), Mariveles, Zig Zag areas were all well covered with the bombardment. Flights of planes up to 27 in number were used. Hospital areas were bombed, causing many deaths of hospitalized men. Incendiary bombs of white phosphorous were used in the raids on Mariveles. 65 to 110 planes a day bombed, probably a fewer number making shuttle trips. They concentrated on the front line of Bataan. There was not enough AA artillery protection for the front lines, and they were subjected to continual aerial attack. Many Zero type fighter type planes and fast two motored observation planes were being used over Bataan and Corregidor.

On April 8, the front line of Bataan broke at Limay, and the Japanese troops rushed through and down the Cabcaben road toward Mariveles. Batteries Hearn and Smith (12 inch barbette mounts )on Corregidor fired most of the night as interdiction fire on the Limay road. Also the 14 inch Naval rifles of Fort Drum fired interdiction fire squarely over our heads into Bataan. As the shells passed overhead of us, there was a crack as loud as the one of the initial firing. We surely had to have faith in the accuracy of the fire control on Fort Drum.