1. Sixth Army FO 45, 26 Jan 45, Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 147-48.  
  
    
	2. The southern group of MacArthur's forces, withdrawing north 
	across the Pampanga on 1 January 1942, blew the two Calumpit bridges. See 
	Morton, Fall of the 
	Philippines, pp. 
	209-10. The Japanese replaced the bridges in 1943, employing in part 
	bridging material left in Manila. The bridges were intact as late as 27 
	December 1944, but the Japanese blew them late in January, leaving two sets 
	of bridges in the water, one on top of the other. Comments by Mr. James J. 
	Halsema, an American civilian who was interned by the Japanese during the 
	war. Hereinafter cited as Halsema Comments, these remarks were forwarded to 
	the author during March 1957.  
  
  
    
	3. These bridges had also been knocked out by MacArthur's forces 
	in 1942, but had been repaired by the Japanese.  
  
    
	4. The foregoing operational material is from: 37th Div Rpt 
	Luzon, pp. 31-33; 148th Inf Rpt Luzon, p. 4; 37th Rcn Tr Rpt Luzon, 8 Jan-3 
	Feb 45, pp. 5-6.  
  
    
	5. Rad, Krueger to Griswold (quoting MacArthur), WL-944, 30 Jan 
	45, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 29-31 Jan 45.  
  
    
	6. Beightler Comments, 18 Mar 57.  
  
    
	7. Rad, Krueger to Griswold, WL-944, 30 Jan 45; Entries 1, 5, and 
	23, XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 31 Jan 45; Telecons, G-3 XIV Corps and G-3 37th Div, 
	0140 and 0855 31 Jan 45, in XIV Corps G-3 Jnl File, 31 Jan 45.  
  
    
	8. Sixth Army FO 46, 30 Jan 45; see also above, ch. 
	XI.  
  
  
    
	9. Sixth Army FO 46, 30 Jan 45.  
  
    
	10. Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 31-32; Sixth Army FO 46, 30 Jan 45.  
  
    
	11. 37th Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 34-36; 148th Inf Rpt Luzon, pp. 4-5; 
	145th Inf Rpt Luzon, pp. 15-16; 148th Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 31 Jan-3 Feb 45. The 
	records indicate that the Shimbu 
	Groupbattalion may have been caught by surprise, or at least in the 
	process of trying to withdraw southeast, but General Beightler, in Beightler 
	Comments, 18 March 57, states that the unit was in well-prepared defensive 
	positions. The Angat and Quingua are two names for different sections of the 
	same stream that, flowing westward, joins the delta of the Pampanga just 
	south of Calumpit.  
  
    
	12. After World War II the 1st Cavalry Division was triangularized and 
reorganized as an infantry division, but kept its name.  
  
    
	13. 1st Cav Div FO's 22 and 23, 8 and 31 Jan 45; 1st Cav Div Rpt 
	Luzon, Org, pp. 1-2; Ltr, CG 1st Cav Div to Comdrs of Units and Separate 
	Orgs, sub: Org of Reinforced Motorized Squadron, 31 Jan 45, 1st Cav Div FO 
	File.  
  
    
	14. The general sources for the rest of this subsection are: 1st 
	Cav Div Rpt Luzon, Narrative, pp. 1-3; Maj. Bertram C. Wright, The 
	1st Cavalry Division in World War II (Tokyo: 
	Toppan Printing Co., Ltd., 1947), pp. 126-28; 1st Cav Div G-3 Per Rpts, 1-3 
	Feb 45; 1st Cav Brig S-3 Per Rpts, 1-3 Feb 45; 5th Cav Rpt Luzon, pp. 2-5; 
	5th Cav S-3 Per Rpts, 1-3 Feb 45; 8th Cav Rpt Luzon, Manila Phase, p. 1; 
	302d Rcn Tr Rpt Luzon, pp. 8-12; 44th Tank Bn Rpt Luzon, pp. 5-7.  
  
    
	15. According to the 1st Cavalry Division G-3 Periodic Report for 1 
February, as well as the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Cavalry Brigade, and division 
journals for the day, Troop G had reached Sabang on 1 February. From the time 
and distance factors involved--especially with a return to Gapan for the 
night--this seems impossible. From internal evidence in the journals it is 
obvious that as the result of garbled radio messages Gapan and Sabang were 
confused in more than one instance on both 1 and 2 February.  
  
  
  
    
	16. See Morton, Fall of 
the Philippines, pp. 
206-08. Both Cabanatuan and Gapan had also been scenes of minor delaying 
actions during MacArthur's withdrawal; see Morton, op. 
cit., p. 
183.  
  
    
	17. Sixth Army FO 47, 2 Feb 45, Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 149.  
  
    
	18. XIV Corps FO 5, 3 Feb 45, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 31 
	Jan-2 Feb 45. Although dated 3 February, this field order actually started 
	going out to subordinate units by radio and telephone before midnight on the 
	2d. General Beightler, in Beightler Comments, 18 March 57, took exception to 
	the reasoning in the last sentence of this paragraph, pointing out that the 
	new boundary left the only intact bridge on the northern and northeastern 
	approaches to Manila in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone, and that the 1st 
	Cavalry Division therefore could hardly help entering Manila first. On the 
	other hand, General Griswold could not have known that the Japanese would 
	leave the bridge intact for the 1st Cavalry Division.  
  
    
	19. 148th Inf Rpt Luzon, pp. 4-5; 148th Inf S-3 Per Rpts, 3-4 Feb 
	45.  
  
    
	20. Beightler Comments, 18 Mar 57. General Beightler stated that 
	Griswold still did not want the 37th Division's infantry to get very far 
	beyond its supporting arms.  
  
    
	21. Information on 1st Cavalry Division operations in this 
	subsection is based primarily upon the relevant portions of the narrative 
	sources cited in note 14 above. The following were also consulted: 1st Cav 
	Brig Jnl, 3-4 Feb 45; 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl, 3-4 Feb 45; 5th Cav S-2/S-3 Jnl, 
	3 Feb 45; 8th Cav S-2/S-3 Jnl, 3-4 Feb 45.  
  
    
	22. The 5th Cavalry could have reached this junction by coming 
	southeast and south out of Norzagaray along a third-class road. However, 
	such a route had been considered too risky because it was believed that 
	strong Japanese forces held another junction some five miles north of the 
	Routes 64-52 junction.  
  
  
  
    
23. The author, who went over the stretch of Route 52 in April 
	1957, when part of it had been paved, could only conclude that anyone who 
	drove fifty miles an hour along the road in 1945, when it was almost all 
	gravel at least to Novaliches, must have taken leave of his senses or else 
	had abandoned his life to the hands of St. Christopher.  
  
    
24. For a combination of this action and a later mine-clearing 
	exploit in Manila, Sutton was awarded the Army's Distinguished Service 
	Cross. Although a naval officer, Sutton spent almost his entire overseas 
	tour attached to Army units and his wartime decorations--the DSC, a Silver 
	Star, and two Purple Hearts--were all awarded by the Army. After the war, 
	Sutton served in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressman from 
	Tennessee. Interview, author with Sutton, 24 June 1953, copy of interview 
	notes in OCMH files.  
  
    
25. Rads, XIV Corps to 1st Cav Div and 37th Inf Div, 1225 and 
	2100 3 Feb 45, XIV Corps G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 3-4 Feb 45; Amended Version, 
	2000 3 Feb 45, XIV Corps FO 5, 3 Feb 45, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 31 
	Jan-2 Feb 45.  
  
    
26. The exact time the squadron crossed the city limits is highly 
	debatable, for the division's records give times running from 1730 to 1945. 
	Most journal entries agreed that it was about 1830 when the squadron reached 
	Grace Park and between 1930 and 1945 when the van units reached Santo Tomas 
	University, well within the city. The question is further complicated by the 
	difficulty of determining the exact locations of the city limits, for the 
	8th Cavalry found no defining signs and the Japanese, during the war, had 
	moved the city boundaries to include some of the prewar suburbs. Thus the 
	8th Cavalry may well have crossed the city limits as defined by the Japanese 
	when it reached Grace Park.  
  
    
27. Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 7, 10.  
  
  
    
28. GHQ SWPA, MUSKETEER I, 
	10 Jul 44; GHQ SWPA Staff Study MIKE IV 
	(Nasugbu-Balayan), 7 Nov 44, OPD File ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43), Sec. 8-G; 
	GHQ SWPA Staff Study MIKE VI 
	(Batangas-Tayabas Provinces), Ed. No. 1, 2 Jan 45; GHQ SWPA OI 86, 11 Jan 
	45, G-3 GHQ Jnl File, 11 Jan 45; GHQ SWPA OI 87, 14 Jan 45, G-3 GHQ Jnl 
	File, 14 Jan 45; Memo, Chief Strategy Sec OPD for Chief Strategy and Policy 
	Gp OPD, sub: Opn MIKE Six, 
	13 Jan 45, atchd to OPD copy of GHQ SWPA Staff Study MIKE VI, 
	During the course of planning for two RCT landings, Eighth Army suggested 
	substituting Balayan Bay, fifteen miles southeast of Nasugbu, for Tayabas 
	Bay, returning to the GHQ SWPA concept of MIKE IV, 
	7 November 1944. The planners found that the Balayan Bay landing would make 
	little tactical sense when they learned that the only practical route inland 
	from that bay led directly to the Nasugbu area, where a landing was to be 
	made anyway. General Eichelberger stated that he had been opposed to the two 
	separate landings idea from the beginning because he felt that the two small 
	RCT's of the 11th Airborne Division would be chewed up in short order. 
	Eichelberger Comments, 21 Jan 57.  
  
    
29. GHQ SWPA OI 86, 11 Jan 45; Rad, CTF 77 to CTF 78, 0225 18 Jan 
	45, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 17-18 Jan 45; Memo, ACofS G-3 Eighth Army 
	for CofS Eighth Army, 19 Jan 45; Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 Eighth Army for ACofS 
	G-3 Eighth Army, sub: Plan for MIKE VI 
	Opn, 21 Jan 45; Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 Eighth Army for ACofS G-3 Eighth Army, 
	sub: Topics Discussed at Conference . . . , 22 Jan 45. Last three in Eighth 
	Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI 
	Opn, 4-25 Jan 45.  
  
    
30. Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur, FB-769, 20 Jan 45, Eighth 
	Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	4-25 Jan 45; Eighth Army FO 17, 22 Jan 45, G-3 GHQ Jnl File, 24 Jan 45.  
  
    
31. Rads, MacArthur to Eichelberger, C-56806 and CX-56903, 22 Jan 
	45, Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	4-25 Jan 45.  
  
    
32. TG 78.2 Opn Plan No. 1-45, 23 Jan 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jnl 
	File MIKE VI, 
	4-25 Jan 45; AAF SWPA OI 86, 15 Jan 45, G-3 GHQ Jnl File, 18 Jan 45.  
  
    
33. 11th A/B Div FO 10, 24 Jan 45; 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon, p. 57; 
	Maj. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., The 
	Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division, 1943-1946 (Washington: 
	Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 1-2; Eighth Army FO 17, 22 Jan 45, and 
	Amendment No. 1, 26 Jan 45, both in G-3 GHQ Jnl File, 24 Jan 45; Rad, GHQ 
	SWPA to Eighth Army, CX-57942, 1 Feb 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-2 Feb 45.  
  
  
    
34. 11th A/B Div FO 10, 24 Jan 45.  
  
    
35. Japanese information in this and the following two 
	subsections is mainly from: 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 13-16, 27-28; 
	Japanese Studies in WW II, No. 9, Luzon Opns of theShimbu Gp, pp. 
	2-3, 8; Sixth Army G-2 Wkly Rpts 76 and 77, 21 and 28 Feb 45, copies in G-2 
	DA Files; Statement of Lt Col Norio Tsutsumi (CO 2d 
	Surface Raiding Base Force), States, IV, 426-28; Statement of Lt Col 
	Tsugunori Kuriya (Staff 14th 
	Area Army), States, II, 371-73; 10th I&H, Staff Study of Japanese 
	Operations in the Batangas Area (Nasugbu Operation), passim.  
  
    
36. Many different translations from the Japanese are to be found 
	for these forces, squadrons, and battalions.  
  
    
37. The general sources for this and the next subsection are: 
	Eighth Army Rpt Nasugbu and Bataan Opns, pp. 14-20; Flanagan, The 
	Angels, pp. 67-77; 11th A/B 
	Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 3-4, 16, 27-28; 11th A/B Div Hist Narrative MIKE SIX, 
	pp. 1-3; 11th A/B Div G-3 Per Rpts, 1-5 Feb 45; TG 78.2 Action Rpt Nasugbu, 
	pp. 4-6.  
  
    
38. Swing Comments, 10 Jan 57.  
  
    
39. Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur (via Navy channels), 0245 31 
	Jan 45, in Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-2 Feb 45.  
  
    
40. Additional information on regimental operations is from: 
	188th Gli Inf Rpt Luzon, pp. 1-4; 188th Para-Gli Inf, Draft Hist Luzon 
	Campaign, 31 Jan-31 Mar 45, passim; 188th 
	Inf S-3 Per Rpts Luzon; 187th Inf S-3 Per Rpts Luzon; 187th Inf Chron 
	Narrative MIKE VI; 
	1st Bn 187th Inf Chron Narrative MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-24 Feb 45. Last four documents are in 11th Airborne Division Camp 
	Campbell (Ky.) collection.  
  
  
  
    
41. Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur, 0245 31 Jan 45; Rad, 
	MacArthur to Eichelberger, CX-57342, 1 Feb 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-2 Feb 45; TG 78.2 Action Rpt Nasugbu, Chron Order of Events, p. 4.  
  
    
42. Rad, MacArthur to Eichelberger, C-56806, 22 Jan 45, Eighth 
	Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	4-25 Jan 45; Rad, Eighth Army to Fifth Air Force, FB-839, 1 Feb 45, Eighth 
	Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-2 Feb 45.  
  
    
43. Additional sources for 511th Infantry operations are: 511th 
	Inf S-1, S-2, and S-3 Jnls (incomplete) Luzon, 11th A/B Div Camp Campbell 
	(Ky.) collection; Ltr, CG Fifth Air Force to CG Eighth Army, 4 Feb 45, 
	Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	2-19 Feb 45, with atchd Mission Rpts, 317th Tr Carrier Gp; 511th Inf S-1 
	Casualty and Inspection Rpts Luzon.  
  
    
44. 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon, p. 4.  
  
    
45. General Swing, commenting on this passage, stated that he 
	could not recall any fatalities (Swing Comments, 10 January 1957), but the 
	division's records indicate that one man was either killed or later died of 
	injuries. The division records being incomplete and confusing on this point, 
	it may be that the two men listed in the subject sentence were one and the 
	same.  
  
    
46. Eighth Army Rpt Nasugbu-Bataan, p. 22; Eichelberger and 
	MacKaye, Our Jungle Road to 
	Tokyo, p. 189. Both Maj. Gen. 
	Clovis E. Byers (contemporary Chief of Staff, Eighth Army) and Brig. Gen. 
	Frank S. Bowen (Eichelberger's G-3) stated that Eichelberger received 
	supplementary verbal instructions from MacArthur. (See Ltr, Byers to author, 
	30 Jun 53, in OCMH files.) Eichelberger, reviewing the draft manuscript of 
	this volume, stated that before the 11th Airborne Division departed Leyte, 
	General Sutherland (MacArthur's chief of staff) came to Eighth Army 
	headquarters on Leyte and stated that MacArthur wanted Eichelberger to 
	capture Manila. (See Eichelberger Comments, 21 Jan 57.) No documents 
	relevant to the change can be found in available GHQ SWPA, Eighth Army, or 
	11th Airborne Division files. Whatever the case, there can be no doubt that 
	General Eichelberger would have liked a share in the honor of seizing Manila 
	and that he would dearly have loved to beat Sixth Army into the capital 
	city.  
  
  
    
47. Steele was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for this 
	exploit. Tragically, the award had to be made posthumously, for the sergeant 
	was killed a few days later in Manila.  
  
    
48. The same questions as to the location of the city limits 
	arise here as in the case of the 1st Cavalry Division. See above, n. 26.  
  
    
49. The general sources for this subsection are: Sixth Army Rpt 
	Luzon, III, 55, 115; ibid., IV, 
	86-89, 108, 118, 134, 143-44; Eighth Army Rpt Nasugbu-Bataan, pp. 22, 50-54, 
	57, 71; 37th Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 37, 197-99, 210-11; 117th Engr Bn Rpt, 8 
	Jan-4 Feb 45, p. 11; Craven and Cate, AAF 
	V, p. 
	408.  
  
    
50. Ltr, Col Harry A. Skerry (Ret.), in 1942 the Engineer North 
	Luzon Force and I Philippine Corps, to author, 26 Jun 53, copy in OCMH 
	files. See also Morton, Fall 
	of the Philippines,passim.  
  
    
51. Beightler Comments, 18 Mar 57.  
  
    
52. Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur (via Navy channels), 0955 31 
	Jan 45, and Rad, MacArthur to Eichelberger, CX-57342, 1 Feb 45, both in 
	Eighth Army G-3 Jnl File MIKE VI, 
	26 Jan-2 Feb 45. See also above, p. 
	222, and below, ch. 
	XXIV.  
  
    
53. The general sources for this subsection are: Sixth Army Rpt 
	Luzon, I, 99-103, 108; Hist of 308th Bombardment Wing, ch. IV, 1 January-28 
	May 45, pp. 8, 13-14, 17; Boggs, Marine 
	Aviation in the Philippines, pp. 
	74-79; Craven and Cate, AAF 
	V, pp. 
	420, 425-28, 442; 
	11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 3-4.  
  
  
  
    
54. Boggs, Marine 
	Aviation in the Philippines, p. 
	78; Wright, 1st Cavalry 
	Division in WW II, p. 128. 
	Both sources state that the incident occurred on 2 February, but according 
	to the 1st Cavalry Division's contemporary records none of its troops were 
	near the target area until the morning of the 3d.  
  
  
    
	55. The Air Forces official history says of air operations during the 
	Luzon Campaign that: "Air mistakes resulting in casualties to Sixth Army 
	troops were few and limited almost entirely to the first two months of the 
	campaign." And again that "Reactions of the air commanders to these 
	accidents was somewhat less philosophical than those of the ground generals, 
	one of whom spoke of having experienced short rounds from his own 
	artillery." 
	The Air Forces' volume lists but three air support 
	mistakes during the period of the drive to Manila, two involving Fifth Air 
	Force planes strafing Sixth Army troops and the third an accidental 
	jettisoning of a bomb on a Navy LSM by a Marine Corps SBD. (Craven and Cate, AAF 
	V, p. 
	442.) But as indicated in this text, ground commanders were anything but 
	"philosophical" about the errors, while the records of the ground units 
	clearly demonstrate that there were many more errors than the Air Forces 
	history would lead one to believe.  
  
  
    
56. Rad, Krueger to Kenney, WL-907, 30 Jan Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 
29-31 Jan 45.  
  
    
57. The strafing of troops of the 1st Infantry, 6th Division, at 
	San Jose. See above, ch. 
	XI.  
  
    
58. Rad, Krueger to Kenney, WG-32, 4 Feb 45, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl 
	File Luzon, 2-4 Feb 45.  
  
    
59. Rad, Kenney to Krueger, AX-34890, 31 Jan 45, Sixth Army G-3 
	Jnl File Luzon, 31 Jan - 2 Feb 45. No reply to Krueger's 4 February radio 
	can be found in available files.  
  	   
     
      
    
	     
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