Operations of the 503d PRCT on Corregidor Island

PHASE II � PLAN OF ASSAULT

1. THE ENEMY SITUATION

A study of the information known about the enemy, as presented in the Intelligence Annex to Field Order No. 9, 503d Parachute Infantry, dated 13 February 1945, shows that there was little known except an estimated strength of 850. (The reader is requested to remember this figure). In fact, higher headquarters had intended to utilize one reinforced parachute battalion (35), but the Commanding Officer of the Regiment succeeded in having the entire RCT committed to the operation, later developments more than substantiated the commander�s reasoning.

As for enemy equipment, there were seven stationary pre-war guns reputedly repaired and in working condition: two 12-inch, two 10-inch, two 6-inch, and one 3-inch; in addition, there were two 3-inch mobile AA guns, two 37-mm split trail guns, plus six Japanese 75-mm guns. Guerilla reports indicated that the island was well stocked with food and ammunition. Ships in the area tended to confirm these reports.

The water around the island was mined considerably. Too, there were reports of land mines as well.

In general, however, despite natural expectations, photo interpretation intelligence indicated that little attempt had been made during the Japanese occupation to improve the island or repair damage done during the 1942 assault. There were tunnel entrances, though, which suggested underground installations as well as fortified positions and small weapons pits.

Enemy capabilities included artillery fire from Fort Hughes (Caballo Island), Cavite, Fort Drum, or the South Bataan coast (see map A) from any batteries which had not been destroyed by our Air Force or Navy. The enemy could concentrate forces on Corregidor prior to D-day, if he were warned of or suspected a landing on the island. In addition, the reported artillery battalion on Corregidor could bring fire to bear on our troops. (36)

It will be recalled that a rumor relative to the presence of anti-parachute obstacles had been proved fallacious by observers in low-level bombing flights. The interference, therefore, was that enemy capabilities did not include defenses prepared especially for a parachute assault. (37)

2. THE OVERALL PLAN OF ASSAULT

The capture of Corregidor was part of an operation assigned to XI Corps, the operation to secure the entrance to Manila Bay (see map A), as discussed in the section entitled, �General Situation�. On D-day (15 February 1945) elements of the 38th Infantry Division were to make an amphibious assault in the Mariveles Bay area of southern Bataan (see map A), seize and secure the beachhead at that point, and then on D plus 1 were to move the 3d Battalion (reinforced), 34th Infantry Regiment from the Mariveles Bay area to land via assault boats on San Jose Beach, Corregidor, (see map B) at 1030 hours.

On D plus 1, the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) was to drop via parachute on Corregidor at 0830 hours. (38)

3. AERIAL SUPPORT

On 23 January 1945, shortly after noon, the Fifth Bomber Command, using B-24 Liberators with 500-pound bombs, was to begin a daily pounding of the island. The bombing was to continue until the landing of the reinforced 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment. From 0745 to 0800 hours on D plus 1, one group of heavy bombers, each carrying 260-pound fragmentation bombs, was to round out the final pounding of the island. At 0800 hours, one group of A-20�s was to bomb the island and that of the adjacent Caballo Island (see map A) with 250-pound para-demo bombs, as well as continue with the strafing.

After 0830 hours (H hour for the initial drop) bombing was to be confined to areas as indicated on map C, but from 0830 to 0930 hours two groups of A-20�s were to have the mission of covering the unrestricted areas. At 0930 hours the parachutists of the first lift would be on the ground and from that time air support would be limited to three squadrons of A-20s on air alert. One of these squadrons was standing by on call in order to fly smoke missions, while the other two were prepared to support the second air drop of troops at 1230 hours. (39)

4. NAVAL SUPPORT

Naval units of the Seventh Fleet were first to conduct mine-sweeping and bombardment operations in the area through which the amphibious elements were to pass enroute from southern Bataan to Corregidor. (The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to accompany the force to Mariveles Bay on D-day so as to be in a more favorable position for the amphibious assault on D plus 1). PT boats had previously assisted in spotting the location of gun emplacements by encircling Corregidor in order to draw fire intentionally. (40) Naval gunfire was set up to fire heavy concentrations on D plus 1 in the unrestricted areas in close support of the amphibious phase of the assault at 1030 hours. In addition to the �on call� fire missions in general support which were to be requested via JASCO personnel who were to jump with the airborne units were to furnish night illumination on call. Star shells were to be used along with illuminating mortar shells. (41) PT boats were to skirt the island during the parachute drop in order to pick up parachutists who dropped over the cliffs into the sea. (42)

5. ASSAULT VIA AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

As has been previously mentioned in the overall plan of assault, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment was to make an amphibious assault at San Jose Beach, Corregidor at 1030 hours on D plus 1. The unit was to pass to the control of the Commanding Officer, 503d RCT (Parachute) on landing on the island. (43) The dual mission of that Battalion was first to secure the beachhead at San Jose, and rapidly seize and secure Malinta Hill area (see map C) as its initial objective, the second part required the Battalion to effect contact with the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, to the west. (44)

6. ASSAULT VIA AIRBORNE FORCES

The parachute element were to enplane at Mindoro Island (see map A) in three lifts: 0700 hours 16 February, 1045 hours 16 February, and 0700 hours 17 February, respectively. There would be fifty-one C-47 planes in both the first and second lifts, and forty-three planes in the third lift. A forth lift of twelve C-47�s would follow the third lift and drop the initial resupply bundles. (45) In view of the extremely small drop zones, strong winds, proximity of drop zones to the edge of the 600-foot cliffs, and the nature of the terrain aggravated by man-made rubble and debris, a minimum two or three passes was to be made by each plane. No more than eight men were to be dropped at each pass. �If one adds the imponderables of gusts, fishtailing, sharp diminution of wind velocity, and the nature of the terrain to the human errors, the margin of safety was nil and the hazardous nature of the drop is fully apparent�. (46) The planes were to fly in two columns of single planes; one over each of the drop zones.

The misnamed parade ground was to be Field �A� and the so-called golf course was to be Field �B�. (47) It is superfluous to state that coordination between pilots and jumpmasters and the selection of an appropriate �go point� had to be perfect. A control plane would remain aloft during the jumping and by means of voice radio supervise the actual jump: necessary corrective action to be taken by each succeeding plane would be radioed to the planes. (48)

The first lift was to be composed of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, reinforced by the attachment of Battery �A� and one platoon Battery �D�, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the 3d Platoon, Company �C�, 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion. The mission of the 3d Battalion with its attachments was to drop on Fields �A� and �B� on D plus 1 at 0830 hours and secure the drop zones. The 2d Battalion was to relieve the 3d Battalion immediately upon the completion of the drop of the former, at which time the 3d Battalion was to advance and seize the high ground approximately 600 yards northeast of the hospital site and the commanding ground approximately 1000 yards east of the hospital site (see map C). During the amphibious landing of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, was to support that assault by fire and effect contact with that Battalion, once the landing had been accomplished. (49)

The 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, with Battery �B� and one platoon of Battery �D�, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, attached, comprised the second lift.

This lift was to drop on Fields �A� and �B� on D plus 1, as was the case with the first lift, but the time of drop for the 2d Battalion and its attachments was 1215 hours. The mission of this lift was to relieve the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, immediately from the defense of the drop area. The 2d Battalion was then to exploit the terrain to the north and west of the drop areas (see map C) and destroy all enemy encountered. (50)

The third and last personnel lift was to be composed of the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, with Battery �C� and one platoon of Battery �D�, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, attached. This lift was likewise to drop on both fields, but at 0830 hours on D plus 2 (17 February 1945). This Battalion was to be RCT reserve, but, in addition, was to be prepared on order to exploit the terrain south of the drop area (see map C) and to destroy all enemy encountered. (51)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503d Parachute Infantry, was given the mission to drop on both fields on D plus 1, in conjunction with both the 3d and 2d Battalions. This personnel was then to perform the normal duties of administration and communication. The Demolition Sections of the Company would, however, drop with their respective battalions, but would revert to the control of Regiment after their initial landing. (52) Service Company was to drop on D plus 1 at 1215 hours on Field �B� in conjunction with the second lift.

This personnel was then to perform its normal functions of supply, administration, and evacuation. (53)

The Rear Base would contain a minimum number of personnel to support the operation and would be commanded by the Platoon Leader of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon. The Regimental Personnel Section, the bulk of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon, the Regimental Motor Section, and elements of the Regimental S-4 office composed the Rear Base, along with a representative from each company to look after personal and company property. The total would be about sixty men and officers. It is to be pointed out that the complete Regimental Staff Personnel (minus the few S-4 personnel) were to jump; all the staff officers and some of the enlisted men would be among the first few to jump with the first lift, and the remainder would jump with the second lift. (54)

Although not exactly within the scope of this monograph, the missions and activities of the closely supporting field artillery and engineer units are so inextricable associated with those of the 503d Parachute Infantry that they will be considered too. The 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion was to attach batteries and platoons, as previously indicated in this phase, and support the respective battalions by fire as directed by the Infantry Battalion Commander. (55) Company �C�, (lass one platoon), 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion, was to drop of Field �B� on D plus 1 in conjunction with the drop of the first lift. The company would, after assembly, be prepared to erect road blocks and destroy enemy fortified installations by demolition, in accordance with orders from the Commanding Officer, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. Inasmuch as the exact nature of the obstacles to be encountered could not be predicted, the Engineer Company was to be prepared further to attach one platoon each to the 2d and 1st Battalions, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, upon their landing. (56)

Of necessity, plans for the ground action had to be very simple and flexible. The reason is fairly obvious. The action would depend upon the enemy strength, equipment, dispositions, organization, and movements --- and very little information, if any, was known about any of these matters. Consequently, the mission of the Regiment might be stated merely �to seize Corregidor and destroy the enemy forces�. (57)

The reader is reminded that D plus 1 would be 16 February 1945 and would be the first day of the assault (both parachute and amphibious) on Corregidor. D-day was to be 15 February 1945, but the assault on that day was to take place in Mariveles Bay, Bataan Peninsula, as explained in the over-all plan of assault.

PHASE III � THE ASSAULT

In accordance with previous plans, the Air Force phase of the assault began on 23 January 1945 and during the next twenty-five days Corregidor was presented with 3,128 tons of bombs. (58) The Naval bombardment, too, went according to schedule, but all bombing ceased at 0830 hours, 16 February 1945, on �Topside�. Preceded by the two groups of strafing A-20�s, the first lift. Which had enplaned at 0700 hours and taken off at 0715 hours from Mindoro Island (see map A), began to drop its human cargo at 0833 hours. (59)

The planes were flying at an altitude of 600 feet from the southwest and in a flight pattern of two columns of single planes in trail. The leading plane contained the Commanding Officer of the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Prcht), Colonel George M. Jones, who controlled the actual jumping from the plane in which he was flying, as it hovered above the drop areas. Control was effected by means of voice radio communication in the clear with the troop carriers; the control plane was to make all necessary corrections in the flight plan and/or to adjust the jumpmaster count based on actual observations of the jumpers as they landed. (60)

A distinct, so-called �go-point� (a definite, unmistakable terrain feature on or contiguous to a drop zone and which is used by jumpmasters as a reference point from which the probable extent of drift is estimated) had been selected for each of the two drop zones. Original plans required the jumpmaster to count three seconds from the �go point� and then allow the eight-man stick to jump. However, Colonel Jones in the hovering control plane saw that some jumpers were being carried to the cliff as a result of the 15-20 miles-an-hour wind with occasional gusts to 25 miles-an-hour. (61) Consequently, the �Rock Force� Commander (The Corregidor force was known as the �Rock Force� -- (62)) through the control facilities ordered the pilots to fly at an altitude of 500 feet in order to minimize the extent of drift by shortening the drop time and ordered the jumpmaster to allow an interval of six seconds from the �go- point� in order to compensate for the excessive wind velocity. These corrections were made, and the jump pattern improved accordingly. (63)

For one hour and ten minutes the two columns continued to pass over the respective drop zones in two giant counter-rotating circles, as eight men at a time jumped out on a signal from the jumpmasters. The intermittent enemy anti-aircraft fire was kept to a minimum by the A-20�s which were strafing on each flank effectively. Some fire by the enemy was directed, also, on the descending parachutists, but this action, too, was greatly ineffective. When the tail plane of the first lift had discharged its last group of eight men, at 0940 hours, Colonel Jones then jumped from the control plane and began the job, which Major General Charles P. Hall, then Commanding General of XI Corps, termed ��.the best handled of any that I have seen during my military career�. (64)

The terrain was worse than had been expected. Continuous bombing had ripped the trees in two, scattered debris and rubble in all directions, performed a superior chore of defoliation, and, in general, created a scene of total desolation. Fields of fire were usually very poor, in view of the remains of masonry buildings, thick undergrowth, and strewn boulders. Observation varied considerably, but the enemy was so well located in his adroitly concealed caves, tunnels, and pillboxes that although we held the high ground, we still did not have observation of him. Cover and concealment favored the enemy in that he had had nearly three years in which to perfect his dugouts. (It is now noteworthy to point out at this time that the enemy had made very few changes in or erected any new installations above ground. The impression he wished to convey was that the island was lightly held -- he had succeeded. The G-2 estimate was 850 enemy on the island) There was no outstanding terrain obstacles as such but the sheer cliffs, the partially demolished buildings, the heave undergrowth, and the rugged terrain were not ideal features over which to operate. There were two roads, hard packed gravel, which formed the main routes of communication to the beach. (65)

During the descent of the first lift aerial bombardment and naval shelling continued east of the bomb line (see map C) to minimize fire on this lift. The strafing which had preceded the first lift had been successful in that almost complete surprise had been secured for much of these personnel. The continued bombing east of the bomb line added to the confusion of the enemy and, consequently, he remained below ground practically completely unaware that a battalion combat team (parachute) and most of a regimental combat team (parachute) staff were dropping on him. The caves, as well as the gun positions, were so constructed that the enemy was unmolested by the bombing and much of the pre-invasion bombardment had been in vain. (66)

As a consequence. The element of surprise acted in favor of the parachutists and enabled them to drop in the very midst of the enemy. Scattered enemy groups only were able to bring fire on the jumpers, but as has been stated, this fire was ineffective. However, some parachutists were carried beyond the intended drop zones by high wind, and these groups engaged in action with enemy entrenched along the coast in caves and dugouts. (67) In fact, it was at 0920 hours in one of these scattered, uncoordinated sections that an unknown parachutist killed the Japanese Commander of the island at Geary Point (see map D), as he watched the paratroopers do what he considered an impossible feat. (68) The loss of their commander was a heavy blow to the leader- conscious enemy.

The first lift, a battalion combat team, in spite of the wide dispersal of the jumpers and with an effective strength of about 750 officers and enlisted men out of the 1000 who had jumped began organize its �enclave�. (Not all of the 250 ineffectives were casualties, however, in that some men were engaged in collecting equipment bundles which were essential to combat). The perimeter was small at first -- the size of the drop zones -- but the initial advantage was ours thanks to the surprise gained, and so the troops immediately organized to begin the task of expanding our area. The three, lettered companies of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, had the assignment of enlarging and organizing the perimeter while the Regimental Headquarters Company, the Battalion Headquarters Company, and the Engineer Company performed the mop-up within the perimeter. (69) Initially, the coordinated action was the clearing of the buildings and the area in the region of the drop zones, plus the preparations for supporting the scheduled amphibious assault at 1030 hours. To accomplish this latter phase of the mission, the Battalion Commander set up .50-caliber heavy machine guns and a 75-mm howitzer from the attached elements of the Field Artillery Battalion. (70)

From the movement of contact with the enemy, his strength, disposition, equipment, location, organization, and movement remained unknown quantities because of the nature of his underground system of caves, tunnels, pillboxes, bunkers, and ammunition storage casements. This arrangement was not confined to �Topside�, but was found later to exist all through the island fortress. In fact, Although we were constantly in contact with the enemy via heavy sniper and machine-gun fire as troops moved out to secure initial objectives, even the nature of his displacement remained a mystery for the first few days. The Regimental Command Post, as well as those of the Battalions received their share of harassing machine-gun and sniper fire. At one point, members of the Regimental Staff were lying on the floor yet conducting business as usual. (71)

Inasmuch as we now held the high ground (see map D0, the enemy could not effectively concentrate a numerically superior force for a coordinated attack or defense nor was he free to use hid chief lines of communication. One fact, had it been known by both sides at this time (1000 hours 16 February), might have radically affected the action: this fact was the strength of the defender and the attacker. Our forces numbered less than 1000, whereas the enemy believed we numbered 8000-10000; the enemy numbered 5500-6000, whereas we believed he numbered 850: (72)

The Regimental Command Post had been established in the former enlisted men�s barracks (see map D) which is contiguous to Field �a�, The 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the Engineer Company and the Regimental Headquarters Company had likewise established their respective Command Posts in the same what-was-once-a building. The Medical Detachment had policed up a large section of the barracks and by 0930 hours had established a dispensary, which rapidly assumed all the earmarks of a hospital with dozens of patients but few casualties. (73) By 0920 hours communication had been established via radio between the RCT Command Post and the Command Post of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; by 1000 hours �5 by 5� communication had been established with the Rear Base at Mindoro Island (see map A). (74)

Promptly at 1030 hours the 3d Battalion (reinforced), 34th Infantry Regiment, covered by close naval gunfire directed on the areas east of the bomb line and on enemy gun positions close to the beach, made its landing at San Jose Beach (see map C) with slight, active resistance. The chief obstacle to the landing was the presence of land mines, not the machine-gun and other small-arms fire which was directed at the troops prior to and during the landing. The mines took a heavy toll of vehicular equipment including one of the three tanks landed and the radio set with which communication was to have been established between �The Rock Force� and XI Corps Headquarters. (75)

Despite heavy personnel and vehicular losses, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, secured the crest of Malinta Hill (see map C) against surprisingly light opposition. The paratroops on the high ground of �Topside� were able to keep the enemy sufficiently diverted to allow the amphibious forces to occupy the hill in thirty minutes. (76) The Battalion then began its mission to block Malinta Tunnel (in Malinta Hill) and the enemy on the eastern end of the island, while the 503d RCT secured and mopped up the island. The southwest entrance to the tunnel was blocked by a landslide started by bombing, and the west entrance was covered by .50-caliber machine guns and the disabled tank. (77)

While the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, on �Topside� was increasing the size of the perimeter, recovering injured personnel, securing equipment bundles outside of the perimeter, and assisting the amphibious assault on the beach, the second lift enplaned at 1045 hours and took off from Mindoro Island (see map A) at 1100 hours. In fact, by 1100 hours the drop zones were relatively free of enemy fire. The wind velocity had increased, and at 1250 hours, when the parachutists began their jumps, the Rock Force Executive Officer in the control plane ordered the necessary changes to be made in jumpmaster and pilot technique. The change in wind conditions had been anticipated, so that appropriate instructions had been issued prior to take-off. The same pilots who had flown the first lift flew the planes of the second lift, and thereby the experience gained during the earlier drop resulted in more effective and accurate dropping. (78)

However, the surprise gained by the first lift did not accrue to the second, in that the presence of friendly troops on �Topside� precluded strafing and bombing by A-20�s on the flanks of the two columns of C-47�s. The enemy took advantage of his opportunity to hamper the second lift, and, consequently, continual although ineffective anti-aircraft fire was directed at the planes and descending parachutists. Ten transports received hits, which merely put holes in them and one crew member was wounded. There were far less jump casualties in this lift as a result of the experience gained during the first drop. However, more men were shot while in the air of immediately upon landing. (79)

The drop was completed at 1342 hours, and the 2d Battalion immediately began to relieve the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, which had already seized its initial objectives. The latter was then to take over the key terrain features commanding a view of and controlling the route to the beach, South Dock. (see map C). The 2d Battalion was to continue the expansion of the perimeter. (80)

By late afternoon it was quite apparent that the G-2 estimate of the situation relative to enemy strength was more than just a little off. (81) The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, from its position on Malinta Hill could keep the forces on the eastern part of the island from joining the forces on �Topside� for a coordinated attack or defense. However, the road from �Topside� to San Jose Beach (South Dock) was not secure, despite a physical meeting of patrols from both 3d Battalions. (82)

The 2d Battalion having taken over the perimeter, which surrounded an area 1000 yards by 500 yards and included the former enlisted men�s barracks and both drop fields, the Battalion Command Post was setup in a barracks, also. Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment remained within the perimeter along with �I� Company, which was to continue the attack the next day. �H� and �G� Companies formed their own individual perimeters outside of the RCT perimeter (see map D). (83)

The two batteries of field artillery which had dropped with the first and second lifts were in position on the parade ground. Fire Direction Center was located in the barracks, which all units seemed to prefer as a change to the mud of the jungle. The threat of enemy air attack was very slight, so that full advantage was taken of what was left of the buildings on the island. Too, there was sufficient room in the barracks, which were shambles from the Japanese bombing in 1942 and the American bombing in 1945, in that these barracks were considered the largest in the world. (84)

Also in the barracks was the American Red Cross comfort station, which had been established by the ARC Field Director attached to the Regiment. He had jumped with the first lift and had had coffee available prior to noon. With the scarcity of water and parched throats from very hot weather, the comfort station was just that for those who were able to visit it. (85)

A detachment of 592d JASCO and a detachment of the 6th Support Air Party, which had also jumped (six men of these groups for the first time) were both operating their communication equipment in the barracks. It is at this point in the discussion that concrete proof is found for the term �operation Cooperation�. These support parties were willing, eager, accurate, and cooperative, and their enthusiasm seemed to be shared by the units to which the requests for aerial or naval strike were sent.

Drop casualties were estimated in advance as 20%, but actually ran about 11%. It is believed the control by the lead plane did much to reduce the original estimate. Of the 2065 officers and men who jumped on 16 February, 203 were injured on landing, thirteen were killed prior to or on landing, and six were missing. Seventy-five percent of the jump casualties occurred in the first lift; no serious wounds were received prior to landing. All planes discharged their passengers except the plane carrying the Demolition Section of the 3d Battalion. This plane developed engine trouble, flew towards Luzon (see map A), where the troops bailed out to avert a crash landing. (This group of one officer and thirteen men arrived the following day by boat). (86)

The cost in lives for the first day was comparatively light, 21 killed, when the odds against the attackers are considered. The enemy lost fifty men from ground action. For four hours less than 1000 men had defied 6000, well-equipped, well-entrenched enemy troops. Even after the arrival of both the second lift and the amphibious element, the ratio was still two-to-one against the attacker, who should properly heavily outnumber the defender. There were, in addition to the 2065 parachutists, 1138 officers and men of the amphibious force. The total American forces on the island the first day was 3203. (87)

In view of the heavy jump casualties, which, incidentally could not be evacuated in that our forces still did not have access to the road to the beach, it was decided to have the third lift merely drop its cargo bundles (0830 hours, 17 February) and then land at Subic Bay (see map A). This element could then be water-borne to South Dock, San Jose Beach the same day: and on hand almost as soon as originally planned. The Commanding Officer of the �Rock Force� at 1830 hours, 16 February sent an urgent request to the Commanding General, XI Corps, for approval of the foregoing plan; approval was granted, and the Rear Base was advised accordingly just as the third lift was enplaning at 0700 hours, 17 February. (It is superfluous to mention that such an announcement would be received with mixed and varied reactions). (88)

The Assault Phase closed with the paratroops holding a tight perimeter on �Topside�, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment holding the top of Malinta Hill, and everyone holding their breath: rumor had it that the island was prepared for destruction by carefully located demolitions, which could be detonated electrically and remotely. Harassing mortar and field artillery fire were maintained on ravines and other likely avenues of approach to discourage enemy thoughts of a banzai attack. Star shells were provided by the navy for illumination at irregular intervals. (89)