General Subjects Section ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL Fort Benning, Georgia ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE 1947 – 1948 THE OPERATIONS OF THE 503d PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK ON CORREGIDOR ISLAND, 16 FEBRUARY – 2 MARCH 1945 (LUZON CAMPAIGN) (Personal experience of a Regimental Adjutant) Type of operation described: PARACHUTE REGIMENT IN A VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT Major Lester H. LeVine, Infantry ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Index……………………………………………………………………………… 1 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction………………………………………………………………………. 3 The General Situation…………………………………………………………… 4 Selection of the Method of Assault…………………………………………..… 10 Phase I – Preparation…………………………………………………………… 14 Phase II – Plan of Assault………………………………………………………. 22 1. Enemy Situation……………………………………………………………. 22 2. The Overall Plan of Assault………………………………………………... 23 3. Aerial Support…………………………………………………...…………… 24 4. Naval Support…………………………………………………………..….… 25 5. Assault via Amphibious Forces……….………………………………..….. 25 6. Assault via Airborne Forces…………………………………………..……. 26 Phase III – The Assault………………………………………………………..….. 31 Phase IV – The Seizure………………………………………………………..…. 43 1. Western Sector…………………………………………………………….… 43 2. Eastern Sector…………………………………………………………..…… 53 3. Mop-up……………………………………………………………………..…. 57 Analysis and Criticism………………………………………………………..…… 60 Lessons………………………………………………………………………..…… 70 Map A - Philippine Islands: - General Situation Map B - Corregidor Island: - Terrain Study Map C - Corregidor Island: - Plan of Assault Map D - Corregidor Island: - The Assault Operations Map E - Corregidor Island: - The Seizure Operations - 1 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY A-1 “Combat Notes”, Number 8, June 1945 U.S. Sixth Army (TIS Library) A-2 USAFFE Board Report Number 208, 16 May 1945 United States Army Forces in the Far East (TIS Library) A-3 Field Order Number 9, 503d Regimental Combat Team (Prcht) (TIS Library) A-4 Airborne Standing Operating Procedure, 82d Airborne Division (TIS) A-5 Vault Files, The Airborne School, File STC Opns – 1.2)2, Subject: “Airborne Operations in SWPA, Los Banos, Corregidor”. (A/B Section, TIS) A-6 Historical Report, Corregidor Island Operation, (Operation Number 48), HQ, Regimental Combat Team, dated 6 March 1945. (Possession of Lt Col John L. Erickson, Ft Benning, Georgia) A-7 Special Text, “Airborne Rifle Company”, TIS (Personal possession of author) A-8 “Drop on Corregidor”, Major Thomas C. Hardman; “Airforce” Magazine, May 1945. (Personal possession of author) A-9 Field Order Number 9, 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. (Possession of Lt Col John L. Erickson, Ft Benning, Georgia) A-10 Letter, file AG330.13a, HQ XI Corps, subject: “Services Of the 503d Parachute Infantry RCT in the Landing and Reduction of Corregidor Island”, dated 9 March 1945 A-11 Biennial Report of General George C. Marshall, 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945. (Personal possession of author) A-12 USAFFE Board Report No. 297, “Report on Miscellaneous Observations of Destruction of Manila and Corregidor”, HQ, USAFFE, dated 25 May 1945. (TIS Library) A-13 “Drop on Corregidor”, by Major Thomas C. Hardman. Coast Artillery Journal, July - August, 1945. (TIS Library) A-14 “Retaking the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays”, Lt Perry Reed McMahon. Coast Artillery Journal, July - August, 1945. (TIS Library) A-15 “Corregidor Coordination”. Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Postlethwait. Infantry Journal, July 1945. (TIS Library) - 2-
A-16 “The Corregidor Operation” -- Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Jenkins. C&GSSC Military Review, April, 1946. (TIS Library) A-17 Paragraph X, General Orders Number 53, War Department, 1945. (AGO, TIS) - 3-
THE OPERATIONS OF THE 503d PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK ON CORREGIDOR ISLAND, 16 FEBRUARY – 2 MARCH 1945 (LUZON CAMPAIGN) (Personal experience of a Regimental Adjutant) INTRODUCTION An objective of this monograph is to show how the first principle of war, mass, can be violated successfully despite heavy odds in favor of a well protected, well entrenched, fanatical enemy. In short, this study is an account of the parachute assault of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, known as the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) along with its attachments, on Corregidor Island, Philippine Islands, 16 February to 2 March 1945, during the Luzon Campaign. A second objective is to point out that when the principle of war, mass, is violated, compensation for the violation can be obtained by a vigorous and aggressive exploitation of other principles. For example, the principles of surprise, simplicity, and offensive were employed with such telling effect, that the lack of mass was hardly a consideration. In fact, the method of transportation for one third of the regiment to the target area was ordered changed at the eleventh hour, which change resulted in an intentional delay of twenty-four hours. Too, an attempt will be made to show that the action on Corregidor might well have been labeled “Operation Cooperation”, so ideal was the cooperation between the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. - 4-
THE GENERAL SITUATION Prior to a discussion of the assault on Corregidor, it seems fitting to give a brief account of the action which preceded that which took place on Corregidor. As a result of a decision reached at the Octagon Conference, 15 September 1944, The Sixth Army, X and XXIV Corps, under General Walter Krueger landed 20 October 1944 on the northeastern shores of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, (see map A) for the invasion of that archipelago, which contained about 260,000 enemy. XXIV Corps immediately began pushing inland, while X Corps was making an assault on the south coast of Samar (see map A) and a short amphibious move to seize the north coast of Leyte. Bitter fighting for the island of Leyte ensued, and all the more so in that the enemy was continually reinforcing his troops at the northwestern part of the island in the vicinity of Ormoc. Although our Navy caused the enemy to take heavy troop losses during his reinforcement operations, he was, nevertheless, able to make sizeable gains in his troop strength. Added to this handicap were violent rain storms and deep (and I mean “deep”) mud, which situation required the use of hand-carry for all supplies. However, by 1 December seven American divisions and the separate 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) were firmly located in the mud at Leyte. Five airfields were in operation, and the contiguous waters were controlled by our Navy. The 77th Infantry Division, after taking off from the eastern side of the island, made an amphibious assault on the west coast on 7 December, just south of the town of Ormoc. Finally, on the night of - 5-
21 December, the last 500 exhausted, defeated enemy quit and fled. Leyte was ours but we unwillingly shared the air overhead with the Kamikaze. (1) The next goal in the American advance to recapture the Philippines was the ambitious one of Luzon Island (see map A). However, the distance from Leyte, where we had our only airfields in the Philippines, to Luzon was too great to expect satisfactory fighter-plane cover. Consequently, the flat, smooth plains of southwestern Mindoro Island (see map A) in the area of San Jose Beach, about 150 air miles from Manila (see map A) were selected as the possible sites for fighter airstrips. The 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) was selected to jump in this ideal-for-jumping area, but the airfields at Leyte could not support such an operation. As a result, the assault was to be amphibious with two RCT’s -- the 19th and the 503d. (2) Both RCT’s assaulted the island of Mindoro on 15 December 1944 against no opposition. Within a matter of a few hours a fighter strip was under construction; within twenty-four hours American planes and PT boats were in operation against southern Luzon. The two RCT’s established a strong perimeter around the town of San Jose to protect the construction and operation of the airstrips. From the moment of landing until the landing in Luzon itself took all their attention, Japanese planes bombed and strafed the airstrips and other military (1) A-11, pages 133-141; (2) Statement of Lt Col John L. Erickson, formerly Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Regiment; Personal knowledge. - 6-
Installations almost twenty-four hours daily; but the construction continued, and our planes rapidly began to secure air superiority. (3) Elements of the Japanese navy assaulted the installations on Christmas night 1944, but our own planes drove them off just about the time that the supply of bombs became exhausted. As each B-25 dumped its last load of bombs, it took off for Leyte, inasmuch as an amphibious and/or airborne assault was expected to follow the naval shelling. The 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, then on Leyte, was alerted to drop at San Jose and reinforce our forces there, if the need arose. Fortunately, the enemy did not follow up his bombardment with a landing. At any rate, airstrips had been constructed and secured to assist in the invasion of Luzon island. (4) By means of a series of feints and guerrilla diversions, the enemy on Luzon was in a state of confusion as to when and where the invasion would come. Two corps of Sixth Army, I and XIV, hit the beaches at Lingayen Gulf (see map A) on 9 January 1945, and by nightfall 68,000 troops had developed a beachhead fifteen miles wide and 6000 yards deep. By means of his deceptive measures, the confusing tactics of the guerrillas, and the activities of our Air Force, General MacArthur had succeeded in the diversion of every major, hostile, combat organization from the beachhead area except one division and a mixed brigade. The enemy was in am impossible position, in that other than the two exceptions, all his combat organizations were in motion and were forced into piecemeal commitment. (5) (3) Personal knowledge; (4) Personal knowledge; (5) A-11, pages 144-145. - 7-
Sixth Army was quick to take advantage of the confusion of the enemy, and the advance to Manila was launched. Slight opposition only was encountered until the troops approached Clark Field (see map A). At that point I Corps encountered heavy opposition from enemy strongly entrenched on the high ground. In order to keep the supply lines from the north open, I Corps held up where it was. (6) The XI Corps, part of the Eighth Army, landed on 29 January on the west coast of Luzon near Subic Bay (see map A). Opposition was light, so that XI Corps pushed eastward and southward to cut off the Bataan peninsula where USAFFE forces three years earlier had made such desperate stands against the Japanese. (7) The 11th Airborne Division, assigned to Eighth Army, minus its parachute regiment, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, made an unopposed amphibious landing on 31 January at Nasugbu, south of Manila (see map A). The 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment on 3 February jumped on the high ground dominating the Cavite area (see map A), while on that same night troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army, reached the north-eastern portion of Manila. The situation in the city looked bad for the enemy, especially so in view of the pressure of Sixth Army troops from the north, northwest, and south. (8) It is at this point in the situation that the reason for the assault on Corregidor Island (see map A) becomes apparent. Without Corregidor Island, the Port of Manila after its capture could not be effectively utilized, as coastal guns on the island (6) A-11, p.145; (7) A-11, p.145; (8) A-11, p.145 - 8-
could hamper our shipping. Too, Corregidor was believed to harbor so-called Japanese suicide “Q” boats. (9) The situation, briefly, is that the time was early February 1945, the city of Manila was about to fall, and the Island of Corregidor had to be taken before the Port of Manila could be utilized. All that remained was the decision relative to the method of assault and the organization which would be assigned the mission. A discussion of the principles and considerations involved in the employment of parachutists will follow to show the line of reasoning which might have been used in the selection of the method of assault; all that remained, therefore, was the assignment of a specific organization. (9) Personal knowledge - 9-
SELECTION OF THE METHOD OF ASSAULT Of primary importance in the ultimate decision as to the feasibility, suitability, and acceptance of a parachute combat mission is the availability of drop zones and their immediate surroundings. A discussion, then, of the desirable features of a drop zone, as well as the actual features of Corregidor at the time of subject parachute drop, is in order at the outset of this study in order to present what might have been the commander’s estimate of the situation. Jumping from planes which are flying about 100 miles per hour, each paratrooper will land approximately forty to fifty yards from any other individual, (10) and “sticks” form normally an elliptical pattern on the ground. The interval between jumpers is increased as the altitude above the ground becomes greater, in view of the drift of the parachutes as a result of wind velocity and air currents. “A jump of regimental size when placed on one DZ [Drop Zone] is best executed if the three (3) battalions are dropped at intervals of sixteen (16) seconds. This [sic] will result in three (3) separate battalion concentration areas totaling approximately five thousand (5000) yards by twelve hundred (1200) yards”. (11) Corregidor Island (see map B) is less than two miles square, and presented but three possible drop zones. One zone was the emergency landing strip located on the tail of the pollywog-shaped island, but this strip could be immediately discarded, inasmuch as no advantage would be gained which could (10) A-4, p. 63; (11) A-4, p. 63. - 10-
not be secured by an amphibious assault. The assaulting force would have to gain the topmost part “Topside”, initially, in order to prevent the enemy from having the advantage of observation down on the assault force; which advantage the enemy would have were the strip used, inasmuch as the emergency strip is situated on the lower, tail portion of the island. The other two possibilities were the parade ground and the golf course on “Topside”. However, the parade ground was 250 by 150 yards, and the gold course was approximately 75 yards longer but the same width as the parade ground. “…the two [parade ground and golf course] combined provided the smallest area into which an air drop of combat troops in any number has yet been made.” (12) As if the size of the contemplated drop zones was not sufficiently discouraging, the actual condition of the fields presented a very short future for the potential parachutists: splintered trees surrounded the small drop zones, as did tangled undergrowth and wrecked buildings; the areas themselves were both pocked-marked with bomb craters, and littered with rocks, scrap iron, tin roofing, and all sorts of debris which all together closely approximated natural and man-made, anti-parachute invasion obstacles. To guarantee that there would be nothing favorable about either of these drop zones, both fields are contiguous to precipitous cliffs 600 feet high, which drop off abruptly to the boulder-strewn beach. Too, the prevailing winds of 15 to 25 miles per hour are seaward and unless the proper exit point was (12) A-2, p. 2. - 11-
Chosen, parachutists would be carried to their deaths over the edge of the cliffs or, at best, dropped into the sea. Drop casualties alone were estimated to run as high as 20 percent. (13) Why, then, in view of all the disheartening features of Corregidor, should a parachute assault be considered feasible? For one reason, the terrific toll that the Japanese had had to pay in lives lost in their amphibious assault in early 1942 on the very same island was still well remembered. Especially did this factor take on an added significance when it was realized that the enemy had had almost three years of concentrated effort during which to refortify the island against attack from the sea. Coupled with an amphibious attack was the necessity of making an uphill attack, once the actual landing had been effected. The estimated enemy strength was 850 (14) and, consequently, expected jump casualties of an airborne attack would still not reduce an assault force composed of a parachute regimental combat team below an effective strength, especially in the view of the anticipated surprise which would be gained from a vertical descent. All in all, casualties from an airborne assault would possibly be less than an amphibious assault. “It was correctly assumed that the Jap was adequately prepared for the latter [amphibious] assault but, in all probability, would be caught flat-footed by the former [parachute]. All other factors considered, the parachute descent was acceptable and the decision (13) A-2, p. 2; (14) A-3, Appendix A to Annex #1 - 12-
was made”. (15) In fact, later confirmation from both a prisoner of war and a recovered Japanese diary proved that the Japanese commander of the island had actually been warned of an approaching airborne attack. The commander had made an estimate of the situation and after a careful terrain analysis, decided that a parachute attack was not feasible. Consequently, he made no preparations for one. Had he prepared strong defenses against such an attack, to include anti-parachute obstacles originally rumored to exist, this particular monograph might never have been written. (16) The discussion just presented indicates that despite the fact that Corregidor lacked every desirable characteristic for a jump zone, vertical envelopment was nevertheless decided upon as the type of assault to be attempted. In fact, the island by it’s vary nature was considered immune to a parachute attack, and this consideration by the enemy undoubtedly assured the success of the parachute attack against tremendous odds. (17) (15) A-2, p. 2; (16) A-1, p. 8; personal knowledge; (17) A-1, p. 8; personal knowledge. - 13-
PHASE I – PREPARATION As has already been stated in the “General Situation”, the 11th Airborne Division on 31 January 1945, made an amphibious landing at Nasugbu south of Manila (see map A). On 3 February the 511th Parachute Infantry of the Division jumped on the high ridge dominating the Cavite area (see map A). To assist these units in their attack on Manila, the 504d Parachute Infantry Regiment was alerted for a probable mission of jumping on Nichols Field (see map A). (18) At the time this alert was given, the 503d Parachute Infantry, a separate regiment, was located in San Jose, Mindoro, Philippine Islands (see map A). The organization was the principal and infantry element of the already-famous 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute), which in addition to the Infantry included the 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion and Company C, 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion (later redesignated 161st Airborne Engineer Company). (19) On 31 January 1945, the RCT had concluded the Mindoro Island phase of the Western Visayan Campaign. Although the phase extended officially over a forty- five day period and included an amphibious assault (without too much prior training therefore), the operation consisted mainly, as has been previously stated, of establishing and maintaining an extended perimeter around the town, as well as absorbing daily enemy air attacks and a surprise enemy naval shelling. The operation had not been costly in men (only four KIA) or material, but, nevertheless, (18) A-5, p. 5; personal knowledge; (19) Personal knowledge. - 14-
equipment had to be checked and replaced, inasmuch as the alert was for a contemplated parachute drop, which would in addition to other details require the fabrication of cargo containers designed by one of Assistance Parachute Maintenance Officers of the Regiment. Too, detailed planning for the airlift and resupply has to be initiated, as well as the numerous other preparations which, of necessity, are associated with any combat mission. However, no one in the 503d Parachute Infantry was the slightest bit surprised when two days later, 5 February 1945, with a target date of 8 February, the alert was cancelled: the Regiment had been on and off an alert status many times prior to this one. (20) The next day, 6 February, found the Regiment again alerted, but the signs of the time appeared to indicate that “this is it”, in that a few days earlier a topographic relief model of Corregidor, Philippine Islands, had arrived. (21) Corregidor was to be the target this time. (22) Needless to relate, the planning and preparations continued on the basis of the new mission, with the target date set for 16 February 1945. One of the most serious problems at this time was the shortage of equipment containers and the lack of time to pack personal parachutes. There was sufficient webbing available, thanks to excellent cooperation of the Air Force, and, consequently, the Parachute Maintenance Platoon began operations on a twenty-four hour basis to fabricate slings and containers (20) Personal Knowledge; (21) Statement of Technical Sergeant Thomas G. Mitchell formerly Intelligence Sergeant, HQ, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; (22) Personal Knowledge. - 15-
of a type designed by members of the platoon. This type container, called AA6, was suitable for dropping much of the equipment, but, in addition, considerable improvisation had to be affected. (The Parachute Maintenance Platoon had just recently completed its move from Leyte to Mindoro and was in the process of setting up its equipment at the time the alert was received. As a consequence of the lack of shelter and ship-unloading facilities at the location of the Regiment at Leyte, the weather, mud, and salt water had taken a heavy toll of parachute supplies and equipment). There were, however, sufficient cargo canopies. Nevertheless, the problem was aggravated by the fact that parachutes and containers used for aerial resupply would have to be considered totally lost during the operation. (23) The second half of the problem relative to parachute maintenance and supply, that is, the lack of time during which personal parachutes could be packed, was solved in part by the cooperation of the 11th Airborne Division. (As has been stated, the 503d Parachute Infantry was a separate regiment, an organic part of no division). However, the 11th Airborne Division gave the Regiment 1500 packed, personnel parachutes. (24) The remainder of the required number of personal parachutes plus the usual 10% allowance for faulty packcovers, webbing, and similar deficiencies was packed by the Regiment’s own Maintenance Platoon, which was working on a twenty-four (23) Statement of Captain Elden C. Campbell, formerly Parachute Maintenance Officer, and Commanding Officer, Rear Base, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; (24) Statement of Captain Elden C. Campbell, formerly Parachute Maintenance Officer, and Commanding Officer, Rear Base, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. - 16-
hour basis. Long-range planning proved its worth at this time in that the many hours previously spent by the platoon on the fabrication of “home-made” carrying pouches of all types resulted in a sufficient supply of this type of equipment. Supply plans included a detail of three officers and fifty men who were to bring on D minus 4 supplies and equipment to the airstrip in the Subic Bay area. (see map A). These supplies and equipment consisted of the squad kit bags, one unit of fire of 75-mm ammunition, flame-throwers, and communication equipment; from Subic Bay the detail was to transport these items via water on D plus 2. The squad kit bags, actually Air Corps parachute bags carefully labeled for rapid identification, contained for each man in the squad a blanket, one pair of jump boots, one set of overalls, fatigue cap, two pairs of socks, and one pair of drawers. (25) Initial resupply, that is, resupply after the jumpers had dropped with their accompanying bundles, was to be by air. Twelve C-47’s were allocated for this purpose and were to begin discharging their loads after the completion of the third lift, the scheduled drop of the First Battalion (Reinf). (See Phase II-Plan of Assault). These twelve C-47 planes were to continue daily aerial resupply until such time as the situation permitted the use of water transportation. As was customary in all operations participated in by the 503d Parachute Infantry, direct radio communication with the Rear Base would be established as early as possible. By means of this communication, the Rear Base would be kept constantly advised of the unexpected needs (25) A-6, Supply Annex, p. 1. -17-
of the organization and would include the requested supplies along with those which were to be dropped daily on an “automatic” basis. (26) On 4 February 1945, just a few days prior to the alert for the operation on Corregidor, about 250 replacements had arrived from the Zone of the Interior. This personnel had to be integrated into the units, indoctrinated, and prepared for the pending operation within a relatively short time. Informal range firing and small unit problems were initiated. With the arrival of these replacements, the Regiment was just about up to T/O strength, and it is at this point that a comment relative to the strength of an airborne infantry unit at the time of the operation (February 1945) is in order, in that such a unit differed so radically from conventional, infantry units. (27) The T/O strength of a parachute rifle company was eight officers and 119 enlisted men; each rifle platoon had a platoon leader and an assistant platoon leader. The organization of the rifle company was an organization of three rifle platoons of the two rifle squads and one 60-mm mortar squad in each platoon. However, experience had indicated that the rifle company organization, as included in the then-current War Department T/O, was inferior to the provisional one which utilized three rifle platoons of three rifle squads each and a fourth platoon of the three 60-mm mortars. The Regiment was organized on that latter basis and had been for fifteen months prior to the operation. (28) There were no heavy weapons company; (26) A-5, p. 6; Statement of Captain Elden C. Campbell; personal knowledge; (27) Personal Knowledge; (28) A-6, p. 7; Statement of Lt Col John N. Davis, Executive Officer and later Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; statement of Lt Col John L. Erickson. -18-
the 81-mm mortars (four) were assigned to Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, as were the twelve light machine guns -- there were no heavy machine guns authorized for use by the parachute infantry. In addition, there was no cannon company nor was there an anti-tank company; in fact, the only anti-tank weapons in the Regiment were the 2.36 inch rocket launchers. (29) There was one part of the preparation phase which actually took place, unwittingly and unintentionally for this operation, during the preparation phase of the preceding operation-- the amphibious assault on Mindoro Island (see map A), 15 December 1944. At that time when the decision to employ the RCT in an amphibious rather than a parachute role had been made, the First Battalion was given training in the use of assault boats. As will be pointed out in Phase III, this prior training proved extremely valuable unexpectedly. (30) To return to the preparation phase for the operations on Corregidor Island, the topographic relief model was set up in a pyramidal tent and kept under constant guard. Briefings were given with the aid of this model and were supplemented by the personal observations of personnel (two officers and four enlisted men) who had previously been on Corregidor and were, therefore, detailed by higher headquarters to work with the Regiment. Beginning on 12 February these briefings were supplemented by actual flights of all key personnel, especially jumpmasters, over the drop zones. These flights were made in (29) Personal knowledge; (30) Personal knowledge. -19-
the bombers which were engaged in the Air Force phase of the assault (see Phase III) and proved of inestimable value in the analysis of the terrain. Too, a very prevalent rumor at this time was the report that the enemy had erected sharp poles and other anti-parachute obstacles on the proposed drop zones, which were already inadvertently prepared by nature and bombings to resist parachutes. Very close scrutiny of the drop zones from the bombers, which “buzzed” the island intentionally low, proved the fallaciousness of the rumor, but did confirm the intelligence relative to the hazardous conditions to be expected. (31) Inasmuch as the RCT area on Mindoro Island was located close to the departure airfields, it was not necessary to move to a so-called marshalling area-- a term uncommon to the personnel of the RCT. Colonel John Lackey, Commanding Officer of the 317th Troop Carrier Group, which had transported the Regiment on other missions, was a frequent visitor and, consequently, extremely close liaison with the Air Force was effected. (32) Although no wire fence was erected around the camp site (a practice not used by the Regiment) as a prevention of leaks in security (33), adequate security precautions were maintained. On the afternoon of 15 February, the day before the jump, the RCT Commander, Colonel George M. Jones held a formation of the (31) Statement of Lt Col John L. Erickson; statement of Technical Sergeant Thomas G. Mitchell; personal knowledge; (32) Personal knowledge; (33) A7, p. 3. -20-
entire command (less the Third Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, which would not become part of the RCT until that unit had arrived on Corregidor) and briefly explained the operation, wished all “good luck”, and had the adjutant announce that all personnel were restricted to the camp. That evening captured Japanese films of the enemy’s attack on Corregidor in early 1942 were shown. (34) The ruggedness of the terrain was again emphasized. The 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) was ready to retake Corregidor. (34) Personal knowledge. -21PHASE II – PLAN OF ASSAULT
1. ENEMY SITUATION A study of the information known about the enemy, as presented in the Intelligence Annex to Field Order No. 9, 503d Parachute Infantry, dated 13 February 1945, shows that there was little known except an estimated strength of 850. (The reader is requested to remember this figure). In fact, higher headquarters had intended to utilize one reinforced parachute battalion (35), but the Commanding Officer of the Regiment succeeded in having the entire RCT committed to the operation, later developments more than substantiated the commander’s reasoning. As for enemy equipment, there were seven stationary pre-war guns reputedly repaired and in working condition: two 12-inch, two 10-inch, two 6-inch, and one 3-inch; in addition, there were two 3-inch mobile AA guns, two 37-mm split trail guns, plus six Japanese 75-mm guns. Guerilla reports indicated that the island was well stocked with food and ammunition. Ships in the area tended to confirm these reports. The water around the island was mined considerably. Too, there were reports of land mines as well. In general, however, despite natural expectations, photo interpretation intelligence indicated that little attempt had been made during the Japanese occupation to improve the island or repair damage done during the 1942 assault. There were tunnel entrances, though, which suggested underground installations as well as fortified positions and small (35) Statement of Lt Col John L. Erickson -22-
weapons pits. Enemy capabilities included artillery fire from Fort Hughes (Caballo Island), Cavite, Fort Drum, or the South Bataan coast (see map A) from any batteries which had not been destroyed by our Air Force or Navy. The enemy could concentrate forces on Corregidor prior to D-day, if he were warned of or suspected a landing on the island. In addition, the reported artillery battalion on Corregidor could bring fire to bear on our troops. (36) It will be recalled that a rumor relative to the presence of anti-parachute obstacles had been proved fallacious by observers in low-level bombing flights. The interference, therefore, was that enemy capabilities did not include defenses prepared especially for a parachute assault. (37) 2. THE OVERALL PLAN OF ASSAULT The capture of Corregidor was part of an operation assigned to XI Corps, the operation to secure the entrance to Manila Bay (see map A), as discussed in the section entitled, “General Situation”. On D-day (15 February 1945) elements of the 38th Infantry Division were to make an amphibious assault in the Mariveles Bay area of southern Bataan (see map A), seize and secure the beachhead at that point, and then on D plus 1 were to move the 3d Battalion (reinforced), 34th Infantry Regiment from the Mariveles Bay area to land via assault boats on San Jose Beach, Corregidor, (see map B) at 1030 hours. (36) A-3, Appendix A to Annex #1; (37) Personal knowledge. -23-
On D plus 1, the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Parachute) was to drop via parachute on Corregidor at 0830 hours. (38) 3. AERIAL SUPPORT On 23 January 1945, shortly after noon, the Fifth Bomber Command, using B-24 Liberators with 500-pound bombs, was to begin a daily pounding of the island. The bombing was to continue until the landing of the reinforced 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment. From 0745 to 0800 hours on D plus 1, one group of heavy bombers, each carrying 260-pound fragmentation bombs, was to round out the final pounding of the island. At 0800 hours, one group of A-20’s was to bomb the island and that of the adjacent Caballo Island (see map A) with 250-pound para- demo bombs, as well as continue with the strafing. After 0830 hours (H hour for the initial drop) bombing was to be confined to areas as indicated on map C, but from 0830 to 0930 hours two groups of A-20’s were to have the mission of covering the unrestricted areas. At 0930 hours the parachutists of the first lift would be on the ground and from that time air support would be limited to three squadrons of A-20s on air alert. One of these squadrons was standing by on call in order to fly smoke missions, while the other two were prepared to support the second air drop of troops at 1230 hours. (39) (38) A-2, paragraph 1 b; (39) A-1, p. 2; A-8, pages 9 – 10. -24-
4. NAVAL SUPPORT Naval units of the Seventh Fleet were first to conduct mine-sweeping and bombardment operations in the area through which the amphibious elements were to pass enroute from southern Bataan to Corregidor. (The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to accompany the force to Mariveles Bay on D-day so as to be in a more favorable position for the amphibious assault on D plus 1). PT boats had previously assisted in spotting the location of gun emplacements by encircling Corregidor in order to draw fire intentionally. (40) Naval gunfire was set up to fire heavy concentrations on D plus 1 in the unrestricted areas in close support of the amphibious phase of the assault at 1030 hours. In addition to the “on call” fire missions in general support which were to be requested via JASCO personnel who were to jump with the airborne units were to furnish night illumination on call. Star shells were to be used along with illuminating mortar shells. (41) PT boats were to skirt the island during the parachute drop in order to pick up parachutists who dropped over the cliffs into the sea. (42) 5. ASSAULT VIA AMPHIBIOUS FORCES As has been previously mentioned in the overall plan of assault, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment was to make an amphibious assault at San Jose Beach, Corregidor at 1030 hours on D plus 1. The unit was to pass to the control of (40) Statement of Technical Sergeant Thomas G. Mitchell; (41) A-1, p. 2; A-2, p. 8; (42) Personal knowledge. -25-
the Commanding Officer, 503d RCT (Parachute) on landing on the island. (43) The dual mission of that Battalion was first to secure the beachhead at San Jose, and rapidly seize and secure Malinta Hill area (see map C) as its initial objective, the second part required the Battalion to effect contact with the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, to the west. (44) 6. ASSAULT VIA AIRBORNE FORCES The parachute element were to enplane at Mindoro Island (see map A) in three lifts: 0700 hours 16 February, 1045 hours 16 February, and 0700 hours 17 February, respectively. There would be fifty-one C-47 planes in both the first and second lifts, and forty-three planes in the third lift. A forth lift of twelve C-47’s would follow the third lift and drop the initial resupply bundles. (45) In view of the extremely small drop zones, strong winds, proximity of drop zones to the edge of the 600-foot cliffs, and the nature of the terrain aggravated by man-made rubble and debris, a minimum two or three passes was to be made by each plane. No more than eight men were to be dropped at each pass. “If one adds the imponderables of gusts, fishtailing, sharp diminution of wind velocity, and the nature of the terrain to the human errors, the margin of safety was nil and the hazardous nature of the drop is fully apparent”. (46) The planes were to fly in two columns of single planes; one over each of the drop zones. (43) A-3, paragraph 1 b (7); (44) A-3, paragraph 3 f; (45) A-3, Annex 5; A- 2, p. 4; (46) A-2, p. 4. -26-
The misnamed parade ground was to be Field “A” and the so-called golf course was to be Field “B”. (47) It is superfluous to state that coordination between pilots and jumpmasters and the selection of an appropriate “go point” had to be perfect. A control plane would remain aloft during the jumping and by means of voice radio supervise the actual jump: necessary corrective action to be taken by each succeeding plane would be radioed to the planes. (48) The first lift was to be composed of the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, reinforced by the attachment of Battery “A” and one platoon Battery “D”, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the 3d Platoon, Company “C”, 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion. The mission of the 3d Battalion with its attachments was to drop on Fields “A” and “B” on D plus 1 at 0830 hours and secure the drop zones. The 2d Battalion was to relieve the 3d Battalion immediately upon the completion of the drop of the former, at which time the 3d Battalion was to advance and seize the high ground approximately 600 yards northeast of the hospital site and the commanding ground approximately 1000 yards east of the hospital site (see map C). During the amphibious landing of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, was to support that assault by fire and effect contact with that Battalion, once the landing had been accomplished. (49) The 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, with Battery “B” and one platoon of Battery “D”, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, attached, comprised the second lift. (47) Personal knowledge; (48) Personal knowledge; (49) A-3, paragraph 3a. -27-
This lift was to drop on Fields “A” and “B” on D plus 1, as was the case with the first lift, but the time of drop for the 2d Battalion and its attachments was 1215 hours. The mission of this lift was to relieve the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, immediately from the defense of the drop area. The 2d Battalion was then to exploit the terrain to the north and west of the drop areas (see map C) and destroy all enemy encountered. (50) The third and last personnel lift was to be composed of the 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, with Battery “C” and one platoon of Battery “D”, 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, attached. This lift was likewise to drop on both fields, but at 0830 hours on D plus 2 (17 February 1945). This Battalion was to be RCT reserve, but, in addition, was to be prepared on order to exploit the terrain south of the drop area (see map C) and to destroy all enemy encountered. (51) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 503d Parachute Infantry, was given the mission to drop on both fields on D plus 1, in conjunction with both the 3d and 2d Battalions. This personnel was then to perform the normal duties of administration and communication. The Demolition Sections of the Company would, however, drop with their respective battalions, but would revert to the control of Regiment after their initial landing. (52) Service Company was to drop on D plus 1 at 1215 hours on Field “B” in conjunction with the second lift. (50) A-3, paragraph 3b; (51) A-3, paragraph 3c; (52) A-3, paragraph 3g; statement of Lt Col John L. Erickson; personal knowledge. -28-
This personnel was then to perform its normal functions of supply, administration, and evacuation. (53) The Rear Base would contain a minimum number of personnel to support the operation and would be commanded by the Platoon Leader of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon. The Regimental Personnel Section, the bulk of the Parachute Maintenance Platoon, the Regimental Motor Section, and elements of the Regimental S-4 office composed the Rear Base, along with a representative from each company to look after personal and company property. The total would be about sixty men and officers. It is to be pointed out that the complete Regimental Staff Personnel (minus the few S-4 personnel) were to jump; all the staff officers and some of the enlisted men would be among the first few to jump with the first lift, and the remainder would jump with the second lift. (54) Although not exactly within the scope of this monograph, the missions and activities of the closely supporting field artillery and engineer units are so inextricable associated with those of the 503d Parachute Infantry that they will be considered too. The 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion was to attach batteries and platoons, as previously indicated in this phase, and support the respective battalions by fire as directed by the Infantry Battalion Commander. (55) Company “C”, (lass one platoon), 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion, was to drop of Field “B” on D plus 1 in conjunction with the drop of the first lift. The company would, after assembly, be prepared to erect road blocks and destroy enemy fortified (53) A-3, paragraph 3h; (54) Personal knowledge; (55) A-3, paragraph 3d. -29-
installations by demolition, in accordance with orders from the Commanding Officer, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. Inasmuch as the exact nature of the obstacles to be encountered could not be predicted, the Engineer Company was to be prepared further to attach one platoon each to the 2d and 1st Battalions, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, upon their landing. (56) Of necessity, plans for the ground action had to be very simple and flexible. The reason is fairly obvious. The action would depend upon the enemy strength, equipment, dispositions, organization, and movements --- and very little information, if any, was known about any of these matters. Consequently, the mission of the Regiment might be stated merely “to seize Corregidor and destroy the enemy forces”. (57) The reader is reminded that D plus 1 would be 16 February 1945 and would be the first day of the assault (both parachute and amphibious) on Corregidor. D-day was to be 15 February 1945, but the assault on that day was to take place in Mariveles Bay, Bataan Peninsula, as explained in the over-all plan of assault. (56) A-3, paragraph 3e; (57) A-2, p. 5; personal knowledge. -30-
PHASE III – THE ASSAULT In accordance with previous plans, the Air Force phase of the assault began on 23 January 1945 and during the next twenty-five days Corregidor was presented with 3,128 tons of bombs. (58) The Naval bombardment, too, went according to schedule, but all bombing ceased at 0830 hours, 16 February 1945, on “Topside”. Preceded by the two groups of strafing A-20’s, the first lift. Which had enplaned at 0700 hours and taken off at 0715 hours from Mindoro Island (see map A), began to drop its human cargo at 0833 hours. (59) The planes were flying at an altitude of 600 feet from the southwest and in a flight pattern of two columns of single planes in trail. The leading plane contained the Commanding Officer of the 503d Regimental Combat Team (Prcht), Colonel George M. Jones, who controlled the actual jumping from the plane in which he was flying, as it hovered above the drop areas. Control was effected by means of voice radio communication in the clear with the troop carriers; the control plane was to make all necessary corrections in the flight plan and/or to adjust the jumpmaster count based on actual observations of the jumpers as they landed. (60) A distinct, so-called “go-point” (a definite, unmistakable terrain feature on or contiguous to a drop zone and which is used by jumpmasters as a reference point from which the probable extent of drift is estimated) had been selected for each of the two drop zones. Original plans required the jumpmaster (58) A-8, pages 9-10; A-1, p. 2; (59) A-5, p. 7; A-1, p. 2; personal knowledge; (60) Personal knowledge. -31-
To count three seconds from the “go point” and then allow the eight-man stick to jump. However, Colonel Jones in the hovering control plane saw that some jumpers were being carried to the cliff as a result of the 15-20 miles-an-hour wind with occasional gusts to 25 miles-an-hour. (61) Consequently, the “Rock Force” Commander (The Corregidor force was known as the “Rock Force” -- (62)) through the control facilities ordered the pilots to fly at an altitude of 500 feet in order to minimize the extent of drift by shortening the drop time and ordered the jumpmaster to allow an interval of six seconds from the “go- point” in order to compensate for the excessive wind velocity. These corrections were made, and the jump pattern improved accordingly. (63) For one hour and ten minutes the two columns continued to pass over the respective drop zones in two giant counter-rotating circles, as eight men at a time jumped out on a signal from the jumpmasters. The intermittent enemy anti- aircraft fire was kept to a minimum by the A-20’s which were strafing on each flank effectively. Some fire by the enemy was directed, also, on the descending parachutists, but this action, too, was greatly ineffective. When the tail plane of the first lift had discharged its last group of eight men, at 0940 hours, Colonel Jones then jumped from the control plane and began the job, which Major General Charles P. Hall, then Commanding General of XI Corps, termed “….the best handled of any that I have seen during my military career”. (64) (61) Personal knowledge; (62) A-1, p. 2; (63) A-1, p. 6; personal knowledge; (64) A-1, p. 6; A-10; personal knowledge. -32-
The terrain was worse than had been expected. Continuous bombing had ripped the trees in two, scattered debris and rubble in all directions, performed a superior chore of defoliation, and, in general, created a scene of total desolation. Fields of fire were usually very poor, in view of the remains of masonry buildings, thick undergrowth, and strewn boulders. Observation varied considerably, but the enemy was so well located in his adroitly concealed caves, tunnels, and pillboxes that although we held the high ground, we still did not have observation of him. Cover and concealment favored the enemy in that he had had nearly three years in which to perfect his dugouts. (It is now noteworthy to point out at this time that the enemy had made very few changes in or erected any new installations above ground. The impression he wished to convey was that the island was lightly held -- he had succeeded. The G-2 estimate was 850 enemy on the island) There was no outstanding terrain obstacles as such but the sheer cliffs, the partially demolished buildings, the heave undergrowth, and the rugged terrain were not ideal features over which to operate. There were two roads, hard packed gravel, which formed the main routes of communication to the beach. (65) During the descent of the first lift aerial bombardment and naval shelling continued east of the bomb line (see map C) to minimize fire on this lift. The strafing which had preceded the first lift had been successful in that almost complete surprise had been secured for much of these personnel. The continued bombing east of the bomb line added to the confusion (65) Personal knowledge. -33-
Of the enemy and, consequently, he remained below ground practically completely unaware that a battalion combat team (parachute) and most of a regimental combat team (parachute) staff were dropping on him. The caves, as well as the gun positions, were so constructed that the enemy was unmolested by the bombing and much of the pre-invasion bombardment had been in vain. (66) As a consequence. The element of surprise acted in favor of the parachutists and enabled them to drop in the very midst of the enemy. Scattered enemy groups only were able to bring fire on the jumpers, but as has been stated, this fire was ineffective. However, some parachutists were carried beyond the intended drop zones by high wind, and these groups engaged in action with enemy entrenched along the coast in caves and dugouts. (67) In fact, it was at 0920 hours in one of these scattered, uncoordinated sections that an unknown parachutist killed the Japanese Commander of the island at Geary Point (see map D), as he watched the paratroopers do what he considered an impossible feat. (68) The loss of their commander was a heavy blow to the leader- conscious enemy. The first lift, a battalion combat team, in spite of the wide dispersal of the jumpers and with an effective strength of about 750 officers and enlisted men out of the 1000 who had jumped began organize its “enclave”. (Not all of the 250 ineffectives were casualties, however, in that some men were engaged in collecting equipment bundles which were essential to combat). The perimeter was small at first -- the size of (66) A-1, p. 8; personal knowledge; (67) Personal knowledge; (68) A-2, Overlay 4; personal knowledge. -34-
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