because the advantages between a day and night assault had to be evaluated. With the defenses inside the Walled City consisting of mined areas and machine gun and mortar emplacements, and with the possibility of receiving enfilade fire from Fort Santiago in the Nortwest corner of the City, the investment of the INTRAMUROS would have to be constantly controlled. Such control was not possible under the cover of darkness. The element of surprise was not a factor of great importance in choosing the time of attack, for the ring about the Walled City was growing smaller day by day, and furthermore, the enemy had been told that American troops were coming. Another advantage of a daylight attack was that it could follow quickly a heavy artillery preparation, and to make the preparation effective the fire had to be observed. Another factor in laying the plan for the reduction of the INTRAMUROS was the employment of troops in mass. To have sent small raiding parties into area in the face of the known enemy defenses would have resulted in heavy loss of life. It was therefore decided that the attack would be made at 0830 the morning of the 23d, and the plan for the attack was specified in Field Order No. 30, Headquarters 37th Infantry Division, issued at 1800 February 22d. The plan provided for an amphibious landing by the 129th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) with 3d Battalion in the assault followed by the 1st Battalion; the 145th Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was to attack overland from the East and enter the City through the breaches already made. To facilitate the debarking of the 129th Infantry on the South side of the river, the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion, using direct fire, blasted steps in the rubble retaining wall during the night and early morning of 23 February. The boats for the 129th were assembled on the small estuary running North from the PASIG and just West of the Jones Bridge (See Sketch No. 24).

During the night of 22-23 February, twelve 105-mm howitzers and six 155-mm howitzers were lined up North and East of the INTRAMUROS for direct fire, the larger caliber being disposed principally oppoaite the two gaps in the East Wall. Interspersed among this artillery were self-propelled 105-mm howitzers, tank destroyers, and medium tanks. Twenty-six guns were lined up on the North bank of the river in buildings and other points of vantage, each covering a field of fire containing observed enemy machine gun positions on the South bank of the river and each prepared to fire on targets of opportunity before and during the assault. The 145th Infantry also employed all of its machine guns to operate against the East Wall.

At 0730, all weapons opened fire, accompanied by the balance of Division artillery and Corps artillery. The bombardment lasted for one hour and covered the points of assault, effectively destroying mines, barricades, and other obstructions in the immediate path of the attacking troops. At 0830, red smoke was fired as a signal to lift all artillery and machine gun fire. Promptly at 0830 the 2d Battalion 145th Infantry started across the open space from the vicinity of the Post Office in an attack upon the North gate of the East Wall, and the bastions and Market Place which enfiladed the rampart. At the same time, from a small estuary extending North from the PASIG RIVER, engineer assault boats appeared carrying the 3d Battalion, 129th Infantry. The first assault troops of the 145th Infantry arrived at the East Wall at 0833, and the first troops debarked from the boats at 0836. At 0830, heavy smoke concentrations were placed by 4.2 inch mortars in front of the Legislative and Finance buildings (still in enemy hands) and against a bulge in the South bank of the PASIG RIVER near the mouth, for the purpose of screening the advance of troops. At 0840, the artillery placed a dense smoke screen across the mid-line of INTRAMUROS, effectively blocking enemy observation of the points of entrance. At the same time the artillery in order to prevent enemy counterattack from striking our troops as they entered the breaches or gained the South bank of the PASIG, commenced neutralization fire in the same areas and continued firing until the troops arrived at the danger zone. (See Sketch No. 27)

With the appearance of the 145th Infantry, and enemy machine gun from the South end of the Jones Bridge commenced fire with deadly effect. This machine gun was later eliminated by three infantrymen who approached it from the flank. No fire was received from the East Wall itself, but a rigorous fire fight developed in the Market Place, which is a triangular bastion approximately 200 feet outside the East Wall North of Victoria Gate. This resistance was immediately countered by a detachment of the 2nd Battalion, l45th Infantry, while the rest of the Battalion passed on and entered the Northeast gate without immediate opposition. On the North, no fire was received by the assault boats, and the troops landed and entered the North gate without opposition.

Once inside INTRAMUROS, both regiments came under sporadic fire which consisted mostly of that from rifles and sone machine guns. It was apparent that the well-known Japanese method of strong cross fire at each street intersection had been disrupted by the artillery preparation, so that only isolated guns remained.

The plan of attack called for the immediate occupation of four blocks along Beaterio street (from the Northeast gate to Magallenes street), which was promptly effected. Both regiments were soon in physical contact with each other, and had secure flanks and rear bases from which to pursue their second mission:  the elimination of the resistance along the North and East walls to Fort Santiago on the West and Victoria Gate (inclusive) on the East. The terrific preparation permitted our troops to seize the walls with minimum opposition, but the resistance stiffened proportionately with the distance from the ramparts, until a full scale battle began within two blocks of the East Wall and several fights developed in Fort Santiago.

At Fort Santiago, the fighting continued all day in and around the ruined buildings, thick walls, ancient dungeons, and numerous tunnels and recesses which harbored enemy, and which one by one were turned into death-traps by hand grenades, flame throwers, and gasoline poured down into the holes and ignited. The Battalion took Fort Santiago very quickly but did not subdue it until nightfall.

In the 145th Infantry zone, increasing resistance developed as the troops moved Southward. A serious interference with progress was the advent of approximately 2,000 refugees who came streaming out of the first floor of Del Monico Church on to Gral Luna. These refugees oonsisted entirely of women and children, nuns and several priests. Few if any men were observed, and the fact appears to be well established that the men had been murdered previously by the Japanese, who took them to Fort Santiago and burned them. In a room 25 feet square in Fort Santiago, Filipinos were found dead five layers deep. The Japanese had strongly organized the upper front of the church, barricaded the windows with sandbags, and emplaced machine guns in the belfry and almost every window. Fire was withheld pending the evacuation of the civilians, although heavy Japanese machine gun fire was meanwhile being received by our troops. After the evacuation of the civilians, fire from tanks and self-propelled howitzers was brought to bear upon the enemy positions in the Church, and by the end of the day only a small amount of return fire was being received.

The 145th Infantry had been directed to move through the INTRAMUROS and seize the West gate on Peral Street and the South gate on Gral Luna. The troops were unable to accomplish this objective by 1800 on the night of the 23d, but did cover the exits with machine gun fire sufficiently to prevent the egress of the Japanese. By nightfall the 145th and the 129th Infantry Regiments had joined. They held that portion of INTRAMUROS bounded by the line running along the West Wall from the river to Postigo Street, East on Postigo to Arzobispo,  then South on Arzobispo to Anda, then along Anda East to Cabildo, then on Cabildo to the South Wall. This line is shown on Sketch No. 24. The enemy still held a small area in the Southwest corner of the INTRAMUROS.

Outside the Walled City, the 12th Cavalry had attacked North trom the Manila Hotel and had reached 16th Street. Physical contact was established between this unit and those within the INTRAMUROS.

Among the incidents observed during the day's fighting was the appearance of Japanese soldiers dressed in complete American uniforms and carrying United States rifles. These enemy made deceptive gestures in an effort to distract attention from other Japanese troops attempting to displace to a more favorable location. These ruses were always discovered and the enemy promptly killed. At one time the white flag appeared accompanied by rifle fire, but this old trick failed also. During the entire day, a considerable quantity of Japanese 90-mm mortar fire was received within the lines of both the 145th Infantry and the 129th Infantry, and to even a greater extent in the zone of action of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Although even at 1800 the enemy mortar had not been found, it apparently had been forced to move or was destroyed because the fire ceased late in the afternoon.

The success of the initial assault on the INTRAMUROS was due in no small degree to the extremely accurate and devastating American artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, and to the precise timing of the attacking troops who exploited the preparation to maximum advantage. The fighting from the lifting of artillery fire until afternoon was done by infantry with infantry weapons, inasmuch as the mines, barricades, and layers of rubble interfered with the progress of tanks until armored bulldozers and engineers had cleared paths through the city.

Throughout the night of 23-24 February, the 129th Infantry (less 2d Battalion), continued systematic annihilation of enemy remaining in caves, tunnels and dugouts in the vicinity of Fort Santiago. On the morning of the 24th, the 1st Battalion 129th Infantry was removed from the INTRAMUROS and the 3d Battalion, supported by 1 platoon of tanks and using flame throwers and pole charges, continued to destroy enemy remnants and isolated groups. This mopping up in the Fort Santiago area went on until 1200 February 25th. In the limited area of the Fort itself, 400 enemy were counted dead. At 1300 February 25th, the 3d Battalion 129th Infantry moved to a safety zone in the vicinity of Letran College, to permit direct fire to be brought on enemy held buildings West of Taft Avenue. The Battalion returned to the INTRAMUROS during the night 25-26 February, and remained within its zone of action until 1400 27 February when it was relieved by the 145th Infantry.

The 145th Infantry (less 3d Battalion), on the 24th of February continued to eliminate enemy pockets in the Southwest sector of the INTRAMUROS, being supported by tanks, flame throwers, and self-propelled cannon. At 1020 on the morning of the 24th the Santa Lucia gate was secured, and by 1215 the San Augustin Church had been reduced. However, it was not until 1430 that the strongly fortified bastions in the vicinity of the South side were secured. By 1800 on the 24th, the entire area of INl'RAMUROS was held by Amerioan troops. On the 25th, the 145th Infantry (less 2d and 1st Battalions) was withdrawn, thus leaving the 1st Battalion for continued oocupation of the Walled City. An attempt was made by the Japanese on the night of 25 - 26 February to infiltrate through the South Wall, but this attempt was defeated. On the 27th of February the entire 129th In£antry was withdrawn, and the 1st Battalion of the 145th Infantry made responsible for the security of INTRAMUROS. There the Battalion remained until the 4th of March.

Outside the INTRAMUROS on the 23d of February were the 3d Battalion of the 145th Infantry, and the lst Cavalry Brigade which consisted of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments. The 5th Cavalry held the line along Isaac Peral between Mabini and Taft Avenue, receiving throughout the entire day of the 23d February machine gun and mortar fire from enemy positions in the Legislative, Finance, and Agricultural buildings. The 12th Cavalry, on the West portion of the line North from the Manila Hotel, at nightfall 23d February had reached 16th Street and was in physical contact with the 129th Infantry, which was inside the INTRAMUROS. Throughout the night 23 - 24 February fire was received by the 12th Cavalry from the Customs Building, and on the morning of the 24th elements of the Regiment entered the building. After fierce room to room, hand to hand fighting, they secured the building at 1530.

Other elements of the 12th Cavalry pushed on to the North and secured the entire port area West of INTRAMUROS including Engineer Island. (See Sketch No. 28). As troops of the 12th Cavalry pushed on, they realized that they had by-passed enemy pockets in the Burnham Green area. Elements of the 12th Cavalry on the 24th February began the reduction of these positions with direct fire from tanks. Combat in the Burnham Green area continued until February 27th when the place was considered cleared.