1/?/42 TO THC: PRESI DDIT FROM THe: SECRETARY OF WAR ·~ Pronklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR. o2oo.9 (9/27/58) 1 Date- ~- I.- S''! . Signature- cPt:Uf /, ~~\ ..
.. ~li 990 ZPNJ •'ll.t;D 0510/7 AG )81 (1-7-42) MSC FIIOII : FORT lULLS RADIOGiWt BXI.CT COpy TO : T!fE t.DJIITANT GENERJ.L WAR DEPT NO. 20 JANUARY 7TH (PRIORITY) ESN-1705 JANUARY 7 1942 ) 151 A!' RECEIPT ACKNO'IILEOOED YOUR NINC. ONE THRI:.E STOP IN ORDEk TO PREPARE FOR ARRIVAL OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPl!UTION Ill MINDANAO I ORDERED BRIGADIER GiNeaAL SlWIP 001100 VISAYAN MINDANAO FORCE ON THIRTET!I TO &lOVE EQUlVALWT Or Otl.,; OF HlS TIOO VlSAYAN DIVISIONS TO lllND.>JIAO AJID TO TiWISF.;n HIS OWN I!:.AJl«UA.ll'l'WS T:lc..llE STOP NO Rl::PORT Of EXECUTION Yt:r F'RO:I S!L.RP BUT tiOV!:llEli'!' OFFERS NO DIFFICULTY STOP NINE P DASH FORTY AIRPLANES SE!IT TO DEL IIONTE STOP ALSO DISPATCiiLD SIX HUNDRED FIFTY OfFICERS AND !.LEN OF' NINL'l'o:ENTH BO!lBARJLII::l~T CROUP TO DEL IIONTE FROM HZRE THROUGH ENOO BLOCKADE STOP TROOP SHI P ARRIVt.D BUT ACCO:JPANYING SHI P WITH AMUUNITION AND SUPPL!t.S \lAS SUNK STOP FORCE IN IIINDANAO lULL CHLCK HOSTILI:: DRIVE IF WADI:. FROM DI.VAO tJlEA CQIIJU PLACE COVJ:.RING FORCES IN COTABATO PARAliC Rz;Pf:AT COTABATO PJ.RANG AREA t.ND COVc;.R POThTS OF' ENTRY AT CAGAYE:N ILISAJIIS REPEAT CAGAYEN liiS.IJUS ARz;A STOP liiLL KU.P II.; INFOR:Wl ON AIRDROilES .>JID BE PREPARED TO R.J:.CiiVE AND SERVICE AIRPLANES STOP WILL DEVELOP ADDITIONAL LANDING FIELDS STOP ESSbNTIAL T~T BLOCAD~ nuNNING SHIPS BE FORCED THROUGH TO MINDANAO 'IIITH GROUND AND AIR OPtJUTING SUPPLIES :fOP GROUND FORCE HAS VERY LITTLE AICAUNITION STOP OUR AIR FORCl:: BO.IIBAR®t.NT MISSIONS FRO!• SOUTH SHOULD QUICKL.Y I:.LDUNATE ROSriLE AIR FROII DAVAO AND OUR PURSUIT SHOULD CO INTO DEL IIONTE WITHOUT DELAY STOP ESTABLIS~NT OF AIR f~HC~ ~ILL P~IT ~IAT~ EXTENSION I NTO VI SAYAN AND ATTACKS ON ENEIIY FOKCES I N LUZON STOP HJ.YE SEVERAL AIRDROltJ:.S IN OPE.P....TIOH ON BATAAN SUBJJ:.CT TO SEGic::;I'
SECHi±lT lliTKRlllTTE.!IT lliTERRUPI'ION BOT ONLY Vt:lrt LDUTED GASOLINE STOP WILL KEEP AIR FORCE ADVISED THEREON STOP JJI AR!LY CORPS SHOULD BE LANDE.'D I N IUNDA!IAO AT TRE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE STOP ESSENTIAL THAT BLOCKADE RUNNERS BRING VITAL ITEMS STOP NUMBEROUS SMALL VESSELS SHOULD aE USED ANO THOUGH LOSSES MAY BE HIGH A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE WI LL Gt.'T THROUGH AND A fEW WILL RELIEVE THE SITUATION STOP ENOO APPEARS TO HAVE TENDENCY TO BEC011E OVERCONFI DDIT JJID 1'114& IS RIPE FOR BRILLIANT THRUST WITH AIR CARRIERS end llAC!JiTh'UR - 2 - SEGR.o·:f'
• AG .381 (1-12-42) USC FRO;\ FORT lol! LLS TO ADJUTANT G£!1ERAL NO . .)6 JA.'IUAil! 12 JANUARY ll , 1942 8:.)8 P:.l GROU!ID ACTIVITY CO.WINI-:0 TO iJ!TILLfui.Y DUI:.LLI!lG A!ID PATROLLING stop ENE!lY AIR ACTION LIMITED stop I HAV<': PLACI:.D T!U. CO:.!MAHD ON HALt' !lATIONS SL:lT 10: 55 Pto! 1/11/42 C0:4 UACARTHUR Frnnlrl in D. Roo11vel t Library DEClASSIFIED DOD UIR. ~200.9 (9/27/S8) Date- 1/- - ' - ~-1 Signature- cat:UR /. ~~ 5-e.:;; X U:::J T
_...JI'II 11118 JILID OA? '0 R G I I '1'. ~te. F;Ie..:~ __.R..,A"'PI.,OO....,.RAM....______ AC- 6 Reeoiwd at tloe Wu Owputm.at ~ C:...ter R-3441Mualtioeo Bide.. WubiJottoa, D. C. J.UUARY 1S 11142 246AJI Jl, From P"l'.!IILLS PI To PRBSIDE!I'l' ROOSEViL'l' WASHN DC. 110. 7 JANUARY 1STB. IT IS WITH UTIIOST DIFFIDE!ICE TIIAT I All SUBlAITTIHG TO YOU THESE THOUGHTS BUT I All SE2'1DIHG TilEY FOR lii!AT THEY MAY BE _,RTB. IT IS II'! FI.Ril CONVICTIO!f THAT AT THIS Tir.IE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BRING TO Ali EIID THE WAR WITH JAPAH !I" A!IERICA AHD ENGLAND OR EVER IF A!AERICA ALONE DECIDED TO USE ALL THE MATERIALS AT HER DISPOSAL TO CRUSH THE JAPAHESE FORCES Al' THIS THE. IWliO RBPORTS RECEIVED HERE INDICATE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF BITLER IS TO BE AMERICAS FIRST OBJECTIVE. I REALIZE TIIAT TBESE REPORTS MAY BE BRITISH PROPAGAHDA INTENDED TO INFLUENCE ACTION IN THAT DIRECTION BUT THEY HAVE NEVER BH!f REI"UTED IN AllY WAY AHD IT IS RBMARKABLE THAT NO ASSISTAHCE BY SEA OR BY AI R liAS BEEII AFFORDED THE PHILIPPIDS SIHCE TilE BEGI11l1IHG OF TilE WAR. THIS APPAIU!II'l' INACTIVITY IS 4 lllTTBil OF GRAVE COHCBRH TO ME AND KY PEOPLE. IT SEEKS TO ME THAT THE DESTRUCTIOI OF HITLER lilY !lOT BB POSSIBLE Ill LESS TBAH TftO OR THREE 'fBARS J THAT THIS PI!JUOD OF TIME li'ILL GIVE JAPAH THE OPPOilTU!fiTY TO REDUCE TilE PHILIPPIBIS , IWATA 4110 TilE DUTCH BlSf INDIES ABO COHSOLIDATI ITS FORCIS BY THE USB OF PRIKB
R...n.l at tile War Ooputm.t M-C...ter R.. 3441 Mouoitiooo Bide.. ......... D. D. c. (SHUT r.:l) II. Fr~~------------------------- To•----------------------- HO. T JAJIUARY 1 am . IT WILL BE f11111 VBRY DIPFIClJLT TO DISLODGE FROll T1IE COJQUIRED TERRITORIES. I B.&VB TAilBII THE LIBERTY 01' SBHDIIG YOU flUS KBSSAGI WITHOUT SUBIIITTIHG IT TO GENERAL WACARTHUR. QIJEZOI • .... _ .._ ____ ~· ··
TELEGRAM '!'he White House February • 19~ FOR 'flU: PRESIDU'l' MacArthur repuleed enemy night attacke on hie left. No new land.attacks at Singapore. Air attacks continue. Our aircraft sank two transports in Balikpapan area. Haleey arrives fifth Fletcher on s ixth. Britieh are making ten new vorvettes available to us and we are despatching crews for same to U.I ., in February. Combined chief• of staff are urging Britieh and Wavell to accept Chiang' e offer of m.ore Chineee troops. Indioa,ione ~re that three eube deetroyed yeeterday in Atlantic. 7 Leary ie, flying to An1ao area. Comieh feele we are •oving too fa1t reference Hart. Co•ieb sent ••••age to Hart and bae reply there'o wbiob be feele President ebould ••• on hi1 return. llcOrea, ,
REC ' D BY PHOUE AT 0236 From : COMICNH CODE ROOM FROM RnDIO CAVITE: l~d~'r ";;.. -r . r ' EIGHT TO TE.<'l TRANSPORTS LAUDING TROOPS AT CEBU CITY SUPPORTED BY FIVE WARSHIPS . LJU'IDINO BEING MJ\DE AT TOLEDO . ALL LANDINGS RAVE AIR SUPt'ORT . HAVE DIRECTED DESTRUCTIOtl TORPEDOES AT CEBU CITY. Frnntl in D. Rooeevelt LiDr ary DtGI.f.S~! fi ED noo Ut tl. ~200. 9 (9/27/68) Date- 'f - '- - .b-9 stcnat- ~£U/ cf #~ J:3S03S- - -
_ .rr~k' - D. Rooeavel~ LibrarJ "'"0 ~C LJ.,S;:,iiiED uuo· UlR. o2oo.e (9/27toa) QQfX RADIOGRAII To GeneraJ. ll&rahall 201 tl o. Feb. 4th February 4 , 1942. 6:49 P.ll. In coepliance with your previoue directive that froa time to time I present ~ strste£1C conception of the situation I take this opportunity of presenting what I believe is a fatal mistake on the pert of t he De1100c:ret.ic Allies. The Jspenoae are sweeping southward in e greet offensive and the Allies are at tempting merely to stop them by building up force& in their front . This Method, as bas almost universa.lly been the case in .....r, rlll fail. Such e~ovements can only be negatived by thrusts not at the enemy ' s strength but at hie weakness . The lines of weakness froa tice imMemoriLl have been the lines of communication . I n thie case they are stretched out over two thousand miles of sea with the whol e lino subject t o J.merican sea thrust . This line is not defended by ene.-;y l>olabers but is held by scattered Naval elements . A sea threat would iaMedi!ltely relieve the pressure on the South and is the only wey that pressure can be relieved . A greet naval victory on our part is not necessary to accomplish this mission ; the threo.t alone would go far toward the desired end . The enel:l)' would probably not engage his entire Fleet in actual combat. If be did and lost, tho war would be over. If he did and won, the losses he would sustain would still cripple hia advance and take from him the initiative.
1-... '' ~ ' <0 • - , - ~ ..I You must be prepared to take heavy losses , just so heavy losses are ' inflicted in return . I wish to reitera te that his bomber strength is practically entirely engaged on his southern f ront and represents little menace to such a naval thrust . With onl y minor tbrea t from the fleets of Germany and Italy, the American and Briti sh Navies can assemble without seri ous jeopardy t he force to make thi s thrust . I unhesitatingly predict that if this is not done the pl tli'I upon which we are now working , based upon the building up of air s upr emacy in the Southwest Pacific, will fail , t he war will be i ndefinitely pr olonged and its final outcome will be jeopardized . Counsels of t imidi ty based upon theories of safety firs t will not win ·against such an aggressive and audacious adversary as Japan . No ' building program , no matter of what propor tions , will be able to overtake • the : initial advantages t he enemy with every chance of s uccess is trying i to ga in. The only way to beat him is to fight him incessantly . Combat i mus~ not be avoided but must be sought so that t he ultimate pol icy of I at :fit ion can at once become effective. No matter what the theor etical odds may be against us , if we fight him we will beat him. We have shown that here . I n submi tting these views I may be exceeding the proper scope of my office and therefore do so with great besitanGY . My excuse, if excuse is necessary, i s that from my present point of vantage I can see the whole strategy of the Pacific perhaps clearer than anyone else. If agreeable to you I would appreciate greatly the presentation of this view to the highest authority. llacAr thur . 2 - SEGREh.' •
1~ Vol. I Cener,l, &r1t11h oo.~onwealth ftle Par Eut
RADIOORAI4 Fro" ft. IIllis, P. I. To General Marshall, Chief of StLtf . No . 2265-February 8. February 8, 1942. 9:04 A.ll. The following message hu just been received by ae from President Queaon for President Roosevalt. "Tbe situation of ~ country haa becoce eo desperate that I feel that positive action ia demanded. llilitarily it is evident that no help will reach us rroa the United States in time either to rescue the beleagured garrison now figltting eo gallant.ly or to prevont the complete overrunning of the entire Philippine Archipelago. ~ people entered the war with the confidence that the United State& would bring such aeaietance to us as would me.ke it possible to sustain the conflict with some chance of success. All our soldiers in the field ware ani.u.ted by the belief that help would be torthcoo.ing. This belp has not and evidently will not be realized. Our people have suffered death, misery, devastation. Attar two aonthe of war not the slightest assistance has been forthcoming tr001 the United States. Aid and succour have been die~tched to other warring nations auch aa England, Ireland , Australia , the N. E. I. and perhaps others, but not on1,y has nothing COlle here, but apparently no effort has been 11ade to bring anything here. The American Fleet and the British Fleet, the t wo most powerful naviea in the world , have appar• antly adopted an attitude which precludes any effort to reach these islands with assistance. As a result, while enjoying security itself,. the United States has in effect cond...ned the sixteen aillions or Filipinos to practical destruction in order to affect a certain delay. You haTe promised redemption , but what wo need is iamodiate assistance and protection. We are concerned with what is to transpire during the next few sooths and years as well u with our ultiaata deetiny. Tbere is not the alightaat doubt in our ainds that victory will r ..t with the United Statea, but t he queation before ua now ia1 Shall • • further sacrifice our country and our people in a bopalass tight? I voice the unanimous opinion of II,)' War Cabinet and I am sure the unanimous opinion of all Filipinos that under the circumstances we ahould talr:e ataps to preserve the Philippines and the Filipinos troa further destruction.
/ Thanks to wise generalship two- thirds of Qy country is as yet untouched. We do not propose to do this by a betrayal of the United Statu. It appears to us that our aiaaion is only to fight as a sacrifice force here as long as possible in order to help the defense of the Dutch and British in this area of the World. But you do not need to sacrifice the people of the Philippines tc win this war. Members of your Govern=ent here r epeatedly said that the action against Hitler would determine the outcoce of the entire war. I feel at this moment that our military resistance here cso no longer hold the ene~ when he sees fit to launch a serious attack. I feel tbe.t the eleaents of the situation here can be c001posed into a solution that will not reduce t he delaying effect of our resistance here but which will eave ~ country from further devastation as t he battleground of two great powers. I deem it 111,y duty to propose ~ solution . The Government of t he United Statee under the llcDufi'ie Tydings law is cOllllllitted t o grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the same law authorized the President to open negotiations for the neutralisation of the Philippines . On the other hand , the Japanese Govern4ent has publicl,y announced ita willingness to grant the Philippines her independence. In V"i&w of the foregoing I propose the following: That the United States 1lllmediatel,y grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence; That the Philippines be at once neutralized; That all occupying troops, both Aaerican and Japanese, be withdrawn by IIUtual agreement with the Philippine Oovernlllent within a reasonable length of tiae; That neither country aaintain bases in the Philippines; That the Philippine ~ be iaaediately disbanded, the onl,y armed forces being maintained here to be a constabulary of modest size; That iaaediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries be a matter to be deterllined entirel,y by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned; That A.urican and Japanese civilians who so desire be withdrawn with their respective troops under autu.al and proper safeguards . It is rq proposal to aalte this suggestion publicly to you and to the Japanese authorities without dela.y and upon acceptance in general principle by thoae two countries that an ialllediate araistice be entered into here pending the withdrawal of their respective garrisons. (signed) Manuel L. Qunon. " - 2 -
"') CJ tl {.zJ ~ c .. • ~ t:t ,J 0 {.zJ J 0:~ :::;) SEOitl:i=;tI took the liberty of presenting this message to Commissioner Sayre for a general expression of his views. follows: High States as ' "If the premise of President Quezon ia correct , that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be availing, I believe his proposal for immediate independence and neutralization of Philippines is the sound course to follow.• ~ estimate of the military situation here is as follows: The troops have sustained pract.icall;y 50% percent casualt ies from their original str'ength . Divisions a.re reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to co•npBllies. Some units have entirely disappeared. The men have been in constant action and are badly battlewom . They are desperately in need of r est and refitting . Their spirit is good but they are capable now of nothing but fighting in place on a fixed position . All our supplies are scant and the command has been on half rations for the past month. It is possible for the time being that the present eno~ force might temporarily be hel d , but any addition to his present strength will insure the destruction of our Gonzale force . We have pulled through a number of menacing situations but there is no denying the fact that we are near done . Corregidor itself is extremely vulnerable. This type of fortress, built prior to the days of air poY1er, when isol ated is impossible of prol onged defense. Any heavy air bombardment or the location of siege guns on Bataan or even on the Cavite side, would definit ely limit the life of the fortress . Wy water supply is extremely vulnerable and may go at any time . Every other vital installation can be readily taken out. Since I have no eir or sea protection you must be prepared at any time to figure on the co~plete destruction of this command. You must determine whether the (mission?) Misegon of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort . The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the Un.ited States , Everyone of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they heve been betrayed in favor of others . It must be remembered they are hostile to Great Britain on account of the latter 's colonial policy. In spite of my great prestige with them, I have had the utmost difficulty during the last few days i n keeping them in line , l f help does not arrive shortly nothing, in my opinion , can prevent their utter collapse and their complete absorption by the enemy . The J apanese made a powerful impression upon Philippine public imagination in promising independence. So far as the military angle is concerned, the problem presents i tself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer - J -
SEGRiJ';} the beat possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. It would not ~feet the ultiaate situation in the Philippines for that would be determined ~Y the reeults in other theatres . If the Japanese Governaent rejects President Quezon's proposition it would psycho logically strengthen our hold because of their Prime Minister's public statement offering independence. If it accepts it, we lose no military adva n tage be cause we would still secure a t least equal delay. Please i nstru ct me. MacArthur SEC&l!:l' - 4-
/ , •Utr ". r·· ~··t l.oi .. ry SECRET • February 8, 1942• b &• to General •!acArtbur The t'll.nc:la.taental strategy outlined in your No . 201 has been under 111ost careful study. From the moment the enemy began his aoutbward drive the de cisive effec t or a successful flank attack against his communication• baa been recognized. Two factors have stood in the -.y ot initiating such operations. Tho first is that, as a tea tun or his opening operationa in early December, the enelll)' p~ vided tor nava.l nank security by aeising G11a10 and llal<e and establishing thoro aa well as in the ~arsha ll and Gilbert Islands heavy pr otective forces principally air . The second factor baa been naval weaknese due to the initial elimination at Pearl Harbor of virtua.lly the enti.re heavy striking elo•ents or the Pacific Fleet . This weakness ia now rapidly being corrected by r epeirs and transfers b.rt very heayY convoy duties to Hawaii and Australia and the submarining of one of our few Pacific air carriere has seriously limited aggressive naval operations . From now on aggressive tactics are becoming possible, It bae been necesaa.ry to convoy and set up garrisons on Canton , Cbriat..aa, Pal111Jra Islands , Borl Borl and Suos and Fiji and a garrison for New Caledonia now enroute- all to cover communications with Far East, On January JO t he Navy carried out an offensive against the hostile flank , striking the Gilbert and Maraball Islands . A great deal of damage was innicted upon J apanese shipping a.nd local installation& but the reaction, pal'- ticularly by air, was such aa to preclude deeper penetration with the limited forces available . Mor e recently United States and Dutch Naval Forces in the N. E.I. , conducting an offensive against an isolated portion of tba ene~'s extended position, were aet by formations of land based bomber s. All cruisers participating in this attack were heavily damaged and were compelled to proceed to naval bases for repair. Siailar r esults have been exper ienced in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and 1n the South China Sea. It is obvi ous t hat surface vessels cannot operate in region• where they are subjected to heavy attack br hostile land based aircraft . Nevertheless, a second offenaive ia now underw&J to strike at the nank of the hostile advance on !lew Britain. But A:nq heavy bombers rr~ Hawaii have to be moved i nto position to support this distant action , These f acta and considerations have forced us to oppose the Japaneae aggression in the only areas in which the r equired air basee and fields remain in our posaeaaion, namely, nor thern Australia and the N.B. I . It ia clearly recognized that tbe decisive effeota that would f ollow succeut'ul. flanking operations aa suggested in your radio cannot be acc011pl1shed through the methode we are now employing, However, theae met hods were adopted simply because there appeared to be no alternative except complete inaction, SECRET
SECREt' Due to unannounced losses the number of aircraft carriers presen tly available to the Allies is not suffici ent to permit the substitution of this type of air power for land besed craft in a general offensive westward from Hawaii . Similarly, the number of capital ships that could coneei vably be made available in the Pacific is not sufficient to permit an advance toward Japan, northward of the Mandated Islands, in an effort either to deetroy hie communications at their base or to force his main fleet into action on the high seas. The basis of ell current effort is to accumulate through every possible means sufficient strength to initiate operations along the lines you suggest, building up behind the effort the forces required to push home a deep attack. More is under way than I dare risk reference to in this coomunicati on. In the meanwhile we are endeavoring to limit t he hostile advance so as to deny him free accees to land and sea areas that will immeasurably strengthen his war making powers or which will be valuable to us as jump off pos itions when we can start a general counteroffensive. There is always the possibility, as the Russians complete their highly successful winter campaign of tremendous counter attacks along the entire front, which are having a serious effect on German arms and morale, that Stalin will feel more free to consider action in his Pacific theatre . He has stated his expectation of en eventual Japanese attack on Siberia. He realizes the enemy's great advantage if that attack should follow rather than coincide with t heir present t remendous tbru.st southward. If we have an early success in checking Japanese progression and secure air superiority through employment of rrcasses of heavy bombers which they lack, there is the strong probability that at that moment Stalin will strike against Japan. Hie eastern submarine force and bomber force should permit devastating action against Japanese shipping and industry. I welcome and a ppreciate your strategical views and invariably submit them t o the President• • 1·r.r ~200 D (Pi27/~8) l t • - /~- Signature- - 2- .... ........... SEeR~f
.., 1372 9/1150 PRIORITY RAfliOORAM Raved at the War Department M-1e Center Room 3+41 MuDitiono Bide.. Wuhinaton. D. C. AC-4 FfBQI fARy 9 1 Q42 10•Q6 A M. From FORT M! LLS To GEN GEORGE C MARSH•! l NO 234 FEBRUARY NINTH YOUR ONE ZERO TWO FOUR MOST ENLIGHTEN ING STOP WOULD APPRECIATE GREATLY YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION FROM TIME TO TIME MACARTHUR fr an klin D. Rocsevolt Lllw~>·y o:Gl/\S~!HUJ rno I • I ) " Lll !l, 5200 .9 (9/27/f>B) Dt~h- /;~- ~-(( Signature-(!~~~ fEB 9 \942 ............... ...._ .... ._... , .... , ...._HUI, I f ,
Tl7 PROPOSED DRAfl' President ~econ: I hbve the deepest eycpa~~ and understanding or tho poin t of vi"" you eubmi t i n your message. You IIID.Y put it do"n as an absolute purpose from which there will be no devit.tion: we shall drive the Jnpanese out of the Philippines and preserve the independence of your people come what aay. Row soon we shall be able to achieve this purpose you rill understand i t ifl impossible for me to S&J' no• . 'lie are bending every poaaible energy to supply the air power which is vi tally essential. befor e any effective and resultful move cnn be made . You should know that the British have been more than generous in the diversion of eir power designed to go to thea - and they need it badly - to our use in reinforcinc the Americen air power 1n the Southwest Pacific. Both British and American reinforcements are now arriving there. A very large number of four engine bomber planes are enroute . Some of t hom have alr eady arrived . As you will recognize maxia1um and effective use of the&e heavy bombers can only be !lllld11 when they arc adequntely protected by fighter craft. The only ..-ay of conveying the latter i s by means of fast. freigbt.ers or converted pessenger ships. These means of trensportstion are now being used to the utmost and already some fighter planes ~\ve a rrived and are now being put into action. In addition to air forces , gr ound forces are being transported as fast as convoys enn carry theM. You will al.so understand tllat du.e to tha dauga done to soae of our capital. ships at Pearl Harbor our original. plans for fightin& Japen have had to be temporarily suspended . I know you want me to IMke no prolllises which I c 111not fulfill tl!CLASSlF!D By Depu ty Arcbl•iat or tba u.s. FEB 7 1972 8y1. J. Stewut Date___ _ - 1- £i &Rif •
• ULJLCI<!f but upon thia you can co•pletely rely - We shAll bend every energy to support the Philippines. DECLASSYYm By Depu t y Archivlat ot t he U.S. By r. J. S tewart Data__ .~;f.~;F.~;~R 7 19n lli8AIIf au
I~ I aa auch diatreaaed that you should have received radio reports givi!ll you the illpreaaian that it waa our intention to await the destruction or Hitler before we endeavored to defeat the aggression o! Japan in the aouthweatern Pacific. On the contral7 !rc~~~ the nry day of the attack on Pearl Harbor and in lUll cooperation with the Britiah government we have been marshaling our fore.. tor an immediate aggressive attack upon Japan in that area. The difficulties and time required tor the full effect of thia effort muat be manifest to you and these difficulties have been somewhat accentuated by the losses at Pearl Harbor. But our air and ground forces are al.ready beginning to reach that area and we have every hope of making our effort effective before Japan has time to complete her conquest of the Philippines, ~alaya and the Dutch Eaat Indies let alone to consolidate any such conquest. The British have been moat cooperative in thia progr8.1l and we are encouraged by our mutual prqoreaa. But our plana are comprehensive and muat not be jeopardised by reckle ss or hasty ateps which would imperil the whole ulti.Jr.ate reault. You~ rest assured that we shall proceed continuoualy and with all pcesible speed and that we shall not deviate from our purpose until the Japanese have been driven out of the PhUippinee and the independence of your people preserved.
see: Draft of Radio to U .S.~ Forces 1o the Far East . rA I &.Ill llaking t hrough TOU an immediate r-eply to President Quezon 1 a proJl?salS of FebruArY' 8th. liT reply ll\lat emphaticail.T denY' the possibilit Y' of t his government ' s agree:oent to the po11tical aspect s ot President Quezon ' s proposs1 . Na¥e~~2tlosa, 1--- ~ditlg~~~der,sewe*al; 1 Laiet 89YnM"t\ ~ t:he fj 1 1p'.~ elements of t hr defend1ng careen W Sa :aa. The detai1s of al1 neces&arT arrangements will be left 1o TOur bands , including plans tor segregation of Corees tm*o P&tiane' al a•eft ta . and the rl t hdranl. , it your judgc>ent so diotates , of American el ements to For t Mills . The tiadng e1so will be lett to you. American forces w11l continue to keep our flag tlyiog 1o the Phi11pp1oea so long as there remains any possibilltT ot resis tance. I have aade these decisions in co3plete understanding MCLASS17m By lle)IO ty A~rbt•l~t or t be f£1 7 l9?2 Bv I. J. ;,;, w.,r~ llutt ,____ sa ' -
SPPIP = or your milit~ry estimate that accompanied President Quezon's message to me . The duty and the necessity of resi sting Japanese aggression to the last transcends in iaportance Bn7 other obligation now facing us in the Philippines . There bas been Gradually welded into a c011aon front a powerfUl opposition to the pr edatory powera that are seeking the destruction or indJ.vidual liberty and fread0111 of goverru:ent . Aa the most powerfUl member of this coalition we cannot dis play weakness in spirit no matter bow physically weak we ~~ now be at the moment 1n any particular theatre . It is mandatory that there be established once and for all in the minds or all people& cor.~plete evi dence that the hariean determination and indor>itable will to win carries on down to the last unit . I therefor e give you tbJ.s most diffi cult aiasion in full under standing of the desperate situation to whic.h you may shortly be reduced. The service that you and the American members of your coMmand can now render to your country in the titanic struggl e now devel oping is beyond all poaaibility or appraieement . ...8 =1 na thor eCore •bet fateJdent QIJSDeJ il wfl l d:caee to ateex ciee •he JALi sllese of •ep•q te ..p• t 'll &Uill• I partieularly request that you pr oceed rapidly t o the organi sation or your f orces and your defenses 80 as to E&ke your resistance aa effective aa circwutancea will permit and as prolonged as h~anly possible. Submit b,y radio the esaentiala or your plana in accordance with these instructions . DI CLAssrrrn By Deput y Archi v1ot o f h t e u.s. Franklin D. Rooaevelt . - By I . J. St ooart Da t• FEB 7 1972 ' ··- =-·.-
I -..Ue"-C la ,_..1121 lielA!.!_una otttot Unl·.a lltat"' 1~ v,l. I Oen.r,1, ltrltl eh Oo:--.alth !be ~'Ill' Eilll'
/ ( - ~ c ( .. • • c 0 Ft . No. SEGHE'r IW)lOO!WI p I l!ills , P. ! . To General Ceorge C. ~arshall. 3, Feb. loth. J • . ..._ February 10, 1942. 9 •51 .l,U, The following communication is from President Quezon to President Roosevelt • "The fol lowing is the letter I propose to address to you and to the Emperor of Japan if ~recent proposal meets with your approval ! Two great nations are now at war in the ~estern Pacific . The C~onwealth or the Philippines is still a possession of one o~ those nations , althoueh throur,h legislati ve processes it was about to attain co~plete independence which would have insured its neutrality in any conflict. The Philippines haa therefore becoce a battleground between the warring powers and it ia being visited with death , faaine and destruction , despite the fact that occupation of tho country will not influence in any way the final outcome of tho war , nor have a beerin~: upon the conflicting principles over which the war is being waGed . Under the Tydin(ls-l!eDuffie Law the United Stntes has promised to recognize the independence of tho Phil ippines i n 1946 and the sane law gave authority to the President of the United States to beein parleys for the neutralization of the Philippines . On the other hand, the Premier of the Imperial Governcent of Japan , addressing t he Diet , stated that the Imperial Government of Japan was ready to offer the Filipino people independence with honor . On the s trength of these cocr.dtcents and iftpelled ~ a sincere desire to put an end to the su!ferings and sacrifices o.f our people , and to aa!'eguard their libert y and welfare , 1 propose the following prO{'rSJO of action 1 That the Coverncent of the United States end the Imperial Government of Japan recoanize the independence of the Philippines ; that within a reasonable per iod of ti"e both armies , American and Japaneee, be withdrawn, pr evious nrran~eoents havi ng been negotiated with the Philippine Government ; that neither notion maintain bases in tho Philippines ; that the Philippine Ar~ be at once de~obilized, the reoaining force t o bo a Constabulary of coderate size ; thnt a t once upon the ffrantinr of freedoc that trade agreeoont with ,::. , ,.,/.Nl ~ "-141U . ~, I /?.Jet;;.· ~.J{. T-+2.. " ·· "--·-'tt• '{}'··~~ , J .. S!:Cl!EIJ' 7 /.. ~ E'-.t ~- ;)7- (.o co~t. ~~ - l -
SECRET other countries beco~e solely a mntter to be settled by the Philippines and the nation concerned; thet Americnn and Japanese noncombatants who so desire be evacuated with their own arnies under reciprocal and appropriate stipulations, It is my earnest hope that , moved by t he highest considerations of jus t i ce and humanity , the two great powers wh ich now exercise control over the Philippines will give t heir approval in general principle to my proposal . If t his is done I further propose , i n order to accomplish the detsils thereof, that an Armistice be declared in t he Philippines and that I proceed to Manila at once for neces sary consultations •ri t h the t wo governments concerned. (signed) L!anuel L. Quezon." J.!acArtbur . SEGBBI'l' - 2 -
February U , 1942. Fro11 F't. lUlls, To General George C. Mar shall 5 . 162 - For President Roosevelt: After witnessing our burying of about 400 dead Jape whom we had just mopped up , the Governor of Bataan has r eported: •I am having a Uttle difficulty collect ing the taxes because of BODe trouble in ~ province .• I assured h1a that you were broadminded and would understand. MacArthur. \ 1 •
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Kessages received f~om General MacArthur during n ight February ll - 12 , 1942. For President Roosevelt: I have delivered your message to President Quezon and have shown your ll029 to High Collllllissioner Sayre . If opportunity p~esents and can be done with reasonable safety and of course with thai~ own consent , I will evacuate the members of the Commonwealth Government , t he High Commissioner , llrs . Sa~e and their son. I !UII deeply app~eciative of the incl usion of my own family in this list but they and I have dec ided that they 'Ki ll share the fate of the garr ison . ~ plans have already been outlined in previous radios ; they consist in fighting my pre sent battle position in Be.te.an to destruction and then holding Corregidor in a similar manner . I have not the slightest intention in the world of surrenderi ng or capitulating t he Filipino elements of my command . Apparently my message gave a false impression or was garbled with reference t o Filipinos . ~ statemen ts regarding collapse applied only to the civilian population , including Commonwealth officials, the puppet government and t he general populace . There has never been the slightest wavering among the troops . I count upon them equally with the Americans to hold steadfast to the end. ll.acArthur For t he War Department : President Quezon's suggested proposal was entirely contingent upon prior approval ~ President Roosevel t . Replying to your 1031. Re has no intention what soever so far as I know to do anything whic~ does not meet with President Roosevelt ' s complete acquiescence . I will however take every possible precaution t hat nothing of this nature goes out . President Quezon has several times declined to accept a trip ~ submarine . His physical condition is such that his medical advisor s do not believe he could survive it. rr o.nklin D. Rooo"'"' t I.ibr&l'l' m:r,l ll.acArthur
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COPY February 12, 1942. From Fort Iillis, P . I. To General G.C.Marshall No. 262 , Feb. l2 . The following message is !roc President Quezon: "The President of the United States: I wish to thank you for your prompt answer to the proposal which I su~itted to you with the unanimous approval of CIY war cabindt . r.e full,y apprecie ta the reasons upon which your aecision is based and •e are abiaing ~ it . (signed) Quezon . " ll&cArtbur .
- SIIOBBtl'- I f WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON Feb:-vur;r 13, l'll.2 . .:n.~OIWIDIJ!l FOR THE PIU.SIDD;T 1 Subject a General Furley . General f.urley has reported in a radiograa dated February l~ t hat his mission or coordinating relief measures for the forces in the Philippines r equires thet t.e visit General ?Iavell ' s headquarters , He stated that for that purpose be was leaving Australia on the 12th and that u pon his return from the trip, which ~~11 involve about 10, 000 milea or travel by air , he will unaertake bia duties in !lew Zealand . He asked that you be inforoed of the reason for his delay in en~ap,inf hie~self in the r;ew Zealand situation, to whi ch he will give hie undivided attentio n as soon ae he has returned froc the f.etl.erlends Eact Indies . The Secretary or State is also being infol'me d , Secretary or War . Fr nnklin D. Rooeevelt Libr arY o:GLASSIFIED cuoom. 5200 .9 (9/27/58) t II - /, - s-q Da e- ..,._ I • signature- (!~ /. ~&Jr
c 0 p J From HQ Philippine Dept . in the Field To Adjutant General No. 289 Feb. l5 For President Roosevelt . Your message has been transmitted to ~• and I thank you for your ldnd words . I think it is trise not to publish OfT lo t ter to General JJacArthur regard ing destruction of Philippine silver c•Jrr ency . (siiJ)'lcd)Quezon MacArthur 19j.. 1/(Ji) Date., JAN ~ :' ,.,.,..!. [JSS 2
' () .\. ' ~I I" jJ5,:'" SECRET ..... " "~'~I/,It/(~;~~ lm:OIWIDUll FOR TR£ ADJU'fANT OdiERAL r Subject : Far Eastern Sit untion . The Secretary of Yiar directs that the f ollowing message be s ent ~ the moat expeditious aeans possible consistent with secrecy to the Cozamanding General , U. S .Arlly Forces in the Far East. The Presiden t has approved the plan outlined in your No . 296 f or the evacuation of President Quezon ann his llur Cabinet to unoccupied portions 01' the Philippines . The C~~der in Chief of U. S.Navy has i ssued instructions which will place the oe~~ submarine to &rrive at Corregi<ior under your ordero for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed fur ther that if no sul:lr.arine is now in t hat vicinity one will be dispc.tched to you forthwith . The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that t his GoverDJ:~ent will support his effort in every practicable way. Means for secret communication between President Quezon and this Governaent shoul:d be arranged . Marshall ll. Jh " 1• ' l I . ·y " , .. f j , ...,. .. , - Cf£u/ ~cvt SEORET
l ZS!l N'PY 2555 0900/16 RADI OCRAJ.! Ac-4 Received at the "lar Department loleesago Center Room )441 Jlunitiona Bldg. , Washington, 0. C. Feb. 16, 1942 6; 54 A.ll. p~--.·; . ~ :.ib " '1 From: Ft, llills. To: General George C, liarshall No . 296. Fob. 16th President ruezon end his r~r Cabinet desire ~· ~ 9 (1!. · •· ;,- n. t t . s.~lut ~- C::V.I I 4cu to establish the sea(' - of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippi ne Islands initially in the Visayan. Tbey feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with tho Filipino public which is now 1Japossible to them because ot siege conditions existing here . Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive , is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied cOI!Gilllitiea in order to prolorv: and make more effective resistance to the Japanese . Thai r usefullnesa here is over anc! H is advantageous from every point o! view that t hey do not s hare the destruction which now f aces this garrison . I propose to evacuate them by wator t ravelling only by nieht proceeding first to lolindoro and thence south t.o Capiz or Antique on Pana , It pressed t.hey will continuo to lolindanao where they could safely e~st in the interior indofi~ttely . I am heartily in f avor ot the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order othentise. In order t.n assist ln the :oov.,.,.,nt 1 requeot be !;iven authority t.o utill~e the sub--arino which will be in here within the next ) or 4 days to ~vacuate them as tor :!• ::&piz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commiesioner and hift family to the far south. Under present plune thu High Commissionors party ia scheduled to leave here in this submarino i.m.ecthtely upon ite arrival . Wy pl&n would
No. 296 , Peb . 16th involve the postponement of his departure for 1, deys . The available capacity is not sufficiAnt to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The :<uexon trip being the short one I place it first . If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CINC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine bu t tha allocation of the passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me the ~ezon ' s will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel . The use of the submarine, however, woul d increase the facto r of safety . Request immediate action . l&lcArthur 1 ' t.il 1) h t• - }6 - %- ~ t ~iDl.t.l=e- (Patf ./. 4!ju c~ :SECRE I >
. . I WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON • p... . , t .. .1 I I :t-0.9 (9/':.7/~8) MELfffiANDIDI FOR mE PRESIDENT: Jl-t • - /~ - ;1, -/{,/{, Signature- (fuf /. ¥ eM I submit herewith a condensed record of the plan for evacuation of governmental officials from the Philippine Islands . 'h\~~~·· Feb . 23 (No . 349) •first part of plan s ucces sfully accomplished, • Feb, 26 MacArthur reports (374) "Second part of plan outlined in myrad 296 began several days ago• Mac;Arthur Plan: Radio No . 296 Feb , 16. President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of t he Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islsnds initiall;y in the Visayas , 'They feel certain that their usefulnes s 1lill be greatly enhanced by contact 'll'i th the Filipino public which is nO'II' 1.1!1possible to them because of siege conditions existing here . Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt •a desires as expressed in hia recent directive, is to maintain the cobesi on morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to tbe Japanese , Their usefulneas here is over and it is advantageous from every point of vi9'11' that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate t hem by water, travelling only by night, proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique o-1 Pana , If pressed they rlll continue to l.!indanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely, I am he&rtily in favor of the plsn and propoee to execute it promptly unless you order other'll'ise , In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine ll'hich rlll be in here 'll'ithin the next three or fou.r days to evacuate them as far as Cepiz and then to ret urn here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far South , Under present plans the lll.gh CCII!IIIissioner•s party is scheduled to leaw here in this submarine ilmediatel;y upon i te arrival , 1,\Y plan 'II'Ould i .nvol ve the postponement of his depart.. ure for four days , The availsble capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groupe at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separs tel;y . 1be Quezon t rip being the short one I place it fire t , If thi s authority is g1 ven the proper i~ s tructions should be radioed to the CinC Asiat ic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the -1-
=--~--------------~~----~- passengers who are to be transported . If the subnarine i s not made a-.ailable t o me then Quezon wi1.l attempt the trip in a emall surface vessel . 7he U8e of the subnarine however would increase the factor of safety. Request i.Dmediate action . Note: It is assumed that the lst and 2nd ~rts of plan, mentioned by General MacArthur 1 refer respeCtrvely to t two paragraphs as above quoted . It is possible that he refers only to successive steges of the Quezon evacuation, but the first interpretation is considered the more :like~ 1 and the t the Sayre .f8m1ly has n01r left Luzon . '!he President's rep~ to llo . 296 was as follows• 'lhe President has approved the plan outlined in your No . 296 for the evacuation of President Quezon and h1a War cabinet to unoccupied portions of the Philippines . 7he Commander in Chief of u.s . Navy has issued instructions which wi1.l place the next submarine to arrive at Corregidor under your orders for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed further that 1t no submarine is now in that vicinity one wi1.l be dispatched to you forthwith. The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that this Government will support his effort in every practicable way. !.leans for secret cO!IIllunication be~en President Quezon and this Government should be arranged. • : ll " D. ll~ •J<>lt Ll l:-r11. r !) 5 "0 . 9 (9/21 II'.) c~· · - ~~- ;~.t. _ "~ Si.,'Da tura- cPa-u ./. ~~
lll RADIOORAII NP!.! 2556 TIU3 FILED 0836/16 Received at the rlar Depar tment :&es sage Center Room 3441 Uunitions Sldg. , r·.ashing ton, 0. C. Feb. lb, 1942 7 :05 a .m. Fr o:n Ft . Lli lls . To : General George C. llarshall No . 297, Feb , 16 . AC- 4 The unexpectedl y early capitulation of Singapore emphasi zes the fact that the opportunit y for a successful attack upon the hos tile lines of communication is rapidly vanishing , If this ene~ Victory is followed by further s uccess i n the NEI t he s ensitiveness o! his lines of communication will la rgely disappear due to consolidation of his posi tions in the south. A determined effor t 'ln force made now would probably 'lttract the assistance of Russia who will unquestionably not move in this area unt il some evidence is given of concrete effort by t he Allies . The opportunities still exist for a complete r eversal of the s ituation . It will soon, howaver , be too late for such a movement . IIAcArthur rrankll n D. Roosevelt Li br arr o:GLASSIFIED u-JODIR. o2oo .9 ( 9/27/58), Date- I+ - I. - S 1 Bip~&tur._ ~.u/1+~ SECRET/
EH UPII :?:IFJ7 1)25/17 A~ )81 (2-17-42) USC !'ROLl : FORT Ml LLS TO: A G 0 SECRET AAniOC!WJ NO . 307 FEBRUARY SE'l£1rr'"'NTH PE&lUAnY 17 , 1942 11 :01 A T:IB "'I.LO:'II!1~ IZI'T!'.J. II:ITH SUPPOR'I'HI': OOCUJ.IDITS HAVE Bl'.Ell RECEI'r.::D PRO:.t PR::SIDEIIT ~U::ZO:I . 1' FOP. YOUR INPOR!.'.AT'ION A!:!) FOR PU!PCSE:> OP R"CCRD .Uln f'UTUR" R!':PER::!'C': , I .\!' ENCLOSlN~ Himfl'IITJ: AC-4 CERT.\111 'JOCU'lENT;; SW' "'lW; '!'fiAT Tft" !''!ILIPPUlE ~'!EIU:!.!Et"!' !i:.S DEL- !VEt.-, 'l" Til , UIIITED STATES !JAVY Tm FOI.In.'I!!JG : OlfE SII.ALL CASE l.!ARKE!l G-tl CONT :,nm;o:; 5 :Ol.!ALL B!JlS Of' GOLD Bl!LLION, 1 BAR 0F SlLvr:R l'.JLLION, AND VA<UOUS OTH"'Y. Pl''CBS OF '".OLD Al1'l/OR SILVER llULLIO!l ; 261, SUALL PARS 0!" GOLD BUILIOtl; 6:JO BA::S O:JNT.Ut:r:n 1000 PESOS £ACff ''I'ITI! TIE RE ,UEST TI!Ar THE5E IT'·l!S BE T'lAilS~TTED TO THE SECRETARY OF Tf!-.:: Tl'EASURY 17~SHINGTON 0 C FO:t S.J'!: KREI'IlY.: . T~!IS ACTIOIJ :iJ\5 TAY.:EN Ill OnDER TO AVCI') THr; !"OSSIBIUTY OF THI: GOLD AND SilVER FALl.I11': HIT() TIP HA110S Of ff' EIIF.!..'Y" . THE SIQPimlT I.IENTIONe:D WAS ACCEPTED BY THl: llA'lY ON FEB. 4 . TI!E FOIID'A>HIG IS FUR!"IS!i''Jl POR !OUR IIIFOR!.:ATIOII . '!AC~"T!!UR . . . Date- ~N ~ .,."f? '~"-'lVII~ ... ...... -,:. ~·>
From F't. . ldlls Pcb . 22, 191.2. To Tho Adjutant General No . 341, Feb . 22 , 1942 . There are indications that t!le enc=->' has been so badly mauled during the Dataan fi;:hting that he is unable to sot up with his present forces the attack necengery to destroy me . Practically every recioent has consolidated by eliminating one battalion, and a number of regiments themselves have totally disappeared . His artillery croupment may be f r om weakness rather than strengt h . l may have sained the respite I so desperately need . Do not publicize in any way any of the above . Little acti•tity yesterday except by ene1:1;r air . Our counter- batterv tP.~porarily silenced his Cavite shore fire . No Chanae in 50uth. l.!acArthur F7 anklln :l . Rooaevelt Library DECLASSIFIED COODIR. ~2oo.e (9/27f5a> Date- i'- , _ ~f Signature- (?aUt,'~ "
- - "o~·•· ;>< - ,,. ". ·;;;,.eH L.>'brarr kl in 1l. "oo ,/I I 1 f'rt>m SECRE'i' t- GLI\SS\flED ooo uhl. 1)2oo.ll (ll/27/&a> Fort ltills I To . ·General l.!arshall : 116. 344, February 22 . The Coast Farmer, first surface vessel dispatched to run blockade from Australia, arrived safely in liindanao February 19. rarr.o 2,500 tons balanced rations, 21000 rounds 81 ~ mortar ammunition, 800,000 rounds caliber .)0 anti )0,000 rounds caliber . 50. She had no di.Cficult;y in ae tting through . The thinness of ~he enef'l,Ys covorare is such that it cnn readily be pierced along :any routes includin~ direct westward passage !rom Honolulu . I have secure bases for reception in L!indanao and the Viaayas . I suc ~est that t he problem c! supplying me should be revised in the above circumstances . This revised effort should center in ~ashineton ar.d not in Australia or the ~ . E. I . The co~anders there, however able they may be , have neither the resouroes nor the means at their dbposal properly t.o accomplish this tlission. l!any categories of s upply ~hat are r equired ar e not available in that area . Moreover, they are so enr.a ·ed in the actual zone of iaoodiat.e or threatened conf lict that it is impossible for them to concentrate upon my needa . The size of the proble11 is creator than the means now boillf used to solve it . The prime requisi~e is tho making available in the United Stn tes of the necessary ships and material , especially the former, and their continuous dispatch to destination. Nowhere is the situation more do"perate nnd dangerous than here. The War De artcent has co:n?let.e knowlod;:e of our needs which is not true in Austr.Uia, t 1e quantities involved are not great bu t it is icperative thst they may be instantly available in the United States ani that the entire impulse and or ganization be reenergized and ccntrolled directly by you . If it is left as 11 a••bsidiary effort it will never be accomplished . Caref•u consideration sh<uld also be
, c: ---- - ' to:z:=vx<,z::::; ..... i ei ven as to troop r eplacer.Jent by this meens ; even 1 f lossoo occur they will bo 11111all cooi)ar ed to tho loss out her e if we do not bnve success . l.acArthur I SECitE'P
._....-- fOR 'l'Ht. PRESIDEliT , fROll THt. SECRETARY Of liAR.
SECRET~ From Ft . !tills To General George C. llarshall No . 349 - February 2) . First part ot plan outlined in =Jr&d 296 succesetully accomplished. MacArthur. ' t Llb•nry r• to- /4- ~-6' Signatuu- ~ :( +~
• 1 ~ • • \ L • • r y • . '·-~ (. - (. ( . ·" - ~at.C I .J,bt>£-t Feb. 16, 1942 . From Ft. ltilla To General George C. ~rshall No . 296 , Feb . 16th . President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in tho unoccupied portions of t he Philippines Islands initially in the Vi.s ayas. They feel certain that their usefulness will be great ly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege condi t ione existing here . Their purpose, in accordance with Pr esident Roosevelt 'a desires as expressed i n his recent direct ive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order t o prolong and make more effecti ve resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and i t is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuat e them by wat er travelling only by night proceeding fi r st to Uindoro and thence south to Capi~ or Antique or Pana . If pressed they will continue t o llindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitel.y. I am heartil.y in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist i .n the moveme nt I reauest be given authority to utilize the submarine
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