JAPANESE MONOGRAPH No. 1 PHILIPPINES OPERATIONS RECORD PHASE 1 6 NOVEMBER 1941 – JUNE 1942
JAPANESE STUDIES IN WORLD WAR II NO. 1 SPECIAL STAFF U.S. ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE) OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
RECORD OF THE PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN PHASE 1 – STAGES 1&2 Table of Contents Vol. I Part 1 Outline on the terrain, traffic, residential districts and weather of the Philippines. Part 2 (1st stage) Operations from the commencement of war to the occupation of the Philippines Vol. II Part 3 (2nd stage) Operations from end of the 1st stage to autumn of 1944 Landing of the U.S. Army) Vol. III Part 4 (3rd stage) Operations from end of 2nd stage to end of this war Vol. I Table of Contents Outline on the terrain, traffic routes, residential districts, and weather of the Philippines. Chapter 1 Terrain of the Philippines Chapter 2 Traffic routes, residential districts, etc. Chapter 3 Weather The Invasion of the Philippines---December 41 — June 42 Chapter 1 Condition of Japanese and U.S. Armed Forces just before the outbreak of hostilities, and preparation of the Japanese Army before 7 December 1941 Para. I Order to mobilize the Japanese Army for wartime and the condition of Japanese. Para. II Draft U.S. Armies Para. III Army operational plans Para. IV Orders for the preparation, commencement, and execution of the Southern Army operations. Para. V Concentration of troops and preparations of each unit
Disposition of troops for opening hostilities and concentration of troops Chapter 2 Destruction of U.S. Air Force and the landing operation by the advance troops (from 7 December to 22 December) Para. 1 Condition of each unit Para. 2 Activities of main units A. 5th Air Force. B. Advance troops Para. 3 General situation of Japanese Army Units other than the Southern Army Command (from December 8 to 21 December) Chapter 3 Landing of forces and the attack on Manila (from 17 December to 4 January) Para. 1 From the landing of main forces (48th Division and attached units) to the advancement to the Agno River (Southeastern Binalonan) and from the landing of the 16th Division to the advancement to the western area of Lucena (from 17 December to 27 December) A. Condition of each unit 1. Landings of main forces and advancement to the southern area of Roario (from 17 December to 25 December) 2. Advancement of main forces to left side of Agno River, (Southeastern Binalonan) and the landing of the 16th Division and advancement to western Lucena (from 24 December to 27 December) B. Activities of main units 1. 48th Division 2. 16th Division. Para. 2 Battle conditions of the 48th Division and attached units at Aguno River side and of the 16th Division’s drive from Lucena to Manila (from 27 December to 4 January)
A. Condition of each unit 1. Disposition of troops for advancement into CABANATUAN and its operation (from 27 December to 29 December) 2. Disposition of troops for the attack on MANILA and advancement into BATAAN Peninsula. Also, advancement into TARLAC and CABANATUAN 3. Capture of MANILA and landing of the 2nd wave units B. Activities of each unit 1. 48th Division 2. 16th Division Para. 3 General Situation of Japanese Army Units other than the Southern Army Command (from 22 December to 4 January) Chapter 4 First attack on BATAAN Peninsula (from 2 January to 8 February) Para. 1 Direction of main force changed to right side of PAMPAMGA River and advance of part of troops to DERALPIAN and HELMOSA (from 2 January to 7 January) A. Condition of each unit B. Activities of the 65th Brigade Para. 3 Reinforcement by the KIMURA Detachment at the western coast of BATAAN Peninsula. Also, the advance of this detachment to BAGACK and the 65th Brigade to BARANGA(from 13 January to 29 January) A. Condition of each unit B. Activities of main units 1. KIMURA Detachment 2. 65th Brigade Para. 4 Reinforcement of the 16th Division at BAGACK and the attack on the U.S. defense line (from south
BAGACK to west ORION) by the 16th Division and 65th Brigade (from 25 January to 8 February) A. Condition of each unit B. Activities of main units 1. KIMURA Detachment and 16th Division 2. 65th Brigade Para. 5 General Situation of Japanese Army Units other than southern army command Chapter 5 2nd attack on BATAAN Peninsula (from 8 February to 13 April) Section I Preparation for attack. (from 8 February to 2 April) Sub-sect. 1. Distribution of army strength and blockade of southern BATAAN Peninsula and MANILA Bay Sub-sect. 2. Reinforcement of personnel in the army and the disposition of elements of the 21st and 4th Divisions Sub-sect. 3. Advance of 1st line units against enemy positions and reinforcement of the blockade in BATAAN Peninsula Sub-sect. 4. The 2nd stage operational plan Sub-sect. 5. Offensive plan against enemy positions and disposition in preparation for an attack Sub-sect. 6. Each unit’s preparation for the attack after the determination of the disposition of the army Sub-sect. 7. Offensive disposition of troops and the reorganization of the army air force Section II Execution of the attack (from 3 April to 12 April) Sub-sect. 1. Breaking through the enemy’s 1st defense zone Sub-sect. 2. Breaking through the enemy’s 2nd defense zone Sub-sect. 3. Pursuit and completion of the mopping up operation on BATAAN Peninsula
Section III General Situation of Japanese Units other than the Southern Army Command Chapter 6 Attack on CORREGIDOR Fortress (from 9 April to 7 May) Para. 1 Preparation for attack (from 9 April to 5 May) A. Planning and execution of preparation for attack and commencement of preparations for shipping facilities and artillery bombardment B. Offensive plan and disposition of troops in preparations for attacking 1. Condition of CORREGIDOR Fortress 2. Offensive plan 3. Disposition of troops after 17 April in preparation for attack C. Disposition of troops in executing the attack D. Attacking preparations of each unit after plan was decided Para. 2 Execution of the attack (from 5 May to 7 May) Para. 3 Conditions after the capture of the fortress (from 8 May) Chapter 7 Conquest of the PHILIPPINE Islands and movement of each unit after the battle Para. 1 Conquest of BISAYA Island and MINDANAO Island (from first part of April to latter part of July) Para. 2 Conquest of LUZON, MINDORO, and MARINDKE Islands (from first part of April to latter part of July) Para. 3 The movement of units to other places as operations draw to a close in the PHILIPPINES (from the middle part of May to the middle part of July) Para. 4 Condition of non-military affairs. (from 14 April to 30 June)
Chapter 8 Condition of the army’s rear area Para.1 Line of communication General explanation A. Transportation and supplying of military materials B. Sanitation C. Repair and maintenance of roads and railways D. Shipping E. Maintenance of correspondence, air defense and public peace Chapter 9 Report on Army-Navy cooperation Chapter 10 Results of the 1st stage of battle
Vol. 1 CONDITION OF TERRAIN, TRAFFIC, AND WEATHER (see appended map) I. Terrain The PHILIPPINE Islands consists of 7,000 Islands, the largest one being LUZON (about half the size of KOREA). The next largest is MINDANAO (a little smaller than HOKKAIDO). The rest being SAMAR (a little smaller than SHIKOKU), NEGROS and PALAWA (1/3 of FORMOSA), PANAY and MINDORO (1/2 of SHIKOKU), LEYTE and CEBU (1/4 of SHIKOKU). LUZON – The SIERRA MADRE Range (average height 1,000 meters) runs along the East Coast forming the BIKOR District (South eastern peninsula). There is the Central Mountain Range in the western part of northern LUZON with the ZAMBALES Mountain Range along the western side of LUZON’S Central Plain (average height 2,000 meter). They extend from north to south with the ZAMBALES forming the BATAAN Peninsula. There is the CAGAYAN Gorge between the SIERRA MADRE and Central MOUNTAIN Ranges and between the SIERRA MADRE and the ZAMBALES are found expansive plains. The lower reaches of the PAMPAGA River and the marsh lands of the northern coast of MANILA Bay are unfordable areas. During the dry season, motorized units can cross the AGNO and other rivers, but it is difficult to cross without using bridges. The CAGAYAN River is difficult to cross because of its depth and the scarcity of bridges. The mountain areas are all covered with jungles and the Central Mountain Range is especially wide and steep. The greater part of the coastline is composed of cliffs, coral reefs, or swampy areas. It is, therefore, difficult to make landings, but large bodies of troops can land at the Gulfs of LINGAYEN, LAMON, and BATANGAS. MINDANAO – MINDANAO and SAMAR are the most uncivilized islands in the PHILIPPINE Archipelago. The rivers of MINDANAO are the AGUSAN and the COTABATO. They are both deep and are bordered with jungles and swamp lands. The largest road runs from DAVAO to ILIGAN (across COTA Bar) and the next largest one is the North Coast Road which runs from KABAKAN through MARAI BARAI to CAGAYAN. They have no
bridges at the point of passage of the river. The road from DAVAO to BUTUAN along the AGUSAN River is not completed in the BUTUAN area. There are three mountain ranges culminating in the KABALIN Mountain (2,300 meters), ABO Mountain (3,000), and the BIYABAYAN Mountain (2,000 meters), respectively. They extend from north to south with the 1st one forming the east coast while the others form the core of the island. The MARAI BARAI district is a wide plain and excellent for stock raising. Moreover, air fields can be established anywhere desired. The mountain range centralizing on the MALINDAN Mountain runs to the west and forms the ZAMBALES Peninsula. The coast line bordering the plains have mangrove jungles. Therefore, large units would encounter difficulties in making a landing, whereas small units can land easily. MINDANAO is covered with trees, making it a large jungle in appearance. VISAYAN Islands – The most civilized islands are CEBU (center of politics and communication), NEGROS (sugar growing district), and PANAY (port for the exportation of sugar). LEYTE and SAMAR are still uncivilized with SAMAR especially primitive. There are beaches suitable for landing of large forces at Iloilo, CABYS, BACOLOD, and TACLOBAN. These islands are situated close together and the sea remains very calm throughout the year. The natives are thus able to cross the sea in small boats. This is a very important fact. II. Traffic, Residential Districts, Etc. Inter-island traffic must depend chiefly upon aviation and navigation. Although aviation progressed greatly before the war, navigation remained stagnant and became outmoded. The main harbors are MANILA, CEBU, and ILOILO (PANAY). DAVAO (MINDANAO), and LEGASPI (LUZON) are also important harbors. There are many air fields (more than a hundred) scattered throughout the islands, but the majority of these are narrow and only a few are suitable for use by large airplanes.
The only railways are located in LUZON, PANAY, and CEBU, and are constructed very poorly. The total area covered by railroad is 1,700 km. (LUZON 1,500 km., PANAY 20 km., and CEBU 95 km.) The traffic of automobiles showed great development before the war. There are about 37,000 passenger cars and 22,000 trucks with about 70% of these being used on LUZON. Roads (highways) were, however, not developed on all of the islands. They were built only on LUZON, CEBU, PANAY, and NEGROS and are insufficient in number on the other islands. MANILA and a few other cities are similar to modern European cities and are suitable for military billets and supply. The other cities and towns are similar to Japanese towns with the exception of churches, government buildings, schools, cock pits, and markets. Most of the houses belong to the lower classes and therefore are constructed with coconut leaves, bamboo, and wood. The capacity of the billets is very small. Sanitary condition is bad. Residential districts are not fenced and are therefore unsuitable for defense. Coconut fields, mango trees and dried rice fields are suitable for billets. The main cities are as follows: MANILA – Center of military, political, economic and cultural affairs. Excellent harbor. Population 620,000. CEBU - Excellent harbor. Population 140,000. DAVAO – Population 950,000 (Japanese 18,000) ILOILO – Population 290,000 (Japanese 400) BATANGAS – Population 50,000. LEGASPI – Population 40,000. Only port in southern LUZON. CAVITE – Population 40,000. Naval base for the U.S. Asiatic fleet. Rice is the main food in the PHILIPPINES, but the yield is insufficient to meet home needs. Corn, potato, coconuts, etc., are found in sufficient quantities to act as substitute food. There is a large quantity of cattle and fish.
Rain water, river water, shallow wells, and lakes are contaminated, but the water of fountains and deep wells is suitable for drinking. The sanitary conditions are improving but there still are epidemics of such diseases as malaria, dengue, cholera, typhoid, and dysentery. We must also prevent sunstroke, heatstroke, etc. BATAAN Peninsula is famous as a malaria zone. III. Weather The characteristic weather of the PHILIPPINES is high in temperature and humidity. There is no change in temperature throughout the year. The annual mean temperature in the PHILIPPINES is about 25oC – 27oC. (The highest temperature of the year in MANILA is reached in May – 28oC). The amount of rainfall varies with the locality and season. 1. The rainfall in the East Coast Mountain Range differs from that of the western part of the PHILIPPINES. The latter has its rainy season between the months of November and June of the following, whereas the eastern part has its rainy season during the remaining months. 2. The rainfall in MANILA reaches a minimum of 25mm. in February and a maximum of 480mm. in July. The rainfall in DAVAO reaches a minimum of 120 mm. in January and a maximum of 270 mm. in October.
Chart on the time of sunrise and sunset and the age of the moon at important places and seasons is as follows: Time of Sunrise / Sunset Time of Moon Age of PLACE DATE Rise Set Rise Set the Moon APPARI SAN FERNANDO (East Coast of LINGAYEN) MANILA ATIMONAN (Southwest Coast of LAMON) DAVAO 10 Dec. ‘41 21 Dec. ‘41 1 Jan. ‘42 31 Jan. ‘42 2 Mar. ‘42 1 Apr. ‘42 1 May ‘42 10 June ‘42 23 Dec. ‘46 21 Jan. ‘47 1 May ‘47 0714 0624 0720 0725 0713 0653 0634 0627 0616 0655 0624 1819 1729 1840 1855 1905 1910 1913 1915 1739 1845 1847 2348 - 1737 1800 1800 1903 1943 0351 - - 1914 - 2037 0555 0615 0626 0634 0647 - 2234 2243 0635 21.1 4.0 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.1 15.5 15.9 5.0 4.0 15.5 1. The time is Japanese standard time. 2. Twilight is approximately 30 minutes. 3. The rising and setting of the moon during the daytime is omitted. Chapter 1 Condition of Japanese and U.S. Armed Forces immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and the preparation of the Japanese Army (before 7 December ’41) 1. On 6 November ’41 the 14th Army received its order, and on 15 November it was placed under the command of General TERAUCHI(general and count). (The organization of the army, main units, and station are given in the appended Chart No. 1.) 2. At this time, according to the plan of the Imperial Headquarters, units attached to the 14th Army were concentrated in FORMOSA from Central and North CHINA, MANCHUKUO, and JAPAN. The distribution of units under the 14th Army was as follows: The 14th Army headquarters was in TAIHOKU.
5th Air Force (one flying group and one independent flying corps). Main forces were in Northern MANCHUKUO with units moving to FORMOSA. 48th Division Main forces were in FORMOSA with units stationed on HAINAN Island. 16th Division Stationed in KYOTO Divisional District 65th Brigade Stationed in HIROSHIMA Divisional District. Other units are mostly in CHINA, MANCHUKUO, etc. The southern Army headquarters is in SAIGON and the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO. 3rd Air Force (4 flying groups) Main forces are moving to Southern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA from Central CHINA and MANCHUKUO. 15th Army (3 divisions) One division is stationed in Southern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, and the others are in JAPAN and Central CHINA. 25th Army (2 divisions) Main forces are in Southern and Central CHINA while other units are moving to Southern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, HAINAN Island, and FORMOSA from Central CHINA, MANCHUKUO, and JAPAN. 16th Army (one division and one detachment) STATIONED IN JAPAN
Appendix: The order of the Imperial Headquarters concerning the preparation and execution of the operation On 6 November ’41, the Imperial Headquarters issued the order for operational preparation in consideration of the possibility of war. It is as follows: Order 1. The Imperial Headquarters has made preparations to attack the East ASIA area. 2. The commander of the Southern Army will cooperate with the Navy and concentrate forces in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, Southern CHINA, FORMOSA, South-western islands, and the South Sea Islands, and must prepare to attack important places in the southern zone. The order for the actual operation will be issued later. 3. The commander of the Southern Army can issue the order for defensive battle if American, British, or Dutch forces attack the Japanese Army. If such a situation occurs, he must endeavor to localize the battle. 4. The commanders of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, Defense Force, and FORMOSA Army must aid the operation indicated in item 2. Intelligence reports obtained by our army before 15 November. 1. The disposition and condition of enemy forces in the southern area are given in chart No.1. The important facts on enemy forces in the PHILIPPINES were: The strength of the U.S. regular army in the PHILIPPINES was formerly about 12,000 (3,500 Americans and 6,500 natives), but owing to the increased tension in the international situation since July. Its strength has been increased to 22,000 (organized as one division, and air unit, a fortress unit, etc.) with the addition of 5,200 Americans and 6,000 natives. This, together with the PHILIPPINE National army, with a strength of about 110,000, organized into 10 divisions, (to be increased to 125,000 by December) and the native police units have placed under the
verified command of General MACARTHUR as the U.S. Far Eastern Army. (USAFE) Strength and disposition of Army, Navy and Air forces in the PHILIPPINES. Army (except air force) U.S. regular army in the PHILIPPINES One division and units under direct control of the army in the Far Eastern Army Headquarters. The main force is in Manila and the others are in BAGUIO (about 60 km. northeast of LINGAYEN) and TARLAC (about 70 km. south, southeast of LINGAYEN). The main force and the fortress headquarters were in CORREGIDOR Island. A portion is in CORREGIDOR Fortress separate from CORREGIDOR Island (will be explained later) and SUBIC Bay Fortress, situated northwest of BATAAN Peninsula. PHILIPPINE National Army The 11th Division was in northern LUZON (north of BAGUIO). The 21st, 31st, 41st, and units of the 71st and 91st Divisions were in central LUZON (from LINGAYEN TO south of Manila). The 61st Division was on PANAY Island and the 81st Division was on CEBU and BOHOL Islands. The 101st Division was on MINDANAO Island. Police units were in the various districts of the PHILIPPINES. Air Force NICHOLS field (suburb of MANILA) – 108 pursuit planes CLARK Field (about 12 km. northwest of southern SAN FERNANDO) – 78 pursuit planes and bombers Other airfields – 20 pursuit planes Total – 200 plans Naval Air Force
OLONGAPO – 18 Patrol planes CAVITE – 52 patrol and carrier based fighter planes Total – 70 planes In addition, the Philippine National Defense Army has about 40 planes, training planes and others attached to it. Chart No. 1 Chart on the disposition and military strength of the Allied Armed forces in the southern area (20 November ’41) Nation BRITISH U.S.A. DUTCH SIAM CHINA Armed Force AREA MALAY BURMA NORTH BORNEO PHILIPPINES HAWAII DUTCH INDIES SIAM KWANGSI YUNNAN Army (Personnel) Battleships 4-6 7 Carriers 2 4 7-8 Cruisers 30 4 18 5 Destroyers 16 14 46 5 3 Sub- Marines 6 30 28 14 4 TOTAL 68-70 52 106-107 24 7 Army 264 60 200 237 165 130 Navy 65 70 75 12 Total 330 60 270 312 177 130 At this time SIAM OBSERVED NEUTRALITY, but the Japanese anticipated conflicts with her forces because of anti-Japanese elements. 90,000 (including 20,000 volunteers) 35,000 & YUNNAN Army 20,000 35,000 Regular 22,000 National 110,000 85,000 50,000 60,t 0o 00 Di 2 v 0 s. 9 Brig. SUMMARY 1. Reinforcement of Army Forces in Malay from ENGLAND & INDIA begun in November 2. Naval Forces include HONGKONG, INDIAN & AUSTRALIAN FLEETS U.S. Marine Forces in Guam. Americans 300 Natives 1,500 U.S. Marine Forces in HAWAII & the PHILIPPINES 2,000 The 40 planes recently shipped from America are included in the total number of planes in the Chinese Army Navy (Ships) Air Force (Planes)
Appendix 1. The U.S. regular army division in the PHILIPPINES has two infantry brigades (each brigade has two regiments), one field artillery brigade (1 pack artillery and 1 motorized artillery regiment), engineer regiment, medical regiment, and supply regiment. Most of the units are motorized and the normal organization of the division is 24,000 personnel, 8,500 rifles, 1,300 automatic rifles, 250 heavy machine guns, 80 anti-aircraft machine guns, 32 regiment guns, 32 battalion guns, 36 anti-tank guns, 48 field guns, 24 howitzers (15 cm. caliber), and 24 tanks. Their mobility and lines of communication are excellent. In addition, the regular army has a tank battalion (54 tanks) and an anti-tank battalion. Units under the direct control of the Army are mainly communication, supply, and sanitary units. The fortress unit consists of the headquarters, 4 coast artillery regiments (includes one anti-aircraft regiment), and some Pilipino units. 80% of the regular army officers and 40% of the enlisted men are Americans and the remainder is composed of natives. The Americans have the makings of excellent soldiers, but due to the weather of the torrid zone, there is the tendency to physical and mental laxness and consequent lack of earnestive (p.13). The natives are accustomed to the weather of the torrid zone and poor quality food, but lack endurance and responsibility. Therefore, their military ability is lower than the Americans. 2. The PHILIPPINE National Army is a force organized by the Philippine Government with independence in mind, entirely of natives. It is mostly infantry, with only a few engineer and artillery units. Its quality and equipment is still weaker than those of the U.S. regular army in the PHILIPPINES, and most of the divisions are not yet completely organizes. 3. The Army Air Force consists of one pursuit group (4 pursuit squadrons – 108 planes), one bomber group (1 fighter squadron and 3 bomber squadron – 65 planes), and 2 reconnaince squadrons (13 planes). The Naval Air Force consists of 20 planes (of the flag ship, carrier, and sea plane tender) and 2 patrol squadrons (36 planes).
The PHILIPPINE National Army has 4 squadrons (30 trainers and 20 observation planes). These three air forces are under the command of the Air Force Commander. Condition of military installations 1. Defensive installation The defensive installations of the PHILIPPINES are the CORREGIDOR fortress (at the mouth of MANILA Bay) and the SUBIC Bay fortress. CORREGIDOR fortress is called the GIBRALTAR of ASIA and boasts of its impregnability. The reason for this is that it has CORREGIDOR Island as its center and with the islands of CABALLO, ELFRAILLE, and CARAHAO commands the entrance of MANILA Bay. Mt. MARIVELES in southern BATAAN Peninsula forms the left wall of the bay entrance, and because it is covered with dense forests, use of siege guns and heavy equipment to attack this fortress is impossible. The western portion of the CAVITE district which forms the southern wall of the bay entrance is a steep mountainous area. The use of heavy equipment and siege guns is possible only in the TERNATE area and that is limited to the dry season. The SUBIC Bay fortress is on GRANDE Island in the center of the mouth of SUBIC Bay. (The maps of the fortified islands in the mouth of MANILA Bay and GRANDE Island are shown in appendix no. 3.) Airfields The airfields in the PHILIPPINES are all narrow and are not suitable for use by large aircraft. However there are more than a 100 that can be expanded using farms and plains. 2. Army operational plans On 10 November, 1941 the army commanders were called to the Imperial Headquarters and shown the operational plans and other matters by the Chief of Staff, Minister of War, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army. Then, from 14 November to 15 November a meeting with the Commanders of the 3rd fleet, 11th Flying Fleet, and 5th Air Force was held at IWAKUNI (YAMAGUCHI Prefecture) and the
operational plans determined. The operational plans were as follows: Outline of the 14th Army operational plans I. Purpose of the operation A. The purpose of this operation is to defeat enemy forces and destroy important enemy bases in the PHILIPPINES. II. Course of operation A. The army cooperating with the navy will make landings on LUZON. With the destruction of enemy forces, capture MANILA as quickly as possible, after which, occupy important places in the PHILIPPINES. III. Outline on the operational directions A. The operation will commence with aerial attacks on the Philippines. B. At the outbreak of hostilities the army will send units forward to occupy airfields as quickly as possible, and at the same time the 5th Air Force will attack and destroy the enemy air forces in the PHILIPPINES. Then the main force will land on LUZON and capture MANILA and other important objectives. C. The 65th Brigade will follow the main force and land on LUZON. Then, if the purpose of the operation is attained, preparations will be made to replace it with the 48th division. D. In case of an enemy attack during operational preparations, the units affected will cope with the situation in a suitable manner. If the order for the commencement of the operation has been issued, the advancing operation will begin at the proper time. The United States-Japanese negotiation is concluded, the forces must cease operations immediately even though the attack order has been issued.
E. Landing operations will usually be carried out in the face of enemy fire after repulsing attacks from the enemy’s army, naval and air forces. F. At first the headquarters was in TAIHOKU in the process of being transferred to TAKAO, however from there it was to land on LUZON with the main force after the outbreak of hostilities. Concentration G. With the outbreak of war, the army will send troops stationed on MAKO and PALAO Islands to the PHILIPPINES and concentrate the main force in FORMOSA and the southwestern islands. In carrying out this concentration and operational preparation, everyone must observe strict secrecy. Disposition of large units H. Disposition and duties of troops are as follows: 1. The 5th Air Force cooperating with the navy will attack and destroy the enemy air forces in Luzon. 2. A.B.C. Detachments (including 3 infantry battalions of the 48th Division, one mountain artillery battalion, and some air units) will occupy and maintain airfields in the vicinity of APARI, LAOAG (about 110 km west of APARI), and VIGAN. D. Detachment (including 2 infantry battalions of the 16th Division, and one field artillery company) will capture and hold airfield in the vicinity of LEGASPI. E. Detachment (including one infantry battalion of the 16th Division) under the command of the SAKAGUCHI Detachment will capture DAVAO and airfields in its vicinity. 3. The 48th Division (including 3 infantry battalions, one mountain artillery battalion, and units under the direct control of the army) will land in LINGAYEN Gulf and destroy enemy forces in Central LUZON, after which they will capture MANILA.
After the landing A, B and C Detachments will come under the command of this division. The 16th Division (including 6 infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion and units under the direct control of the army) will land in LAMON Bay and cooperate with the main force in destroying enemy forces in southern LUZON, after which they will capture MANILA. After the landing, D Detachment will come under the command of this division. 4. At first the other units (including 3 infantry battalions of the 16th Division, one field artillery battalion and other units under the direct control of the army) will be under the direct control of the army. Outline of the operation I. The 5th Air Force, deployed in FORMOSA, were to cooperate with the naval air forces, deployed in FORMOSA and PALAO Islands, and attack enemy air forces in the PHILIPPINES. They were to equip the airfield captured by the navy at the outbreak of war on BATAAN Island (about 220 km, north of APARI). J. On the evening of the day before the 1st air attack, A, B, and C Detachments will depart from the rendezvous point. B and C Detachments will land in Vigan, C Detachment in LAOAG, and A Detachment in APARI. They will quickly eliminate forces and capture and maintain airfields in the vicinity of the landing points. K. D and E Detachments will depart from the rendezvous point on the same day as above. D Detachment will land in LEGASPI and E Detachment, in DAVAO. They will eliminate enemy forces, quickly capture and hold the airfield in the vicinity of the landing point, and cooperate with the navy in maintaining these airfields. After the capture of DAVAO, the SAKAGUCHI Detachment of the 16th Army will capture HORO Island (southwest of MINDANAO).
L. The main force of the 5th Air Force will cooperate in the convoy and landing operation of the A, B, and C Detachments. The naval air force will cooperate in the landing and battle after the landing of the D and E Detachments. The 5th Air Force, upon completion of airfields in LUZON, will advance to northern LUZON from FORMOSA and continue the air attacks. M. The Army cooperating with the Navy, following the success of the air attacks, will land the main force of the 48th Division in LINGAYEN Gulf and a portion of the 16th Division in LAMON Bay, within 15 days of the outbreak of hostilities. The 5th Air Force and the naval air force will cooperate in the above mentioned operation. N. The main force of the units landing in LINGAYEN Gulf will advance to MANILA passing through the landing point of ROSARIO (about 8.5 km. east of LAMORTS, the eastern coast of LINGAYEN Gulf) and CABANATUAN (about 40 km. east of TARLAC). A portion will advance to MANILA passing through TARURAN and SAN FERNANDO. The main force of the units landing in LAMON BAY will destroy enemy forces in the Southern LAGUNA Lake District and will capture MANILA. These units will cross the SIERRA MADRE Mt. Range without waiting for the concentration of the main force. At this time, the A, B, and C Detachment will be quickly attached to the main force of the army. The 5th Air Force will aid the army in capturing and repairing airfields, step by step in accordance with the progress of the operation. O. The main force of the army will enter MANILA from both north and south. After capturing MANILA, they will occupy other important places in the PHILIPPINES. P. When the objective of the operation has been attained, the army will concentrate the 48th Division in the vicinity of MANILA to prepare it for transfer to the DUTCH INDIES. The main force of the 5th Air Force will be transferred to the MALAY Areas.
Chart No. 2 Disposition of the 14th Army Reference: 1. X indicates the day of the outbreak of hostilities. 2. With the exception of the ground crew, the air units advanced by air. 3. Shipping units were used several times during this operation. Distribution of Duty Concentration Point Date of Beginning Landing Point Landing Date Summary A Detachment The 2nd FORMOSAN Infantry Regt. (1 ½ Bn. missing) of the 48th Div. Ground Crews, Army shipping Units To capture and hold the APARI Airfield MAKO X APARI Morning of X 2 B and C Detachment 1 ½ Bns. of the 2nd FORMOSAN Infantry Regiment. Ground Crew. Army shipping Units. To capture and hold VIGAN and LAOAG Airfields MAKO X VIGAN Morning of X 2 D Detachment 33rd Infantry Regiment (1 Bn. missing) of the 16th Div. Navy Ground Crews. Army shipping Units. To capture and hold the LEGASPI Airfield Advance to NAGA PALAU X LEGASPI X 4 E Detachment A detachment under the command of a regiment of the 56th Div. 1 Bn. of the 33rd Infantry Regt. Navy Ground Crews. Army shipping Units. To capture DAVAO Airfield, after which the units of the 56th Div. will advance to TARAKAN, passing through JOLO Island PALAU X DAVAO X 6 At first under the command of the 16th Army Commander. ADVANCE UNITS
Chart No. 2 Disposition of the 14th Army (Continued) Distribution of Duty Concentration Point Date of Beginning Landing Point Landing Date Summary LINGAYEN Forces (Main Units) Army Headquarters. 48th Div. (2nd FORMOSA Infantry Regt) 9th Regt. of the 16th Div. Special troops under the direct control of the army. To land in LINGAYEN Bay. Main Force will pass through CABANATUAN, and others will pass through TARLAC and destroy the enemy field army and capture MANILA KIRUN MAKO TAKAO X 9 or 10 Between SAN FERNANDO on the northern coast of LINGAYEN Bay and ARINGAY X 15 Ground crews of the air force will land on APARI and VIGAN LAMON Bay Landing Forces 16th Div. (9th and 33rd Infantry Regt) Some of the special troops under the direct control of the army. Line of communication troops. Army shipping units. To land in LAMON BAY cross the Southern LAGUNA Lake district advance to MANILA and cooperate with the LINGAYEN landing forces in capturing MANILA. AMANI OSHIMA X 9 or 10 ATIMONAN MAUPAN X 17 6th Brigade (Garrison Troops) Line of Communication Troops. Shipping Units. The main force will land on LINGAYEN BAY and take up the defense of LUZON Island. TAKAO X 16 or 17 LINGAYEN Gulf X 25 A portion lands on APARI and VIGAN Railway Unit. Remainder of line of communication units. Shipping units. To land in LINGAYEN Bay and carry out various duties TAKAO X 30 LINGAYEN Gulf X 35 2 Landing Forces (p19) 2 Landing Forces
Appendix: The outline on the disposition of naval forces for the operation in the southern theater is shown in Chart No. 3. Chart No. 3 Disposition of naval forces for the operation Troops Commander Strength Area of Operation Location at the time of the outbreak of the battle Mission at the opening phase of the operation 1 Battle ship 2 Heavy Cruisers 6 Destroyers 10 Sea planes MAKO At the opening phase, the whole operation will be aided by preparing a force to cope with the appearance of any strong enemy fleet in the MAKO Area. 1 Battleship 1 Heavy Cruiser 2 Destroyers 7 Sea planes Off the north eastern coast of LUZON To cooperate in the operation of the eastern coast of the PHILIPPINES and subsequently make successive advances southward. Also, to participate in the DUTCH INDIES operation. 5 Mine Layers 1 Aircraft Carrier 3 Sea plane tenders Air Strength 12 Fighters 18 Bombers 40 Sea planes 4 Marine Battalions A portion of the air force in the MALAY area joined in the midst of the operation. 1. To destroy the enemy fleet. 2. At the opening phase, to capture Bataan Island, and cooperating with the army, to occupy APARI, LAOAG (and VIGAN), LEGASPI, and DAVAO. To maintain airfields and capture HORO Island as soon as possible. 3. On X 10, to cooperate with the landing of the 14th Army on LINGAYEN and LAMON Bays. 4. After the first stage of the PHILIPPINE operation, continue the next stage of the operation with a portion of the force and with the main units begin the DUTCH INDIES operation. Commander of the South Fleet: Vice Admiral Nobutake After the first stage of the PHILIPPINE operation, the DUTCH INDIES unit is organized from a large portion of the PHILIPPINE unit. Headquarters of the Southern Fleet Supporting Main Unit Units of the Eastern Fleet Commander of the “HARUNA” PHILIPPINE and South CHINA Seas PHILIPPINE and the DUTCH INDIES The main force is in FORMOSA and AMAMI OSHIMA. A portion is in PALAU.
Chart No. 3 Disposition of naval forces for the operation (Continued) Troops Commander Strength Area of Operation Location at the time of the outbreak of the battle Mission at the opening phase of the operation 5 Heavy Cruisers 2 Light Cruisers 16 Destroyers 8 Submarines 3 Sea plane tenders Air Strength 36 Fighters 72 Bombers (Medium) 6 Observation planes 24 Sea planes Some of the air force will go to the Philippines in the midst of operation. 1. To destroy the enemy fleet. 2. At the opening of the battle, allow the 15th Army and a portion of the 25th Army to land in Southern SIAM. Also, to hold airfields and cooperate with the army in carrying out the MALAY operation. 3. To occupy MIRI and KUCHING maintain air fields, and send naval air units. 4. On X 25, allow the main force of the 25th Army to land in Southern SIAM. (A portion of the escort fleet is from the PHILIPPINE Unit.) 72 Fighters 114 Bombers 18 Flying Boats 12 Observation Planes Light Cruiser Submarines 1. To open the battle with the initial air attack on the PHILIPPINES and destroy the enemy air force as soon as possible. 2. To advance the air bases in accordance with the progress of the operation and destroy the enemy air force in the DUTCH INDIES. 3. To be on constant alert for enemy ships and to trap and destroy them. 4. Following the capture of MIRI and KUCHING to advance one unit into these areas, and participate in the anti-MALAY air campaign. Patrol and observation, attacks on enemy fleets, laying of mines, etc., in the PHILIPPINE and DUTCH INDIES area. Submarine AIR FORCE Unit MALAY Unit Commander of the Southern Fleet Southern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA and MALAY PHILIPPINE, DUTCH INDIES, AND BORNEO The main force is in SANYA ( ) Southern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA. The submarine unit is in SINGAPORE. Commander of the 11th Fleet Commander of the 5th Submarine Squadron The PHILIPPINES and DUTCH INDIES PHILIPPINE Area The main force is in FORMOSA and a portion is in PALAU
2. The essence of the air operation arrangement between the army and naval units involved in the opening phase of the operation was as follows: (1) The army will undertake air operations north of 16 degrees latitude (approximately the line running east and west of LINGAYEN) and the navy, south of this latitude. (2) The air defense of advance units during sea movements and anchorage is assigned mainly to naval air units. During the landing operations and the operation immediately following the landing, the army and naval air units will provide cover for the northern LUZON advance unit. The LEGASPI and DAVAO advance units will be covered by the naval air units. (3) During ship movements, air cover for the main units of the army will be provided mainly by the navy. The army and navy will cooperate in providing protection during anchorage. The army air units will cooperate mainly in the landing battles and the battles immediately following the landing. Only the naval air units will cooperate in the LAMON Bay landing by a portion of the army. 3. The particulars up to the formation of the army operational plan In studying the main points of the southern operation, the General Staff regarded the operations of other areas to be closely related to the PHILIPPINE operation and formed a plan accordingly. About fall of the same year they learned these following points: (1) Plan The army will cooperate with the navy in the air operation to destroy the enemy air force in the PHILIPPINES, send advance units to important places of northern and southern LUZON and DAVAO of MINDANAO Island, and send air units to these islands to strengthen the air operation. The main force will then land in LINGAYEN Gulf and a portion will land on BATANGAS or LAMON Bays. They will attack MANILA from both the northern and southern flanks, destroy the American and PHILIPPINE Armies, and capture LUZON Island. After which they will destroy the American
and PHILIPPPINE Armies in the VISAYA and MINDANAO Islands, and capture these islands. (2) Outline on the direction of the operation At the outbreak of hostilities, the army and naval air force will attack the enemy air force in the PHILIPPINES (as much as possible). At least three days will be required to carry out this operation. Moreover, the naval air force will attack CLARK Field and NICHOLS Field. During that time, the army air force will attack all enemy aircraft approaching the airfields in northern LUZON. The land based air units (11 Air Fleet) of the naval air force will be deployed in several airfields in southern FORMOSA AND PALAV. The army air force (5th Air Force) will be deployed in airfields in southern FORMOSA. The area of operation for the army and naval air forces is separated by the 16 degree latitude. Although aerial photographs of the landing points will be taken from high altitude, reconnaissance, due to security measures, will not be carried out aircraft or submarines before the commencement of the operation. The maps of the PHILIPPINE Islands in the possession of the Japanese Army at that time were inaccurate and included LUZON Island (1/200,000) and other islands (1/200,000 and 1/600,000). (3) Air force ground crews and shipping units will be attached to A (1 infantry battalion), B (1 infantry battalion with 2 companies missing) and C (1 ½ infantry battalion) detachment. Having MAKO as their rendezvous point, they will land on APARI, LAOAG and VIGAN on the 3rd day of the operation and will occupy, maintain, and hold the airfields in the vicinity of each landing point. 10 ships (5000 to 6000 tons) and 3 to 4 days will be required to execute the landing. Air force ground crews and shipping units will also be attached to D (1 infantry battalion) and E (2 infantry battalions) detachments. Having PALAU as their rendezvous point, they will land on LEGASPI and DAVAO on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation, and will occupy, maintain and hold airfields in the vicinity of each landing point. The units landing in DAVAO will also protect the 20,000 (approximate)
Japanese inhabitants there. 10 ships (5000 to 6000 tons) and 3 to 4 days will be required to execute the landing. The escort fleet will return to the rendezvous point when the success of the landing operations of these detachments seems eminent, and will escort the main force. Therefore, transports behind schedule will have to return unescorted. These detachments will carry 2 months rations and ammunition in view of the possibility that the main force will be unable to follow the plan. C.( p.23) The main force of the army air force will advance to the airfield of APARI, LAOAG and VIGAN in accordance with the progress in the reconstructing of these airfields. A portion of the naval air force will advance to LEGASPI and DAVAO to increase the success of aerial attacks and prepare protection for the sea movement of the main force. It must occupy these airfields within 2 to 3 days after the landing. Therefore, the airforce will not be able to strengthen the aerial attacks until the 6th or 7th day of the operation. The purpose of the aerial operation will probably be attained on about the 9th or 12th day of the operation, after 3 to 5 days of aerial attacks. Because of the belief that only the southern airfield of APARI is suitable for large aircraft (heavy bombers), the main force of the air units advancing into northern LUZON will be sent to the southern airfield of APARI and a portion will be sent to LAOAG and VIGAN. (This was found to be erroneous during the war). In viewing the condition in which a small unit checks the attacks of a large enemy unit for a long time, it was decided that the advance units would concentrate in holding the airfield until the landing of the main force. If necessary, the advance units in LEGASPI may advance to the vicinity of NAGA. During this period, the naval task force (3rd fleet) will provide protection for the sea movements of main forces and carry out anti-submarine operations in the FORMOSA and PHILIPPINE sea area. D. The 1st landing units (main force of the army) will land on LUZON Island on the 10th or 15th day of the operation depending upon the results of the aerial operation. Moreover, the main force of the army will land in LINGAYEN Gulf and a portion will
land in BATANGAS or LAMON Bays. In other words the LINGAYEN landing unit (approximately divisional strength with 12 infantry battalions) will concentrate in MAKO and TAKO, leave the rendezvous point on the 5th day of the operation, and will land in LINGAYEN Gulf on the 10th day of the operation. The southern beach of north SAN FERNANDO was selected as to the landing point. The convoy will arrive during the night and the landing operation will begin at the break of dawn. About 70 ships (about 350,000 tons) and 7 to 10 days will be required to execute the landing operation. The ground crews of the 5th Air Force, who advance by air, will accompany the main force, and will leave for APARI and VIGAN in the midst of the operation. The landing units of BATANGAS or LAMON Bay (about one brigade including 5 or 6 infantry battalions) will concentrate in the INLAND Sea or the southwestern islands. They will begin maneuvers on the 5th day of the operation, and will land in BATANGAS or LAMON Bays on the 12th day of the operation. If the landing point is BATANGAS a portion will land in the vicinity of NASUGBU. If the landing point is LAMON Bay, they will land on the beach in the vicinity of INFANTA, MAUBAN, or ATIMONAN. About 25 ships (about 130,000 tons) and about one week will be required to execute this landing. The line of communication units, which are necessary for this operation, will accompany the landing units on LINGAYEN, BATANGAS, and LAMON Bay. E. The 2nd landing units (about one brigade to be garrisoned on LUZON and including 6 infantry battalions and the main force of the line of communication units) will wait in JAPAN. They will board the ships used by the 1st landing units upon their return and will land on LUZON on 45th day of the operation to be garrisoned there. The landing point of the main force will be LINGAYEN Bay, but if MANILA Bay is open at that time, they will land there. A portion will land on APARI and VIGAN of northern LUZON. The third landing units (remaining line of communication units and railway units) will wait for the return of the ships used by the 2nd landing units. Therefore, the date of landing will probably be delayed. Because the escort fleet of the 2nd and 3rd landing units will be insufficient in connection To the DUTCH INDIES operation which follows, a small fleet will be attached for the use of the 2nd landing units.
F. The main force of the 1st landing units in LINGAYEN will advance from ROSARIO through CABANATUAN to MANILA and a portion will advance from SAN FABIAN through TARLAC and SAN FERNANDO to MANILA. Units in BATANGAS and LAMON Bays will advance from the south (southern side of LAGUNA Lake) to MANILA. Then MANILA will be attacked from both the north and south. It was decided that, if conditions at this time permitted, the advance units in LEGASPI would leave a portion behind, and the main force would go north to join the landing units in BATANGAS and LAMON Bays, also, the advance units in APARI, LAOAG, and VIGAN would leave a portion behind, and going by the sea, the main force would joint he landing forces in LINGAYEN or advance to OLONGAPO Naval Base after the landing. But, results of these movements are doubtful because of the bad condition of roads in LEGASPI and the shortage of ships and escort units in LUZON. Moreover, the effect of this movement is expected to be small because it will be carried out after the landing of the main forces. G. An engagement against UNITED STATES and PHILIPPINE forces is anticipated in the vicinity of MANILA. The decisive battle of this engagement will be carried out in the battle for MANILA City. When MANILA City is occupied, they will capture the fortresses in MANILA Bay and open the bay as soon as possible. The period until the occupation of LUZON after the destruction of enemy forces, is set at 45 days after the landing of the main force (the early part of February 1942). When UNITED STATES and PHILIPPINE forces on LUZON have been defeated, a unit is necessary to carry out the mapping up operation of remaining enemy forces. Therefore, it has been planned to utilize a garrison brigade to carry out this objective. When the period planned for the LUZON operation ends, about half of the army (1 division, special units under the direct control of the army, and the entire army and naval air forces) will prepare for the next operation in the vicinity of MANILA, after which they will board ships and using MANILA as its rendezvous point, begin the next operation. Because of this operation, it is necessary to quickly construct naval bases and ports for ships in MANILA Bay.
H. Then, the remaining forces of the army (one division) will execute the landing operation to occupy the VISAYAS and MINDANAO Islands as soon as possible. The essentials of this operation will be decided in accordance with the conditions at that time, but it is necessary to carry out this operation, quickly before the enemy retreating to other islands is reinforced. It is necessary to attain the victory in the PHILIPPINE operation by the end of March, this division will be reinforced with a group garrisoned in the VISAYAS and MINDANAO in order to aid other operations. (The organization, name, etc., of this unit has not been decided yet). 2.(p.25) STUDY ON THE PHILIPPINE OPERATION OF THE SOUTHERN AREA OPERATION The main force of the army was directed to the MALAY Peninsula operation in order to aid in the capture of SINGAPORE. Notes: Following tradition, the army directed its attention to the continent of ASIA, while being indifferent to sea battles. The main purpose of this operation was to obtain petroleum, being unable to continue the anti-Chinese War due to the embargo acts of the UNITED STATES. The final purpose of this operation was to capture oil fields in the DUTCH INDIES and it was believed that one of the obstacles in attaining this purpose was SINGAPORE. Therefore, every means was used to avoid warfare in the PHILIPPINES. But due to the conditions at that time, it was impossible to tolerate the alliance of the U.S., ENGLAND, and the DUTCH against JAPAN and we were afraid that it would become impossible to attain the objective of this operation because of the relationship of the situation in the PHILIPPINES with the MALAY and DUTCH INDIES operations and the policy of the AMERICAN leaders. Therefore, the PHILIPPINE operation became a secondary operation because it was not carried out at our own choosing. B. Reduction of the Army Air Forces The Army Air Force (5th Air Force) included the 4th and 10th Air Groups, but when the 10th Air Group was used in the MALAY operation to protect the Army from flank attacks by the BRITISH Air Force reinforced in BURMA (especially in RANGOON), consequently the fighting power of the Air Force in the PHILIPPINES was reduced to half its former strength.
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