Airborne-Operation-Corregidor

.. 0. E) .T 0 I" I . . 1 sion to drop the 503rd Para+ roo 0 J . • slana of orre~1aor . a . To be accom 1 shed by two lifts of 51 rla'1ee o ~ the 16th of Februar· , : 'l d O"le lift of 43 u l - ,es o · t e 17th da. of :<'ebruary . b. A resuu~1 m ssi on w·11 be fl o 1n after the ~ rst lift o '1 t'1.e 17th of ti'ehruary . Tumber of ulanes to be de term ned H> ter . c . F f teen nlanes o ~ t e 46th cquacron will be equi ~ ·ed 1 jth ~r r ac s fo r drop p n~ o f art ller . ? . r ocea e of dropnin~ . a . Troorr ~ill be ro~ ed n two u ~ eJds to be des n ed (1) • Tu f e d A is .loca~ed 0 1 Lhe par ae ro n1 in fbont of the a racks. (2' . 'Tin r~ e a is loc ted o"l the old f"Olf course to the eo·it',..,e' ct of t11e D' r3.de tt rOPDd . ·... : / ,· . (3 Course·s to ~ \ f.l~r·p . ve:r f 18f, · e1d , fO poi·,..,~s a.nd 0re'l'\{a"T -r n o nts wi 11 b /~ · ~ tf·rln(dn~~ h?to ."1<4 ~ 1.d ·naps n t 'J.e pos:: ­ es«ion. of a 11 c au~dro·'1. Tntell1fe'1.ce Of i ·1cers. ·· . ti.. ( 4 ':' rooD" '.Y • ~ J be drorned f'r~'TI a'1 ~t.Hitide of ll5C' feet n 'c· ted at a speed of ir o m h . · ·. b. J-•1e" 'l 11 fl f over the j ump fie a ·s ins nr le file SDac ed 5rC fe et ap~rt . n,a q me on eac t dronr stick of c . ·------~..;~~~--:-·-:-=---__..,_,~~ d . J a'1 s oro - TIP' in \ field · 'll fl. a left h '1d pu.tte'Y'n turn nr- , after dronni"'l'" U'1 a a ·1 'ki ' :;:, seco·1d Do.rs . The7 w Jl rna1 {e ? lo ( do· '1 'rl"' nd le( f 0 0.S to ""Ve e'10U''rJ sr,c,ce ~-.d ti ".le to li'1e u 1'o ..... t!:iei..r fACori.d ri('I, aiso eo t t ther ·ill not tJe~ '~th l nes f l · · ng-, uat'e ~. ~lanes dronrin~ dronp 1 r ~ ~d ~roceed to E rq t 1ed a..-,ove . t-{2 s£P 1945

·. i 11 it mo onl '1 en f . rrroons (('!'ree r~t b1 t~e n lot. ( 1 r~ lot e n Ft t rn 1 ght back to rea d• (red positio'1 on do· T ' 1d Jer- , so astQhe ·.' J.e to g ive Droner s n l. t'or '"ec 0'1d u :Jn . (?' In caee nla e ic 11ot li1ed o r ro verl · t~ fielo ,..., lot R '1rit E -~., e 0 1 "go" noirit' , " r o' ' s rna 1 11 11 t be ven and a1 e tra p· Sf 11 be ~ad e n ~~ t h ~r n f eld . °IJ'nd on t,_, r '.3.d ~. Al n l ts il n "' '9. rl i "-1 ,..,., com~~~ ch ~ " }] bP 0 Serving a"'ld r 'T l 'Jr=-•r r1v '1 "Jr tJ..i'"' nae. o. a~ OU y ec f net uct 0 '18 may be gi ven: ~ o c rc l P n• l c e Jee w from e dR. mo lo~er ~o n alt tude. To dela J.. "go" signal one or t o s eco "'lds na t " o" no !1 P. To fl nar·11i:>J11.10 "eld sl " l7htlr to 1ef or r gh t. To cease dropn · ·::i...,d r orb tot of' ra '1 e o f e a.,d 11ti fur her '1f tructions a re fi ven . To Tia1re t'"'ree p3Lc.es dron'Jiry onl s ix men e~cl-i t me. Tt 'iVil be e·'c i '1d vidu 1 iJots res'r'ons 1 ty to ~ qce h s troons n t~e dron zone. P wil ob se~ve ~ a~ ~ ~ ri:>~ R X~E "'"'l e ·~d of h m ··'1d ·re necefs~ r'r c o ,,,rect ons for d r ft, Ptc. b he i J viot f] 'r ':>l i dl n tra 1, Dl tti ng h s troons j JSt 11-\ere the plane ahead doee. 3. nstruct ens to t e 9th Qque ron: a . ~la es w 11 ~e na rked on c ash st ~i r at Elmore Fe d . PJa'1eB w l be arked 1 ~ f o~mat on order s tarti nP at ·ast e11d of er· sh [-'tr · n . b . Pla es 1iVill ;)e rn r ed c learl r l 'n n1Fnbers 1 throu ' h 12 nex t to c q~~o door. c. cq1 e dron i 1 o roo in A field us1n£ left hand patt e,,,11 . d. c r.6.ron 1 t a e o f f ~ 71 5 a d droG a t 0830 a nd in 3 t . r on (' h 24 . • c . <='qtad ron w 1 drop i 1 fie d s ri ha id a te rns. d. C' ad "'on at CRY) arid n no c ae e efo,,,e tri en . 4. nst r1 c t 0 11s to 40th fq u· dron: a . P a1es v sta"'ti 11r ' ,h f rst •~~~--~.....,.... oa r a 1 e 1 i ne: rt U' 9. • :~!!!!tt=:==;= b. p a ie" '1 E''1!7 n11 ;bers

no c9.Ee oefore thc11. ,he '40t'ri 1 "!Je d al moe t'1e se e t'me ~E t~e 39th qlad o nstrlctions to 4lst er adron: a. 'D]a·1ee ivill be nurked in "'or11ation on TiJ] 'tr sta·,,..Un "1 firP ~ onen revetme ts neit to 40th 'q1 adron also uE ·ng parking a~ron in ~~ort of to' Pr. b. •1a~es il be may> ed clearl rext to c ~r o dOOY' u~1~~ mbe rs fro'TI 25 t>-iY'o ch Yi. c. 'q adron w111 drop n ~ field us·ng r1 ht hand p~ttern . d . cquadron ill t& ~e off at 0725 a id drop at approx m~~el 0~40 . It rrr1v be Y1ecess:lr• to orb t o· it of ra .ge until 4Cth c quadron h~s c 11 leted the•r droo befo~e apuroachin~ t ar[et . 6 . n·tr1ct ons to the 46th cquad ron: 0 la es ill en~ ~ed in forrrat·o: ordeY' on er h str ~ ~~ EJM Y'e ~ eld, from east to west sta t ns at first open spot aE t t e 9t1:. pla es . b. s~es il oe mar ed c ~earJy next to car~o doo 11 nbers ro ·.,, 37 t ro· 1 51. c. ,...q uadro"l ' i~J dro n f ea us·np 10 t ha d at erY1 . d. cauad~on \ 11 t ake off a t 725 and drop ~t apnroxim·tely rR4 . Tt 'TI ·y be neceEf r· to orb t out o:' r !., , e o<> ta~ et until· )9th ,. q a6ron h:is como eted their d ro""' befo~e ap oa chinr- t a r f- et. e . On f rs t run oveY' tar~et lot~ ill hold een 1 Pht 9 1d dron bundle~ pq d "'el '1 ce riter Qf ua r L.de rro1mds , but on second run "go" li ht will be c ven a~ or >I" nal "e o" uoint a d a sticlr of 9 ~en will j mp . f . ?hree plaries fro11 ~ e 65th a1d 66th r q ~drons i 1 be flown tslnr.· 4th ('"q adron ere s . 7, Coi rse -1d forma tion . a . t · s s11 ested t'1at V' s n trail be flmm ntil reacri ng 1 Iuban€ s and · ~e11 plaries w 11 e o into s 1 le f le foY' aDproach to tarp:e+, . b . co·rses 0 be f Obn ..,~ 11 be obta ined from t~e rq ~d ron nav r-at or. c. In cas ~ it s riecessary to orb t out of' r ::.r e of target , 39th a ~a 46th auadro ., ,,~ 11 orp: t to the left a 1d 40th 'ld 41 st r ~a i.H3.dro'1s 1v l . orb t to t'1e 8 . qescue ao lit es . r r t.

a. µT boats wiJl be c rclinr offs~ore a d crews f~ll be n eked llD BJmoPt rn:iediatel·r iri CC:J.Ee of' a ditcl-i nr . b. Tn c aE e o a sin~le en~ ine a1d nlane s still fl yahJe , '"aYl ll'arceJ-;_ne w'll be 1 r ed 'ls e crash st r n . In no case will lot qttemnt to re~ch an f eld in the ·~~1 1a area. y o,...d er o,c> I ·-ED f C"O .r=<TT "' FL, ta.j or, . r Corps, Execut ve Officer O"? - C I : H qD~::;lf"'l AT D'"~ T ~a·or , Air Co,...ps , One~at~o~ s Office,...

I cra ters . IV -/­ FIED EXT RAC l'c FROM NA RRAT I JE 0.K0 0q}' 317th Troop Carrier Group O'Y - .., ·rn \ ~q0oRc E _:__1_7 "'ebruary 4_5_____ 3y TR.OD JC '1' IO T: Dur1ng the f l rs t ha lf of 1943, t~e 317th Croup a nd the 503rd . e p: iment h a d 1 0rked to ge the r at C:airns , Aus tral a , on a jump- tra ning -o ro e; ra rn and pa r a troop mane vers. On 5 f e tember 1943 , in the I ae operation, the 317th Group dropped the 503rd :=teg:ime11t at nadzab , ew r uinea . On 3 and 4 Tu ly 1944, 317th Gro ·J p dropped t h e 5C3rd Reg ment at Mo emfoor sla~d , Netherla ds East Indies . · I HIPSIO : The m S E ion was to · dron the 503rd }'arachute nfantr RC'r on Corre idor Isla11d . This was to be ac compli s~ ed by two lifts of 51 C47s e a ch on 16 1Tebrua y 1945, and one J.,i.r t 0 1' 44 C47s on 17 February. " res11pply m ssion ·"1as scheduled to follow tbe f rs t 1 ft on 17 eb ­ rua ry - t~ e nu.mber of p l a0es to be determined by req ireme:J.t s . III TAR.GET: The tare_ et w<.rn Correg idor I sl aYld , Janila Bay (14°22 1 N - 120°33 ' E) The two dro-o zones selected on Corregidor Isl and Nere the smallest in the h story of pa r at roop operatio ~ s . Both dron zones were on the esterl y 11 he9d" of 11 t adpole-shaped11 Corregidor, popular ly known as "topside" . . The old ath~ letic 1 Yl d par a de ~ro ~nd was des ~nated as drop zone " " " T is drop zo'1e wa s approximately 1500 fe e t in lenqth, extendinf dia r onall '' a cross the na r ade g ro ·ind fro m cw to _E . In idth it varied from :::ib ou t 7ro feet at its widest point to about 200 to 250 feet at its na rrowest points . The old ol f co11 rse was de0 i gna t. ed a s drop zone "B' '. This dro zone aiE o "lad an ext!l'e '.Ile le'1gth of 15CO f e et, a1~ the w dth vaY' ied fr om 600 to 70 feet down to 450 feet o less. The drop zoYJes we· e ap1Jroxima·tely 5uo feet above sea level. t the approach-ends a p rec ni tous·cl ff dropped off a bruptly to Man ila Bay . On t he. remaining sides o the dro p zo nes , t here wo.. s bornb - s re: ttered fra~~ ork ~1 d r1bble of wrecked b u ildi ngs , ~nd the drop zo nes themselves we e s tudded wJth bomb

Pulag1~n~e;~~~~'a 1~!?~1~1SDI rB~~ill.t ~~ "~~~J'n~a~h~a;~~s~t week ' in l<'eb r uary, the e-Ttire a ir ec eloh 'went to Mi ndoro IslaD.d on detached servic e to drop the 5llth ~a rachut e Infa "ltry t e r i ment, 11th Ai r borne Divis ion , on Tagaytay Ridse , 35 miles s o:1th of Manila , on 3 a.1d 4 February .1945 . The a ir echelon retu rned to i t s home base on Iey te IsJand just in t me to learn th~t t~e 317th ~rouu had b een ~ler~ed for ~he Correg dorope ~at i on , a d prepa r ati ons for the new operation were l a nc~ed at once . i inc e 54th Troop Carrier Wing was on g iak Island, a"ld ~ifth Air orce on Vindoro Island , tntel ligence conta ct s were mad e with Far East Air ~orce s on Teyt e . The ut most cooue ration was obtain@a f r om Flakintel, Photo ntelligence a'ld \ ir · Intellige"lce Ce'1ter sections on ~ - 2 Far East ~ir ~orc es, w th the result that the ai r ec!l.elon returned to ·,~indoro w th a complete pic t ure a nd unders t andn3 of the enemy capab ilities and the probl e~s involved . Charts and mans showing enemy gun positi ons on Corregidor were prepared by P. I. and ~lakintel sectio~s , F ~F . On 14 Febr uary 1945 , the air echelon retunned to Mindoro Island to s tage for the orreg~dor operation..... -" , On ~indoro Isle"ld, contact s were maintaihed w th A-2 and A-3 sect ons of F f t h A r '."orc e , w',, e re the utmost cooperati on was exte 1ded . P . . sec ti o'1 .'!.. - 2 , V '=! omber Com110Yld, was also ext r e11ely help. ul aYJ.d cooperative in passing on . I . data 1·rom nhot ov ranhs bein t aken da 1 on Corregidor st~ikes . Lt ~indoro sland , close co 1t act was maintained between the com1anding officers a~d ataff officers of the 317th Group a~d the 5 3rd qep-irneYJ.t . i" 1tua unders t anding of overall proble~n s, as a res lt of 1-:i::: vi n2· worked toi:rether f or two yea r s , s impl:i fied the matter of WO"king out details for the Corregidor operat ion . The final b riefinF of all pi lot s pa ticipating in the missi on t~ took place a r o nd sa~d-table model of Corregidor which hea heen u2ed by t he 503rd qe~iment . ~he ilots were briefed by Colonel (t ..en l eutenent Co1one1 Iacke:v 01 i.,he 317th Grou o and Colonel Tones of the 503rd ttegiment . Al l c quadron c omma nders of the 317th Gro . p ~,,a a11 battalion commaaders of the 503rd T:?.egiment '1ere present at t he bri efing , allowing w~ich t~ ere was a gene"~l informal d~SC USEion . Ae a result of lan~iqg and discussions, the followin~ c on ­ c 1usions rere r eached : a . Planes would n.··es over the drop zones at an indicated ·..1t tude of 1150. feet, or 650 .feet above the terra in . b. Drons would be made at a speed of OO muh . c. Due to t ~e narrowne ss of t he drop zones , it w?s obvious t het the ulanes would h~ve to pas~ over the t areet in trail. d . ! t a speed of H'll.' mph it would t ake ea ch plane approxi . :t: a~ e1-y 1 s"c onds to uaEs over t'lte 500 foot extre11e le·1e-th of t11e drop zones , wh ch 1ould ma 1 e it impossible to get a l tne pa~atroops jnto the dron zones on o ~e pass . It was therefore agreed that t~e . aratroops wo 'ld jump in " st c ks"of e ,·ht, with each pla'1e mak ng three paEses over the drop zone . ' IED ·

e . "Go-point s " ~ ,e· C i1 droo zo '1e , but . t ·s .,...eco rni zed t~Pt p reva rly w'nds ove r the ~anila Bay r.. r ea ·:rn·i J d rec lude us i nr anv b •ch. ::to. 1dardized procedur-e "'s f v n~ a r reen 1 ht at a fixed ~o-poi nt. t ~as a"~eed t hat t he - opo i .'.lt E"1011 ld be fixed, but t >i t the pil o ts would 11 co"nt ·seconds11 a fte nasEi'1g the ~o-po int , as di rect ed b1 the c ommand p l b.ne . f . r he Antire operati on would bed r ect ed from a co o11~na Pl-'1 pi1otec b'f Tt . Co l . rackd'{, a.-,a co- iloted by Cant. ·o.x W. Cuc·'uer, Ope ·.,a t oYJ.s Officer of t11e 31?t' -ro11p. Col . 0 ·1es or t11e 503r d 'te.· ­ i -ie"lt e.nd It . Col . ohn T . To lson , c ·ixt'1 -1. rm1, Chie f 0 e ta.ff, " R.oc k" orce" '·rn1Jld also · . on t'rie co rnIDa11d la.ne, v'l.ere t'l-ief co · ld Consult 1rith Col . lac key on d rect4ons to be r iven the t.,...ooo c0rrier pi lot s on 1 4' 11 ' 1 ba'1d . Col . onPE a1d Tt . Col . Tol s on ould iu11p after detern n n~ t -t the uer~~rooners we~e eat sfac t o .,...ily rett' n ri'1t o the d ron zones . g . t e0 a~reed t at the be~ 11n '1g of t"'le ope~t on p1lo t o ld CO 'P1t t'"' ree seconds a ~t er pass in,.... the <"'"O-poi,"lt befo e f v n <'" the rrF>e'1 1 17'-l t o rnn . ~lots 'fare warned to be 0'1 trie alert for d rect o'1s f rom t >ie conim·c n lal"le to ncreas e t'l-Je co int f 1 '1d c ond ­ t o s ma e t 11ece sar 1 t 1 gs fu rther a reer hot ,.,,"'rt .... s • ' I)" t"'l l') I • ­ I I +,he ,....~ re ,, en 0 t from ++ ., ,., ...... 1 o 1 d be ' 1en tnree m "' 'J t- e"' .P.,... rr ne eY.r-et . h . ~ ere ~ae onl~ 1e oss .ble co r~e to be flo~n n ascins over the droD o"'l.es, d•1e to the · r sm l l nes s 1::.nd sl:'a pe . ~ o cons iderat o co•·1d be er to th e f act th t nhoto internret·-t .. 011 s o··red t>-ia+ 13.nes ·T a~ roach n• the dro zo!"les would aFs over ~& c11. ne ~ n "OE tlons in the caves ~lol"l ~ the cl f'fc on t e weste" s·~e o the sla'1.d , or thlt 9 -"'ter Da" S. Y' 0 e.,... the drOD ZO .es Dl ... nes Ollld n:~ SS OVe Y' TI ch ne fUn a1d 'nt - a' rcra~t ~oc ·t·o ~E n t11.e central pert o ~ t~e iEl.nd . It TES ~ssu~ed t t ~ftF> .... para rooPs we~~ ~roroed on the sl:nd, ~ t na bomb 'lq bv ~ fth ~ r FOY'Ce a11d • val ·bo b~rd£ "~, t"1.e e'ler.i v O'J 10 se in m· c - "e r11""s or d a l u Y'T"'OEe ,.,. ns 111 cave e.,,tr'inces and ~ re on troo~ c; rr_er n a-es 2ss · over t~e t &r [et . Tt~ ~s be ­ 1 eve '1ev table th t so e n l a1es ~0 1 ld be hit, aid ne~hans a fev sho+: d o•·rn . 1. l<'or l' t o ·· o Jld be V of s . rom ' ndoY'o I" land to T i g "I':" s 1 nd, fro~ w~'rh po nt e ch r1· ~two ld ~o i~to trail · nd ~rooeed to t'-ie ta .,,(' et, 1'1'-lere r;,, 1 e 1- nes 0 11ld o.sr over t e aron zo es spacer 00 ~0et ~r· rt . k. Pla'"e ,, o Jd 'TI' i,..e a left - h· 1d ~a.tte "Cl rte"' as sin"' ovt=?·"' dron zo e ., ' "' '1. <-' ~ · rht -1-i'l d'pBL1erl"l ef'te.,... "Of"f·· n..- ov r> cron zo·'1e 11 " J . T"1.e seco'1d fl r-ht for eac riro zri e iro" d o-rb_t ":eo.r t e tc y> et u 1t t"ie Drec ed. n ~ 'ht "lac cri11pl0ted t"' pb.sses and w~s ~ead· to eve. rn . ots '·r e-re 1 nst~ucted to tte:n t to n· lre rq,n a eel no a'rstY'ir , 50 "P Jes r o f the ta .... ~·et , ; '1 an erne.,... ency , or aPt'rb'r eTer ­ ~enc' 1 a·· 1r- ~ro 'lQ , 22 rp le" so 1th o" t ' eta r.iet "iS c... E-eco'1r'J e11.oice . :ret '"isE.in'1 , lS -;ie'br•Ja ,...- 1945 - on tlie f rst '.IliSuio'l1, 16 ><'ebru ­ 11 •• " 11 0 11 a~"y , 51 C47s were-n:;-ed . - _'hAf rs!. -f 1· hts "'or drop. zo:ies '.r1q took off fro!TI ~11ore · 1 • 11 a rstr ns , · i1do..,...o Island , · a':, 0700/I , ~-3­

~ ..... ~ f 11 o,red · t 0730/T b·r t"'e s ,c;:ind fJ i J.itP t QG..'i?9/ ")011bin of Go reE dor cea.s 23 300 ~sl !d . . f 3,12;'.1 t nc of hombs droDned by ~ fth ~ ·r orce bet een rd 16 ?eb . flt 30/I ~he co ~:na d pla 1e nassed over the feet 0,bove - -• dron --· the terr i·ri, Obce.,..V; '10 E n of ene "Y :leti Vi ty mried­ r o. te . thereafte ,,, , C47s of the f 'Y'f't t'ro f li _ht e bev1.n ass n(" ove the zoDes, droo in,: the rc:.troops in st cks of ei'\ht. ~'1 route to the t& ~et ~ the Davi ctor Of the C0'1lmcnd Jlane h·d de ­ ter:ni ned t ' 'lb t the 1-1·~nd veloc · ty w.-.s 12 knots f-rorn ' E. '/hen the fj rst sti c1• of pa ratroops went Ollt it 1vas obseY>Ved :'ro'll 0 the CO "~cnd Dl~11e th t t~e ~ere c r ft nr b c~ Port of the d rop zo!'lec, S"' e f"l.llin~ a 1 0l'1C" t',,e n rec" "'i tous cl · f < sho"'t o"' t11.e e-o-no nts . The co rn·rwnd 'IJ ·~ne inrnedi~tely di ectec t e 11 lo P to l'1Cre-se t e cow1t fro111 ~three to six seconds pa~t the fixed ~ o - uo nts befoY'e ~'vil'1 the f reen , iD"11.t as j inn s. fn'3.J . Even the s x seco d co ·1d ,,, .. s no enourrh to 0 - - · ullr CO !TJ e1SBte fOY' the Pt.,..onc- w'nd, Whir;h l&S S~e::td'l increas~ri~, 1.d --• the n lots i·rere d recte1 o increP~se the co 11 to 10 seconds 'Jact '~e ro-noin s 'befo,,,e rivj n'T the c- ree 'l l' ("'ht . 'P lots we e alro d rected to nass over the drop zo11As a t J , t C'O f8et nd · c ted , or 500 feet over t "' e terra n, · nstead of 1,1 r feet ~p or ~~naJl rl.nl'1ed . c ·nce t requ red O seconds to paEs over the 150 foo t d op zonee, the c 111 in~ of 10 s0cond past the ~o -po ntL befo'Y'e ~iv ng t~R ~reen J ght res•iJ ted n the first r. trooper o""' a st ck r:Ji..nq out jt Pt -bo Jt as the e 1dc. of tl-ie a on zo,,,es •ve.,..e re~ched . Tllmns ere a ct1al ' e € : m de 9~te~ t11e drou zo18~ h~a been p~sf ed, )tr, each s~ c of troon be nr -~1n bbc~ nto the a op zones by ~e strorir tnd . T e~e as no '!ll:lre;jri or error. T trie ,....aratroops ju:nped t'·O o r :tP!rB three seconds too soon the• old dr'ft b ' ck over the 'J reci itous cl i ffs sh(Yrt of t e dro zones, '·There the enem hac. '!lo chirie gu s set uu n ce.ve e11tr-: nces . f they ju ··med two or three s co'1.ds too l· te , the1 would 1 ~ id arnonr the r bble or wrecked bJild '1FS or on t~e sl ope down o the ce 'ltr~l 11 bottom"'ide11 o t"ie isl nc , '·ere t1e enemr <.ilso h;;..d 'Tl c"'ine ,,.uns ..., et u in c ave entr nces . Sonve.,..e&tiors of Pil o ts ~nd crew c · efs w'th n ratroopers ind c-ted t1at the n ~atroope~s feared la11di1r '1 the ruoble o t e 1 e c kee b ld11'1 s be 01~ the dror zoneE rno~e than drifttnF ove~ the cl ff on t~e . estern f'.'..de OT' the al"O.d, t11erefore , there m r-ht h Ve bee:i a pS7 Ch OlO ­ r· c a l tende r-c•r to _j•1mn too soon , r ather tha'l to o le' te. Act 1all7, over 90 pe-r cent o•· trie na r 2t oops ho d" d not et 'nto t e drop zo nes f ell short .. T11np d s c Dli ne lsft not h inP- to be des· red: Jurnpmaste s ad~eri rig str ctly to d'rect 0 '1S that no 0 1e ould ump unt'l the ilot had g · ven the r reen 1 ~ht . ThiE is espec aJly note10 thy bee~ se p rior to the m ssio~ the n~rct roo shad expected the r r een li~ t three seconds afte'Y' p s 1 1'1S t11e r o - po '1.ts, he~ea0 , b1 d rect 0'1 of the co -~Lnd pla1e , Lhe p lote' ere t n 10 seconds, ·.vh c11 bro 'CJ' t t'-1e pl' ne to the ar end I e of tl-ie drop zo'1.es before the ~ reen 1 ~ht vent on . In t o or three solated 1St8 cee , lffiU'Ilas ters We e Sk°entiC" l (;.bout iump · ne; the~ r st c lrs of r ratroops 'he'1 the r ree'l 1 lit did not ,..o on 1mtil the l~ne bad re iched the extre"Tle e1El of d:e drop zone, a1d , '-,h n k ng th·~t the pilot mirh~ have ~een n erro.... , or tha~ the ~reen 11 ht was not function nf properl , the· elected not to jtimp their nen on 11e · rst pass . 'e1fil'l~ the necessity fo~_ ~aer to f-et the p&rat r oops nto the drop zo1es , the pilot~ ~nh, and , 11'1 so~e cases , eve 85 ~ph , w11 le pa0 finr ov es . I C2 On t he first ~isE 01'1 , 16 Feb . , 51 C47s, ere ove_ the tar0 et from Id C830/I to 0932/I, mak i l'1g 174 pla~e passes ove~ the drop zon e 0 to dro~ -'-!­

. -.... rtr..il'I...- .__._ trooDs rop zo"1es , 1021 pa r at roopc and 151 ce11t laided in the ~ fa 11 ng ~ h ""' rt . Onl two planes wee holed d1rirE th·s miss1on . ro personnel on the Dl a'1e s h ere · njured . T,rnlve fi C"'hters ere furnished for cover <..nd twel.ve fo Eupport . .....There w~ s no ntercept ion , e~ d none ha d been anticipa ted . c. econd , ss i on , 16 Fe brua:r r 1945 - After the f rst mj s . ion, planes ret urnee ta"J.l a1d El "o re a rstri os on ··1ndoro I sl nd to r e load for a.:.i...• t -i e second m ssion . t. t 1035/ - durin tne -'1 terval bet ween trie f irst a11d s ec ond para ­ troop m sf-ions - a11 amnh b ous l ' nd no· <-E. made on the E:ea - level "bo "toms de' 1 ce'l.t r al .sect i on of orreg;c or by the 3rd. ~3.t tal ion, 34th qeg i me '1 t -:::: l S omba t :'eam. 0 11 t e s ec ond m esio11 , 16 7eb, 51 C47s ~ re over the t a r ret from 1230/I to 140 / . On 17 plane - pas es ov e th e droD zones , 979 para ­ a'1.d 1 59 pare.bt n01es ere d ropped ith an estim ted 92 . 7 pe r ce ,,, t a ce rac,. Ar a n , moet ar~troops fai l 1 11~ to l and n t h e c ron zones ...... fe l l shnrt . ~ 11d veloc it ~ s 16 to 18 knot l ro ~ 55 deErees , and p i l ots made nece s a r c or r ec t ons . r ,f t i,, e nterva l s· rice ti,e firs t mjsr o·'1. , w th 5e'1era1 bombing '1.d s '..,ell ing. of the s 1--id no on r-e r DOSE b e , t '" e e "' emy had a-r.peared n ca ve entr::' nces to set 1'p mac 11. i '1e t. uns a 1 d JJb e rif l es . Enemy f re w s ob ee rve from seve-rc-~l positio1s on t h e s1·"'.nd . f orne o ~' the s e nos t O " SWX fe e beinF s~cl~ed b destroye rs offsho e. ~T boat s were al co exchang1n t ire w tri enem Dos t ions alo'1.~ the c jffs . 0'1 this r it.:sion, eig'1~ p l ane s ere hole d by enem.r gro1na fire , a"1d one uers o 'l. T~, fuded . F ghter cove r .E 16 P38s . ~ here as no i '1 tercept on . i:;i irs!'.._:_:iss io_Q. L-17__2'.eb r a ry_l9~ - Prior to t a e off for the i rst m sio'1 on 17 ti'eb . , p l ans e ".'e cria 1[ ed . i he· t acti c a l s t 111:i t i cn on 0 Co :r e ~id or 6'd not requ re th e risk of ft rthe r ump c&s al.t ies, t~e refore it wa s a·rected t h&t insteaa or d roppi ng p~r~t roops on Cor,,..eg dor thef wo a be Ja~ded at can ~ree l no airstr , f om 1 ch poi~t t i, e wo1 ld p roceed ":Jy truck to Sub c 3a t boaY'd lr.1ainr craft or a n amph b ous l nd n • n r o te to fari ·- r c e J '10 the orm~ tion wo• ld u·ss ove r or e ~ i dor i n tra11 , droP~inv n~r~b ndles :s ur evio us ly pl n'1 ed . On the first m.scion, 17 ~eb 44 G47s took o ~f ~ ro~ H 11 & ~ El~ore rs t r i s , ~'indoro r 0 1a1d , <-t 0715/ a~a 0730/I. 1he f or'Tia tion uas ed over t e d r oD zo11es on Co regidor . s and i'1 trc::.i l between C'345/ a'1d 0921/ , d r uui n r.r ·197 narabundl.es on 66 pla -i e uaE ses . .n. 11 u..... rabund les .,., e,,..e drou,,ed nto drop zone 11 A' 1 wit'ri an e s tim::.t ted 95 to 9!-j er cent eit'1er la nd '1£ in t e droD zone or be ~g recove,,..able . ~arab ndlPS v e,,..e dronned f ro ~ 3 0 to 400 feet above the ter r a· n a t 110 to 125 ~P . T'ri e ~ormat 0 '1 co 1t nued to can "a. reel no a rstr p , c ~ rr· in~ the 843 u at ro rus o ere to m' e the a'TI~h b ou s i~ndi'1~. ··rh ~ e ove Y> Cor r eg dor , 16 G47s e e oled by enem1 t, ro nd fire, and 1 fi ve persnnriel were O"nded . ~eco n6 ~ ssi on , 17 ~ebr ~!:.)/_ - on t~is re supnlr 1is sion , 33 C47s ere red. r· ke orf o f l hts f rom SJ.more a d l-! 11 a ,,..st r s on ·• n ­ d0,,..o Isl~~d ere a~ 13CO/ I, 1330/J, & d 1405/I . ~ 191 pJane - ~a0 . es , betfeen 141C/ ~nd 1630/I, 7 15 p_rabundles 1ere d ropned 0'1 t. -2. , ed 95 tcLA .t al f' D dron z o 1e ".·"

l'-~• been Dro ~ere m~de ~t 110 to 1 5 feet -bove t'ne terrain . Pl<:l. es XE: made a'1 a.ve"B e !I,.. n 19 Dl~ e - n· s~es , no pJaneE were h1t b ~ro ind re, ne 1son~ were ~ounaed . ,...ro1inc f re was observec, b 1, no1e o-'"' '1.e .1 ·re aprye·· red o be d.i.rec ­ ted to·: rd he nl:., es, as was the c ·se on t' e reviol s m' ss ors . 1.pri.::t r ­ e'1tl t~e e1emr r ~s p-reoccuDied w th uroblems on the ro nd . Par trooos !Vere obrerved att~ck-in" c ve entr~ nces . 'th n"lospho rus bomb, ~ "d f l~me t'1,....0''1e-r e , a d encaE·J.nf tlrir: enern- c.t r·osit o s fro-'•1hich ';round f:.re d received on previo s m ssio'1~ . Destroyers eY'e ~1fo onse-rved s~ell ­ in.o- c - ve e'1tr-nces in t'1e c iffe oYJ. t"'e '·reste""l' s1de of t'ne icl ,...,d , +'rorri '1ic11 pos·t~o~s conEiaerable ene·:;r -ro1 1 nd fire 11rd een ecei_ved ori tlte ~orriin5 ~ cs on . v r~e 317th mroop a rier r-ro 1P ~ada lH9 sorties to t11e t r~et . In plar-e - p's ef 01e t~e two aron zones , ?6 i~-es holed represe~~ed 13 . 7 uer ce~t or the ld9 I'l es ove"" t~e a-ro~ zo'1es on the four ~1ss onF, - a 4.5 per ce1t n Y'ela~i o~ , o t11e 6Cl ~1 ne-n~sces over t~e drop zo el . 0'1e I'lG.. em de an e11er eri.cv l n6.irir n ne en"'ine: 'aYl Uc.reel rio 'rstr.n, 'J·1t no re rf t 1,p-r0).i ct, 8.'1d no pe"'sorp1l1erP 11 Q d1 ~]'°'<"' i::,t-i0 nerat 1Y'), \ to E1 of 2019 a t,....n~~2 ~P.,,, dropped on CorY'.~ ~ a r p ~p • ~~0 8 rM ~p '10 1'-rq rin. r ' to "'~ o.,.. ? ? n" r·· '1d es e:-'e dro"l"lner1 f'ro..,., ca r-,..o d _ r"' ~ "a­ ,,.,~~ , c ~ 1~ ~~ ~o~ ·tzer , 24 .5 cal . ~-chine ~uns, a~~ ­ 0itio , a-~ ~1 cart~, cr..,.,~1 YJ. c ~· iois eou r-P t, enades, r~t ons, T'lter , me d c··] l"'J1JY)lies c:.."r o+her DPCe 0 s-'>Y'•r ea11it"'I:'1(l t. r-, ,..; r- at tr] of' t)?7,?5 n-' e hours, L. e r:t i"l tea 73,815 m les 'e"'e f own C r ~·rini.- 8C)5,0i::;0 no 1 nds 0..., cc-rro ~ c' -rie:...,SO'lnel , "he 03 · · ·1 c"' 1te nfa"11tr1 1.C: h-d 279 ill:-' c·.su es, or 3 . 8 1 1 l"'P ce t of ~he ?010 ·,rh,.., ·um ed . c+ t"1 's n 'Tiber, 267 we.,,,e YJ. lred a.11d l? k 11ed. ne nara+y>onner ~· f : lled -s a rssult 0 .... h s c ~ te f b' l '1~ to O'')en . he erna '1 rir- 1 ·r'~o ·er ki led ·,rere s"ot ori t'~e '•r r d'J'P1 or mo ta ·rounded m··ed tely c.. ter reacli n the "' ro1 md, a d "18Ver r."Ot n a~nes~ea fro~ t' e'-r c..,.,utes . DE ED -£

Asi de from 'the sen imental aspects of the , entire operation re resents a otable cooperative effort of ir, ground and naval forces a ainst a common ob ective . T e speed 1 ith wr ich tl1e fall of Corregidor Island was conswnmated is a tribute to the effectiveness of our planning nd operations particularly when considero.tion is t,iven to the size of the enemy garrison and the strong defensive positions manned . he part played by air power may n t have been played do intentionally in official r eleases of information but certainly adequate e phasis has not been placed on the contribution made by air power to t he success of the Corregidor operation. As a matter of fact , without the maintenance of air superiority and the use of air strikes, Corregidor probably\ ould have rema,ined tie impre£nable fortress it was believed to be before air power came into its own . So much for generalities . o an examination of the campaign (if it may be so called) against Corregidor from the air standpoint is in order. The operations against Corregidor nat rally f 11 into three ph ses , namel y, (1) Preparatory l:ombin and general softening up, (2) The assault (16 February 1945) , and (3) Close support by air . The ensuing discussion will s ow how the air effort was dove- tailed into t e operations of the ground and naval forces to insure success with a most co endable dispatch . To appreciate the extent of t e bonbing _and strafing effort against Corregidor, the small size of the island area must be considered . Fro1 the westennost point on Corregidor Island to Hooker Point on t .e eastern tip is only 7000 yards. lso, the approximately circular section of l and forming t he western half of the i sland and comprising most of the land area is only 2300 yards in diameter . Thus while t he number of sorties on bomb tonnages may appear small 'hen compared to European air operations , t he bomb concentration on such a small area as shown under hase I is significant . PHASE I: On 23 January 1945, the attention of the Far East Air ' 'orces first was t urned to Corregi dor Island. n that day, 20 Thirteenth ir orce B-24 airplanes dropped 180 250 lb . G•• banbs, target Corregidor, while 16 Fifth ir orce - 20 airplanes bOOJbed and strafed the island . rom tl}en on, the tempo of the bonbing and strafiflS increased steadily day by day up to tie date of t he amphibious and paratroop landings on Corregidor on 16 ebruary 1945 . During the three weeks spent in softening up orregidor, the Fifth ir orce conducted a total of 696 sorties , 362 being B-24 strikes, 198 being a-20 bombing and strafirg nussions and the remaining 136 sorties being fighter-bomber attacks . Over fifty per cent by number of the bo bs dropped by t .e 'ifth ir orce were 500 lb and 1000 lb G.P. bombs , twenty percent were 100 lb and 250 lb parademos , twenty percmt were 260 lb fragmentation bombs and 500 lb fragmentation clusters and the remainder included a few 100 lb incendi·ries , so e 250 lb G.P. bombs and 990 gallons of napalm. The Thirteenth ir Force ran a total of 316 B-24 sorties during the same period, 6. 7% of the total number of bombs dropped being 1000 lb and 500 lb G. P. bombs, 58 . 6% being 250 lb G. P. bombs and 34. 7% were 260 fragmentation bombs . The tonnage of bombs - ns by t e hirteenth

Air Force for a gran total of 1222. tons . A reej.pitulation ob bo bs ropped and sorties is gi.ven in Inclosure o . 1 . The effects of the bombi of anti-a.ire aft and seacoast g~n positions and other installations are evident . · t the ti.Irie of the first air missions on Corregidor, anti- aircraft fire v•as reported to be intense by canbat ere s , an:i photo- interpretation listed the efenses as 7 heavy, 18 medium18.nd 10 light positions . Of course this did not include trJOse guns kept concealed in . caves until needed when they were moved out . ,,·thin a short time , anti-aircraft resistance had dwindled alay t o the point where our aircraft attacked the target vith impunity. On 13 ebruary 1945 , elements of a U.S. avy task force comprised of five cruisers, six destroyers, PT boats and ot he r vessels began shelling insta llations in riveles har bor on Bataan peninsula, Caballo Island and Corregi or Island. This ork was directed a gainst pillboxes , waterline caves , tunnels and gun installations on Corregidor. The s elliflb of orregi dor conti nued through the landing made at kariveles on 15 'ebruary 1945 and the lan in5 of 16 ebruary on Corregidor . The nig t of 15/16 February, boats and estroyers mai tained an anti- shipp in screen a round vor e i or Island in preparation for tre eNents of the approaching day . PHASE II : The assault on Corregidor sland on 16 Februar 1945 represents an outstanding V success in cooperation between air , ground and naval forces . The timing and coordination of the Entire operation exemplifies the ig est -type f plan1ing and execution of a · ssion . ,, en the curtain rose on t e morning of 16 ebruary with Corregidor Island as t e stage setting of the real flesh anu blood drama about to be unfolded, air power was in the unique position of mt only having had a najor part in preparing the sta e by a merciless ban.bing an strafin pr ogram but it also was to play t e dominant role in the action to follow . The weat er in the Philippines was enerally good and clear, on t e 16th. In the early r rning , there as a broken t in layer of stratus at 6000 fee t over Corregi or but this dissolved l a ter and subsequent reports vere C VU . stiff northeast breeze was blowin ; t e ind being estimated 20 mph . he heavies started of t e day ' s activities rith 24 ifth ir orce B-24 airplanes hitt·ng gun positions on Correbidor with 960 260 lb fragmentation bombs with good results between 0747/I and 0759/I . Bombing ra.s done under 6000 feet to get under broken stratus clouds . ne squadron reported s light , mediun1 and inaccura te / fire from aballo Island. One minute after the heavies left the target area, eleven B-25 airplanes bombed and strafed dispersing 80 100 lb bombs throughout th e southern half of the.western part of Corregidor arrl expending 1592s . 50 calibre rounds in strafing passes . imultaneously with B-25 attacks 25 a-20 airplanes bombe and strafed the western section of the island where the paratroops were to be dropped while 6 - 201s bombed and strafed nearby Cabello Island . l 86x100 lb banbs hit orregidor while 4Sx100 lb bombs hit Cabello sland . A/A was r epo rted to be slight, ediU!Jl, inacc · \;, aft cl eared t 1e area at 0829/I ,.

Like a well-oiled machine, cog after cog clicke into place . At 0830/I, right on cue, the first Mindoro based - 47 a irplanes bearing paratroops and parabundles arrived over the dropping zone ~hich was over the golf course and athletic field approximately in the center of the western half of orregiaor Island. it t e s ame time , 0833/I 34 - 20 airplanes ar~ived on the scene bonbing and strafing the eastern half of Corregidor dropping 143x250 pa.rademo lb banbs and expendi g 5900x. 50 caliber rounds, some strafing of Cabollo Island taking place as rell . Slight /A fire was received am no aircraft holea . he a - 20 ' s left the area at 0900/I/ t this tie, as tle -47 airplanes continued flyi · overt e dropping zone i n trail, 36 - 20 ad..rplanes arrived to continue the l:o ing and strafing of the eastern half' of t;orregi or dropping 143x250 lb arade ,o bombs and strafing a ay 59000x. 50 caliber rounds , some strafing passes being made on Cabello Island as ell . t 0932/I, the C- 471s had completed t e drops and at 0940/I the - 201s cleared t e area . The paratroops and bundles dropped between 0830/I am 0932/I constituted mission number 1 and 1021 men and 151bundles1ere dropped from 49 -47 airplanes . In spite of the strong northeast ind (20 ph) , t e small area of the dropping zone , an the rugged terrain, a high percentage of personnel and bundles was dropped in t e target area . stick of 24 lnfantry paratroops were carried in each C- 47 airplane exce t those - 47 ' s caITying field artillery equipment an they carried but 10 en in a ition to t ie equipm t . rops were made by s ips flyin in trail at 1 0 eet above sea leYel ana at an airspeed of 90-105 mph . LJue to the l imited area oft e dropping ground, eac 1 C- 47 airplane dropped ei t men on one pass thus necessitating at least three pa.s~ es ·over toe target area fort iose planes car ying infantry paratroops . Un mission nunber 1, although very little / as re orted by - 47 crews, t rn s ips were hol ed b small arms fire • / at 900/I, ele ents of the naval task orce began shelliOf, b ac es and installa~ions on orregi ·or in preparati n or t h e amp ibious lanain to be made on the beach near outh .i.Jec designated as Black eac • 'l'his bec.i.ch, on y 230 yards in width, an the suITounding area ere subjected to intense shelling until 0945/I . The landing beach , both flanks of the beach, the s oreline and the cliffs nd hi.gh ground to t e east of the beac all ere s elled vigorously . he a phibious force consisted of the third battalion o the 34th lnfantry Regiment boated in 2 LCT1 s and 1 L and escorted by 3 destroyers, 6 LCI .( ) rocket support s ips and ~ LCS (1) gun boat fire support units . Two LCI - ) 1 s preceded the leading fave of landi boats . our LCI ( ) 1 s ana t o LCS (L) 1 s flanked the two LCI ( ) •s ·1hich preceded the lea ing >ave. Afte r 0945/I , the destroyers fired on call at selected targets · t counter battery work tacing precedence. Care was taken to avoid firi g into the paratroops on hi h gr und to est of landing beach, fire being limited o bas l.f cliffs w en covering cav:es to left of landi area . During the lanc:d. on 16 February and on subsequent days, naval guns fired 2000 bounds of 3", 2500 rounds of 5 11 am 1500 rounds of 611 ammunition at targets on Corregici.or, a oodl proportion o ich as exp nded on t e d:l.y of too landing . n addition, 1200 rockets were fired on the landi beach area by the roe ets support ships preceding t e 1 di In spite of this preparation, boats approaching the beach v1ere fired on from both flanks of the beach and o.s soon as t roops lan ed on he beac ., th y were pin ea do rn . • The first 1 ave f landing be ' each at 1000/I.

' ~, · From 1200 - 1210/I, 9~a.nes bo bed Cabal o Island with ,36.x250 lb parade11os and t en strafed t ... .e area attackin - a/ positions . Then at 12.30/I, the first drops were made fro C- 47 airpl nes on mi ss ion number 2 . ifty C-47 1 s dropped 1038 paratroopers and 159 bundles in t he same dropping zone on the estern half of Corregidor tr at was tilized in the early morni iore A/A was encountered than on the mornin mission .3 C- 47' s being hol ed by flak and 5 aircraft bei g hit by small arms fire, probably •25 callber . rops Ye re. made 1 ror 1000 feet altitude above t e water which was about 500 feet above the ground . our fighter activity in the Corregidor area as sli.Vit, 12 fighters flying cover for t e two troop carrier nissions , our fighters flyi g continuous cover durin daylight hours over t e naval b bar aent and mine sweeping force and fo r fighters flying ccntinuous cover over the objective area during the daylight hrurs . In a · ition, 12 - 47 aircraft bombed and strafed aballo Is and in early o ning and f our P- 5l's hit Corregidor bombing and strafing in the aft moon on a close support mis sion . o ene ny air opposition was encainte red, eloquent t estimony to the completeness of our air superiority. By 1800/I, elements of the b10 battalions of the 50Jrd Parachute egi ­ ment dropped on orregi or had made contact with the 3rd Battalion, .37th Infantry which had made the amp ibious landi ng . .As o t at time , jump casualties were reported a s being .3 killed and 175 injured, not excessive in view of tli e dif icult terrain and strong v<l.nd, and battle ca sualties for al l three battalions were 10 killed and 56 wounded . The remarkably low casua lty rate can be attributed to t he neutralizati n of orregi dor defenses by aerial banbardment and naval s elling . rh e ef ectiveness of our bo bing and strafing is attested to by the statement of tie - .3 of t h e 50.3rd arachute egiment that on landing, troops found all gun positi ns that could be reached by aerial bombing ere out of comnission . It is eviaent many of t ese positions bombed could not be reached by flat trojectory naval gun f ire . On 17 February 1945, naval fire on call continued . kt 0945/I , 47 C-47 's from kindoro dropped 110 parabundles but 671 paratroops originally scheduled to be dropped were landed on orders at San rcelino . t 1410/I, .3.3 C-47 airplanes also fro ·uridoro dropped 650 bundles ma.ki ng a total of 760 bundles dropped fo the day . hese b1,m l es contai e 75 nm a nd . 50 calibre ammunition, grenades, artillery pieces, flame t h rowers , rations a nd equipment . robably due t o t he la.ck of preliminary bombi r¥?; and strafing to neutralize A/ defenses , /A 1as mare accurate , oling 11 planes of tie 44 on the morning mis s ion . one of the C- 47's on the afternoon mission were hit , ho ev r . PHASE III . Now, the close support phase of the air effort against orTegi dor sland commences with the first mis sion run on 16 February 1945 . All close support missions from this date on were directed by the 6th Support ir arty commanded by Captain I RE, . C. which landed in the ourth ·ave of the amp ibious landi at outh ock . 1' e party consiste ' of t he Conmanding f fi cer, a first lieutenant and three enlisted 1en . The next day , a replacement arr ived for the enlisted man who as wound oute to the beach . l'he party was equipped •

( with· a jeep and a trailer . The jeep carried the AN-VRC radio (VHF and L 1 I SCR 19.3) equipment and the trailer was loaded with gasoline, rations and av other equipment . Lr & Cornmendable caution was ex.cercised in conducting all close support missions . s a result , not one of our ground personnel was injured by o ur banbing and strafing. On each strike, the target was spotted by white phosphorous artillery or mortar a.nununition . On most targets , a dry run was made to see if the instructions of the Support i•ir .Party were being received correctly. No strafing was permitted v i thin 1000 yards of our mm troops and most runs were made from west to east along the isl and to get better area .coverage and avoid our troops. JHben bombing was ca:rried eut as close as 500 yards from our troops , the locations of our troops were marked by colored smoke . Bet ween 16 February and 3 lii4arch 1945 , a t otal of 407 s orties were flown agains t close support targets on Corregidor Island . All missions were conducted with P- 47 aircraft except for four P51 sorties . As a result of these sorties , 466xpOO l b demolition bombs were dropped, 55 , 500 gallons of napalm dropped a.od 320 , 000x. 50 ell ammunition expended . A summary of c l ose support missions run is attached as Inclosure l~o . 2 . To illustrate the types of missions flown, discussions of some of the rwre interesting missions follows . The first close support mis sion directed by the 6th Support ir Party took place the afternoon of the 16th . 'dhat was reported to be a /.i.O mm gun west of North Dock was firing practicall.y point-blank at our ground troops as well as firi1g at C-h7s on dropping missions . Four P- 51 airplanes, each carrying two 500 lb demolition bombs, attacked the gun position and one P- 51 scored a direct hit on the emplacement blowing the gun into the sea . Although the shore area between South J.Jock and Breakwater Point had been shelled repeatedly by naval guns , e very ship earning into South Dock had been fired on from that area from the day of t he landing up to the 18th of February . On tha v day, 20 P- 47 airplanes each carrying two 165 gal. tanks of napalm, to coin a phrase , napalmed the area . After the attack, no more fire was ever observed from tha t area . lso, complete defoliation of all trees and vegetation in the area vas reported . On mission after mission, our ground forces were able to take a position without opposition after eur fighters dive bombed with 500 lb demolition banbs or glide bombed \;ith napalm- gasoline filled tanks or both . Inclasure No . 3 which is a report by the S- 3 of the 503d Parachute egiment gives the ground forces considered opinion of the close support rendered by our fighterbombers . Numerous instances were cited here enemy troops emerged from caves and dugouts obviously in a dazed condition when they were easy prey for cur forces . On 24 February, 12 P- 47s dropped 500 lb demo ~ition bombs on the east slope of the ridge between infantry Point and Or dnance Point , 12 more P- 47s dropped napalm gasoline filled tanks southwest of Cai:alry Point and yet another 12 P- 47s dropped 500 pounders from Cavalry Point to North oint about 100 yards inland from the shore . N strafi wa done on the due t the proximity of our t>oops .

At this stage , Japanese troops started mvimrning a~ay fr m the shore towards Bataan and our P- 47 aircraft ~ere able to strafe the swimmers very ef ectively. On t h e 25th , four P- 47s a i rplanes flew continuous cover from 0800 t o 1400/I to strafe Japs try ing to escape to the mainland by use of planks and improvised rafts . On 2 i.a.rch , the reta ing of orregidor .Lsland wa s virtually over an Generals l¥Jac rth r and Gen. Kreuger am p::t rty attended a flag raising ceremony near the parade ground area . Gen 1.ac rthur ha e:x.pres ed a desire to witness a ma.palm bombing for the first time so a strike was mde \ ith 12 P- 47s flying in formaticn and then a strafing attack follm ed properly impressing the General. T e bombing f onnatiun was unusual in that a ll other strikes were made one airplane at a time for pinpoint accuracy . Possibly because of the lack of / A opposition, our dive banbing of Cor. egicior targets was uncanny in accuracy in :iany instances the the banbs stri ing through the white phosphorous ke laid on the target . By 1 .warch, the r otting cadavers of de ad Japs 'ad att r acted hordes of flies to the island which both red our troops conshlerably . ence , one C-47 airplane was ciispatched to dust t e eastern portion of the island ·1ith DD1' powder and on 2 Uia.rch another C- 47 dusti mission was flo• n, an ironical twist to the mi litary use of air power . U .3 March , 20 - 47 sorties dropped oth 500 lb demolition bo bs and fire boILbs concluded t e c lose support phase of the Corregi or island show and the 6th upport itir Party closed a station reparatory to leaving t ie island . SU1~ The compactness of the air cam ai5 n a g inst Gorret;idor Isl nd .akes it stand out in bold relief for ie tudent f air ewer as a s · ning example of the effectiveness of air power use , roperly . It is ele,;1e tary t at t, e attac , on t,;orregidor cculd mt ve been sue cessful dthout ai s peri rity. Our o use of air forces against ur face vessels have s o iil how futile t ey can be against a ete mined attac s by aircraft . gain, a i r vas tue euium whi ch made possible the vert ical assau.lt on Corregi or by i.-aratroopers . There is no question but that aeri al bombardment of Gor egi dor prior to the amphibious and parat r oop landings enabled the~e opera. ions ~o be cari·i ed out wit a mJ.m..mum of loss t cur groun orces an naval ore s as 1el l . ecor s eak for t emselves in uenotin the ef ec i veness of aerial close support ; ssions ­ time after time , poi ts of resistance collapsed under aerial polilnd:i and our troops · e t in virtually standi up . Two battalions of paratroop;> and one battalion of Infantry pitted against a potential of 56 3 ene ry troops •ere a le to con uer the fortress island of orre i dor ml.i because ir pover primarily, nd naval poW"er were elded ogether int o an bea able con:.b· tio dtn t e gr un for ces . uver 4700 Japanese troops ave been killed or foun ea alrea y an an uncounted number are seal ed in caves some by their own ands but mcst o f the by action of our force • ln f iinal analysis, of orregidor Island

from the air standpoint is no p esented as an unusual use of air power but, instead as a cogent example oi' the terrific potency of air power in modern ·warfare . D CARL F • DAMBERG, Colonel, ;,ir Gorps , A.AF Board Liaison fficer. I •

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