• .. HEADQi.JART~iS AP.~ lY OROlfr·m FORCES ARMY WAR COLLEGE . Washlng'~cn 2S, D•. c. SUBJECT: Report on Oper ations and Materiel - For t Drum. Number 1991-45 . . ( ... ""· l ~ ' ..J ......___,, .;. 1 . furnished t he vier;s The att ac!1ed r epor t , r eprod11ced a s r~ceived in t .his l!<"ad'luarters , is for yonr :!.nforrriation ~nd file . T~ d·,es not r eprei:;ent necesca r i.ly of the theater couuriander, thi.s heanquarters or the '.Var J)epartr1ent . 2 . Distr ibuti on has been r.!ade as indica ted bel ow: --·- AGF :bis Div: CG C/S C::J. G-2 ?J-3 G- h fq t s : :Gen Stf l l .\GF Sta·!i :Che~: Engr : 2~a Ord. @ Sig AO SF St.f : OPD :G- 1 MID G-J O::h A:\F J\tH" f JDTI . . W. D. : 8 l : 10 l USFF.'1' :hl!DPAC: hf To ZfiL"'la :So i'ac BC : :Thoa.te:-:::: :Cent ers :Scl1oolc -:re:-:\: ice : B~ ~!l·C.3 ::isc AA ArmG.: TD : l AA . Armd: TD l AA xrma: TD .. A/13 :F.&SC: RD#l ·SJ51f'F: . - RD#J .. l cA : F" Ini' . i".lav Pr cht - ~ 5 CA !FA :.\/B : fm' :cav: J ~.c:ct :m .. : 20 ,'Jmy : 4tl~ Army: Eas te r n Defense. ~ Western : Command Defense : 3 . p omd T{fil 'O:!iT DISTFii3UTED : 6 October 1945 Pl ans OT!: Hist l .. AAA 1JO Ala s J.:ci Uar1Dbean 3 3 HD//l.t ilawaiian Defense Cora:iand 3 (3 0375) DEC ...... 1948 . . . .. .. ..
( - - - ·' ,. • SUBJECT : DE~LA('SIEIEIJ:'l.U gust Report on Oporat a. . · t ~ D ring the Ba taa.n - C0rreg1 or a ibn, ·. · b, . to ti May 1942.• TO Comma nding Gene ro.1 Army Ground Forcos WashirJ.g ton • u.c. 1, Ori onta tion. 1945 a . Geographical . Th0 entrance to Manila. Bay is gun r d.ed by 4 islands . (1) Corr eg idor - (Fort Mills). (2) Ca.ballo - (Fort Hughes) . (3) El Fr:\i l e - . (Fort Drum). (4~ Cara.b3. o - (lt'crt Frank) . b. Tactica l Command . The t acti ca l co1;.mand o. t the beg inning of Wo rld Viar 11 was known as the. Harbor DGt'em;e s of Manila and Subio Bays . This r Gport deals with Manila Bay only. The defens e s . we re divideJd into two part s . the .:,.;1. Corrnnand a nd the Seaward Defense Comma,nd.. Unde r the Seaward D0fense . Command were .;roups I ,, II ,, III c.nd IV . (The r e we r e no gr oupmonts ) . ThQ mission of the Seaward D0.f'ena Command wu s "to deny the en~ my the uso of Manila Buy a.ml t o p rot e ct the d e ba uuhroent of our No.v.y'therefrom"~ ' 2 • Fort Drum - Description a nd. Organizati on . a . Fort Drum was constructed on the small i sland of El Fraile in the south ~hanne l of ~a.nila Ba y in 1913,, and was termed the "Concre te Ba.ttle:;- ship11 • The entiro t op ot' the original isla nd was cut away t o b e low the su~ face of the water . On thisfotindation, the r e inforced con'lrete f ort was construct0d . ':'\'hen completed. it Vftl.s 350 fe~ t long l >y 1 44 fe et wide and the ma in top deck extGnd.ed 40 f eet above uea.n low wa t 0:r.. The gener a l out line of. the hull a· as seen from above . rosembled a s hip with the poin.teri bow toward tho China Sea , The 8:xte ri or walls of the fort werG arpr oxima.tely 20 fee t · th~ck , of reinforced concrete ~ . The ·decks hed an ovorhoad thickne ss of 18 f eo t of reinforced .co:nor e t e and steel , Thin F l aces on the t op de ck ove r the casemates and wh8re observat i ~ns. we lls existed, were 1991- 45 r r f
·" QE·c~ ~ ~~~~1rn compensated for ~U;;~n~I . 3 ~r 4 i~ches ~f ste~{.plate . Thrr overall resul 1.; was a top deck of uniform strene;th gc::norally equivalent to 18 fe0t of r oinforced concrete. The int erior of the fort was out into sever al compartments, cons~ructed on various int0rnal l evels. The l ewer l evel was the engine room, the fl; ool" of' which was six f eet b@low 11Jean l<?W water. a·bovo this was tho ma.in 1 i nternal dock called the "Typhoon DE!ck" . It was here t hat most of the troops were quarte r ed·. Otht»r com1?artments housed the fuel tanks , the powder a.nd pro jectile rooms , plotting room, stor age facil i ties , kitchen and ·mess hall compartmerts . Access to the Fort was had by means of the sallyport toward the stern which r a:r:i entirely across the ship, gene rally f r om north to south. The coyer for the sallyp0rt and entrance to the ty- . phoon deok was another approximate ly 20 f eet of concrete which had been an afterthought and had peen addE111 to Fort Drum as prot ection to the interior of the ship· a t a . l ater date. b • .h.rmamen t • (1) Primary armament, 'rhe prima rv ,.; rmament of Fort Drum otinsistod of four 14-inch (NaV'.3-1 ~ifles), two guns to the turret . The~ f orwo.rd turret was mounted on tho lower f orward por tion of top deck and wqs 9 f ue t below t.he uppo r l evel . Thorear turret was mounted im:nodiately in r cat of the forward turret , but on tho top dock; this maue it possible for the two turrets to fire in a forward position simultaneously, the rear guns firing over clle forward guns. The forward turre t was lim~ t od to 230°, while the rear turret had a 3ti0° traveirs e . The turrets were 14-inoh gun turrets , Mod.e l 1909 f or 14-inch guns , Model 1909 . The fa..c0s of the turrets were 18-inch armor plate, while the sides and r oar were 14 i nohes in thickness . The flat t op was from 4~ to 6 inohes in t~ickness. The turrets hd no exter nal openings for either vents or gunporta and this proved tc be very irr.portnnt l ater on. The . entire turre t was Barbette mounted and tho wute r shed armor was on tho out side of tho turret and very thin, l oss than l inoh . This presented a sizeable vulnerable area, exposed to enemy fire . on th0 top deck . As this ring was a.bout the turret wells . it exposed portions of our ' powder as well , as our personnel who were be low decks, to acy hits whioh mi~ht rupture th'is thin armor above . Tho interior ·Of each turret ·wn.s divided into two compartments , o~o for each gun; and in the r ear of the turret, sealed off completely~ was the turr0t 1captain's booth. Observation fr om the turrets v{a.s had by 3 periscopes , one for each gun and one for th0. turr e t capt ain's booth. The pcrisco?es extended o.bove tho top . of the turret for about 8 inches ~nd we r e covered with a very thin armor hood in tho roar,1about 3/4 inch in thickness. This was a · point we were to r egret later a~ the top of the turrets were hit me.xiy times and d~mai?;e was done t o s ome of .the inDE ClASS IFIE D struments . '. ·-S . .'... " ··~'
.. , ' , . ~~~~ ~ ~,.;r...~ plm~, .,._,..,, ,.'ifttA._ i . ,ftp \, ri ~~1. ~JHU These turret&: ~'ef.'e "c~-tlq_t~lY~~.e~c!tn]c trolled . The ,~ - _I r ~{. ,.. I ... ,. ir 4-~. ammunition hois~ Mdii& · ~1% ¥bi<ijt~lje wde r fr om below, The turrets wer e traversed artd the guns were e l evated by electrical g~ars . It was practically impossible to operat0 the turr ets without power as the traversing of the turrets by hand was extremely s l ow, in fact, it took about s ix hours to t r averse the turrets 180° manua lly. The loading was acrnornpli shed by e l ec tric r ammers and the gu_ns were blown with compressed air, The elevation of tho 14- inch guns was limited t o 15° whi ch limited our maximum range from that height of site with normal ballistic c onditions~ t o 19, 200 yards, (2) Secondary armament . The s econdary armament of Fort Drum consisted of f our 6- inch Naval rifles , two each in two casemate s, Two of these guns , one above the other , were on the starboard, or north side , ·and tow· of them were on the port , or south side·, Each of thes(J batt•;;rie s had one gun above the oth€.r on separat e lavol s with a separate casemate fer each gun . The de ck , of fl oor, between the gunsof each battery was .ste0l about 3 or 4 inchos thick. The two 6- inch ·guns on the starboard (north side) were called Battery· McCray, bGl onging to' Jroup III with its 1 CP on the south side of Corr egidor . Group I II wus me.do up of secondary armament with the miasion of guardin~ the south charmel . The two 6- inch por t e;uns (south ·sid~ ) we r e called Battery Robe rts. They were not a part of any er oup , but came strictly under tho Fort Drum Commo.nder . These casemate blisters were constructed of 6inch armor p l uto , r ecessed about six f eo t in the side of the concre t e hul l. The fields or f ire for both batteri es was limited to npproxirrately 120° of traverse . Or iginally rthe e l evation of these ·guns had been limitad to 12°, This was gover~ed by two factors in construction, the size of the port through whioh the guns fired i n the armor plate and the fact t~t at 12° e l~va~ion, th0 br eech v~s a l most down to the floor of the cnsema te. The f ort r ecord book and the emp l acement r ecords kept before the war, indicate~ that the 12° e l evat ion h\d proved to bo unsa·~isfe.ct ory duo to two fact or ·s . Firs t , tho l oading operati on with the ~)reo oh so near- th0 "fl oor harepqr ed smooth loading and ramming • . Second, the gtins wer e slugg ish ·on going from r ecoil to battery, Thuse things had hampe r od tar5et practiCe and after mariy r eports a.nd much oorresponde:rice , step·s had been taken .to limit the guns t o 10° elevation . · When the war started , this10° elevation was in effee"t , whi ch l imi ted the range of this ·armarr.ent t o 101 200 yards . Three months a fte r hostilitie s began; the gun mount~ were a.gain altered . tP per l!lit 12° .0£. . elevation, Thisinoreased . . f tho r ango -~DECLASSif I ED 1
•• .. . ;.. . ... The abOVC3 mentio;ned artillery comprised the entire armament on Fort Drum up to the beginning of the war. A diagram showing the fi e lds · 6f fire reveal a. wide a rc or· dead soace in the st ern of the fort• bnly one battery, the r eair 14-in;h guns. would traverse this field of fire to the r ear in. Manila. Bay. The fa.ot · that the oe.geniast was dirootly between the turr·at and stern. oo.uspd this battery to ho.ve a sever e lirnito.tion due , to dead space. Even, t hf)ugh the cag;emast 'hf~d not existed, the tpp deck couplea. with the he i ght c f site created a dead spa.oe • This meant that enemy surfo.ce craft , ap;proaching Fort Orum from the reat in Manila Buy, could not be br1ought unde r fir e from tho guns of Fort Drum. When the ,Japanese b.r-rey- gained control of M-mila , and the Ca.vite shoreline, this w0alme ss became i;i.' problem. The fa.ct chat the enemy had se ized a number of largo harbor boats ar.d countless other power craft and barge: s at Ma.nila. , heightened the acuteness of the problem. ~~·ction was t aken t o r emedy this I ~ituation. A Model 1906 3-inch seacoast gun,, wi tin pedesta l mount, was shipped to Fort Drum. A concrete bhse on which to bolt the pedestal yms: poured and tho gmi was mounted 12 January 1942 , and desi.ignated at Battery Hoyle. This <smplace roent was on top edge of the stern. T·he following day , 13 January, at 1430, an enemy vessel wa,s observed approaching Fort Drum fr om Nia<'.l• As it drew nea.r6 it turned out to be a double-dcok vessel ojr t he inter-islnd type. Thatthe enemy was w0 ll aware of · the :0ld weakness was evidont ·as she bo1Te down up·oo th0 fort,, k eeping thE: cr1gomast be tween her and the 14-inch turre t. Apparently she had not ~iscovered our ·latest addition ... Major General, Moore called ilort . Dl"tlm and inquired if the ,Wwly emplaced 3-inch gun could be fired.. On r eceiving an a.ffirµiative answe r,, he ordE~ red the Fort Commande r to open fire with the 3-inch gun. Remember that tho conoreto was les~ than 24 ho~rs old and that. the range drum was without graduation. The. piece ha d neither b een bore-sighted nor checked .for , e.oourate 1le.vel . · A five-man orew of old artillerymen were assembled. As tho to.rgc t grew noaror, observers . no ted th~1~ the decks were lined w:i,th enemy trocps in uniform and O'iviliEms, apparenbly ma.king an inspeoticn trip .to . ·.the area in · the r Har of Drum. ·' . . " I •
·" ~ fi,' E:~olalA ~~tif:JE:Dn pos:tion :inder . m:Jt iJ f Pllrds. The first round was off in defl ect i on . T e apu.nese surprise was ovidont by tho mass confusion on tlor deoks . She began a fast turn whi ch exposed her ster n . The seventh. and e i ghth r ounds we r e ne&r misse s throwing geysers of water on the target . 'l'ho ninth round was a d~reot hit aft on the lowe r deok~ The t enth r cund was short as the enemy was pulling cut of range , Never again did t he enemy attempt to appr ooh Fort Drum from the r ear• This was the first battery of aeacoast artillery t o open f ire on the enemy in World Wa r II . (3) Other a r ament . For nnt~a ircr&ft artillery the r e were t~o 3- inoh ~obile AA guns jacked down on spider mounts on the deck. Fire control was by dir eotpr and ste r eoscopic height finder. Combination protection f or beach Aefense nnd low-flying planes was provided f or by four 50- ca libe r , wate r - oool ed , Al~ machine guns with impr ovised mcunts an·d two 50caliber a ir-coo l ed mahino guns dona ted by tho Air Corps . Thirteen calibe r 30, Ml wu.ter~ oooled machine guns with Infnntry mounts served f or beach 51of01ise . This was augemnted by f our subThompson mnchine guns secured fr om t he 4th U. S. Marines through the detachment of im r ines on Fort Dr um. A quantity of Springfie ld rifles , with some l ong barrels, pump shotguns oom- 'p l e t e"d the defenses . Illumina tion was. by searchlight . Number twelve seacoa s t searchli ght was .located on the t op of the oighty f oot cag0mast. Thi s light was put out of action the first da.y li'o rt Drumwas t aken under fi re . Number e l even s eacoas t searchlight was located -on the southeas~ sid~ of Fort Hughes . This light was under the di r ect command of F'ort Drum. Its ' a ission was t o p:.· ovide ill imination of that pa.rt of Manila Bay fr om Ce.vita t o Rustinga Point , jus t southwa st of T0rnate . The purpose of this was t o prevent -one ll\Y attacks by wate r fr om the r ear of Corregidor and the fortified islands . This light was i n action until the surrender. The r o wa s alsp one .60- inch mobile .a.A s ea rchlight with . steel miLrror. Despit e t he f ac t that this light wa s hit r ep~atedly during the seige , it was always r epaired t o such an e~~ent that it $upplemented the illimination of the wa t er area and a fforded an emer gency light aboard Fort Drum. The daim.ge caused by ene~y shell fir e m~e it imposs ible t o ue it to illuminato enell\Y aircraft. Finally1 f or immediate prot ecti on of the Fort in the way of il l uminat i on , t:her e we r e twG> 12- inoh beach de f ense lights thnt remained i n a ction until the end . c . Communica tion. The prinoipl a methoq of communico.tion was by submar ine tc l oph<'ne cable s connecting tho f ortified islands . Despite the t ons of explosive dr opped by the • :~;t:~~:~;~~ iif C{A~s~~if)~f:~~:1!n°~p~~~tion
·' I~~ ~ ~ · i• 6 -: <\ ,.,, I .. !~ • f' 1,.£ u l) \ ·! : ' ~ A short wave r ad io ~e ~; ~available foi- .- use a t f or communic~tions with the harbor defens~ . However , it was seldom used. t Blinker si6nal lamps wero used batween all tho fortified islands and due t o the high sta t e of training of the porsonnel , this was ext~emely successful . To pr ~vent detection by the enell\Y at night, the lamps ~e re placed i n the breeches of one of the 6-illah·1rifles. The rifle ars then laid at the pr ope r a zimuth and el evation wt-ich caused ·the piece to be airood .at .the fri endly r eceiving station. d. Supply . Fort Dr um was constructed with good stor age space fo~ most supplies and i t was not nticessary t o send a supply boat too often . This W!:l.S ve ry fortunat e .as the enGmy artillery on the Cavitu S~ore could eas ily destroy any ship carrying supplies to eithe r Fort Drum or For t.Frank, if it was not o- ~pera ting under cover of absolute darkness . In f act, the har- ~or boat Neptune was destroyed by enell\Y artiil er y while unloading s upplios ~ t Fort Frank one night i n Febr~ ry 1942 . Aft er this in ~ident , no boat would make t hisrat i on. run QXcept at night when there was no moonlight . · · · Water. . was one of the ohief concerns of the Fo r t . · A boat towing ' a wat er bar ge would t~e up alongside and f i ll the fr e sh water storag~ - ~anks. The Fort was.equipped with metal tanks f or thie purpos e. but the oapacity was not adequate to c~rry over the long!interva l s 'Yh en no boat arrived . This was ~a~ed ied by two steps. I n peacetime, ther e wer e two largo wooden water tanks on the top deck of the Fort. One of these tanks wa s a t l east 14 f eet high and 12 f e&t in.di~meter . It was of wooden stnve oonstruction, bound wl.th iron hoops . In the fir st days of _ t~e war, this .tank was empt i ed, torn down, oarriadbe low t o t~e - an5ine r oom and reassembled . The seoond method of incr easing water stora ge .~ faoilities was ·t o u~ilize the empty 14-inch powder o~ns• These cans heid better .t·h~ 50. ga_:pons .oaoh, and severe..l hundred wer e ut ,i lized . The. f'.6rt pe rsonnel wa s pl aced an llta ho.nor t o co~ sume absoluteiy no mor e : w~te r than was .necessary . Th~ se m~n we r o soldier s . No rationi ng was neoessary, Ther e was an old evapo rator , but. it . requi~ ed too much fuel to op~rate this ma- ! : I ohine , and oil was t; Qo pre.cious . ' The ha lf ra.tion on food was inauger a t ed at the outse t of host ilities. Fort Drum adhor od rigidly tq this or der , despite the fac t .that there was an extra supply · or fo od availab l e on t l;te Fort, due to t~e .fa. ct · ~.ii~ma -. thirty- day extra ·supply oa:ftm· ph~~~~Jf. ~ ~ s wise as it was nover kno ~-e ra~ion ' .boat would . ma~e:1 its run. ' ~ ~r\\ ro.1 .. \.,•I h ?to "\I~-~' W" :t1 . ..1·~;:: ·. ' , . .J' .. - 0 utmost i mpor tance to Fort Drum was fue l oil. The 14-inch guns were depend.ant upon electric power f or a ll their ( . '.>i ,.
·' t funolf c· ~- \Ti A ai~lEDve our large Diesel. gene ra 4 ·o j~ ~!'-\ • , lpless . Cons 19 rva t1on was · ~. vftii~t>~ · ... The engine s we r e us ed only when necessury. Less than 30 days sup~ly was on hand \\hen Lieut. Gen1 ral Wainwright or de r ed tho surrender . 'The sup!_)ly of' .tune rican flags wfis exhauste:i as the enemy simply blew them to shreds . However , t he flag was kept flying at a ll times by paiiltingtlie stars and stripes on i;alvuni zed shee t iron. e . Pe rsonnel. Tho appr oximate stren6th of :B'ort Dr um · was 240 cf.f'icers and men cons is ting of thv f ollowing or ganizations and . detachments . 'From the 59th c~ , the re . Wt\$ the Fort . Headquarters a rid two batter ies ; Bathry E and. Heodquarters Batter y , 2nd l:atta. l ion . Thi s was augmont0d by the following dotnahments :· 13 Mar ines f r om the 4th U .s. 'Marino Corps Regi - mon.t; dotachment approxima.tely 6 men from the t>Oth Coo.st .\.rtillcry f or mnnini; the 60-inch antio.ircraft searohlight J 4 Pli.illippine Scouts from Fort Frank manning tho B- 2 station f'or that f ort; rredicnl detachment , one office r and one enlisted IDD.n; Ordnance personnel were civilian Ordnunoo mucllinists , na imbei r ing 3 or 4 . a ppr oximate ly 12 April 1942 , tho Fort was r e inforoed by 20 mm fr om a tunk battalion t o au6mc nt the garrison . These men had escaped fr vm Bataan whvn that command had capitulated . ·~11 personnel manned oert11in b a ttl e :::to.tion s r egard l e ss of the ir organizo.ticn . The r e we. s not suff'iciont p1.,. rs onne l · to men a l l ·the posi tions at any on '3 time, thur e for o,, persomie l might have 2 e r 3 ussi:~nmcmts d-:>pond i ng on tho Signal given at the call "Battle Ste. t i ons 11 • 3: History ·a . Per iod imrr.odfotely proceding wo.r . 011 the night of' 29 ·November , Goner al Goon;e Mcor e , oommandin6 the hurbor defense s , suddenly summoned o.11 tho officGrs r:if the c ommand t0 the ir r egi mental headquo.rt ors. The r a , orders were issued that the intire command of the Har·bor Defenses of ;v1a.n ila. and Subic Bays would . im."Ilediate ly take the field. The barro.cks were to be abandoned and troops moved to the 'fiAld in a.ccordanoe with previously prepared wo.r plans . The entire command would be alert .at all times, and that under no conditions would less than a a l f the tactical armament ·of the defenses b e out of o.ction_due to absence of personnel . The entire deferisas we r e to be prepar ed to open fire imnediat<: ly on any enomy tar gets . The complete move from peacetime to wartin~ C'onclitioris was to be comple ted by 1200 the foll owing day. In the meantime , a ll 'organizations would report r oady f'or action as soon as they ·we r e aotually moved an<l s e t up in the field . Approxiiill i E· to the attuck on Pearl Ha r bor an. o f ficial 51E!lfff e f ense He~dquarters , whioh st t · o i fied as enemy , had beon sig e · ·Lingayen ar ea . - 7 ..: ·
...A. 8.-~me~~~· .. ·- ~-- c 14 b . Period . • ~nU,1Br-" - ~~-!i?. t:,fl • ediat0ly upon the notificat. • er p~ ~~ ~ ·. ~ 1 I Fort Drum ' took find step s to c eg_'f 'its dooJC !'or action , In poaootime , tho troops assigned to Fort Drum had lived topside in tempora ry wooden bar racks . These barr acks we r e shoved over the side , ' During thispe riod , there was ve ry little action in the harbor dafenses . Only a f ew ' cncI!\Y planes fl ew about the fort t:t.nd occasionally they wou ld be taken under fir e by somo of the antiai r craft batterie s on 'tho diffe r ent forts . c . Period 29 December 1941 - o J anuary 1942. On Decembe r 29 a t 1200, Corregidor wa s attacked for the first time by enemy twin- engine bombers . There was be tween 50 and ·so of these bombers flying a~ altitude s ove r 2,0 , 000 f ee t . They wer e a ocomppaied by numerous Japanese dive- bombers, including nine oldfashioned bi- planes . These attacks continued daily on Corr egidor thr ough b January . During th:1.s pe r iod the re were no attempted bombings of Fort D1·um . This Fort assi sted the other islands at thistime , by taking the enenw bombers under fire with her two AA guns whenever the enemy came within r ange . d·. Per i od 6 January 1942 - o February 1942 , During this pe riod , there was pract ically no enerr.y activity conducted against the fortified island . The enemy air efforts were limited to occasional observa tion planes and to a f ew attacks on shipping in the vicinity of tre fo r tifi ed islands . On l~ January 1942, at appr oxi.r!Jltoly 1430, an cnell\Y vossol approa6hing Fort Dr um was t aken under firo by the 3- i nch deck guns and the enemy fl ed , (Note of historic inter e st . 2o January 1942, Batt- . e ry Geary , consisting of 3ight 12 inch seacoast mode l 1896 mer~ tars opened fire on Japanes e g ~oundforce s dug in on Longaskawavan Point on the Bataan Peninsula . Tho same batter y fir ed again on january 27th at the same targe t. The enemy had landod behind the Bataan l ine on this point from submarines . Their positi ons was the tip of· the point on an ar E:Ja 200 yards l ong by 100 yards wido . 33 rounds wer e fired of 090 pound point detona ting ·pcrscnnel shells . Of the 33 r ound fired, 32 woro · hits . The corrected range was 14, 200 ya rds whic h l acked 200 ynrds of being the maximum r ange . This i s of historic inte r es t as this was the fi r st prima ry bc ttory of s eacoast artille ry in the history of the United Sta t es of .America t o ever open fir e on an enemy from our fortif~oations . ) . e . Per iod 6 Februa ry 1942 to 9 April 1942 . 6 Februa r y 1942 a t 0820 Fort Dr um vres fir ed upon by Japane se artille r y . This initial action lasta~3t hours . It was t he first for t in !~; . ha~~~rw~:~:m-:.ns;re~t,~~;e~0~~en~~un~~r:f~r,~~nJ~~~~:~er~:;i~1she ll . The fir a i~ · o 85' s econd.,s . • -,. __:_ • ~ ~ • ~ • ~i. ,,. ~ .. • ··" ... ---- ...I ,_. c..z.;' \:&.'" • - .l ~ • ·'
·" 1Jf ~I ,~ ~~fi''r'.Jl The ta r ge t was t~e cage mast ari( ,Q ~{j1 ro#_ ,._f l at ions . A f ew. round s of co unte r-~attery wero f ed -~ the 3i nch de ck. 5un ancl the o- in~h oas 1.;mate 0 uns B..itto.ry Robe r ts ( south side ). ThisJo.panese fire continued daily for about two woek s with fewe r r ounds be in6 fir ed oaoh day . The damage wo.s vvr y limit ed und in no way affected the t a ctical situation . Fr om thi s time until 10 April 1942, For t Drum f i red occas - icma.l two E;Un , 14 inch salvo::; in the o.reua a.lent?; the Cavite Shoro . Fir ing oft en took place at night . Th~ t e rgots ~ere a.ruas r eport ed by '3-2 ope r ators who we r e . aoti:ve in t ho oncmy hold. terr itory: . They consistod primar ily of ~momy t rot<p bivou:ic s . 17 Murch 1912 , Fort Drum und Fort Fr:Ank undo rwrmt a very h<:H1vy bombardment from J npunosc 240- mm ho "wit.i'JTS qroplo.ecd or., the Cavite shore . This action. continuad for UP,proxitn0:~ely two weeks • . TheSCJ w.:.re tho first 240 - mm W~Apons to be usud F~gains t har bor dofens t;) s . At i~ a.st six .240-mm howitzors wor o el}lployed in this bombnrdmont . 'rhey ri r c'd. two gun salvos 1md f rom tho location a.f the hi ts, it was appa r ent t h ...:. t the a rtille ry wa.s well disp l.: rsuci in the mountains b.lck 0f the Cevi te shurelin<:; . The; fi r e was c oming f r om thre <:: wi<le l y: s op11ratod positions . Countor-battc ry fir e wus b r ouGht to b e::i. r f r om tim~ to . time by ull the fort~i'ied i s hnds • , Fort Frank v~hioh was only 4, ZOO yards ' trom Fort Drum, suff vr EJd s0rious .ma t:e riel damng0s during thi s bombardl'!l1,n t . Almost all · oi' her t;uns were out of act i ori tor a cori 'si,u'i:;r able pur iQd of time and s ome of th~m ~er a out of action perl11J'lent l y . The principa l targ(:jts on J!'0rt Dr um Wf:~ re th.e two ·11:-inch turro ts arid the ousematc Ba 1;tc ry Hoborts . .Bo.ttery R~~e rtri. was tempor::i.rily out of conu:ii:.; sion nnd tho No . 1 , or upi:rnr 6un, wa s knocked out pe rmunently by hits on tube . 1'ho. 14- inoh turre ts ,. d~spite many hits on ~ho si<le , r e ar and t op ,.· r ema i ned in a.otion . 1'ho prqj ectpes ctr iking tho G- ~nch · casemu~e causod fhshGs cf fi r u t o appear a ll the way ins ide t he ves sels to the typhoon de ck. Thin created a. :;rave fir '3 hazar d . It was r1ot w1common f o r fi r e calls to sound at 11Jast ·one «;; every five minute s . Steps w0r e pr omptly t aken t u throw overy t lH .nc; wl').ich was .inf.l ammable and not abso.lutely noC.essar y for aQt i on on board the ship, .over the s ide . Every s qua r e foot of the int eri.or of' the surface of the cnseniates w~s deeply dented and t orn by heavy i'ragmen ta tions ~ The s.e fr agments cal'l)6 t }:lrough the open gun port aud 'through the ~arrow c r aoks a.roUJ;1d the horizonta l shie ld. The two 3-inch. an~iai~craft guns . ~ere completely demol ished in ,.
. ' Ot~lA~U' lt.li .. Enemy dive bombers began attacking Fort l urn ·s Febr~' ~ry 1942, and continued until the surrender~ Seve r a l a t tacks Wt1 r e rmde daily end always i n the si:.mo nunnor • Invarie.bly two dive bombe rs would approuoh Fort Druffi and circle the Fort seve r a l times just out of r ange of the 50 ca l i ber machine guns . The pilots ware evident ly attempt i ng to stampede the 6\lilners into breaking fire discipline and opening up at r anges beyond their effective fire . The personne l manning the 50- caliber mahine guns would hold their fire until the pl:mes came within range . The first plane would come over maneuvering and would never drop a bomb . He evident ly acted as a de coy . The seooni pl ane would then glide in o..nd hastily release his bombs •. The fir s.t plane was never taken under fi r e by th(;i gunnc:.1 r s as they prefe r r ed to hold t heir fire for the plane which atua;J.ly mado the attack . The Japanese evidently had groat r e spect for 50oaliber fire as they seemed very nervous in th~ ir bombin~ opo'!-a.tions und wer e very inaccurat0 . Tho. two a ir-cool ed 50caliber guns were put out of action by Jape.no s~ artille r-1 . f5i!"ea but thc3 f our water-cool ed 50- oal.ibe r maohine g uns continued in action unti l the time of' :-::urrGnder • Hi ts we r e s cor ed , but no enemy plan es wer e downed until 6 May 1942 , s ome thirty minutes ::;>rio1· to the surrcn:ler wh1.m a J .ipu.ne s l3 dive bombo r was downed i u the wa t e r be tween Fort Drum and Ni a.c • Despi te the f'act that the 50- oaliber guns· only account od pos itive ly f~r one plane , they pr oved t hc:- ir v:1lue as the Jupaneise i n attemp ting to avoid the 50- ca liber ma chine gmi fire , s cor od only 5 dive bomb hits . Thes e 5 bombs caused no danng? • After the 3- inch ant i a i rcraft guns on For t Drum and Fort Fra nk we r e destr oyod, th0 enemy wa s ablu t o make any unmolested high bomba r~ment a.ttackson Fort Dr um f r oo whatever altitude they chose . The bombing was ext r ome l y inaccurate . Ouly two out of hundreds of bombs dropped by the hic;h borube rs str uck Fort Drum, and the r esults wer 1.1 of no consequence s . One of t hose rnis iles l~ndedon the sl oping f a ce of the forward turr e t , just ~bo~e one of the 14- inoh &uns . It glanced, hit t he 14- inch 15un and detonu:t; ed, but o~ns (;d abso lutely no damagti • The cage mast was se rving no usefu l function 1'1.nd in a.dd 1.tion to th,is served as an il. i min;; l ' Oint t o thi:i en.o.IJ'\Y artillery . It crea t ed a dead spo.oe to the i ·ear for the 14-inch guns , and ther e was a possibility that it mSght fall und er l a t er bombardments . Should it f all, i t mi ght ~lock the r ear 14- inch t urr ets. I t was di smant l ed ~d t~ken do~n . Beach qefonso positions on Fort Drum wer~ oonst~ntly i mlrovod . They woul d be dam:igod during the dny ,, but fully r epa i.-ed during the n ight . In vi aw of the he uvy attack£ C•D Fort Dr um and Fort Fr nnk,, coupled with G2 r,eports tha t tho enemy was asumblying numerous bar6~ s in protected positions a long the Cavite shor e- !!:~t !:a~i~~a;hDCDTrtl~m-~rrnemi! :~i~st .· ' • -,_,1:.-t1·[ ~-·~ U ~ ~ ~ ~ i i:v~,
j' . ' L:i.h. . coc:ndotion;;.. p1DfDJr&e~~frl~Bt:wo forts to ass~st eac~ I#. ~1 .- 1~ ~ , ~,. <y . y amphi bious opera tion . -· ·.. .>$ "" l.t ...it ~ ·' ' "j • •. , . . - ... tl ~- v The morale of Foi·t Drum JIO.S 0ccepti ·nally hizh. Trai ning continued until tha final d ay of surrender . I • f• Pe riod 9 April 1942 - 6 May 1942 . ·Bataan surrender ed 9 Apr il 1942 . The next few day3 were ones of prepar ation for tho enemy . unending columns of troops , guns and oqu ipmBnt rollc:d do~ the peninsula and wont into po~ sition for the sei5e of tho for.tified islands. The tempo of the fir~ a gainst Corrogi1or and Fort Hu_;hes gradually incrcas·sd. The Japan.eso artillGry was of all calibors , but 150-mm and 240- mn were the most pr€valent. Fort Drum wuo culled on for. oounter-battc ry missions on frequent occasions v:ht.; n the encr.-y was within r o.ngo • The co"ordinatc s Gf t ho tar~o ts ~er e f'urnish0d by tho Sea.ward Defense. Coinnadc r . '~he spotting for this f iro wa.s dono from observation stations of high eleva tion on Corregidor . Very f ow ro'l.lllds we r e generally r e quired · to complete the miss~on . The moment the turrets w1:, r 0 traversed , enumy ba t t c r 1os from Cavito would be gin shollin6 Dru~ . Their fir e would be dir ected at the turret which was bein6 us od at t he time and despite the many hits , th~ turrGted guns we r e never out of action when called on to fire . Duri ng tha latte r part of April, the enemy used a ~ausage balloon on Bataan for artille ry observation . On Z7 April (Empe r9r ' s birthd.o.y) the. Japanese trea t ed Corregidor and the fortified islands to an artille ry show. Botweon 125 and 150 shells p3r minu tu we re laid down . Thiscon tinue d until the oth of May. It was during this pe riod that l''ort Drum was fired on by 105 - mm ba tt eries f r om Bataa n . Our forward · turrot wa.a in o..ction. at tho time and tho ir pr ojectihs hit the turrot thre o ·successivo times , then ceased fire . Tho nee.rest -poss ihi'e position for that 5un was 17, bOO yo.rds . Thor e was no d amage to the turret . By 5 May a lmost all of the batteries cap able of firing on Batuan wor e ·out of action . . On Fort Drum, an act of naturo of no small consequence had ~een takJng place for the pa.st three ~onths . The ordinary method of ventilation a·board ·Fort Drum was by means of two lar ge exhaus t fans . In the initial bombardment of the fort , these . fans had been · put out of action and as a oonsequonce, ther~ was no ventilat ing .system operatfng or,t the Fort from that :p3riod on• ;... As a rosult , . the hoat f r om the ohgines :~nt~;.~~:~;fj(tfA~S.lfi°£i. in•hl· hnd I .. t -~ -
Ut.Lt-~~lf 1til, . For some tiire tho thcrmom6t0r had stood at over 100° . ' As a consequence,, the powdGr fo r the 14- inch 1-; uns in the . powde r i:naga.zine had amp:Le opportunity•to become uniformly h.;;at od to a hi3h temper.a tur~ . ~ As a. result of this h ca tcd powder, the r o Was 8. 'high increase in initial ffiUZzle Vf!lOC.i t y I Which, in turn, ga~a a increase in range. ·On the night of May 5, 194.2, the enemy b ogan amphibious ope r a tions a ga inst Correg idor . The assaul t boats •ca.mo from the vicinity of _Cabcaben and l a nded troops on th0 Kinle y Fieli s e cto r be t ween Infantry e.nd Cal va ry points. At dawn, € May 1942., observers on Co rregidor spotted large conce ntra tions of enemy troops in assembly areas just north of Cabcaben. The coordinates of th e se en emy position& wc:. r .e plotted e;nd D·rum was ordered to fire . It will b e r emember ed that the normal maximum• r ange wa. s 19,200 yards, w{lile this tare;'e t was well over 20.,000 yards . Fire was openod a nd the:; target w.as we ll within . r :ange . The fort fir ed 4-gun s a lvos into this a r ea e~pendin5 ove r 100 rounds . The .F'ort was then ordered to take en emy burgo s in the north channe l approaching Corre gidor under fire. Drum r eplied that they cou ld not see the b~r60 s for the densA cloud of dust and smoke arising from Cor ogi dor., the Comm~ier ~~ported back : ' 'Jus t fire a nywh0 r e in that smoke ., anywhere bo twcer.. you and Co.b caben and you can 't mis s them" . On Fort Drum c:i: ord e r was isued for " Turret Commande r's a ction" D. nd tho t a r gr ts W0re taken unde r fir e . The ob s e rve rs on Corregidor r e pc: rted the. t t h0 barges were being hit and to keep up the f ira . Firini:; from Drum continued a t int e rval s all morning until 1140, wl;ten the order was g iyen to ·a0stroy tho guns and surr0ndor. Firing would only c ease long <moug;h fo r the Soc.wa rd Def Em se Command to ass i .;;n a n ew target . During a ll of this ti.rr.e , Fo~·t Ururr. was under constant Eirtillc ry fire fr om cavite and en~my heo.vy bobmors . Their action was fl.lt ile a.nd at n o time wer~ the 14i n ch guns silent . Tha pe r~onne l of Fort '.)rum h ad exce llent opportunity t o l earn of the effGctiveno ss of fire that d~y when they we r e t a.ken away to c point s outh of Manila Bay for punishment by the ,To.panese . The Ja.panostJ office r in charge of the punishment was the brother of a J apane s e Co l one l commanding one of the a ssuult r e giments in ~ he assemb ly a r ea north of Cabcaben. It appeared tha t the Fo r~ Drum fir 1:i had k.ill0d his bro t.h c r and almost 3, 000 troops, in that ar~a . Fo r this; t he p 0r sonne l of Fort Drum was s~v~re ly p~ishod. · g . The surrender of For t ) rum. At 1140, ti May 1942, the Fort Comma:rrl e r of Fort Dru1u waSSuiiiiuonod to the t e l ephone and t old 'by tbe High Command to de.nolish the a rmnment on Fort . ~~~~ii~~:~:~~dMl~~n~w~it~E:up~r:~~:tge~dw!pli:.~s~::•:~~d~~ct ly cmlist~q men, · · · · , · ' : ~ · ic ":1; · ecn pr epared in .. .I . ' . . \» I ~ ~. . ..
J I .• ...... ... . - 11r ~ ·· . .... .- ~ t;; I• ~ ::::i:~~ :~ ~:g~11· ~~1~31a·£g~=~~~li~y!~:~r muzzl e s . Then "r '. ~ · ' und fired by . :::I • ~I n:eans of electr cu pr me rs w1 tn long wire s a t c ohe d, eo that they mi6ht be fir ed from .the li ght switches in the oenter of the ship on the •Typhoon Deck . 11 All of the guns on the Fort were oente r of the ship on the "Typhoon Deok11 • All of the guns on the For t WGre handle d in this 111Bne r, except the 3-inoh b~tt e ry and the up~er c- inch gun in Ba tt ery Robe rts on the south side . The 3- inch batte r y hd s us taine d a h it on the breech from a J apane se bcmb some 25 minute s prior t o the surrende r order~ Tho . b re~ oh of t he 3- inoh gun was thr own ove r board and all the me chanism and thC3 broGch rece s~ we r e sledged with a heavy sledge - hammer. The uppe r 6-inoh gun i n ~~ ttery Roberts had be0n p e r roanantly put out of action by Japane se art ille ry fire . All the communicati ons 1nnteriol was smo.shcd and thrown over the s :id o . The plotting room, with a ll of its ' equipment , was cut into' s1!19.ll bits with an ti.xo , a ll th3 r 0oords wt. re thr.own into the water. All the me.hine gµns , rifle s , und p i s tols wore sma shed and thr cwn into the wa t or . All of the s !Dli ll- a r ms ammunition was ca rried t o the t op' d e ck a nd thrcwn ove r ~he side . The r emn ining 14-inch powde r cnns ha d the i r t op s t uken of f and bucke ts ot' sDlt wat<; r wor e -pour i;d j_ntc the ca ns with the powde r. The o- i noh powde r !i1S.&~ zincs wer e fl ooded with sa lt wa ter froffi the sprinkl e r system, uut the r 0sult of this wa s unknown . Ame rica n troops wor e ke,t on the f crtifi od is la.n~s by the J apane se for over one year oft e r tho surrend e r . Fr om time t o time , these t,r ocp s wr:uld be sent t o ciur prison oamp when the J~pane se h~d finish ed with t hem . Thr ou&h ~he so men , ti was lea rned tha t tho J o.pilnaSb a ttemptedtc pu t b .1 ok i nto ooam\iss.i on , niiny of the guns on Correg;id.cr, Fort Hughe s and Fort Frank. Howeve r , a t n o t i.'.'!le j ur.in5 that fir st yco. r , .did the J e.pa.nos e make any mcve · t o r epa ir the guns or Fort Dr um in any manne r . The exception t o this Wi s the 3- inoh gun 'and nt ono timo a J upnne se ·boat ·-ca.mo t o Fort Dr um and tho 3- inch gun W.lS dismounted from the dock a nd t a ken away . 4 . Effect of enc roy fir e . u . Pe rs onne l . Fort Drum l os t none k i lled by enemy actiq.n a nd on ly five 'Wor e injured . Of the f ive i n jured, on - ly one of them r equi:red hos pi t ::i liza tion . Twn of t he se i n jured wor e in th·o '3a tt €. ry 'Robe rts cas0ina t o· whi l e it was being fir ed C'n by 240- mm' howitze r s . A she ll e xp·lod ~d a g,-ainst t1lc o.rmor on tho outside· a.nd fr ...gm0nts o.ime thr cugh the t'pening s cu.using the se twc oasua.lties. The oth0r thr e e we rt) injur ed in bne of the turrots by ·fr_eak hits. The tµrr ot Cc:pt :1 ~n .ho.d hi s periscope hit whilo he wa s ~bser,ving fir~ and the perisocpe o ~me loos o and c rasbodint't:> h_i-s f oot, breaking it at the instep . The other two ll)en i.n t he turr~ t · wer e injured oy ene.my _she ll fr agments which came thr ough tlie J'tPJX:t~:;{t a s the .br each was oponod , ruid frag~~nt8.i"tJP:.!i S.:1c ~ SlfJfD
.• OEC~1itSS~~:ED ,. This d ti:r. onst ra t~d that under heavy er~omy fir e ., fra~:nonts will enter any opening in.. any gun emplacement . .tilthou.;h the f ort took a va ry heavy pounding and the noise was constant ~nd the concussion ve ry heavy, i t . is t o bo noted thut the r e' we re no cus t s of comba t f at i5ue deve loped on thut Fort . b . Ma t _or i e l '. The f'i r st day of enemy aoti on agninet Fort Drun, no reoords of hits were kept, but conec rvative estimates pla ced t he number as a~p r oximate ly 100 by enemy 105 howit ze r s . Be~innigg the sec ond d~y and continuing through the war , accur ate recor ds wor e kept of a ll ene ll\Y firing . The number of rounds fi red , the number of a ctual hits on the hull ' and turra ts of the Fort , were r Qcorded. Near mi s ses we r e not counted . The number of actual h it s was 593 . Of thi s numbGr , only 7 were bombs , 5 light bombs from low altitudes ~nd 2 bombs from h igh altitudes . Of the 2 hi&h a ltit ·.dc bombs , one hit the turre t face above the guns and was harmless . The s econd was a 1100- pounder and hit whcr o many 240- 1mn shells had previously landed on top of tho Batte ry Roberts ca s ar:iato . Some of tht:1 beams of the powder rna.gazinc. , .dir ectly undc rnua t)"l, wer e br oken, but no r ea l s e rious damago done . .At l oast one- half of the 58b r ecorded art illery hits , we r e 240- .'.LlI!l . The side s , backs , and tops of the turrets wor o hit by many proi ~ ctilG s . Also, s evera l exp l oded against the Ba rbette undern~ath th0 ov0rh'lllg and at the r ~)ar and undGr the t~1rr c t . Threo of thEi hoods protecting the pc:. ri ·scopes we r e hit and the instru1oonts ruined . Thos e hoods we r e l e ss than 1 inch thick . The forward tu rret top was open ed by a 240-~: hit . ThG ·opening occured at a seam and was about 3~ f eet l ong by 6 inche s wido . No d~:rege occurr ed i nsid e t he turr e t ., und it was not munned a t the time . Tho bad f oa ture wa s tha t whGn both turr ets we ro firing at the s~r, 0 tice , the flaehfro~ the r oa r tur - r 0t ont f. r ed the fo rward turret . This wc. s Pe•mod i ed by WoJ lding a one- inch piece o~ iron ove r the op~ning , and fortun~ t aly, th~ re was no other hit in t his ulc. oe . ' ~ The ci-inch oasemate guns on the south side wer e r epeatedly put out of action t empor ar ily by enemy o. rb i ller y fire. In the interior of the oa s emate , fragments t or e off the r ange drums and si5ht br o.cke ts e.nd f r om time t o time daI!ltl ging the el evat i ng and t r a versing mech:lnism of th<s ~ uns . This was r epaired , but conside r o.blc time was r equired to put the 5uns back into · action . The uppe r &un w~ s hit twi ce on the outsi'de of the tube by dir ect hits, by 240-rmr. howitier • The extent of the dent on the i nside was meas ur ed by use of ·a. star 6aug0 . Tho hit nea r the muzzle was found t o b e 86/1000 and the h it near . the ce nter of the tube was ·173/1000 . Vfuen ~~!:o~~h~~P~~: e~dto~t~e~~tBbD~~tf~e~n~e\t~rdn,, ~~f!~:~ · ..::: too l arge in are ·~~de , ,t · de of the tube . Thiswas the ~ 0 • e ort which wo. s per !OOnontlyput out of action by em~ fire . • •
·' I I The 3- inch batt ery sustained damage about 2"5 minutes prior to the surr ondor by lltl!M aff.T~. ~<tim, . , but this oould have been rlJtli l Ii~~ 1 W ~ 1 · · . The two 3-inoh antia ircraft guns on the top dock wor e co~ple tely put out of action by en~my arti llery fire . The two oir-oooled 50- ca libor mohino gune wer e o. lso oornplotcly destroyed by enemy a rtill ery fi r e . The four wat er-c ooled 50- oaliber antiaircraft maohin0 guns wer o dcma6ed fr om time to timo, but prompt repairs wero a lways ma.do and tho ·guns wor o r oudy to maot the next a ttack. All the insta.ll~tions in the cage reast were dostroyod by enemy fire , but thisdid not hampor our op0rati ons in any manner . The concrete hull of the struoture stood up very well und e r the prolon5od pounding und only about 6 or 8 feet at the most were whittled away by enemy action . However , it was noticed that' the longe r the so bomba r dments l a sted, tho more d ~mage was r esulting to the Fort by hits of tho sarae ca liber whicr. h~id pr evi ously not inflicted so much do.ma.go . This wus prebably dua t o the concre t e being sha.tterod and to the loss of bond between the ccmcre t o and the l arge stee l r einforcing reds . The l urge re,infor oing rods woro two f ee t below the t op or outside surfa ce and there wor e no smalle r r e inforcing rods or mesh near the surfeoc . The 240- nm proj ectile wc·uld bury · itself under the r e inforcing and thon detonate . S r Conclusions . The one !J\Y wus denied the use of Mani l a Bay for five months . That th0 enemy both wanted and no0d0d th is ba.y is a& unchallenged fact . The bay was ~uarded by two things . saacoast artillery and minDs . The mine fi e ld sunrding the south channel was o. Navy contact fiold plantcm prior to the war . Those ~ino s had been det onating a ccidentally in gr eat quantitie s ever since the fie ld wa s l u id and its effect iveness as a baTrie r ho.d been dissip&ted·. That this mine defens e had fail ed was known to the enemy, was ovidenoed by tho f o. ct that at the surr ender, 12 enen~ ships s~ il od into the south channel abreast . through tho ffiinefields an~ back aga in without any sweeping • .The r eu:a inin& def ense was seacoust artille r y,, :md it is a matt er of r e cord that al~ost a ll of the cpen scac0ast butterie s had either been knocked our or rendered ine ff ective with the outstanding except ion of tho four 14-inch ; unson Fort Orum guarding the south oham10l . It isthis officer ' s opinion that properly designed , completely olosed turr e ts , mounted on a strong ooncre t e steel empl a c0m0nt , correct l y sited t o c ommand 360° fields of fire will pr ovo unquestionably sup·::. rior t o any other seacoast fortifica tion known to us a t tho pr cs0nt tDne. King KIN} c.A.C.
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