Qell$I"U Subjects Section A.~3 nifARtw. TlU£ U'~ht SCHOOL ,01'\ 1&.1m1.ni, h~1a tIm OPlltATIOHIOl 'fa S03D, PARAO~D.WANftt J:U&G,DfIftAL ~r flAM IN ta DOAFWM; .QI oommo~ XS~, 16i'61UAlI .... 8 1i4ID. 1'45 (UJIOI OAHP4IQI) (P~nJQMl GDlenatlQ. 01 a 'ar•• hut. Jat~~ QollmlAUlder) 'type ot' ~erati~ d.aeribedt 4lMORIl AaSAtfL! It 1 'A~CWfE REGIJ.mlft.U.. OOJmAt '!'Id om _ 1ll1OOIJ '1I'lWAJlJ01 AiKALL tstAlm kjor La-on B. CaskeT ADVAIOEtl lRrAftRI OWI01fmS CUBS 10 I
Will::!!: .'."' ....... " '" ,.·11 ,. .... ., .......... ",. "'.<Ii .... "". J! .........................'" ........ .,,, ........ .,........ 1 IntrQs'\lctio1'l ......... i. t ..... t ., .... "~H' • ................. Ii. ,. .......... II ...... '...... It • .. • .. .. ... • • • J The Gene:rai 8it-nation ...................... , ............ ,................. 4 'the ElCe~irtion of t.he Plan ....... " .. " it • ...... II •• 11 ............. " ......... .. ., .. •• .. • .. ... 14 AMl.;rs:t$ ~ Crttiel.. II .......... 11 .......... II ...................... I> ................ «...... n ... .32 x.e.a:On$ ...................................... !fI................... " ......... *............... If .. .. • .. .• .. .... 34 Operationa on CQITegidol' 17 February 1945 Map Ii' -Operatl\)IlS on CQrragidQl' 18 February' 1945 Map G Opf~ration!$ \lU Corregidol' 19 23 l"ebruary 1945 Map H 0psI'$¥t1ons on OQrregidor 24 2.'/ February 1945 1
J.. -1 tuz~n C~a.ign. $ixth U. S. Ar1f:lY! Volume 1 (,JanU1ll.r;r :1945 .... 30 June 19h5) (118 tibr~'Y) .1-2 lJ. S. l. i'.Ii'. E. B01l.U1 Report ~!u.m:ber 208, 16 May 191,;5 {'lIS Librs.:r:yJ A-3 "'f~ Corr.~dor Operationn tifu,te:tliiiln,t/ Colonel 'Edward L. J el'lkilui, C it, G$SC MUitary'II\eview. April.. 1946 (~ Lib:f~) i' A""4,~at ~W$, Nu."Jiber 8, JUlle 19L5 I fJ__ s. SJ;tnh Arllf¥ ' / (rIS L~1>re,ry) / I, ' A-I) / Field ,~de:r l~1Jl:'/ber 9, 50311 Parachu:t.a Intantry Regimental Oombat Team / (t,IS i~bra:ry) ! 'I , . A'f"'7 \A-a \ I \ ~Oor~~~ido:r Coordinationn /UeU~ali't 0:0101161 F,. }.t. Postlethwait / lni'antrr Journal, July 1945 (TIl:; t;i.brary) Hi:mtoI1iical Report, Oorregj.cl.Gt I"'la.."1d Op~r9.tion (Operation lmmber 48) (Pers(j}ruu, pos,Se5siun of attthor) Airb$'Iie Wa.rfare Majo;l ~ene:ral Jwn.es M. Gavlll (TISI:liL~rary) $lRe~alU~& the Harbor Defenses oJ: ~mn;i.la. and Subj act !3a.ys" ticlJlte~t Perry R. kliahon, O~st 4rtillerT Journal, July - August 45 (1'18 tib%'a.ry) ,I .4-10 f'1h-op on Corri!\\gidorn. 11!Qjor Thomas C. Hardman, Ooast Artil.;lery Journal, Jv~y - Jnl~;uat 45 (TIS Library) r ..I .:~-ll fBiermial :Flt!:lport of l$enf~ral· f}sorge C.. krshall II; ! (1 July 1943 - 30 J1mG 1945) I • (Perl!Hlnal possession author) 2
IN lllLCAPTUHE; OF CORRFJlI.DOR ISl.l"ND 16 FEBHUAaY - is MARCH 1945. . (t.ll?:OH (jAMPA!ruO (Personal Obst*r.ati.:ms ot a ,arachtrteBattalion Corrm:mnde:r) it played in the reopening of Manila Bay to Allied ship:ping. In o:t'da;r to ori!;:frlt the reader, it will be fi('$cessal.ry to discuss brief11' the major events which led fir~t two phases the overall p1.Bn to liberat.e tIle the In the south, additio!lal IT. S. south. TheiSe torces wm:re approaching the southern edges of the the Subic llay ru'EH!t and early (4) (30B A) :3
than Tb~ pl{\li.l1. fl)l' t'$~1~1l:U:lti,g ~J~ll¢1. H~Yj as $llbmitt!l{i by thiS! Sixthi::kl"n'iT i ;: $o'Ut;h.~rn tip or ia:t;,e.M ¥'\ti"nll'lii'l,\;lla in the Martve~~$ Ii 'I B~ $.t"Ela, on D-Day. Oth~ tr0-u,Pii$ in tor 1 a~egidol' Island., ~H!~~ aU-borne.. eQ!nmand of thi3 ReT };):ass~$d trl~l lU.ghth :
the airbQl'ne foroe C~ under the eomnmnd ot tneXI U. S. Corps of Sixth Army. 1h cOnjunction 'With the airborne assault., thereWoreed b$tta11on f.:coompanying tn. Mariveles. ~ :Coree "MilS to maka an amphibious landitli on \Oo:tT~gidor Island.. Upon completion of their uphibiotlS landing, this battalion pHsed to the control of the Co.rnr1:andi.n:g Officer ot the P-.rach\tte IWT. ;o..Dq. W'dSS set tor 12 j1ebruary 1945. (7) (See A:J'~t3o.RJ~ cO:M!~NnF,;.re ESTl!4iA'J:E AND PLA~ On 6 February 1916, .. COpy of Sixth ArIffY Fteld Order No. 48 &litthe operation lRM~ delivered to the Headquarters ot tNt It might well at tfl.iS point to briefly outline the forces avail... able for the ail'borne'Qs$&ult. The infantry units of the Rer cOIl$isted of tllrae infantry batti,allon,) a service company; and a headquarters and headquanera ciompany. i:aehb&tt&lion bad three ri£le companies, $Uk company eOMist1.ng of. tbre1!S! ritle platooTl$ a.'1d a o()...;mm mortar platoon (3 mortar.) J& kttalion. ~eadquart9rs company ecmsisting or a )0 oal. light machine gWl p~toon, an e~ mortar platoon, a c_nnm:~cation platoon snd an attached .~im;U. detu~t., In addit1.on to the i~lfantry units, the , . ie'! bad as o~tmie laNdI_field artillery battalion and aneng::i..nlMr company. 1~: artl11er7 battallot3 consisted ot So. headquarters and servie. I bat~1 )J~ ba:tterie. anIled with the 15-9 pack howi tser (A, Il, c) J and 1 batterr armed with the 50 oaliber machine gun (D). The engineezo company Qo~~ted 01.' a oompany headquarters platoon &nd three en.gineer ;' 8tlpP<Jrt p1a.f,~ona. Tni, lct had never operated u Pali. of a la:rgf)runit bu~ operateci! d1l'el.ltly under ArtrCf or GHQ I.lontrol. (9) 1mm.ed:iJatel;r upon receipt of the siXth A:n:q order, the staff a.l1d the island!, ~ro begun and I.lheeks and il1SP6ctlons initiated to complete the equiplYl~n~of subordinate units. (10) (7) A-I, p. ~50J (8), (9), (10) Perscmal knowledge .. . '
eut to west, at the entrlllnoe of Manila. fJay. The helJl.d of the tadpole (the 'West end of the island) is called Topside. It is a 500 foot pla;t&&l1 tlmt drops i."lto deep raviess and cliffs t{) the water's edge on all sides. this part (if the ilillarw is al-,proximately 2,500 yard. in dialfleter. The thin waist ot the tadpole is called Bott~:1de. It is about ,00 yards wide and rises to abou.t twtmty.... five teet. above water level. OVer~loold.ni Bo'ttomsid., anti to t11e east of it, is the stEllep, jagged mass ot Malin:ta. Hill t.o-Nering 400 feet· into the air. This hill sits squarely across the narrOl'l waist of thi!'l island. It is a:p:prGxi,mately 800 yards long from nonh to south and only 3C'JO yude wide. from lfalin'ta H:Hl, the tail' of the island stretches out fo:r about 3,000 yards to the east. This tall a:veragell :from 50 yards wide at its eastern extremity to about 800 yard$ where it reaches Malinta Hill. A hog back ridge rising to about 17!> feet ru:ne slong ths ;c,ntir€" length of the tail. (See .YAP C) Aerial rccH.nlllaisssnce fli&hts OYE;r tho island were begun to make a close study ot' possible drop Ut!;".. TMse flights disclosed t,hat thQre WQre only three possible drof.' areas. Oaf: was an abandoned airstrip (Kindley Field) approxitml.tely 100 yards wide and 500 Yal-ds long rH~ar the eutern e.xt.remity of the isl<ltud. 'rr()()PS drOf,lped here would be e:;x:posed to enemy- fire irom l:dih ground at lialinta Bill and from Topside" An attack. from tha ar~. a 'Would have to move aga.ilJSt heavily defended higher ground. ~~o i'urthbr consider:';!.ti;)l1 uf this temtative drop sr'tH" wu given u a landing here aC.hievsd nothin~ :mor~$ than could l>e achieved by an ~hibious assJAult. (ll) (See MAP C) The other hm possible drop areas w~re loeated on Topside. (12) These areas were~he only other places on the islandtlia t had 1,W.'1 resemb1anca to o;:>~n gl'olmd. Area "A" was the old pre-war parade ground and approximat;.ed 100 y~ds by 150 yards. (see Map C) Ar03. "D" 1I'as an (11)A-2. p. 2; (12) 11.-2" p. 2. 6
old golf course a.bout 150 yards by 2,0 yards loca.ted just south o£ Ar+~a II Aft. (See Ilap C) Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that these fields were 8urroW1ded by wrecked concrete builctin&;s, pock-ma:rked with bomb and shell craters and oovered with rocKs" scra.;p iron and tin rl)of'ing. Small trees on these fields had been bombed to suoh an extent that only stubs of from two to eight teet in height remained. The danger of bein~ im;paled on one 01' these tree stubs W&iiI apIJarent to all. To add to the hal&ards I thl:; drop fields sloped sharply a t their ex'tremities to end in sheer cliffs. HOW~lV'3r the h41~lU'ds of the drop areas would simply have to be accep't.ed. There was nothitlg ElIsa to do. These fields ..ere acoepted and plans for the mission of the .unitB began to "ake form. (13) ltow that the decision to drc>p on Topsid'..\! had been mde, it was necessary to plan for naval. and air bomba.rdlflent r;);f this a:rea to reduoe to it m1ni.'l1'Wl1 the enewlY forces maintained on topside durirAi daylight hours, as trois wu the time the drop would hi.! lnade. (1.4) 'to secure the fire support and cOQrdination neceSM.ry to successfully accomplish this mission" conferences had already beg>Jn on the higher levels of cOl'ml:tand. The first of thell'l6 was held at Sixth Ar111Y Headquarters on 5 l'ebruary and at XI Gorps Headquart<i,;I's on 7 li'lebru.~ry. On B ti'ebruary the final detJ,tila for this supplJrt and coordi..¥lation wer~ planned aboard the lligship of the Commander, Amphibious Grou.p Nine. :l."hOS6 prest.mt for this canterence were the Connnlimding General, XI Oor:psl the Commanding Gem'lru, 54th Troop Carrier yang; the Com.mander, Seventh Atnphibim.w Forces; the Oommtmder, O1'1li$e1'8 Seventh Fleet; the Commander I ,A..-rnplrlJ:d.oUB Group Nine; G-), XI Oorps; A-J,P'i!th Air J!'orce; 0-3, Sixth Army, the Commanding Of'ficer" 50)d f'arat~hute Infantl'Y Rep;imental Combat Team~ the A.irborne Liaison Officer, Sixth Army; and vtil.rious staff officers u;liigned to the headqllart(~rs and cosmnaoos named. (15) The final detailed plan evolved as a r~~ml1t of this ]a st conif;;rEmee called for the ISlet Infantry .~'''_ .._.. Comb::l.t Team to .make the landing (13 Personal knowledge; (lh) A-l" p. 50; (15) A-3, p. 58-59. 7
on the southern hYGld accompany the 151st '<>m",,"'u aboard landing craft in .- on on D [ll11S 1 "d:CDr t.he a,iroorn<!f on the morning n plus 1. All three for'ces wonld be under the cOlm'1and U. S. Corps. (16) (See IdaI' B) In ·the :meantim\i.~ a recomn~end&t1orl to to 1.5 February 191;.; had been approved by General 1.1'a.eArthur. (17) early'as 23 wh6n 180 two hundred fifty pound. OP (b€lleral airborne assault (16 February 19~5), 1,,012 droPJ}ISKl em the ca,n best be shswn by th!:1 diminishina. antiairt'.ratt, opposition is,nCCiuntered. This opposition went from intel'l.lSe dur:.ng airborn.a n~ade. Corregldol,' wns subjected to the heaviest a.~~:rj 3.1 to which iiill.y a,rea i,f comparable size (less than onE; en'tire war in the Pacific i1.r~::a. (llj the heg'.tu on 13 E'ebruary 1945 when g1L"1 .m.adeon Gorregidor on 16 :February 19k5. (1.9) the P'craehu.te RCT f I
Wd rapidly being oompleted. (20) Liaiieon had heen establi:shed with t.he 3l1th Troop Carrier Group based on :MindQro Island. this unit had the mission of transporting the airbol:'lle troops trem MindorQ to Corl"egidor, and for supplying the neees~;.#U'Y trarutPQrt tor aerial re.uppl;r untll 1f1;bel" transported resupply could be effected. !his unit. had 51 0-47 plane., 15 ot which were equipped with artillery dropping pnr&~'r&eka. These planes lieN: o8.i'able of dropping ap:proximatitly 1,000 troops at one lift" plua bundles ot supplies and equipment not carried on the pel son af the 1ndivid.u.U. {21} The lil'ttit0d eapaoity of the airborne lift at one time , dietf!l.ted that the .Parachute acT would have to be transported 1n trx.ree lifts slncethe total strength of the ROT •.pproached 3,000 _n. (2:1) jam table models 'Of the island had be:en constructed and all tro.ops studied these models along With aerial photograpl'l$. DetaUed instructions as to the part to be played bY' eaoh individual in the. operation _re covered. Every j\w,pmuter was fl~ over Qorregidor and made an. aerial , I'ac.!rthur dispatched Uajor General Ms.rquat. his staff advisor on Coast Artillery and antiaircraft matters, to !tindwo to 'Oriel the parachute Wlits on ill that he knew about the terrain on Oorregidor. General Marquat had been on \!orregidor With General MacArthllr and wa~ evacuated trom the island in 19h1t along with General 'MacArth1U'Mld <)ther membe.rs of his staff. (23) AllJ the .ottening up of the island by air continued, all avaUable intelligence of enemy forces and dispositions at his troops was being gathered. Several officers and enlisted men of the Parac"ute Ret had served on Co:rregidor prior to 1941 and were inv,uuable source. of information about the tunnels I gun emplaoements and underground barraoks island bY' Amerioan troop., were that Malinta Turmel runs through the base of Malinta Hill trom east to west nth a main entrance at each end. North and sout.h wing tunnels join the lnain tunnsl inside and eome out at (2) Personal kr.towledgeJ (21) .A-h.., p. 43 (22) Persorull knowledge,; (23) Personal knowledge.
~!!lall~r ~v&ue$ en south k\\icl~ ""tth,lIII hill.. 'r.he l"Itgp;eti te~l"a1l1 !~i the l$l\lU7Kl 1.I".alt~ it i!!Ul .x~~llt\n:t sit0.~ £(1)1" the Cc!'~l1ilt10!1 d ~~Sit. ~~~bl~ :f·orl.r~.$. imlll1:r1c.$ .t'o:r~.$ Xlrior- to 'ij;tllalt war devf.Plope4 thel!H" ~aattlr:ll f~.at~U"f.i$ '1!t',d:enaiv'ely. 'lh. d.G:teM~$ Qo:nSil'tiid of an ela'bora~ IYS'\~ of eCtnc~teg ~ 'teel reintoreed emplllOl!:;imen.ial pillbotet, tm<lb.n."grOtllld.'tw.~tf; sites fOcit hIlll'llnl tion $"J.pplh~', l:100 uooer&t'Q'Wld l:mrl"aeks. AIlllJljW det~tWive irur\;,~ll&t1o:tlll YlIiIl1ll1il conru-letrad bYl1n et'tact.- ive syst~ ttu\tl;(i.liu 'flles~ 'U.oolilrgro{u'1il ·icl.f$ta.l1atioll.s '!f4'111d b@ :tmpe~ \"'iOll,to d1r$ct h:t,~s 'by bom~ tIl.lld liiQval ~ lire. i:n;y additional inW~8 l'H!lft:;j·t.hj-S 1n:f\:~~t1on 'Wi th~'U:t eoo&.l.zering the lee'U:r'lt)" (Hl>nd.n~ ~l'at1on. It~· etft,1:t~t,ed 'ibat hi~ d\1l!~,$iv~ plan would i'~1$l"a1l7 tollow t}w,t; .tI!.d.Q'£t"d by General \ila~iiht in 1942.. A.ftfir th. u~ult fflt!'dso. t.hl$ estitl~iil't,~ oJ: h1,t. plan. proved &(}o.urat~. this $8:timfll:t~ WM briefl:r a disposlt!on a:ppl"Q,a;~t.a~11 h~l.f o£w'ha:t,ever trtlops «1I.vailable on iliiland. 1I'Iel"m~te:i;' t.o ftro oft a:nU\[iW.... biou$ ~il~e en th$ i$l,and. tJalani;e of' i't.is t 0:1'4& ''lI f}uld h.l'ill<i in l"ela~l.·1r~ in tun~1el$ ot )lalinu F,Jll to 0l:intam limY l~Ji:n& waist Qt bl.and J'Ut. .. .it 0.1: Jruinta 1:1111; and to l~ein.t'oroe hi$ per:i.- meter tr'~~>8 &'I)JJf point. (~4) A thort1ut!%h krj;o~led~. of all det'ens;iv'll lfteaSu.r~.t~n '01 the enenry islAnd C'omman.a$Z' would M axtrl.!'mely :tl)'t"l'r~~$tini. ROli'iSlVe::t' this in,!'ormation .:vllil&bl~. En(iJ!'i;f Xl~.:r:,sott!'l\el oa;pt.',ll'iiild ¢Qu.r$~ ()i t.ho r~:l t}~;en directed hi/the thfli sGnililJ" Japane#e oomH'tander ill (J~Jli$tnc$) naUaa!1Cll'.l' d• .f~lta:tve {rke.~l.ml:rfl:\S Phl1iPI';i..u.ea" .Generll1 IamasM ta, to take 11 pO!l111ble airho1"mt aIJUIJEtul'ft. In. ialtilx! A :r~eon"" pl.aoe to laok otw1ta"bJ.!tJI ....._".,....,... g" ~~3. It~lt'Jvur.t~o O('wOl' (24) Personu knowlEilt'l,&$. 10
himself, he had ext~nsive minfl!: fields placed on the landinr; strip (l\indley ]i'ield) on the east€::l."n end of the isl:a:nd. (See ~lap C) No other total lninimmn estin1!.ated enemy forces on 'tho island were anno~meed r Since the limited lifting capa.city of the available aircraft would allmv a force of battalion sizi';-:;, reinforced, to be droPI··ed at one time, organizlil tion of the battalion headquarters cOl'lIp<anios. 1'~10 additional machine gun pl<:<j,toons liere to etil.C.h battalion, giVh'1g each battalion three li.{;ht machine gun platoons (4 guns eaoh). 1'he organizatim of the gun pla t,oon pr€s€{~ted no problem as every m.an in the ngim~;rnt had recei"red instruction in the firirlg of all weapons organic to the in!c:,ntrJ regi.1!1e:nt. SL'1ceeach battalion lii't would have its proportions.. te share artUlery sl1ppo:rt,this in effect made each battalion a l'Il'na11, but 'frell balanced combat terun wi thin itself. (27) regimental field ordlllr (FO l,jo. 9) was issued. on 14 February 1945. '1'his orde:!.' desig;n;;;.tedthe troops to comprise each lil't, their mission" and the oquipment to ~Qe curied by the assault echelons. The first lift., to be dropped b;;"ginning at 08)0 hour 1m D plus one, carried a detachment of Regiment,a}. Heudquarters f CO'mpany and Service Company; the 3d Battalion, 50)d Parachute Infant!"'1 Regilllentj Ba.ttery A C75-mm Pack Howitzers) and one platoon of Battery It (.50 caliber i<1:8.chille Guns), 462d l:arac:hute Field Artillery 13a.t'Galion; and Oompar.y C, 161st Para.chute I~ngineer Battalion. the second lift" to be dropped beginning at 1215 hoUl:' on D plus one, '¥flitS composed oi" the 2d Battalion, 50Jd Pa:rachute Infantry Regiment; Battery D U:>-mm Pack Howitzer-a) and one platoon ;)1' Battery D (.50 caliber Machine ':;UDS), 462d J'arachute .B'ield Artillc:;.l"Y Battalion; a detachment of Service Company and the h'il.lance of negimental Headquarters Com:r:any. The third lift, to be droppod at (8)0 hour OIl D plus two, '\'raS composed of 1st Ba.ttalion, 5030. Parachute Ini'arrt.x'y rtegilIl.imt; Battery· C OS-rom Pack Howitzers) and one platoon 0.1.' l3a.ttery D (':;0 caliber j;Iachine Guns) j 462d Parachute Field (25) Personal Kllowledgs; (26) A-5 (Int. Est.) j (2n Personal knowledge. 11
Artlllery Battalion. rlH~ Hea.dquarterlS a.nd Service Battery of the field Artillery Battalionw8.5 divided between the first two lifts. 3d Battali<:m, 34th Inf¢tnt17 (reinforced), _$ to land amphibiously on San Jose Beach, Corregidor, at 1030 hour on D plus Oll!!, and pus to control of the Parachute ReT e:ommander upon l~mding. (28) Each parachutist was to carry one unit of atml:lunitiun on his person tor the individuu weapon, and four :m<~als of the ttl':" ration plus two canteens of water. .bmrunition for the erew served weapons, of neceSSity, had t.o be dropped in bundl... :Medica). aid men were to drop wi tb their platoons and the BattaJ.ion and Regimll'l:ntal Aid Station Groups were i.e drop With the Bai:.'talion and Regimental Headquarten respectively. (29) An interesting innovation, born of neceSSity, is worth mentioning here. The dootrine taught at the Parachute Sohool prior to le;J;t'Ving the continental U II S., envisaged dropping all weapons. except the small course ot the rlli!gi.'!Usnt's I'ight trom .t"118tl"alia to the Fhilippines, most of this in jungle terrain, demonstrated that the recovery of these bu.'1dles was in .11 CUf£iS dif'ti<mlt and in some :impossible. 'I'here!'ore in this operation, every weapon in the regiment, with the exception ot the artillery pieces••$0 caliber :machine guns, flame throwers and 81__ Mortars, .e.re jll:llped on the person of the individual soldier. This system extended to all signal com.murliCation equipment lIfi th the exception of the 801-284 radio set. (30) All resupp1;r was to be by air until the tactioal situation allowed supplies to be moved in 'water. 12 c-Li1s .ere allooated for the•• aerial resupply :missions. (31) In.itial missions had been assigned units as fol101fS1 commencing at 0830 hour on D plus onejseoure till!: drop areaj set up a perimeter generally along the 500 foot contoUr line ot (28) A-5j par. 3; (29) A-5, (Adm" 0.); (30) Persorml knowledge; (31) A-1, p. 53. 12
Topside; support by tiro the amphibiouS l&llding of 3d Battalion" 34th Infantr1 at 10)0 and, upon relief along the d*.f.'ensive pi!rim~ter by units 0'£ -the second lift, to drive toward Mdixlta Ifill to effect con.tact with -the 3d Ba:l>'tulon, 34th Infantry. (See Map C) 2d Battalion, 503d P<U't:whute Infant.ry--Drop on Fi(~lda "An and lltj3tt co]n:meneing at 1215, relieve the 3d 13at-t"tlio!1 from defense the drop gone, tmd exploit the terrain north and west of the drop zone. (See If£p C) 3d Battalion, 34t.h Infantry (reini'orcoo)-Land on San Jose Beach at 1030, SeClll"e beachhead and MB.linta Hill area a.nd effect contact with the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Inf'ant1'7 Rir:giment. (See Ma.p C) 1st 13atta.liOIi" 503d Parachute Infa11try r;:egiment-Dl"O'p on Fields it and B commencirlg s:t 0/3)0 OIl D plus 2 as RCT reServe and be prerared, on order" to exploit t,erra:in south of" the drop zone. (See C) 462d Parachute It'ield Artillery Battuion-lUements of this uniti to drop with th,,,, l.nf'ancry battalion they, were supporting s.nd to fu:rn.iSh fire support as directed by the infantry battalion commander. (Sec Map c) COlllpany' C" 161st Parachute EnGineer Battalion (less one platoon dropping 0:0. }i'leld "A" with the 3d Battalion) to' drO'p on Field 1JBtt and be :prepared to erect r)ad blocks, destrO'y ene-lq fortifications by demolition as directed by ROT COl!tmandaI' and to be prepared to at'tach one platoon ,to' the 2d Bat'tl!lion one platoon to the 1st, Battalion, S03d ItO'll u:pon their landing. (32) (See J''iap C) Since nothing 'WaS definitely known of or dispositicns, th.e detniledrr..issicl'flti assignel1 units 'Would depend on the O~5J par. 3. 13
situation confronting theRCT Cormnander after t.h." landings had bl"ten made. 'With all plans completed, t.he units Yfatted impatiEmtly f01' 16 15 February. Ca.ptllred Japanese 1110vies showing the fall of Corregidor in 1942 andt.he insulting treatment of the ltli:10,:ri(~!m .flag u-lld prisoners of war wertS shown the trooPJ of the ReT. (33) Early on the I!ilQrning of 16 February, the first lift of the Parachute assault element was airborne and headed toward Corregidor. 'rheiormation flew in two coll:trnns of Single planes in trail, one column over each field. The prevailing Wind from nort,h'!ast. to southwest and the smallness of the field;s had dictated a plan )Thereby each pIa-ne contained not more than 21t parachutists plus Qmaxiinum 0;[ thr&e bundles_ A maximrtm of eight men plus one bundle would leave the plane at each pass over the fieid. Planes would follow a west to east course, flying into the wind, cirele and fly the second pass. This completely disregarded the approved 'doctr~~e of getting the maxium nttmber of men on the ground in the minim:um time interval. Furthermore it meant that each plane exposed itsel.t: to ground fire three times. This condition had to be accepted. The preTailing wind generally followed the long axis of the field Which meant that the jU!!Wma.stt~:rs M.d to wait until the drop zone had been passed before giving the eOroJrlandto jump_ It control plane cont,ainine the Parachute RCT Commander wooJ.d t)ontinue to circle the island at a greater height than the troop carriers and, by voice radio with the ca.rriers, attempt to make corrections in the line of flight of the carriers or a.lter the count of t,he jl'LlllpmAsters ba.sed on observation of sticks of men alreadT dropp'ed. A. "'Go" point had been selected for each of the two drop zones. In each case t:his"Qo*' point was a prominent terrain featUre known to the pilots, co"'pilots ar.d ee"ch jumplllhster. The procedure adopted for (33) Persona1 knowlodge. 14
0) ( 10·~·\ ~. i
p3,raohllte jump for any of these men. ~i'wo deatroYEJN were in oontil1UO'll.8 S11pport of thegl"ou.nd units from the mGrJ~nt Qf thi11 t:1.rlt. drop to the end of the o;j,)erat1on;onc destI'oYtJl" supporting troops on the western part of'tll" island rind one :ready to fit'S tor 1:mit,$ on the eastern ar~ ot the isl,and. Aerial $u:PI'Ql"t, 118'\1$:11y p.... 47' with two 50<3 pound booit'l$ or two bflllT t,e.nKs ot lapalm, was ov€'rhead ec)ntinuouSlly (1ur:1'1'11]; dayltght hours for the dJll"l.tion of the operation. 11th the air arIIl naval li<li\,l.son units ashore wtth the ground troop5, a mission usually requ:lI'!:Kl oruy m. ,i'ew ll'l.il"mtes to seCl;ure. (37) At 1030 hour the a;mphih1ous landing 1'(U made on San Jose 13each, juet west of Malinta Hill, by the 3d Batta11on, 3hth Int'antl'Y (reinforced) staging ·from Kariveles. This assault wa;:; covered by close naval rle.avy p<>I'llJl::mnel and ~quipmelrt, lOtH~efj from thesE~ mj.nes b€;tore they secllI'ed the top 01' Ual:i.nta Hill.. Opposition Waa stunned b;r the preparato17 fires ~nd the battalion's objective ns quickly -talten. 'rhe !l(nr 8.1 i:;tm.fire had started landslides and some of the tunnel entrancos o!M(l,l,lLnta nll had been s-'::,aled by t.hese slides. After ss<:rur1nc th{~ ere>st of the hill a;,:tQmatic vrettpOhS Yel'e s1ted em all knatm entrallC0$ to th,,!tlmnels to keep the enemy bottled lJP inside lhl:tnta Hill. (0) (See D) It ie; noteworth3r that t,ne :pr(~parato;:'Y softening up of' Topside was .al'lCtttf1r1.es~ tr.at the airborn,e troops we~:,e ablfil to the amphibious unit •. ~O calibGr nachin~ &un support during its l;;v;d.lng. (.39) The author of' ttli. mGnograph Commanded the 2d :eattl,~j(m,l ;:O,3d Paraehut, !nfant:t'Y n,eg:lmo.nt. In omerto effect a l'$:peedy re·l:t"~:f of' th€.: 3<1 Bnttnli'~)n on it.s def$:;ns:1.ve ':;:,~rim61t;<i.r csit,iQllS, the Battalion 8-3 and the 6Xeel'lt:tVIt) office!'s. of Con:lpanii 3!tS D, E and F had b~en f)~nt alor;.g riith the £i1"&t l:1£t to be able to qtl.:te1dy acquaint tlH~ir l'espectiv~; conm,ande;ra 'I'd t1: the situat;i,on upon arrival ot 'th,;;; second lit'\:, and t::i expedi.te :'.'\oving (37) A-6, r. 19,; (38) A-I, p. ::3; (39) 1~-2, F- 7. 16
these ".!nita into positioo", (40) seC3nd lift, beoame Illu'b{}l"'ne 8.M approaehed COl":!'egidor Island about 1220 hour. Urlkmmn to 20. Batt::lli(nl CO)·!1.'T;!8n:der was the £aet thAt. ·the acT GomJ'lutnrier llad radioed tQ XI CQrps Nqu.e~rt:.ln, that the drop of th$ second l:1.1't ~~ oancelled and t:tu~.t 't.hJ..$ unit lI'~o"e ill u:tphibi(:I1.1Sly. trAt following (iay. 'l'his acti(m by tba ltOT C~$l:" 'WaS based on two sup... posit:l.oMOt1 his part, (1) That the troops of the £1rat li.ft had gained such ,. tactieal adV~!:lt~lge that they could rHJt t.. 9Vl'It"r'llll by the enerr/y. (2) Jump ca8ualties had been sO heavy on the first litt that tM e:.ti'ective strength of the [email protected]~ [cress COUld. ver:/ adv,u'sely &ft$et the ClutcomQ of tihea O'pf;,ration it the$i>\me e~:mditiClns prevailed dllrin~ the second drop. Also co!'.sidered WU8 thff taet tl1l!lt the enemy had been &l~rte{i m,t the $t,~eon!'i lift cot1...1d e:xpect intense ground tin to be direct-. IJd illt the plan(l;ls ~:md p(~r~onnel a~ they floated earthw~u"d. l'his II'l6saage .tailed to 01111<11' i '\ time a.nd the drop ot the second. lift began about 1230 nOlu' and by 13h5 hOUI' the chltire lift was on the gl'O'und. being aJJuil6AiJJlsd p.r·e'pal~·atOl".Y to movlxtS, 111tO p0~iM.on to :t:'olieve the 3d Battalion. (41) Enemy' tire direet«l against the triGpcarriers of the second lilt was heavy 'bu.t rev c;,~ualtie8· l1$l't~ ~ut'f(:n'od. ,An elemont or ~;,;ood fortune entered. into t~,he dl"<lip 01.: the second lil:t.i;hol1 tr..c planes ftl'e onlJl (j. couple of mLl'lute$ a~&iy 1'romt.he I~QOIt pOint, the 'windwhicl'l had reached. a veloelty or abollt 30 miles per h(>'Ur died do,,!} to a very gentle Ql'."ii.lze. Con$$q~e'ntlyth. o&s1it~ltia. suffered u a result or jump# were negligibJB when oQIflpared with those of t~le first lift. (hi!) :By 1500 hour" the eampanies oi' t;he· 20. Battalion had moved into pOSition, assisted in e~a.nding the plilX'im.eter to more favorable t<U"rain and _1"6 prepfa"ing ! 01:' the foUowing da.,v f S operation. (43) (See lJfa.p D) Paw'Ols of t.he 3d Battalion; 503<1. iarac:rIllW lnf'arxt.l'Y had made cent.act with the 3d BattlUl.OU; 34th Infantry pa.trolling west .from 1!:alinta HUI but the route tram 'tOpside> to the beach (;.rea waa far from seou.re. (i..~O), (41), (h2)~ (43),. »ersonU Imowledge. 17
By this tiM/' it ft, app.r~nt that tm. est_te Qt 8,0 enemy on the ialUld Dad malMd its mat'k b7 ~ thousal'.lQ. (414.) (Se'. Hap n) By the end or the day 2,06> perlo~ had landed on the uland b7 parachute. fhe total ~'tt'f9 .. ualties mounted to 222 or 1().1~ of tru. total fOl'Ce j~inI. the lirst lill $uttered about 7;;~ of theee jUl:11p casuali.1_. It had. beflUl .,t:t.mated that 2~ of the foroe might be 1D9-.p..- citated u a :Nsult of 3Ul1.P inju1.ea. It 1ilUI 'celt by all concerned that mak:Lng the a$sault V$rtieal~ •• "fea though it was the most difficult and. llaaardous mission ever usigned to a parach1rte unit, would result ill t •• r casultt!ltis than tho.e to be tJ;lecte4 as a re4INlt of an ataphib10lUl .lU1Ul:' alone. (45) QOl'ldit1oM enewntered by the trroOj)$ ot tll.e first 11'£\ eauaed JIlan7 men to land wer the side. of the cliff houndinl It.. Pield and SOlH indi.... vidualJil ~e eVen blown into the~. These men lMre immediately rescmed by patrol boats standing 1>7 for j'llSt such an eventuality. 80lD ot the llell la:nd1.ng <wer the cl1!t gathered on the 'beaoh and were picked uIJ b;y \:>o&t. tiweTer one group landingneu ~t.lr ,oint decide.d·t.o lind th.d.l" _y up the clit£ side. I.Uld $teap :ravl.ne4l and :rejoin their units on Topside. captain ljn ltagaki, thG Japan.a. Commander on Corregidor had been intQhled t¥t the 8ppl"oach ot boats carr7illl the aItph1bioUB units and had gone trom his el' in.id. lIalinta ftlnnel to an Of near ire_at.. point. There 111.a pety l"an into thie group of paratroOpers and in t. enning $k~h t. Japal$e8. e~nder 1fas killed. This must have .mde4 ~u'lU'ably t.o the oontusion of the enemy. (46) Jy la_ aEt(1;r~.J 16 J'ebl"uary ·1945, the ~a held on Topside was about 1,000 yards 0)'" SOO yard$. Included in tni.s arM "''';1$ b13thdrop 1"1e13, the bombed remairul of the barracks, 13fficer8 quvte;re and various h.eadquarters buildingS. These buildingS Dre aU constru~ted .ot rein!oreed eOnCn!lte and .ould afford exce.llent g!m 8ites and or. to ward oft 811fT attack. The.lOT OF, 2d Battalion OF, artillery Of' and tire control oenter (44)' (4), Personal knowledgeJ (46) A-2, p. 71 18
plus the1mprOV1$ed hQIlj:J:ttll had til be&n e$tahl1.W in the 014 ~ nillS. The three 1~1"1.d. buildi~ .. as apPl:'Q~t.e~ on~q~~r aile long. .All rQC:Qvel"ed.utillar1 pieo_ 1f.. reWi;.s~ on t.he parade gr~ (field. tIl"). {Ul) (3e$ j~ D) The Ret Co~er re:q'Uest~. and \h$ C~nding GSl»ral, ;U Qt>JpI \ (1117. Jattalion :reW~ed.) sebeduled tG drop at 06.30 hQU1' the ;follOWing day. :Irl$tead of G.rQl)pitlg.. they were to fll' over the island•. drop only their equipment bundlklS (ilrt Field t*Aft I proceed. ~ the &.U1ItJ'tp in tbe $Ub14 JAY ~a aJ:ld land, and trom thve be m<W'1!iId amph1bioull' to OQrl"$gidv. 'fhil ebanie '.nUd el1m.l,utetht depletion of tlle att-€Ingtb of tMs unit ~~$ultUlg .from e:.q>eeted. jUlllp c.a$U4lti$~h Anoth.ecl:' laotor involved here wa.a the tact that cUillual. t1~ omlld Mt 'be evacnatad util the l"O'tl~ from· Topside 'bo the b$sch.iarea \.lad1:JGm 8~$d. Thl!) heavy cYu:<ies IJUt.fe:nM:i during the day weI'. (lV6:rta.xi.n,g the medioel .faoili t.iIlilS that had ~_ lmnugbt ·in 'by the Q.aa$;w.t euo1oWil. iI. hospital had be.n 1mprwilled by cQmb~ ,all the aid stations tmder eQi:ltral (1£ the reg:iJtf.nltal Rl'geOl1.• (40) Thlill cost in eas~tili$ i'or the .first day dtUil to eneJQ' action .had bHn light (21 kill$d).. whim the odds aliiai.nst the att&cke.X's are eorutidered. TheoClunted eneltl1 10S8aa wWI'eSl ~nen due W &round ..t"ire by the usa;ult. 1'01'08$. lI'0r $$V$l"'U houl's le8s tl:!aa 1.000 :men had defied 6,000, we11equ.ipped ~ '.i:tl~t~nched exl~mytr~. mnn after the eecond litt ft. on t}l® sround ~. the _ph1bioua trGOps uhore I the $n$mY ordi>n\lmbe3."- ed the attackers 2 to 1. Tbla to~l Amel"iCttOl !orces 00 the islfUld the first day ~ slightly in exoeSB of ),000. It la~ developed. that t,n. en~ force num:bered abaut 6,000 Jap~8(jJ1 Jlar11'!6$. (49) Enemy oppOS1tinn the firs t daT was C Qn!ir~ed to small arms.. m(Jrt.itr rmd a!ltomat1c .rae directed "i~ain8t tM IJt$r:i.metar trom $11 sides. This fire grn in intensity as dark a{'proaahad. It lI'aS apparent t..'hat. the 19:Ml'q was reeo'vel'in.,g 1'rom t.he initiu 3hQQk of tbe ~XJ?ected u$au~t. YeTI t_ (47) P~rsorml knmvledge; (48) A-l1 p. 5hj (49) Perl$onU knowledge. 19
.nemJ personnel_r. $~n. His tue ft8 coming trom the l'IlaDY underground empacement8 arul eave. in the area. (50) ..tflre dlu"k, au:tOJD.atie aapons had been s.ited to cover the most likely &"enuea,lJl:f &p,pJl"oach into the perimeter. Ilortar and ..ni.Uery piece. had. regHt.&nd concentit-a t10M along the,. avenud of approach. It was teltthat tb$ p0$1t1on could be· heldagainet whatever forces the enemy CQuld throW ~a1nst the per1meter. Occupation of Jalint& Bill and the oritical 1i.errain on Topside had split tM anemy l~q.. ($1) I-inC tamUiu With the eneJ1l1T habit of putting his We communicationa .&1;$". grQ:l:Uld, the pre-usault"helllng and bomb1ng must have eomplet(1fl1' d;tsrupted his wire s,.ta. The nature of the terl"&u _s such that ~a cOJIl:r.wd.eation 'WOuld be d1.flicttl t due to the clit!s, land maSllea and deep ftY:1nIil.~ fha &,unllliption latv proved correct as a coordinated attack by all. hiB torces at one t~e never did develop. This apparent lack ot e~eat1Qn facilities was one of the contributing factors to the enelrlY's failure to obtain cOQrdination of 1118 et.forts. (S2) During the night artIllerY' ~nd mortar kept up harassing fireD on likely aVl'JI)nu.:es Of approach to d!lIcourag:e anT ~eIIY' thoughts of a baneu attack. The two destroyer$ auppcn-t1ng the ground forces illuminated the entire islam at irregular intervals throughout the night. E~ tire dving the night .as con$tant and heavy, but haras,ing in eflect. (53) At calm, 11 Feb:t"Jlary 194), units of the ,d. Battalion, 503d. Parach;ak Wantrr Regiment... 8'u.PPOrt.ed .by one CO~ of the 2d Batt4.tllon, launched a coordinated attack aga.inst JIorrisoni>oint. and the hill just .outheut.. of this point. This hUl dominated the route t.o the beach area. By 1000 noun th18erit.ieal ten-un teature had been t.akenagainst $U:t"prUinglT light opPO$ition. 'ailttre of the enemy to defend th1s &rE1/,a. was 01'1111 ot the 'Wl!»"st bllUlde:rs he maie du.rillg the en:t.1re campaign. It should have been apparent that tM first efto1"ts of the attackers would be to elteet contact betweeI1 the torees on Topside a.nd those on Malinta Hill. (54) (See Map I) (So), (51), (52), (53), (54), terBonal knowledge. 20
'1'hu.s, the objective of a graduAl er.largement of the perimeter with conlltant reduotion of the enemy, while the 3d 'Battalion, 34th Infantn" contained the defenders inside Malinta Hill, had been launohed. (55) Coineident 'With the atUick on ttorrison POint.. ~ l(orrison Hill, the remainder of the 2d Battalion launched its first assault on t.he old battery position Was the romer Illite of a 16 inch Coast Artillery piece, a.."1d waS o:t:mraoterlzed by underground storage spacelli, tunnelt3 .. ventilator sha.lts and innumberable apertures for aut.omatic wl'lilapon$ fire. When driven underground.. the el1entV simply kept 1I1oving trom one position to another. It 118.1 :not until late on the fol1ow:ing day that the :);,os1tio11 was fi.n.a.l17 oleared when one of' the many white pnosph0l"1.l11 grenaded dropped inside through the ventilator shafts finally ignited powder and ammunitien stored inaide. (56) (See },[ap E) aerial resupply" was accomplished em !'tAft Field. '.this resupply mission was \ carried out by a detachlrient of the ROt Service Compar..:r 'Who had set up .. :rear supply base at the airstrip on :Mindoro. An interelJt:l.ng teature o£ this resupply liaS that of 1,250 gallons or water dropped free (i.e. without parachute) from a height of about 400 feet, :more than 80'; of it was recovered intact and undm.m.aged. (57) The water wa3 particularly welooIfl.ed as the canteens eaeh .1NUl h..'\d. when he landed had long sinoe been eonS\m}.ed and. there was no water to be had in the area. held on Topside. A diilagreeable feature of each aerial resupply' Was that as loan as the bundles began to land.. the ene1'1lY would lay dovm. a heavy mortar and automatic weapons barrage on thtl field from his hidden posltions. 'l'hi$ mean:t that everyone was pinned dawn during the barrage, including the artillery gun crews. Why these barrages were not tired at other times remains an oriental m;)'''Stery. (58) The third lift of the Parachute ROT (lilt Battalion, reinfore.ed) !lew OVer the isl.and as scheduled, dropped their bundles and proceeded (55) .. (56) .. Personal knowledge; (57) A-7, (Supply Report, p. 1); (58) .Personal knawledge. 21 \
to tu a.irfield. atSnbie jay. H~U"e &.not-her e.umpl.e ot thfi exceUen~ eOGperat1on aM. eGoI'd-illation characterizing the 1i'101e opttrat1on oceurr~. 'huok$ _re waiting at the air,tripand rl18ned. this unit to the doek$ .re it _barked on the waiting AfDa (Attaclc 'er8Qnnel Destroyera). ~ operatiQn "6.1 llQt anticipated 0';" scheduled, yet it .. org.ani$ed. on the. briefest of advance l'Iarnillg and operated pe:rl'ectll. (59) As the a1\ DS approaohinl th$ Su dCil$4 beach area.. it. ca'lne under haavy 1':11'e tr. c~v.s 1~ leaw&.rd located in th(!l faces 01' the cl1t:ts. th.eae eave. COl1ld not be fired en 'by 8i tner the trQKJPs OIl 'topaid.e or thol. on Malin"ta liill. The A.f'!Ds pulled. any from. tbe b$aeh and our ff float1Dg art ill.,..., the two dflll'tro;yera~ l'IOTed in and sUencEtd thE! enemy S11U18. ll:a.ving spotted. the cu:ve openinis durl.ng tl~ Japanes.• .tir:i:ng.. the destroyera fired point blank int<> ,the ca'V(!It o.p~r,tin.jj{;$ and must bave aC(H)lmted. tor m.tmerou el"leJq P&r$onnd.. liere' &,~ y .. S~. excellelll'\ eool"din4il.t.ion and. eOGpel'.at1on bet:.een the military and l'lI;val torcu. .( 60) S7 l630 hQUl"S the lit. ht.tfAlion hai landed, moved inland trOll ·the bfiUU~h tor ate.. b:lmdrfJd lards and •• t. up a per1.meter for the night. {ell (Se$ Map E) ,.>0 je~$ landing with the at kthlion att~d to make the rnn .trQtli w beaeh a:Nl:ft to fopside t .AI t.hOf1gn the dj,.atanee to be travilled was only about l?QOYarde along it fairly- $erviea$.ble· paved road, the•• jeep•. :t'Ul e. gauttUet of Elmtl'l\r fire and one ftl)l so badly dal\aied by e~ fire that it bare If eompleted the trip am ntiilver WaS '\.u~6d again. The other jeep ftS inval:u.able for h;uuing ammunition and m.oving artillery pieces. It was tbt Onll transportation on 'f0p$ide. (62) \Uth the jeeps having run this gauntlet or enemy .tire amour other battalion being on the island. the sp1rits $: everyone rose as it wu felt trAt the wa]f t,,1l the beach area 'Would soon be open and our dead and Seriously wounded could b\\ el'Qcuated. (63) The end Qr 17 'eb1'11a.ry 1945 $UW the perimet.er of the preV'i{,}l;$ dajI' (59) ret"lorutl K:.":\owledgeJ (oo), A....1" 11. ,4, (61), (62), (6.3); iersonal know~e. fit
~iihtly enlarced and units ot th. 3d B..1;t&110n, 50)0. Parachute lD£ant17 dug in 011 thE! top ot '.Iorrison till. (64) (See lIIap I) The Gperatlol'18 on this day .'et the pattern to he toU_d throughout. the Iillntue: operation. 'atrols of plat0<>.ft s.nd comp&»I' Ii. moved out trotJll the per1Jlet~ during daylight hour. and destroyed whatever Gnem¥ torees encoun.t.red, then lIl0Ved back to'· their perimeter pOlitions batore dark. During the night thl enemT would move back into pos1tioas that had been 1fl"ested Ira him during the d.-;;;y at .ne&V1' ca$U6lt1es to his force.. !he following day tbe proeedure lft:mld be "pea ted. An sor for t. in& certain positiOns wa$ deviSloped. As a matter 01 course, all uv•• taken during the ds:.1_re aeU.ed by dgolit1ona. (65) OIU' dead tor the two daY'. &peratioM ft_ 2' llA or DOl.. wbile tbft counted eliemT <Ie" was announeed ... .364. (tb6) 'helOT CCIl'lm'landu-ts plan to use the 3d kttall<m,~ 34th Imant17asa blG.<:ki.ng .to:rce to contain that portion of the enemy tOX'CGI on the eastern end oltha island and insid.e the t'UNl$ls of )klinta Hill" while the 503d Parachute RO! destro;red his forces on the 1I'4stern end of the island, DB succeeding batter thG an,yone could have hoped. (61) the night of 11 ,.bruary 1,45 _s again marked by intermittent herusing ti.re into the perimeter area. ~r uaual artillery an4 mortar harassing t:1.r&ot>nt.1nued.. Durln& the n1ih~ an ~ column, .8timat.d ate 20Q, as Jeen mov~ west from. ton. JIal:inta! HU.l a.rea.. fhe destroyera :wreal..,ted and fired .tar sh$Us tor Ul:wl1nation and a;rtUlery tire 11'&$ diteoted on thi8 column. Whether th1l column was moving into position to launch an attack on the forces on 'topside or :Morrison HUl 18 \1nknofitl. It that wu his intent1o:n, the artillery fire and:i.ng right on h18 colu.mn. had d:1.tc~ag.a. thi. undertald.ng. Lattlr events indicated that this fore. proba.bly hed been occupying posi tionll1 along the ronto from the be,aeb. area. to fopa1de and, aftElI'teeing the 1st Battalion land and being unalilil.e to rltbdraw inside klinta. 11111, brEI trying to make the~ wq to the· (64), (~)J Personal. knowledge. (66) A-al' overlay nW!:'IbEll' L~; i-7, Med1eal report,J (67) Personal. knowledge.
·_tem end ot \be island to rejoin the enemy torces located there. (68) Eulf on ~e morning ol 18 February, the lst BattalionJl ,0)4 f&:taI ebnte lnf~t17 kwed throup sqiitered cmemy fire and joirulld the un! till· em t0ps1~e.fh. three infantry bat.tallonconnandera .e~e called to the ! lO~r OP ~ a relhuflling of areo ot r $SponsioU1... ueompl1ahed. !i Each bfttal10n :.as gi"lfft an area of respol'ud.hility on the ... tern portion ~ , ! . . . of thiV itland !.eMral~ wedge shaped. The Boot-hem 2ione -.en" to the at ill" /-" , i ktt4'tonJ t~ M a.ttial1on getting t.heuea £r_ the no.t'th to \he southl i ' <'ri westJ fUld thei)cl Da:t.~ont. area extending trom the north to the southI .. ,. ''I . { ~;. (iee.p') ~ order given to the batta\l1on e~e:;:: .. 01 the' fl·· . . , Ii I. I I9'f i~4~r 8' pro~'bly one ot the shorteat IiU'ld m.ost terse operat1Oa / \,! / /'Me~ ev~. ,iyq~ 101ear the dUI'ltipa from your are... Coordinate ;yOWl' I. I ' II f l>pera~10.! ~gh .. or my statt.- (69) /11 l 1\ /1~' the ~ 1'.0 the· "'eh area 'IrIS $Ufticitmtly cleared eu17 on 11 ,/4 ~.h51 BG t!jf *_1:.100 of the diad and aerioualJr -.led to the < I I I . ., beach ~&4 GOuld. ~eg~. 1he dead andwo~ _rEt picked up at the beach r i. 1,' 1\'., " by .a~r tltaupGrt. (Water borne supply began tor all units. (70) I \ " , •• t~t this ~te was open, the 18t11 Portable Surgical Hospital as . I I mo.-Ill r!-oP.~. and suppOl"t.ed all unite on t.he uland.. '.theT set up in the I . ,. Darr4eiuJ qea adj.acent \ t.o the aid stations and rendered ou tatand1.ng mediIi cal <iUPPo1 tor the,'~~lance of the operation. (71) Operations on !La ',.bl"Uar;y 1945 continued along t&m1liar lines. I ;Pa.trols ~ed outtr_ the periI!l$ter.. &cc$mpan1ed by t1" thrower and I, d"'li:t~~n c~t~. ~le Demolitiona Platoon of the Reg:blentl\l. HeadI "\ I: . qUU"t,~!c:~fWY ·and·:I1-.o1ition partit1!a tl'Oltl the Engineer Oampa.ll1". Reduction) of the enU¢ ~\trong points follcnMd this general. patt.ena.. ':ire .UPPO~\ bT point blanklttre or the artUle):"1, 81-m."ll and 6O-mm mortara ! ,'~ I. i . I. buT~e. and the tire ~l the mac~ gunIt drove the enemy below grQlUl(,i. I I ' fhe usaul t tr00p$ thel'J;l'lOVed icu."a.rd and Eli ther destroTed the end17 by ~l'e from. the n_ ~hr01rer. or sealed. them. inside their positions ~ " I \ ,/ ',:,:' 't \ byd"olitiou. to el~te casualties of our mm. toreell, oaused by t' " /.'! \. (6Ill. 69), (70), Per.QW knowl..ed,ej (71) A-7 (Supp~ report, p. 2) ,Ii ! '
lnt.aJ(w UPIlml..."liS, .. ~ methcQd Gf u.~.in, the .fl.~.me thrO\'fel'$ as d$vised. Alt.l' the ~ni~ fuel o.fthe ~e thrOlflirliJ bad been directed into re(luinc1 extensive ¢t_€!11tionli to seal its m.:~ openin:gS, the Aassltlt troops t)l the p.. ratroopi~rl p'"lshad ahead .and dropl ' ed oft eng1neert:roops to complete the job. (12) i.'1aid.e. (7:3) (13M l!ap 1) ~o iMi.dent."l durillg; the night or 18 - 19 leb1.'1l11u·y 1945 111U$trat. fi:rainsrt the ~d Battal:i.orh As laoon as thl. attack -'2 discwered.. tht naval $u.p~Jort p~rtT called em t.he deatroyel's 1;,0 ril~e"tar shella to _s r(t:pelll:~d try daylight:.. S ome ene~~trocp$ Ittecee<:3ed in ref1.ch1ng the 2d i3!,:,ttillon CP ;;,nd t.o$sing grenad,as inside thliil blrtlding b~;fore they wS;nJ cliff'S. ( (72), (73), ('(4), Pereonal k!)owledge. 2> during the
steep that hand-oarrying of personnel and evacuation of casualties baok up the cliffs was not feasible. Xo overcome this difficulty, the Na., sent LaVPs to the beach car~ing water and ammllnition and evacuated the dead and wound$d on their :ret-urn trips. (75) the balance ot the day of 19 )~.bru&ry 1945 was spent in the S;:l'$tem- &tic elosing ot eaves and elimination of the enemy wherever' found. (76) Before da.rk, the perimetQr was pulled back to that held previous to its expansion to the west during the operations on 18 February 1945. It Wa,$ felt 'that the ell6my had definitely recovered from. hisin:i.tial shock and that the thinly held expanded perimeter invited attack. (77) (See Map G) The cu:m.tUative counted enemy dead had mounted to 1,553, of which t~ 3d :Batballon" 34th Infantry atOp Malinta Hill had accounted £01." 230. (78) Despite all efforts to oontain the eneq foroes inside Malinta Hill" each night they att~ted to infiltrate out from. the hill's many tunnels and some sucoeeded in their escape effort. (79) The operations 20-23 February 19h.5 continued along the same lines. (See Map G) Pa:trol$ were being sent ~ll aug the beach art-,a5 to clean out the cavel$ that could not be cleared from above. Here it 'Was impossible to. call on the eVer present air force for support. the cliffs in most of' the area were sheer and rose t,C) a height of several hundred teet. !he beach areaalo.ng the base of these cliffs was from 50 yarda Wide to. a £" leet in aome places.. The en~ had gun positions in caves along the ta.ce or the oliff that they entered trom tunnels dug from a top the cliff. Some caveawere locatad along the water line. Here the destroyers won their aurels. A :parachute of.1'ice1" would go ahoardthe destroyers to point out the positi;)llS that CQuld not be reached from the beach area or above. '1'he dl\:>stroyers would then move to within a few hundred yards (7;;;), (76), (77), Personal knowledge} (78) A-2, overlay number 13; (79) Personal kllowledge. 26
of the Ih~re and. (leal the. caves by tid.ng point blank into their entrances. U'tdtl ot ~ 2d B&tta:U.OIi tiucove:red and d~lStl"01'ed the a.pparatus wherebJ tbe enemy oOllld eleotr1eally explode .. 8·er1e. of lea mine.' located in the o~el at the b_,. &~tlJeell the island anGl iatatm P~mirl$ul& about It mile. to th. nQl'th.(8o) Tb~ aid givq by air support oannot be overe,t1:mAted. As an $xs,mple.. 31 P-47a tlq)ended 41'000 gallolU;lot JapalJa.. .38,500 pound b~s and ),000 r<>undt:l 01 .SO caliber ~t1on in a .snpport mission for one o~ll111a 1t. ~sa'U.kt onj.ust one position. (61) Knowing the eMlt\,t practioe of blG'Wing himself up when oornered, u all :tmportant queat1on:in eYe17One's lIl1.nct wu;~ "what would happen should he attempt to'tulplode Malinta Hill with ita many -t-wmels probably at-orad. i'ull 'Ot alt:rnanition and .~loa1ve$7'* At 2lJO hours the !light ,of al-22 1(;ibruar'119i6 the dr... <led. e:xpl.osioll OQ,eu1":red. the ot,1ft iall.and and th• • 0Uthem pwt of !e:~ f'eniMul".hook and trgbJ.ed like a loa1' :i,zl the wind. flam_·and debra pottreti i":tQUl evef:'¥ t~l enil'mCEh There were many land.$lides. casulties among the troops of the 3d Battalion, 34th Wa.ntry, atop t/lle hUl. were hea.'¥Y_ But the ass of the hUl atlll atHd after t.b4 explu;i.on. (6~) Lat~:r qu•• tlo~ of prisonera of war DO _re inlidet~.e hill and survived. the ~los1Qn disclosen that the ••losion __ in.... ntiotW.! aM'1fU meant. to el.Wr.late the troops blQckina the tunnel lixatraneea to the nIt $0 thiit 6. o."~ted.nemy attackeeW.G be laune:Md against the t~ on Topside. HQ1.fever W'ba t _ill int.el1dEKi asa controlled. explotd.on eXCeeded the intentions of thE! enerq commander and »'I!lsulte« in 1U.D1' C$.$lUlJ. tiel GOlli hta ovm troGps. In the eMu1ng confusion J!l~ e~ tried a 4aah to treed_ tram the tunnel eD,traneea aM those Who were not killed b1' heavy maeh:i..l1e gun tire and mortar con... centrat10u, heaped. to the .. temend. ot thEil island. All thoughts ot an. att$.ck on Topsu. ..-ere abandoned. (8) The last m&JGl? enell\Y ailS a ul. t &galrutt O'llr periaeter on Topside (SO) .Pe;rsoMl knowledge} (a1) A-4. p. 13} (82) A-1, p. 54. Personal knowlad~eJ (8).) Personal knowledge. 21
occurred about 0930 hour, 23 February 1945 whm an a ttaek by about 400 thisenem,y foree us deei:ma.ted by the oOllcentrated.. fire of the 2d Battalion from. tile land approach and the five inch naval t~ire of the destroyers from the lea aide. (84) (See .Map G) By dusk, ·23 rebru.ary 1945 the toll of counted enemy dead had reached a total of 2,466. (8S) OUr dead as 8. :result of enemy fire had risen to 99. (86) The ",estern ponion oi' the uland had been suf.fic:b;ntly cleared .10 that attention could be turned to the enG17 forces on the t.lS.il of tht is1a1\d. e4l$t 0;£ Kalinta Rill. (87) The ple adopt.d 'OJ' theM! StlI.DJIU.ndex- en:viaaged turning over respon..... lib1l1ty for the entire easterll portion of the 1s1andwestofKal:1nta. Hill to the Id Battalion, 50)d Parachute Infantry. The lst aaiJd Battalions, 503 Parachute Want17 would be mo~ to the 'Muinta Hill area and attack east1Jt column down the tail of the island. (8B) (see Map ti) the attack: jumped off early on the morning of 24 Februa.ry- nth the 1st Battalion :4:aading. With excellent fire support from the 3d Battalion, 34th Want-q from their positions atop Malinta Hill, field artmery support trom topside and: support :trom. naval and air tJ.niU, the lst Battalion had s.dv~c:ed east about 800 yard$ bY' night fall to a general.linCt Infant17 POint-Gamp POint. (89) (See Map H) The air units giving suppart during this phase ot the operation were at times So n~ua that long _its ocourred before the planes oould get in over the island and drop their deadly cargoes. The air observer and support party had. .et up their installationa atop llalinta. Hill whioh gave them excellent observation of the entire eastern end at the island. Bombers and fighter planes :returru.ng to their bases !rom strikes made on 1.111011 would ny over the island. and,il they had atl1' (84) fersonal. knowledge, (85) A-4, p. It>, (86) A-7, ledioal report, p. 11 (87) A-4, p. 16; (88) A.... 4, p. 16, Personal knowledge, (89) A-4, p. 16) Personal knowledge.
bombs m' a:num.m1t1.,)1'l lett, uk tor permil~,1on to join in the continuo'Q pounding attd strafing taking pl-.ee just Mf.!ad of tb® ground u8tl1.nlt 'W"liw. Targets tor tY;e ~i:r I'Uwort units would 0$ marked by smoke shells. At t~i the linemy WIt have themght that the entire air strength o£ the PaeU'io Smllt~st 'hU' directed againlt him. (90) .As t1lelst futttalion advarteed east. the< 3d Battalion, 50)d Para.... ehuta Infantry followed close bt~hilld and mopped up the enemy wl» had taken refuge in h1$ underground posit1ons. (91) During the night 0:£24 - 25 Feb:J:'il&rY 1945 i the enemy Wtil seen ooncentra,tiug a 1'01'0$ astima:ted .at 600 east of the line held bl' the lst llattal:ton. Just.s lrl,s attack was launched against our pOSitions, the cQne~trated lire of the parachute artiller;,r battalion ftS brought lilatt'1l on his tore.a. The islam tail at tnt. point is about 400 yards wide. Wl:th the Artillery- tire and the fire of an ent.1re battalion directed against this i'M-ce. 1t_8 docimated. 1A$s than 100 of the orig.in&l. fo!"C1J.I was believed to have sllrviv.-,d. (92) On 25lfebr'lar;y 1945. the 3d 'Battalion., 34th Infantry De relieved b7 the 2d Bat.talion, 1518t Inf'antry. The work of the 3d Battalion.. 34th Intant.r:.r had oontrl~llted :l..:rnmeasurabll to the tuccess of the operation. le~hen they depart-en from, the i.sland they left behind 81, en~whO had died at the mouth of their gUllS. (93) In thiill !l.$ut1me the 2dBattali'()¥l., 503d Parachute Wantl7 continued their mopping IIp of the western portion of the islaM. (94) (see!Utp H) , At! the eneID.y was ,aquEIle.eel ful'ther into the tail ot the island,. ot opportunit~ for fighter planes and PT boata patrolling the I~rOW channel sE)parating the island from southern Ba.tun.. (95) Operations on 25 February 194.5 extended thEl. i'orees of the 1st (90) A-6, J:h 18J (91) 11.-4, 11. 16J Per~()ruU knowledge) (92) 11.-7. p. 3, (93) A-7, p. 3; (94) A~4, lh 16J (95) A-4, p. 17; ;Personal knowledge. 29
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