LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU THE CAMPAIGNS OF GENERAL MA.CARTHUR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA :I9h2/l9h$ The great cycle: ^nila-Melbourne-l<anila is completed. In a brilliant Campaign, slicing-the inchoate mass of Japanese troop concentrations into isolated segments, MacArthur lias destroyed the myth of Meiji and broken the hypnotical spell of an Asiatic Confederation under the aegis of Japanese Military conquest; the symbol of the invincible Imperial Army, the arrogant conqueror of Singapore, General Yomoyuki Yamashita, has suffered the most humiliating military defeat, in the annals of Japanese history; his conduct of operations from Leyte to Luzon was inept, hysterical, second-rate In the period, Summer, 19l|2-19ljl4, the Japanese General Staff has poured tremendous amounts of troops, planes and shipping into the Southwest Pacific area. It can be said, without exaggeration, that it was on this particular front that the Japanese war machine received not only its first definitive set-back at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Trail, but that it bled itself white, thereafter, in its expensive and highly vulnerable Air and Navy components. They failed to reckon the iron tenacity of a great military leader, a spirit indomitable in adversity and disappointment, a skillful technician who has wrought miracles, with modest means, a brilliant strategist who forged an advanoe of 2,500 miles, slicing deeply into the enemy*s Pacific conquest, at the lowest, conceivable figure in soldier's lives and the least expense in money, material, ships and planes. Tenacious adherance to a single strategic concept has characterized ' all of General IfecArthur's operations, throughout this wide-spread theater, some 3,100 statute miles from Batavia to Kavieng, - equivalent to a front' encompassing the Northern Hemisphere, from the Panama Canal to Hudson Bay, Canada, including the full length of the United States from Miami to Buffalo, An arrow of advance runs straight into the Philippines, The Military operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater can only be properly appreciated against a background of geographical distances. If we superimpose the area of Continental United States over the Southwest Pacific Theater, Bougainville is in the approximate location of New York; Mine Bqf is very near Charleston; Darwin is north of El Paso and conquered Hollandia is beyond Milwaukeej Seattle corresponds to the center of Borneo and San Francisco lie's in the East end of Java, while Denver and Salt Lake City are in the vicinity of Portuguese Timor* Based on Mine Bay and Moresby, we have executed aerial strikes that reach as far as Boston in the North, St. Louis and Chicago in the West.' Based on Darwin, we have attacked targets at equivalent distances to Denver, Salt Lake City and San Erancisco, The local tactical and strategical problems would be comparable to those set at a hypothetical American Headquarters, stationed at Miami, charged with the mission of conducting an advance by land, sea and air that stretches from Charleston to the Canadian border. When the Americans took Sansapor, they made an advance from Charleston to Billings, Montana, When they reached the Philippines they will have covered a distance to Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, This is War in spaceI This enormous extent of military geographical area has been actively covered by an Air Force and a number of Infantry Div*- isions that are insignificant, compared to the huge masses that have been lavishly poured into Western Europe, - 1 - J£6 AUG 1945 /Jo
r PHILIPPINE 0SAIPAN IS. GUAM iS *«*.T.BUK IS. a PONAPE SINGAPORE SEATTLE BOSTON BAhfUERMASM j J MACASSAR^ X] 8ATAV1A #SALT kSAN FRANCISCO LOS ANGELES LAKE CITY .DENVER CHICAG • ST. LOUIS WASHINGTON CHARLSTON- \ NEW YORK BUKA PASSAGE V iUADALCANAL^ ^ EL PASO NEW ORLEANS (MIAMI NEW IOCKHAMPTON CALEDONIA COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILITARY THEATERS CONTINENTAL U.S. SUPERIMPOSED OVER SWI 01AMAXON PROJECTION REPRODUCED BY 2773RD ENGRS.
Were such tactical and supply problems given to an American Commander in the United States, or as a problem in any of our Staff Schools, the proposal would be classified as momumental, if not impossible of accomplishment. Were we to superimpose the S.W,P-.A. over the European theater, we would find that the Mediterranean barely covers the northern half of Australia; that our operations from Finschhafen to the Vogelkop are equivalent to the distance between Batum, on the Black Sea, to Berlin, and that an advance into the Philippines, in a straight line from Milne Bay to IJanila, carries from the Black Sea, via Odessa, Konigsberg through Norway to Iceland. This is war in spaceI These enormous distances were conquered, a master axis of advance was determined within the framework of a master plan and against climate, terrain and an anachronistic suicidal foe, operations stretching over 2,5>00 miles were relentlessly pursued, throughout the bitter years of 19U2/19U3 and 19Ut until the brilliant goal is within inescapable reach in 19li5» The attempt of the General, to create a modem Army of ten to twenty divisions in the Philippines with an annual budget of ten million dollars ("510,000,000) is an epic in itself5 it fits into the pattern of MacArthur - Economist. He almost succeeded. Ihe Japanese General Staff paid him the sinister compliment not to wait until his ten year mobilization programme was completed and struck, in its fifth year. The salient features of the Philippine Campaign, terminating at Bataan and Corregidor are generally known; its quality of greatness is probably less widely understood. The Japanese capacity, probable action and plan of invasion were brilliantly anticipated by a strange and discerning genius, Homer Lea, in his monumental work, "The Valor of Ignorance", published in 1911. This extraordinary work created a sensation in the General Staffs of the world. The American Chief of Staff found it important enough to write a preface* The growing Japanese menace was probably understood by the principal chancelleries <£ the world, except America. IJacArthur was the only figure of international stature to recognize the danger signals and, in a despairing race against time, attempted to stem the tide. He failed not altogether: Bataan held out longer than HongKong and Singapore and gave the Navy a breathing spell to pick up the pieces of Pearl Harbor; later on, he gave the United Nations the chronologically first clean-cut victory, at Milne Bay. The structure of his militarization of the Philippines is the skeleton on which the resistance movement was pegged; it is also closely linked with his campaign in 19U1-U2, There are any number of interesting, professional points. In a war of logistics, another name for men and supplies, MacArthur seems to have been pursued by devils of chicanery. The war began long before Dec. 7, 19U1. The War Department, however, let the Philippine plant run down in the last decade of 191+0; no appropriations, no new construction, just enough to keep the plant from falling apart. Philippine Independence explained all that. The exalted war plans, which the Staffs of all nations putter around with, either have teeth in'them or not. The Jap ./ar Plan for 19U1 had teeth in it. Our plans did not, but provided only for the defense of the entry into Manila Bay, to be held for several months for the rescue fleet that never came. We ran out of food, primarily: when you plan on six month's supply for 90,000 men and add 30>000 refugees, then your waiting period shrinks to four months instead of six. The Filipinos fought well and devotedly; the Regulars, known as Philippine Scouts were second to none, but one cannot create a veteran Army on six months' ROTC Training; MacArthur lost in a race against time, training, equipment and supply, A good General is a craftsman, able to gauge accurately the capacity of his tool. Hie story of the first Philippine Campaign is probably known; it contains some of the nicest split-sccond maneuvers in the history of Warfare,
The Jap landed at widely dispersed points; that did not fool anybody; his main landings, in Lingayan Gulf and Laraon Bay were to drive the Filipino Divisions into Ifenila. The Jap was well—informed; strength, location and routes of our main groupings were accurately plotted on the intelligence maps of the Japanese Headquarters, Bataan's forests and ravines gave the General his only chance. He promptly called,in his Divisions in the South. On commercial busses, large columns poured through Manila, northward across a single bridge, the Calurnrpit defile, A great occasion. The Jap knew it and wildly strove to cut this vulnerable point. LJacArthur threw in his tanks and held sufficiently long to clear the bridge. The hazardous timing of this operation is remarkable; it is a school problem for Staffs. One slip, and the Divisions would have been cut-off, cornered within J&nila, ultimately destroyed, MacArthur*s total defense force cut in half# It worked; the assembly on Bataan enabled re-organiza* tion and a brilliant systematic defense# No trained veteran Divisions could have done any better. The heroic defense of Corregidor and Bataan is history. In a world in defeat, the only light of hope flickered in the forests of the Bataan Peninsula, Transferred from this hopeless cause to organize a counter-offensive, the General left for Australia, by Presidential Order. Hie tactical and strategical problem then was the protection of the Australian mainland against further Japanese incursion and to prevent the interruption of U.S. shipping routes, through the Southern Pacific# 2he Japanese expected to accomplish both by a southeasterly advance through New Guinea, Papua and the Louisiades and a parallel advance along the chain of the Solomons. Shortly upon the arrival from the Philippines, the General made his first great decision, namely to defend the Australian mainland by a fight to the finish in the New Guinea area# He promptly displaced his headquarters forward about 1,!?00 miles and thereafter the forward movement of troops and establishments followed this great decision. On the enormous front of the Southwest Pacific Area, approximately 3,000 miles, extending from Soerabaya to Bougainville, separate operations were conducted that were, in fact, consecutive olements of a single, strategic conception : the continuous calculated application of air power employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops, the application of offensive pavrcr in swift, massive strokes rather than the dilatory island-to-island advance that some strategists predicted in the Pacific where the enemy's strongholds were dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagos. The far-flung operations of this extensive front were firmly held together by the central theme of a general plan : the liberation of the Philippines. As the basis of military action, we note the most subtle employment of the factor of surprise; the General has always succeeded in deluding the enemy as to his objective and his purpose. Y/ith relatively little loss of life and the minimum of assault forces in ground action, he defeated or neutralized his opponents# Enemy strongholds were almost invariably by-passed and their supply lines severed, first by air,-then by small naval craft# The General's preference for the envelopment, as a maneuver form, the decisive operation against flank and rear of the enemy, illustrates thoroughly his repugnance to frontal attacks. The economic futility of the frontal attack has always been known: historically, it has been recorded as a very expensive and bloody undertaking! One of the greatest military technicians of all times, Napoleon I, operated against flank and rear of his opponent almost habitually# He employed this form of attack from thirty to forty times, over a period of years. It was with great reluctance that he undertook frontal assaults.
HAINAN THAILAND LUZON PHILIPPINE AlPAN IS. IS. GUAM ARCHANGEL SAIGON 0 N«TOCKHOLMk Z & LENINGRAD SWTS Q V-TRUK '• IS. «* PONAPE MOSCOW SINGAPORE KUCHING BORNE KARKOV SUMATRA KAVIENG ^^BERLIN^ HOLLANDIA • ^ EWAK O^3 NE RABAUL^ is * BANJERMASIN ROS^^ * ODESS MACASSARv® BATAVIA GUINE A GASMATA EVASTS PORT ROME GUaSALCAN ISTANBUL 0 NAPLES LISBON DARWIN THEN3* * MALTA ALGIER CASABLANCA EIRUHle TOBRUK NEW CALEDONIA ALEXANDRIA °VROGKHAMPTON AUSTRALIA 0/BHISBANE rERTHjo SYDNEY £>\ ADELAIDE MELBOURNE SCALE STATUTE MILES COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILITARY THEATERS EUROPE SUPERIMPOSED OVER SOUTHWEST PACIFIC HOBART DIAMAXON PROJECTION Htproductd By OCE - GHO
9 ASE IV PHASE V ADMIHALT Y II Ov N—^ ci^V4savi«ng V * MM 09mA \X IIEW THE CAMPAIGN IN THE ^NL5-ELA*0W,tr SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA PAPUA TO THE ADMIRALTIES AUG 1942 — APRIL 1944 Madang VitM IV PHAS Finschnaftn Gasmota 61 PHASE II phase 1 a 11 PRECEDING CAMPAIGN MORESBY TO LAE SEPT 1942 - SEPT 1943 PHASE 7 Qoodtooogh I NT^-^Ftrguwon I. Normanby I. a* WW A/r Allitd Gtogrophicof Section • 15 Ftb 45 • A G S ilnt Boy
There was also a great American commander, Robert E. Lee, who understood war perfectly. The campaign of Chanccllorsville will remain the imperishable model, A comparison with Lee is most appropriate, since he was operating with very limited means — a blue-print of the initial operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. IfecArthur applied to these classical precepts the most modern technical means. He understood, in particular, the enormous flexibility of air mass. His method was more and more revealed as the calculated advance of his bomber-lines, through the seizure of advanced bases, so that his relatively small force of bombers could continue its attacks unde.r cover of his limited fighter force, operating on short and medium ranges. Each phase of advance had the objective of airfields, which determined the scope and distance of the next advance. As this'airline went forward, his naval forces, under newly established air coverage, regained the sea-lanes, which up to now had been the undisput*- ed principal arteries of the enemy's dispositions# The masterly coordination of ground, sea and air have not had a more brilliant exhibition in recent times* In tracing this most modern pattern, while exploiting the latest technical tools, the General still remains the fellow-craftsman in a distinguished historical company of great commanders .... Napoleon, Wellington, Lee. The Operation from Hcrr Guinea to Luzon is a military model of first rank — a Chancellorsvillc of Continents. The verdict of history will back MacArthur as the inheritor of the boldness and strategy of Lee and Jackson. Along the iron axis: Papua-Luzon, he executed a series of brilliant amphibious maneuvers, Ground, Air and Wavy components;wore welded into a perfectly integrated machine. The high points of successive conquests were: Gloucester, December 191*3; the Admiralties, February 19U+; Hollandia, April 19hh; (the destruction of the Japanese XVIIIth Corps in this general Area); Biak, I.Say I9IU1.J Iloemfoor-Sansapor, July1and Morotai September 19U+ —- the spring-board to Leytel These successive operations netted the destruction or emasculation of eleven (11) Japaneso Divisions and Brigades, an impressive string ranging from Bougainville to Horotai, viz : the 6th, 17th, 20th, 32nd, 35th, 36th, 38th, l+0th, 1+lst, 5lst, and 65th. Y/ith auxiliary troops, they represent an equivalent of 300/1+00,000 casualties, whose pathetic remnants were long ago stricken from the books of the Japanese General Staff, In the pattern of general Pacific liar, however, the brunt of fighting was centered from 191+2-U+ in the Southwest Pacific Area. There is no area of the Japanese conquest, from Burma to Manchuria that was exacting a similar toll# A major proportion of the Japanese Qnpire's total resources, in planes and ships were poured into this front. In myopic fanaticism, the Japanese continued to pour reinforcements into the fight and kept pace with their terrific losses, easily comparable to the most intense operations in western Europe. The defeat of the enemy, in the air, was equally decisive. In constant attacks on his main air bastion, in the Solomons and New Guinea, the Jap lost over 3,000 planes, on the ground and in the air; at Hollandia alone 1+75 separate weeks wore definitely identified; in comparison with such tremendous air-blows, the affair of Clark Field in I9I4I and its 15 bombers has shrunk to insignificant proportionl The combination of Air and Navy was equally deadly: from the Spring of 19l*2 to I9I4U, Air and %vy destroyed 375 warships, 21+75 barges and 973,000 tons of merchant vessels. Against this stupendous achievement, there is an astonishing record of economy, in men and in material, Tfar is a form of bookkeeping : in payments that are final with a white cross as signature. General MacArthur is an excellent bookkeeper and a great humanitarian. The grand total of American casualties, in the Southwest Pacific Area, to include 19UU} was 2,1+79 officers, 16,278 men, killed, missing and wounded, ranging from slight to serious: most of the wounded returned# A trial balance in the important campaign of Aitapc is characteristic.
The ratio in killed is roughly one to thirty(1 to 30)in favor of the Americans; the tally: American killed - 285* Japanese killed - 8,065# In the Philippines Campaign, the ratio is probably lower and fluctuates from 1 to 28, in the Visayas-Mndanao to 1 to 22 in Luzon# The great Campaign of Liberation entered its final phase# The baffled enemy was not permitted a breathing spell; within three months, from the springboard of Morotai, a major amphibious assault was launched, of greater preliminary preparation and initial strength than the Allied invasion of Normandy. Anticipating an . attack on Mindanao, the Japanese were decisively surprised and the Tacloban beachheads were secured with small casualties# The U#S. Sixth Army, operating under broad strategic conceptions of piercing the enemy colonial conquest in the center, thereupon broke through his vulnerable Visayan front and commenced rolling up the flanks to north and south# Although a Japanese naval reaction to this obviously vital encroachment was immediate and strong, its fate in Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf and off San Bernardino Strait is history; the combined Third and Seventh U.S# Fleets, dealt it losses of major warships so great that the Imperial Navy was irretrievably crippled. On October 26th General MacArthur stated: "The Japanese Navy has received its most crushing defeat of the war. Its future efforts can only be on a dwindling scale," This abortive Naval sortie did not disrupt our ground advance, Within 10 days after the landing, the liberation of a million and a half Filipino people on the islands of Leyte and Samar was virtually accomplished# On that first free Sunday, all churches were opened throughout the liberated areas, and divine service was attended by the free population# In a desperate effort to retrieve the strategical position lost in eastern Leyte during October, threatening his hold on the entire Philippines, the enemy started a chain of reinforcement convoys into Ormoc Bay# Troops and mechanized equipment from Ifehchuria, China, Luzon, Mindanao and the Visayas wero hurriedly dispatched toward the Western Leyte battleground, in a constant vulnerable stream. Despite initial losses exceeding 35*000 men, the infamous Yamashita began an unparalleled squandering of troops to protract an obviously hopeless situation; within one month he more than replaced these initial "losses, and ultimately committed an entire Corps. By November 30th, at least 6 troop-laden convoys ran our sea and air gauntlet, toward Leyto and disaster; of those attempted reinforcements 21,000 men were lost at sea; 26 vessels, totalling 92,750 tons and 17 escort warships were destroyed. By late November, Japanese dead on Leyte had ex- ' ceeded U5,000 as compared to our losses of 1,133 killed and htb}2 wounded, this great disparity being due to our tactics of mobile maneuver and superior artillery which steadily reduced the enemy without possibility of effective retaliation. At the end of the Campaign, Japanese dead and captured on Leyte exceeded 82,000, exclusive of losses at sea, a mute and grisly monument to dreams of empire that in its brute savagery turned back the clock by centuries. Meanwhile, Philippine guerrilla forces in the Western Visayas and Mindanao had maintained an aggressive offensive against enemy garrisons on the several major islands and had succeeded in liberating large areas, including strongly-held coastal points and airfields. Constant guerrilla pressure seriously disrupted enemy communication lines, impeded free movement of his reserves, and constantly bled him through troop and supply losses. Colonel Fertig in Mindanao, Colonel Peralta on Panay, Lt# Col. Abcede on Ncgros, Lt« Col. Cushing on Cebu, Lt# Col. Suarez in the Sulu Archipelago, Inginiero on Bohol and Kangleon on Leyte, led their gallant men in constant disruption of the enemy's rear areas. Our later amphibious assaults against the inner Visayas, IfiLndanao and the Sulus wero hastened to decisive success by this invaluable aid# The stage was set for the final act of liberation# In personal command of assault operations, in an epochal envelopment of the enemy's rear, General MacArthur sent an irresistible force ashore at Lingayen Gulf on January 9th, 19^5» that in 26 days swept Luzon's Central - 5 -
* Ato* I WAIGEO I SANSAPOR PHASE VII PHALFE VI 0|»T0n NEW~3UINEA ARE** K0OO0 Bar - /BATANTA I SORONG SALAWATI Smisool I Kabor Main MANOKWARI NOEMF I oemi ^Roemberpon I »OUT •JJoerr JAPEN I • ARMI PHASE V ^Mioe Woor I k1ACCLUER GULF (Omroo9 Box) 0 r Roon I j GEELYINK ^Angromeot I BJUL Moor I Boelo II CERAM Koroe I Oorong It ° Wotoebelo It & CAMPAFGN IN ^ SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA NEW GUINEA TO THE MOLUKKAS APRIL - SEPTEMBER I944 4 4 Allied Geographical Section 13 Feb45 AGS HQ24/44
SULU SEA § RALABAK Ml N D AN AO THE CAMPAIGN IN THE Zomboonga ito SOUTHWEST PACIFICAREA MQQJKKAS TO THE PHILIPPINES "OBASILAN SEPTEMBER NOVEMBER 1944 Sandokon ^ 0 50 IQO 200 300 TawiTowj V SULU ARCH MILEB NATOCNA IS A * talauo 6LANDS Tanakon CELEBES SEA & SOUTH sAnci islands NATOCNA l& ISLANOS Kuching MOROT Manadodl Moy Tondoftc W ASIA IS MoptaJ Temafc HALMAHERA ASEVII ' PHASE VI Rontionok r TOGlAN IS A10LUKKA MAKASSAR PHASE V ^ STRAIT — Botjon likpapar GROUP •tjSANSAPOR HAKLH * SOELA ^ CERAM SEA Wort) IS. , CERAM Billiton Nam)aa Bandiermosin R\ ^JCoimono^-* Nobire OUT HOLLANOA „ ^ Boeroe I Laoel Kendon Ambon NEW du t N E A ft O Kokenou NOMONPR0CBona WATOEBELA IS Boeton Timoeko Makassar T0M|// Bawean Bafavia BAN DA SEA Dobo®[ J aroe is KEI IS ^ w, Rembong Modoera I Kangean OAM AR IS rabaja •tor ../Ttanimbar is Frederik Bondowoeo -p.. Hendrik I B^'1 Lombok Alor I LETI IS •T?" UTSoumloki •\;II: " .'00 • „ ' . X 'MAFKC OAS I BABAR is. 'ieloroe°|€ Merouke^ DenPosor ARAFURA SEA mb0WQI z^y^oPo. ^ ! ALLIED GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION 1 SEMOOT.S^- — Chnttmos I 1 13 FEB45 AGS/H028/45 TIMOR SEA EIS. -^ROTI | Melville I I N D I A N O C E A N Bathurtt I WESSEL IS. Ashmore Cortier Darwin AUSTRALIA
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<9 9ABUYAN CHANNEL PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TUCUIGARA VIGA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA LINGAYEN© Military Intelligence Section 80NT OC JAN 1945 General Staff N FERNANDO SCHEME OF MANEUVER UILIAN OCTOBER 1944-JUNE 1945 AGU STATUTE MILES 50 100 TARLA NAUTICAL MILES SECOND PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN TABLE OF U.S. UNITS A. CRUZ ISt. CAVALRY DIVISION ©BICOLANDIA BA1ANGAS SUBIC@ APR 1945 6th. INFANTRY DIVISION GORREGIDOR-BATAN6AS BOAC £ S 7th. INFANTRY DIVISION JAN-FEB 1945 CALAPANV V / ii th. AIRBOURNE DIVISION SORSOGON M INDORO I 24th. INFANTRY DIVISION ULAN 25th. INFANTRY DIVISION KASBATE 31St. INFANTRY DIVISION M A »S>8 /^BA1 32nd. INFANTRY DIVISION RJOSE © C A PI Z 33rd. INFANTRY DIVISION EC 1944 B ORONGAN w 37th. INFANTRY DIVISION P A N A Y \p STA. BARBARA —' M^0E 38th. INFANTRY DIVISION © LEYTE 40th. INFANTRY DIVISION ACOLOD OCT 1944 ALAWAN© 41St. INFANTRY DIVISION FEB 1945 43rd. INFANTRY DIVISION AMERICAL DIVISION CARMEN 77th. INFANTRY DIVISION (jo) CAGAYA DUMAGUETE 96th. INFANTRY DIVISION VISAYAS© SKJUIJOR MAY 1945 MAR-APR 1945 BUTUAN •ILIGAN DANSALAN 8AL ABAC K) ZAMBOANGA© M I N D A MAR 1945 ® SULUS - S. MINDANAO © SARANGANI APR 1945 JULY 1945 REPRODUCED BY 2773RD ENGRS.
Plain and entered Manila. Simultaneously, our airborne and parachute troops previously landed in Batangas, raced into the City from the south to complete the enemy's local envelopment. Flouting the Humane precedent set by IfocArthur in 19l*l, the Japanese organized a bitter defense of i-anila. More than 20,000 naval troops turned the city into a complete fortress. Our unexpectedly rapid advance and envelopment dislocated this supreme barbarism, to some extent, and spared nuch of a city otherwise marked for utter destruction by its suicidal defenders. The atrocities •which could not be prevented in time, have echoed in horror throughout the world wherever men are free. The Philippine Islands are now liberated. This arduous island campaign of 8 months, beginning at Leyte Gulf, has ended v/ith the current final phase of mopping up in Mindanao and Northern Luzon. Only the mountain corridor of Cagayan Valley, a trap from which there is no escape, remains under Japanese occupation. A democratic nation has regained its freedom from the invader. Japanese military forces in the Philippines, reinforced after our initial landings on leyte on October 20th, last year, comprised an entire Area Army, 2 Army Corps, at least twenty-two (22) Divisions and Brigades, and a large number of service troops totalling U00A?0,000 men# Merchant marine, laborers and hastily drafted civilians swelled his locust plague of armed occupational forces. With the exception of several thousand prisoners and some isolated fugitivo remnants, all will have become casualties. Enemy losses in the Philippines to date, exceed 380,000, a mortal wound inflicted on the Japanese Army, with relatively low losses to ourselves yet another example of the brilliant quality of economy of force as a characteristic of that great leader — Douglas MacArthur. The strategic effect of Philippine liberation has set the stage for ultimate Japanese defeat, at home and in the south since these areas now are isolated and severed from each other* Ihc Japanese Efopire and its cardhouse "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" is doomed.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHHi/EST PACIFIC AREA COMMUNIQUE NO. 3185, 5 July 19h$ For release to the Press at 06301, 5 July PHILIPPINES The entire PHILIPPINE ISLANDS aro now liberated and the Philippine Campaigns can be regarded as virtually closed* Some minor isolated action of a guerrilla nature in the practically uninhabited mountain ranges may occasionally persist but this'great land mass of 115,600 square miles with a population of 17,000,000 is now freed of the invader# The enemy during "the operations employed twenty-three divisions, all of which were practically annihilated* Our forces comprising seventeen divisions# This was one of the rare instances when in long campaign a ground force superior in numbers was entirely destroyed by a numerically inferior opponent# The Japanese ground forces comprised the- following divisions or - equivalentss 1st, 8th, 10th, 16th, 19th, 23rd, 26th, 30th, 100th, 102d, 103d, 105th, 2d Armored, 2d Airborne Brigade (reinforced to divisional strength), the 5Uth, 55th, 58th, 6^st and 68th Independent MLced Brigades (reinforced todivisional strength),•three divisional units known as the KOBAYASHI, SUZUKI and SHIMBU commands, organized from twentyeight independent battalions, three- naval divisions comprising a Provisional'Naval Command of corps strength, under Admirals Iwabuchi and Shiroya, and a large number of base and service elements, Tho total strength approximated U50,000 men# Naval and air forces shared equally with the ground troops in accomplishing the success of the campaign# Naval battles reduced the Japanese Navy to practical impotence and the air losses running into many thousands have seriously crippled his air potential# Working in complete unison the three services inflicted the greatest disaster ever sustained by Japanese arms# The objects of the campaign were asfollows: 1# To penetrate and pierce the eneisyfs center so as todivide him into north and south, his homeland to the north, his captured Pacific possessions to the south# Each half could then be enveloped and attacked in turn# ,2, The acquisition of a great land, sea and air base for future operations both to the north and to the south comparable to the British Islands in its use as a base for allied operations from the west against Germany# 3# The establishment of a great strangulating air and sea blockade between Japan and the conquered possessions in the Pacific to the south so as to prevent raw materials being sent to the north and supply or reinforcesnt to the south# U# The liberation of the PHILIPPINES with the consequent collapse of the enemy1s imperial concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the reintroduction of democracy in the Far East# 5# The liberation of our captured officers and men and of internees held in the Philippines# 6# A crippling blow to the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force# All of these purposes were accomplished* i
9ABUYAN CHANNEL LA OA6 VIGA *1LAS AM • BO NTOC •TTAMO TARLA£ • STOTSENBURC S.FERNANOO A. CRUZ LIRA LUGENA BATAMSAS CALAPA M 1 N O O R O 90AC LEGASP! SORSOGON I ULAN C API ^ VJ STA. BARBARA S.JOSE ILOH.Q ^COLOD / M /CEB CEBU® CARIGARA I TACLOBA \ •ORMOC •RON SAN RTO P«ING*5SA E 6 R 0 S TAMJAY UMACUET B O H O L BUTUAN ILIGAN •MALAYBALAY •COTABATO K ABACAN # PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Military Intelligence Section GENERAL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC ENEMY STRENGTH DISPOSITIONS AS OF 20 OCTOBER 1944 STATUTE MILES NAUTICAL MILES SECOND PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN UNITS PRESENT ON 20 OCT 1944 14TH AREA ARMY 35TH ARMY (CORPS) 8TH DIV 16TH DIV 26TH DIV 30TH DIV IOOTH DIV I02ND DIV I03RD DIV I05TH DIV 2ND ARMORED DIV 54TH 1MB 55 TH 1MB 58TH 1MB 61ST 1MB (BATAN IS) SUBSEQUENT REINFORCEMENTS 41ST ARMY (CORPS-FORMED IN PI) ST DIV IOTH DIV I9TH DIV 23RD DIV 68TH BRIG 1ST RAIDING GROUP (2ND BRIG) 3 PROV DIVS (FORMED IN P.I.) 3 PROV NAVAL DIVS THE BEGINNING REPRODUCED BY 2773RD "ENGRS.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS BANGUED VI GA SAN FE LINGAYEN • 8AUTISTA TARLAC STOTSENBURC 5.800 500 10 0 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA Military Intelligence Section General Staff ENEMY STRENGTH DISPOSITIONS AS OF 30 JUNE 1945 STATUTE MILES 50 . 100 150 NAUTICAL MILES S.FERN \ MANILA^ 7*PASI« Havite 53 F*"* \ V SECOND PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN STA. CRUZ LI PA LUCENA BATANGAS SAN CALAPA M I NOORO JO BOAC LTGASPI S0RS0G0N ^ \BULAN ^X V \J ^ VS *GATARMAN KASBATE \ .S A M A R MA . S . BAT _ , . . . . C A L e A Y 0 6 CAPI Z • CATBALOGTAN B ORONGAN &.JOSE FABRICA CEBU CARIGARA TACLOB ORMOC MALI T-RIX, RTO PPINCESSA CARMEN S URIG AO OUMAGUETE SKJUIJOR •ILIGAN OANSAL M I N 0 A N •COTABATO KABACAN• DAVAO 3.000 c? nl SCATTERED : 500 THE END REPRODUCED BY 2773RD ENGRS.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA 17 November 1943 A strategical resume of ths operations conducted since June 29th by General MacArthur, with the combined forces cf the Southwest Pacific and ; the South Pacific Areas, was given to the press today by General MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier General C.. A. Willoughby, who said: » PART I "As in a mosaic, isolated fragments are pieced together until suddenly a definite pattern is recognizable; on the enormous front of the Southwest Pacific Area, approximately 3,000 miles, extending from Soerabaya to Bougainville, operations are conducted that at first glance (might) look as more or less disconnected actions, but are, in fact, consecutive elements of a strategic conception, which was announced by General MacArthur on January 2k in a press release, with reference to the recent Papuan Campaign"... The outstanding military lesson of this campaign was a continuous calculated application of air power employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops....The offensive and defensive power of aviation and the adaptability, range and capacity of its transport in an effective combination with ground forces...represent a broadened conception of warfare that will permit the application of offensive power in swift, massive strokes rather than the dilatory island-to-island advance...that some have assumed to be necessary in a theater "here the enemy's far-flung strongholds are dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagos..." The far-flung operations of this extensive front are firmly held together by the central theme of a general plan, conceived by General MacArthur. As the basis of action, there has been the most careful and subtle employment of the factor of surprise; the General has always succeeded in deluding the enemy as to his objective and his purpose. With relatively little loss of life and the minimum of assault forces in ground action, he has forced the enemy back and maneuvered him from one position to another. He has struck first on one flank, then shifted the assault to the other or applied pressure from the center, or engaged in a combined maneuver, a combination of several directions, thereby completely bewildering the enemy. Enemy strongholds, carefully prepared by ground troops, are almost invariably by-passed and their supply lines severed, first by air then by small naval craft, eventually forcing the enemy to a retrograde movement, with little or no losses to our own ground forces. His preference for the envelopment, the turning movement, the decisive operation against flank and rear of the enemy's position, illustrates thoroughly the General's repugnance to frontal attacks, entailing disproportionately greater loss of life. The economic futility of the frontal attack has always been known: historically, it has been recorded as a very expensive and bloody undertaking] General MacArthur understands the value of military history and is completely familiar with the science of war as practiced by the great military commanders. In his annual report as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in 1935, he said, "The facts derived from historical analysis, are applied to the conditions of the present and the proximate future.....Military history reveals fundamental principles and their combination and applications, which have always been productive of success...these principles know no limitation of time"...." One of the greatest military 'technicians of all times, Napoleon ^ I, operated against flank and rear of his opponent almost habitually. He *= employed this form of attack from thirty to forty times, over a period of years. - 1 - $6 AUG 1948
We do not have to quote the famous Corsican, there is a great American commander, Robert E. Lee, who also understood war perfectly. The campaign of Chancellorsville will remain the imperishable model. A comparison of MacArthur with Lee is even more appropriate, since he was operating with the limited means of the Confederacy, shifting from one flank to another — a blue-print of our operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. The General applies these classical precepts with the most modern technical means. He understands and evaluates, in particular, the enormous flexibility of air mass. His object is more and more revealed as the calculated advance of his bomber-lines, through the seizure of advanced bas~s, so that his relatively small force of bombers may continue its attacks under cover of his limited fighter force, operating on short and medium ranges. Each phase of advance has as (the) objectives the seizure (of) airfields, which determine the scope and distance of the next advance. His airline-base is now Finschhafen to Empress Augusta Bay* areas taken for the main purpose of establishing netf bases, which in turn serve as the springboard for still further advances, the direction of which remain for the enemy a matter of conjecture and confusion. As this airlifte goes forward, his naval forces, under newly established air coverage, regain the sea lanes, which up to now have been the undisputed principal arteries of the eneny's campaign. The masterly coordination of ground, sea and air has not had a more brilliant exhibition in recent times. In setting this most modern pattern, while exploiting the latest technical tools, the General still remains the follow-craftsman in a distinguished historical company of great commanders....Napoleon, Wellington, Lee. FART II Synopsis of additional, explanatory remarks, as a basis of reply to miscellaneous queries, etc. Maps : New Guinea and Papua - 30 miles to the inch. Australian Aeronautical Series 1:1,000,000. The general Map contained square areas, in a sequence of events and relative relationship: 1 - Operations from Moresby: Development of the Base. 2 - Seizure and Defense of> Milne Bay. Development of Base. 3 - Operations via Owen Stanley-Kokoda-Buna-Gona; Papuan Campaign. 4 - Operations from Wau via Komiatum on Salamaua: Frontal Pressure. 5 - Operations against Lae: Dwuble Envelopment. Parallel Operations: 1 - Guadalcanal: Seizure and Development of the Base. 2 - New Georgia; Seizure and Development of Bases. 3 - Bougainvillej Empress Augusta Bay: Envelopment. 4 - Trobriands: Development of Base. These remarks are, a continuation of a previous press conference, a month ago, with a view of orienting the Press on some technical aspects of the-S.W.P.A. operations. I In the resume, I have laid stress on the classical maneuver forms of envelopment, turning movement and the severance' of the eneiny's life lines, through operations against his flank and rear - ordinarily referred to as "by-passing" or "pincer movements". The significant aspect is the fact that these are maneuver forms that have been practiced throughout the history of warfare - the novel feature is the brilliant modern usage, in the employment of most modern equipment and armament. It is obvious that the range and flexibility of the Air weapon, on a background - 2 -
of tropical jungle and mountains, represents the ideal tool for the execution of these maneuvers, and that the balanced employment of all arms and weapons, in combination, represent the face of modern war. A Basic Decision; The tactical and strategical problem involved was the protection of the Australian mainland against further Japanese incursion and to prevent the interruption of U.S. shipping routes, through the southern Pacific. The Japanese hoped to accomplish both by a southeasterly advance through New Guinea, Papua and the Louisiades, and a parallel advance through the chain of the Solomons. The purely arbitrary location of boundaries between the South pacific and Southwest Pacific .Areas, allocated the task in Papua to the Southwest Pacific and in the Solomons, into the South Pacific theater. Geographically, it was inevitable that the lines of operation of both theaters would ultimately converge in a common objective area, the Bismarcks. Shortly upon the arrival from the Philippines, the General made his first great decision; namely, to defend the Australian mainland by a fight to the finish in the New Guinea area. He promptly displaced his headquarters forward about 1,5C0 miles and thereafter the forward movement of troops and establishments followed this great decision. Map Segment 1 : Port Moresby: His first task was the speedy development of this sleepy, tropical port into a vast overseas base and airport. That story is wellknown. The Jap reacted promptly and made his drive across the Owen Stanley Range to the gates of Moresby. The General's riposte was equally decisive, and is now a matter of history. Map Segment 2 ; Milne Bay; The Jap made parallel attempt at the seizure of Milne Bay, which was anticipated; Allied forces placed there, in a surprise movement, frustrated this attempt completely. Map Segment 3 ? Buna: . With the defeat of Horii's Army in Buna, the General began his drive on Salamaua. An intermediate act was a displacement forward of airfields and air equipment. Note that seizure of airdrome sites through combat, was a preliminary to the construction of airfields, conditioned on an expansion of fighter range. Note the triangular pattern, Lforesby-BunaMilne Bay, the apex being within supporting fighter range of the base line. Map Segment k : Wau; The garrison at Wau Island was reinforced and an operational line : Wau-Komiatum-Salamaua determined on. The "pincer movement" came complete with a coordinated advance along the coast frcm Buna via Mbrobe Bay on Salamaua. Note the triangular pattern with Salamaua as the apex and the line of Buna-Wau as a base. Map Segment 5 : Lae: The converging attack upon Salamaua served to attract the enemy's attention and resources into this combat area. In the classical scheme of maneuver, this represented frontal pressure "to keep the enemy occupied while a decisive double development, the classical operation against flank and rear,"was in preparation. For the first time, limited amphibious equipment was available to accomplish a dash across Huon Gulf to affect a landing at Hopoi, East - 3 -
of Lao, while a brilliant airborne movement accomplished by our Paratroops at Nadzab, in rear of and West of Lao, sealed the feite of that locality. This opened the way into the Ramu Valley, to envelop and threaten the shores of Huon Peninsula, while the quick seizure of Finschhafon, utilizing the same limited amphibious equipment, procured a springboard for further advances. Related Operations in the Solomons Map Segment 1 - Guadalcanal: In the meantime, the South Pacific forces were engaged in similar operations, parallel to the expansion of the Southwest Pacific forces in Papua; the seizure of Gudalcanal is well-known. The stubborn enemy made it a time consuming venture> with continuous frontal attacks in the Matanikao River area until an envelopment via the west coast brought our forces directly in flank and rear of the enemy and astride his barge supply routes. Map Segment 2 - New Georgia Group; Then followed the occupation of the New Georgia Group in hard fighting for Munda, the seizure and development of new airfields as a springboard for further advance. tfcp Segment 3 - Bougainville; S.P.A, was confronted by the Buin-Faisi area, one of the strongest enemy positions and most heavily garrisoned, next to Rabaul itself. In conformity with the MacArthur pattern of avoiding costly frontal attacks, strong contingents were transported by sea to the Empress Augusta Bay area and arc now established there, as a deadly threat to the remaining Jap garrison on Bougainville and a springboard for »he next movement. With Bougainville, the geographical and strategical unity of Soupac and S.W.P.A. has became irrosistable. Map Segment 4 - Trobriands? In collateral operation, conducted with speed and secrecy, certain islands of the Trobriands were seized, to bridge the gap between the Solomons and New Guinea. Efficient airfields were constructed at astonishing speed and the intervening sea-lanes blocked through the potentiality of continuous air intercepts. The present enemy front, of approximately 400 miles, as the crow flics, consists of a series of strong points for the protection of airfields, within mutually supporting flight range. The successful execution of MacArthur's operation with the combined SWPA and SOUPAC forcos has pushed our..airline in close proximity to the enemy's : Ramu Valley-Finschhafen-Empress Augusta Bay. The operational possibilities along the enemy's arc of 4Ot miles were promptly exploited, first striking one flank : Wewak-Madang, then moving to the other flank s Rabaul-Buka, with a potential threat to the enemy's center, emanating from the Buna and Trobriand bases. The enemy has been placed in a precarious position and is made to pay a heavy prico on land, sea and in the air, at disproportionate cost, for his meager holdings. In the pattern of the general pacific War, however, the brunt of fighting is centered here in this North Eastern fragment of the Southwest Pacific area. There is no region of the Japanese conquest, from Burma to Manchuria that is exacting a similar toll. A substantial proportion of the Empire's total resources, in planes and ships arc poured into this front. Control of interior shipping lanes and well-established air ferry routes have enabled the Japanese to pour reinforcements into the fight and keep pace with their terrific losses, easily comparable to operations in western Europe. - 4 -
FART III — Historical Examples, Illustrating The Afeneuver Pattern — Schematic Diagrams; 1 (Triangular Pattern); 2 (Oivi); 3 (Buna); 4(Chancellorsville); 5 (Beersheba, 1917); 6 U.S. & S.W.P.A.,etc. a. Beersheba, 1917: The futility, or expense, of frontal attacks and the almost invariable effect of the turning movement, the attack against flank and rear, can be demonstrated on a thousand battlefields, ancient or modern. The attack on Beersheba is a typical case; the frontal attack by several Infantry divisions was ineffective, except to pin the enemy down, but the turning movement by the Cavalry, in flank and rear of the enemy position, sealed his fate. This pattern was repeated at Lae and on Bougainville. b. 7th Australian Division at Oivi - November 10, 19^2: The situation on or about November 10th is a typical example of the by-passing of an organized resistance, in which the 7th Australian Division held the enemy frontally at Oivi with the l6th Brigade, while the 25th moved against his flank and rear via Gorari-Ilimo, and forced the enemy to abandon his position, in a retrograde movement. c. 7th Australian Division and 32nd U.S. Division; On a larger scale, the movement of the 7th Australian Division advancing in direction of Buna (S. to N.) was coordinated with the entry into action of the 32nd American Division via Oro Eay (E. to N.). This threat against their flank and rear, compelled further Japanese withdrawals to the coast; thereafter, the fight became an expensive frontal attack with the enemy's back against the sea -- against Huon Gulf, which was then still open to Japanese reinforcements by destroyer and transports. d. ffau to Komiatum - Lae: The same pattern repeats itself in the operations from Wau through the mountain ranges, via Komiatum, on Salamaua -- the "frontal pressure" that pinned down and attracted the mass of the enemy, while a "double envelopment" against his flank and rear took place via Hopoi and Nadzab, on Lae. e. Empress Augusta Bay: In the Solomons, that pattern is repeated in the recent seizure of Empress Augusta Bay, which places our forces deeply flank and rear of the remaining enemy positions in SouthernBougainville. f. Chancellorsville 1863 - S.W.P.A. 19b1'• The pattern of Chancellorsville is that of an inferior force onehalf the strength, confronted by double its number. The Federal commander obligingly divided his armies in two almost equal parts, with a view of crushing Lee in "a pincer movement". Lee, relying on surprise, left a small, deceptive force on one flank, moved his mass on Chancellorsville and decisively defeated one arm of the Federal pincer movement. On a larger scale, we are pursuing similar tactics by striking the enemy first on one flank - the Wewak-Madang and Finschhafen area, then striking him on his other flank, the Rabaul-Buka area; only yesterday, the pendulum has swung again to strike the enemy's west flank - Alexishafen. While attacks against his east flank, Rabaul-Bougainville, and his west flank, l&dang-Bogadjim-Wewak, have been heavily accentuated, his - 5 -
center is equally menaced by the surprise seizure of the Trobriands and the extraordinary rapid development of airfields, not only as an intermittent link between the South Pacific area and our own, but definitely placing the sea area south of Rabaul under continuous Allied land-based air threat, bridging the gap between the Solomons and southern Papua. g. Northwestern Area: On an even more fantastic scale, the historical pattern repeats itself in the coordinated, timed, air operations emanating from Darwin into the enemy-occupied Netherlands East Indies, as jyacArthur's "Western arm", while his "Eastern arm" is engaged in the Bismarcks and the Solomons. Considering that the objectives on this front are over 3»°00 miles apart, the acadenic distinction between first and second fronts can be said to already exist in the Southwest Pacific Area. h. Geographical Relations: The immensity of this undertaking can best be realized if we express l&cArthur's mission in geographical terms of the well-known American Continent, in which the General is charged with operations extending from New York to San Francisco, not only to hold the enemy successfully along this scattered line, but to dfive him into Canada, by operating from Denver towards Edmonton and from Philadelphia towards Quebec. On the New C-uinea front,a fragment of his front, one of his bases is equivalent in location to Charleston, S.C.; he is expected to strike Rabaul, i.e. Washington, D.C., when he took Lae, he had advanced as far as the vicinity of Zanesville, Ohio; when he strikes I&dang and Wewak, his bombers really fly to the vicinity of Chicago, 111. Were we to superimpose the S.W.P.A. over the European theater, we would find that the Italian peninsula barely covers Northeastern New Guinea and Papua, and that ftfecArthur' s advance from Milne Bay to the Ramu Valley is equi-distant from Sicily to Florence. Rome is in the relative location of Lae. On the larger European front, in an East to West line, the Bismarcks and Rabaul are in an equivalent location of Kharkov; Port Moresby is superimposed on Sevastopol, Cherbourg is located approximately at ]\focassar, and Berlin on the island of Ceram, one of our occasional air targets. - 6 -
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