Reports of General MacArthur THE CAMPAIGNS OF MAcARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC VOLUME I PREPARED BY HIS GENERAL STAFF
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60005 Facsimile Reprint, 1994 CMH Pub \3-3
FOREWORD The Reports of General MacArthur include two volumes being published by the Department of the Army in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this foreword and indexes. Since they were Government property, the general turned over to the Department in 1953 these volumes and related source materials. In Army and National Archives custody these materials have been available for research although they have not been easily accessible. While he lived, General MacArthur was unwilling to approve the reproduction and dissemination of the Reports, because he believed they needed further editing and correction of some inaccuracies. His passing permits publication but not the correction he deemed desirable. In publishing them, the Department of the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their accuracy. But the Army also recognizes that these volumes have substantial and enduring value, and it believes the American people are entitled to have them made widely available through government publication. The preliminary work for compiling the MacArthur volumes began in 1943 within the G-3 Section of his General Staff, and was carried forward after the war by members of the G-2 Section, headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby with Professor Gordon W. Prange, on leave from the University of Maryland, as his principal professional assistant. Volume II of the Reports represents the contributions of J apanese officers employed to tell their story of operations against MacArthur's forces. The very large number of individuals, American and Japanese, who participated in the compilation and editing of the R eports would make a complete listing of contributors relatively meaningless. Volume I narrates the operations of forces under General MacArthur's command from the Japanese attack on Luzon in 1941 through the surrender in 1945. While service histories have covered much of the same ground in separate volumes, no single detailed narrative of General MacArthur's leadership as commander of the Southwest Pacific Area has yet appeared. Chapters dealing with the reconquest of Borneo, plans for the invasion of Japan, and the Japanese surrender make a distinctly new contribution. Volume I Supplement describes the military phase of the occupation through December 1948, reporting events not treated elsewhere in American publications. Volume II on Japanese operations brings together a mass of information on the enemy now only partially available in many separate works. Collectively, the Reports should be of wide interest and value to the American people generally, as well as to students of military affairs. They are an illuminating record of momentous events influenced in large measure by a distinguished American soldier. Washington, D.C. January 1966 HAROLD K. JOHNSON General, United States Army Chief of Staff ill
FOREWORD TO THE 1994 EDITION I determined for several reasons to republish General MacArthur's reports to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. First, the Reports of General MacArthur still stand as a detailed account from MacArthur' s perspective of his operations against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area. Second, the Reports offer a unique Japanese version of their operations in the Southwest Pacific that remains one of the few English-language descriptions of Imperial Army campaigns during World War II. Third, excellent illustrations, many of them original artwork commissioned for the Reports, plus superb maps give these volumes an enduring value for military historians and the American public. Finally, while General MacArthur remains a towering figure in American historiography, the passage of fifty years has dimmed the contributions of the U.S. Army units that first checked the Japanese southward advance in Papua New Guinea, then spearheaded the counteroffensive along the north New Guinea coastline that enabled MacArthur to make good his promise to return to the Philippines . The veterans of these campaigns, both men and women, deserve to be remembered for their contributions to the Nation in its time of greatest peril. These are General MacArthur's Reports, but they are also his testament to the American soldiers who served under his command. Washington, D.C. 31 January 1994 IV HAROLD W. NELSON Brigadier General, USA Chief ofMilitary History
PREFACE This report has been prepared by the General Staff of GHQ to serve as a background for , and introduction to the detailed operational histories of the various tactical commands involvecl. The pressure of other duties having prevented my personal participation in its preparation, it has been entrusted by me to that magnificent staff group which actually conducted the staff work during the progress of the campaigns. They speak with that sincere and accurate knowledge which is possessed only by those who have persona lly participated in the operations which they record. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR v •
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I : THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE IN THE PACIFIC Page Pearl Harbor ...... . .. .. . . ....... .. . .. . . ... . ... . ... . ... . ... .. .. . .. ... .. .... .. . ... I Japanese Strategic Objectives . ... . .. .. .... ... ... . .. .. .. .. ... . ....... ..... .. .. . I Initial American Dispositions.. .. .. .. .. ........ .. .. .. ...... .. .... .. .. ....... . 3 Allied Strategy after Pearl Harbor .. .. ....... .. ............. .. .. ... .. .. ... 4 The Attack agamst the Philippmes ... .. .. .. ........ . ....... ... ..... .. .. ... 6 Strategic Withdrawal to Bataan .. .. . .... .. . .............. . .... . ... ... .. .... 14 The Battle for Bataan.. ................... .. .. ............... ....... .. ..... ... 16 United States Army Forces in Austral ia...... . .. ..... ........ .. . .. ...... 21 The ABDA Command ...... .. ... ... .. .. . . ......... . ....... . ....... .......... 22 The Threat to Australia . .... . ..... .. . ......... . .... ... ..... ... ....... . .. .. .. 22 Disposition of Forces ... . . .. . . .. .... .... . .. ... . ... .. . ... .. . .. ... ... . .. ... . .. . .. 26 CHAPTER II : ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA General MacArthur Arrives in Australia .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .. ...... .. .. .. 28 Organization of the Paci6c Theater ·.. .. .. ...... ..............., ........ ... 30 Establishment of General Headquarters, Southwest Paci6c Area . -3 1 The Organization of Forces .... ......... .. .. ............ .. .. .. · .. .. .. .... .. .33 Decision to Take the Offensive .. ...... ...... ........ .. .... .. . .. ..... .. .. .. 34 The Magnitude of the Task . .. ... .. ........... .......... .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. 40 CHAPTER III: HALTING THE JAPANESE Concept of the Offensive ..... .... .. . .. . .. .. ... .. . .. .... .... ... .... ...... .. .. 45 Strengthening Port Moresby .. ......... ... ....... ...... .. .. ... . .... .. ....... 45 Battle of the Coral Sea .. .. ...... .... ............ .. .. . ............. ..... .. .. . 46 Kanga Force .. ........ ....... ...................... .... . ..... .. .. .. .. . .. ....... 049 Battle of Midway . ... . .. .... ..... . .............. .. . ..... ....... .. .... ...... ... .50 Milne Bay and Merauke .. .... ........ .. ... .. ... .. .... .. ...... .. .. .. . .. .. . .. 50 Kokoda Trail ........... ... . ... .. . . ...... .... . . ..... .. ..... . ... . .. . .............. 51 Intelligence in Operations .. ..... .... ....... .. ... .. . ..... .. ........ .... ....... 53 General Headquarters Transferred to Brisbane .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. ..... 55 Pursuing the Counteroffensive . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. ......... . .. . .... .. . .. . . ..... 55 Japanese Landing near Buna . ........ ...... .. ... . ....... . . ..... .. ... .. . .... .62 Enemy Advance along Kokoda Trail .. ... ....... . .... ... . .. ........ . .. .. 62 Action in the Solomons ... ...... .. ..... .. .. .. ... .. .... ........ . .. ..... . .... .. 63 Battle of Milne Bay .. ................. . ................ .... .. .... ... .... .. ... 66 Enemy Checked near Port Moresby.. .. .............. .... ....... .. ..... .. 70 vii
CHAPTER IV: CLEARING OF PAPUA Page Plans and Preparations .. . ........ .... . ..... ..... . ... . ... ... . . ..... ..... .. ... 72 Clearing the Owen Stanleys .. . ... . ........ .. .. . . .... ..... . ....... . .. .. ... . .75 Airlift to Wanigela . ... . .... .... ..... .......... . .. .. . ...... . '.' ..... ... ... ...... 78 Landings on Goodenough Island .......... .. ...... ... .. .. . .... .. ... ....... 79 Guadalcanal ...... .. .. ......... .. .. . ....... . ....................... .. .... . ... . ... 80 The Advance in Papua Continues ............. ...... ....... .... .. .. ...... 84 Attack Stalemated .. . ........ . .. . .. . . ..... ........ . ........ ........ . .. . .. . . . .. 88 The Fall of Buna .... .. ................... .... ....... ... . .. .. ... ............... 9 1 Gona-Sanananda ...... ......... ........ ... . .......... . .... ... . .. ...... ......... '9 6 The End of the Papuan Campaign .... .......... .............. .. ....... "9 8 CHAPTER V: UP FROM PAPUA Concept of Strategy .... . . .... . ........... .. .... . .. ... .... .. ....... ... ....... .100 The Struggle for Wau ................. . ................ . ...... ........... 101 General Situation in Early '943 ........... ..................... .. ...... 105 Southwest Pacific Area Command . ... .... .. . . .. ........................ 107 Battle of the B,smarck Sea .................................... . .. ........ II 0 Final Plans ............... .. .... ..... ....... ... ..... ..... . .. ......... .... ... . .. 113 Wood lark and Kiriwina ................ ......... .. ............ ............. II7 New Georgia ...... . .. ......................... . ...... ........ .. .......... . ... . 117 Nassau Bay to Salamaua ......... .. .. . .... .. .... .. .... . ... .. ............. 120 Air Attack on Wewak ...... .. . .. ............... ... ............ .... . .. ..... 121 Nadzab and Lae .... ......... ........ . .... ...... .. . ...... . ... .... . .... .. .... . 122 Securing the Huon Peninsula ....... .......... .... .. ... . ................. 124 Bougainville ....... .... .... .... .... ............ .......... . ... . ..... .. .... .. . .... 1 25 New Britam .................. .. ....... . ................. ... . . ..... . .. .. ....... 128 Saidor . ............. .. ......... . ... ... .. ... . . ..... ... . . .. . . .... . . .. .. . ... .. ..... ·J 32 Objectives of '943 Achieved .... .. .... .... ................ ... .. .. ........ 132 CHAPTER VI: THE WESTWARD DRIVE ALONG NEW GUINEA Preliminary Plans ... ... . . . .. . . ... . ... .. . . .. ... .... ......... . .... . ..... .. . . . ... 134 The Admiralties .......... . . . ..... .. .. . .... ........... . . .. .. .. . .... ........... 136 Supplementary Operations ....................... ... .. . ............... ...... 142 Plan to By-Pass Hansa Bay .... ... .... .. .. .... .. ... .. . ....... ............ 142 Hollandia-Aitape Invasion ...... . ...... ... .............. . ................. 145 Regrouping of Command Functions ............ . . ............... ·. · .. ·· J49 Capture of Wakde Islands .... .. .... .. ... .... ............................. 150 Struggle for Biak ...... . . ........ . .. . . ....... . ... . . . ..... ... ................. 1 52 Noemfoor Island ... . . ............ . ... . . . . ........ ..... . .... . . .... . . ........... j 53 Counterattack at Aitape .... .... ........... ....... ... .. .. .. ....... ...... .... 156 Seizure of Sansapor .... ... .... ........... ...... .... ........ .. . .... . ........ 160 VUI
Page End of the New Guinea Campaign . .... .. ... ... ... ...... .. .. . . ....... .160 The Battle against Enemy Coastal Shipping ..... . ...... . . ... . .... .. 164 New Strategic Situation ... .. . ... ... . ....... . ..... ........................ . . 165 CHAPTER VII; THE PHILIPPINES; STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE Basic Strategy .. . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. 166 Initial Planning for the Philippines .. .... . . ... . ... .. . . .. ... . ............ 168 The " Musketeer" Plans ..... .. ... . ....................... . .. ...... .. ..... I 70 Leyte Invasion Date Advanced ............ .. .... ..... ............ .. .... .172 Morotai ........ . ......... ...... . ... .. ..... . . .. .... .... . .... ... ... . .. . .. .. .. . ... 174 Palau Islands .............. .... . ... . ... . .. . ... .................... . ...... . . .... 178 Preparing for the Leyte Invasion """" "" " "" " " ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, [78 Logistic Support ... .... .. ... . ... ... .. ... .......... . ... ... .. . .. . .. .. ... .. . ..... 179 Organization of Forces ........ . . .. . ... . .......... ..... ... ... . ... . ... . ... . .. .181 Additional Fleet and Air Support ....... ... .. .. ... . ................ 183 Operations Instructions .... ......... .... . ................................... .184 Logistical Difficulties .......... ............. ....... . .. ..... . ..... . .......... .190 Japanese Forces in the Philippines ...... .... .. .. .... ................... 190 The Filipinos in the Plan of Operations .... .... .. .... ........ .. ...... 191 Preliminary Air Bombardment .. . ....... ... ...... .. .. .. ... .... . ....... ... .193 CHAPTER VIII; THE LEYTE OPERATION Strategic Value ot Leyte ............ .. ........ .. .......... ... ............. 196 Clearing Leyte Gulf .. ..... .. . . .. . ... . .... .. .. . . . . .. . .. .. ... . . .............. I 96 The Return of MacArthur .. .. .. .. ......................... .. .. .. ......... 198 Widening the Beachheads .... .. ................................... .... .... 199 Naval Threat to Leyte Gulf .... ...... .. .... .. .. ... ... .. .. .... .......... 203 Indications of Japanese Intentions .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. ........... .. .. .. ... 205 Approach of Enemy Naval Forces ..... ..... .. .. ........... .. .......... 207 Estimate of the Enemy Plan.... .. .. .. .......... .. ........... .. ... ........ 209 Battle of Surigao Strait ............ ... .. .... ......... .. ............ .. ...... 212 Third Fleet Goes North .. .. ..... .. .. .......................... .. ..... .. . 213 Battle off Samar ...... .... . ... ...... . .. .. ... . ... . ... . . . .. .. ..... . .. . ... . . ... 2 I 6 Admiral Kurita Breaks Off Engagement ....... . .. .... .. .. ......... 22 I Defeat of the Japanese Navy .... .. .... ......... .. . .. ......... .. .. .... .. 223 Japanese Reaction to the Invasion .............. .. ......... .. ..... ...... 224 The Advance Inland.... . .... .. ........... ... ... ... ..... . . .. ...... . ... . .... .226 Resistance Stiffens ..... . . ... . ... . ......... . .... . .... ...... .. .... .. . . ... .. ... 228 Approach to the Ormoc Corridor ...................................... 230 The Japanese Attack Burauen .... ........ .... ........................... .232 Preparation for the Ormoc Landing .. ... .. . .... .. ....... .... .. .. ...... .233 Ormoc Captured. .......... .. ....... . ..... ... .. . .. ... .. .... .......... ........ .234 IX
Leyte Leyte CHAPTER IX: Page Secured .. .... .... . . ... . . ..... .. . .. .... .... ... .. .. .. ... .. ... . ... . . ... ... 235 in Retrospect .... . .... .. . ... ... . ... .......... .............. . .... .. ... . .237 THE MINDORO AND LUZON OPERATIONS Plans for the Northern Philippines ... ............... .. ................ 242 Choosing the Route to Luzon ........ . .......... . .. . ..... . .. ...... . ..... .243 Final Plans for the Mindoro Landing ... .. . .. ........ .. ..... .. . . .. ..... 246 Occupation of Mindoro .. . .......... .... ...... . . ............. . ............ 247 Assault at Lingayen Gulf. ... .. ........ . ......... ... .......... .... ......... 254 I Corps Advances Eastward .... . ...... .... .... .. . . . . ........ . .. ... .. ..... 26! XIV Corps Advances Southward .... ...... . ... ... .... ... .... ... ... . . . . ..262 Enemy Plan of Defense ............. . .... . ..... . .. ... . ... . ..... . . . ... . ..... 263 XI Corps Cuts Across Bataan .... ..... ... ....... ....... ....... . . ... . .... 267 Recapture of Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg .. . .... ... .. . . . .... 269 Final Drive to Manila...... . ... . . . ....................... .. .. . ... .. . . ...... 270 Battle in Manila .... ...................... . ..... ... . . ..... .. . .. ............... 27! Bataan and Corregidor Retaken ..... . ............. . ... ... . ... ...... . ..... 277 The Assault East of Manila .......... ................... ... .......... . ... 280 Drive in the North ............ . ................... . .. ... . ............. . ... . .284 Ipo and Wawa Dams Captured ....... ............ . ..... . . .... ... ... . ... 288 Clearing Batangas and the Bicol Peninsula . .. .... ....... . ..... . ..... 288 Occupation of Kiangan and the Cagayan Valley........ ...... . ... . .29! CHAPTER X: GUERRILLA ACTNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES The Philippine Resistance Movement .. . .. . ..... . ..... . ..... . ......... 295 Activities of the Allied Intelligence Bureau .... .. .... .. ... ..... . .. .298 Activities of the Philippine Regional Section ......... . .. . ...... . .... 304 The Guerrillas on Mindanao ........... . ....... . ..... .. . .. . ....... . .. .. .308 The Guerrillas on Negros, Cebu, and Bohol .............. ... . ..... .312 The Guerrillas on Panay and Adjacent Islands ... . ..... . .. . ....... 3 [5 The Guerrillas on Leyte and Samar . . .. . ... .. .. . .. . .. .. . ....... .. . . .... 316 The Guerrillas on Luzon . . . . ...... . ... .. ......... .. .. .... .. .......... . . . .3 I 8 General MacArthur's Tribute to the Philippine Guerrillas ...... 324 CHAPTER XI: OPERATIONS OF THE EIGHTH ARMY IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES Southward Advance .. ......... ... .. .. ... .... ... .... . .. .... . ... .. . ..... .... . .327 Clearing the Visayan Passages . ... . .. .... ... .. . ... ... ....... .. .. .. . ...... 328 Operations on Palawan . ...... .. . . .. ..... . ......... .............. ........ .. 328 The Zamboanga Landing ........... . . .. . .............. . . . .. . ..... . . ..... 333 Clearing the Sulu Archipelago ............ . ... . ... . ...... ........ . .. . ... 337 Planning for Operations in the Southern Visayas ...... ..... .... ... 339 The Seizure of Panay ... . ... .. .... . ..................... ............ .... . . .339 x
Page The Attack on Negros Occidental .. . . ................. . ... . .... . ... ... ·342 Liberating Cebu . .. . ..... ............................ ....... ... ........ ...... ·343 Final Operations in the Visayas-Bohol and Negros Oriental ... ·347 The Enemy Situation in Mmdanao ................................... .. 348 X Corps Invades Mindanao ............... .. ........... .... .. .. ........ .. 348 Kabakan to Davao .. ........ .............. .......... .. ............... .... .. 351 Clearing the Sayre Highway .. .......................................... .. 352 The Landing at Macajalar Bay ....... ................. .... .... ... .. ... . -354 Reduction of Enemy Forces in East·Centrai Mindanao.............354 Final OperatIOns on Mindanao .. ............ .............................355 End of the Philippme Campaign ............... ..... .. .... .. ...... .. .... 355 CHAPTER XII: FINAL SWPA OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF AFPAC Changing Concepts ..... ..................... .. ....... . .... . ................. 363 The Directives of 3 April 1945 ......................................... 366 Pacific Theater Command Reoganization .............................. 367 Army Air Force Reorganization .... .. ...... .. ................ ............ 368 Plans for the Borneo Campaign ......... .. ......................... . .... 31>9 Final Southwest Paci6c Operations : Borneo ...................... ..371 Assault along the West Coast ................. ... ....................... 375 Assault along the East Coast ....... ....... ..............................379 Final Actions in New Guinea. New Britain, and Bougainville .. ..383 Interim Plans .. .... .. ....................... .. . . ... .... ... . .. ... ... ....... . . . .. 387 Command Changes for U Olympic" .... ....................... ........ .389 Division of the Southwest Pacific Area ......... ........ .......... ..... 391 Demobilization, Redeployment, and Replacements ....... .... .. . ..... 393 CHAPTER XIII : U DOWNFALL "-THE PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF JAPAN Evolution of U Downfall" ................ ... ................... .......... 395 Strategies under Consideration .... ....... . . .. .. .. .... .. ........ . .... ...... 397 Concept of "Downfall " ...................... . ........ ........ ......... ... .399 Japanese Plans arid Estimates ....................... ... .. ................ 40 1 Geography and Road Net of Kyushu . ... ... .... .... ................... 406 General Plan of "Olympic" .. . .......................... .... ........... 407 Employment of " Olympic" Ground Forces ................... .... .. -4l1 Logistic Arrangements .. ............. .. . .. ....... ... ......... ... . .... .... ... 411 The Enemy Situation ............ .......... ............................... . 414 The Planned Defense of Kyushu .. ......................................4 18 American Plans for the Invasion of Honshu-Operation "Coronet" 423 Geographical Considerations ............................................. -426 Xl
Page Employment of " Coronet" Ground Forces ........................ . . 427 Enemy Plans for the Defense of Honshu ....... . ................... -427 CHAPTER XIV: JAPAN'S SURRENDER Continued Pressure on Japan ... ....... ................... ..... ... ........ 43I Naval Pre-InvaslOn Operations ............................. ...... ...... . 433 The Potsdam Declaration ............. .. ...... ........................ .... -435 " Blacklist" Plan ..... . ........................................ . .. ............ 436 The Final Blows .. .. .... .. .. .. .. . ..... .. . ......... .... .. ...... ....... .... . .. 440 Japan CapItulates . . . . .. .. . ....... ......... .... ...... .. . ... . ..... . . ... . ....... 442 Preparations for Surrender ............... . ........................... .. ... . -445 The Manila Conference ...... .. ......... .. .... ............. .......... .. .... 447 Reorganization of AFPAC ... .. .. .. ..................... .. ............... -450 Ini ·· f "Bl kl' " tlatlon 0 ac 1St ......... . ................. ............. .. . ........ 450 Tokyo Bay: 2 September '945 .............. · ........ ... .. .. ......... -454 Surrender throughout the SWPA Areas . ......... . .... .... .... . .. . .. -458 "The Guns are Silent" .................. . ................................ 466 ILLUSTRATIONS Plate Page I The Japanese Conquests which Isolated General MacArthur's Forces in the Philippines ...... . ... . ...... .. ..... . ............................... (Facing) 2 The Japanese Invasion of the Philippines and the Forces Employed .... 5 3 Aerial Reconnaissance of Luzon ....... . ..... ....................................... 8 4 Operations on Luzon, December 194' .. · ...... · .. ...................... · .. ·.... .. 9 5 Terrain Features of Bataan ........ ... . . .......... . . ...... ............... . ... . ....... 1 2 6 Route of Strategic \X'ithdrawal to Bataan and Concept of Defense. ..... 13 7 Action on Bataan, January- April 1942 . ...................................... 17 8 Disintegration of the Malay Barrier and the Threat to Australia........ 24 9 Orientation Map Showing Lack of Rail Transportation along the Vulnerable Northern Coast . .. .. . ................. ............... . ... . ... . ........ . . .... 25 '0 The Boundaries of the Southwest Pacific Area and the Extent of the Japanese Advance ......... ................ . ..... . ................. ... ..... ........ 32 II The Main Australian Defense Areas. . ................ .. ......................... 36 12 The United States Superimposed on the Southwest Pacific Area .. ...... 41 13 Relief Map of New Guinea ... ................ . .......................... 44 '4 Battle of the Coral Sea .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .... ....... ...... .... . 48 '5 Section along the Kokoda Trail ....................... .. ...... ..... .... ...... . ... 52 16 Coast Watching Teleradio Stations .. .. .. .. . .. ... ........ .. ... . .. .. .......... . 56 '7 Operation Plan" Tulsa Two B" ...... . ...... .... .. .. . ......... .... ....... .. .. 60 ,8 Japanese Thrust toward Port Moresby .. ........... ............... ..... .. ...... 64 XII
Plate 19 20 21 22 23 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 3 6 37 3 8 39 40 4' 42 43 44 45 4 6 47 4 8 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 Page Enemy Landings at Milne Bay, August 1942 ... ...... . .... . .......... . Action from Oivi to Imita Ridge, July- September 1942 ............... . Japanese Dispositions and Capabilities, September 1942 .. . . ... . .... . Relief Map of Eastern Papua ... ............... .. . ............ . Axes of Advance, Papuan Campaign .... . . . ... . ............ . . ............. ... . ... . Owen Stanley Offensive .. ........................................................ . .. . Coast Watchers Stations (AlB) along the Japanese Bomber Routes , Au65 68 69 73 76 77 gust 1942-April 1943 ...... ....... . ............. ... ......... .. ... . ... . ... . ....... 83 Action in Kokoda- Oivi-Wairopi , November 1942 ................ . ....... 86 Terrain Features, Buna-Gona Area ... ... . ... . ... . ..... . ........ 90 The Capture of Buna ............... ... . . ........ . ... . .... .. ......... . 94 Sanananda Front, 22 November 1942 -22 January 1943 ·· .... . .... .. .. . ... 95 New Guinea - Solomons Area ... .. ....................... .... . ...... ...... .... .. 102 Strategic Location of Wau . ............................................. . ........... 106 Command Organization, Southwest Pacific Area .. ........................... 108 Operations Chart " Elkton Plan," New Britain- New Ireland- New Guinea Area ...... ........... . .... . .... ... ................. ... .. . ... . ....... ... ..... I 14 Operations, Nassau Bay to Salamaua . ................... . .... .. . . . ..... . ...... . . I 19 Nadzab and Lae .................... . . ............... . .... . ... .. . . ... ........ ........... 123 The Envelopment of the Huon Peninsula ...... . ... . ... . ............ .. ... . ..... 126 Allied Operations and Estimated Enemy Dispositions, Solomon Islands. 127 Enemy Ground Dispositions, Bismarck Archipelago, 30 November 1943 .. 130 Westward Drive along New Gumea ...................... . .......... .. .. .. .. .. .. 135 Admiralty Islands Campaign .......... .. .. ....... ... .. ... .. ... . .. . ........ . ... ...... 139 Hollandia Operation, 22 April-6 June 1944 ······ ······ · ···· ...... . .. .. .... 147 Wakde-Sarmi Operation, 17 MaY-2 September 1944 ............ . ...... 151 Biak Island Operation, 27 MaY-20 August '944 ...... . .. . ......... 154 Noemfoor Island Operation, 2. JulY-3 1 August 1944 ..... . ............. 155 Japanese Counterattack East of Aitape ........ . ... . ........... . ... . ... . .......... 158 Sansapor- Cape Opmatai Operation, 30 JulY-31 August 1944 . . 159 Enemy Shipping Routes Destroyed during the New Guinea Campaign .... 163 The Philippines ...... ............................... .. . .............. 167 "Musketeer II " Plan ............................. ....... . ..... .. 171 The Morotai Campaign, '5 September-4 October '944 .......... . . . ..... 175 Enemy Airfields Reported in Use, September 1944 ..... . ........... . . . ...... 177 Allied Geographical Section Publications ............. . .......... . . ............. . 180 Organization of Forces for the Leyce Operation ..... ... .... . ......... . ....... 182 Plan of the Leyte Operation ... ........... ............................... . .......... 185 Enemy Ground Dispositions , 30 September 1944 . .. . .. ...... ........ ..... . .. 192 Leyce .. . . ........ .. ... . .... ... .. . . . ....... ..... ................................... . ........ 197 Sixth Army Landings on Leyce, '7-20 October '944 ................. ... .. 200 Xlll
Plate Page 58 Leyte Assault, 20- 25 October '944... . . . .. . .. . .............. . ......... ... ....... 201 59 Approach of Naval Forces ....... ... ........ ...... .... . .. . ....... . ...... .... . ...... . 204 60 Battle for Leyte Gulf ... . .......... ........ . ... ... .... . ...... .. .. . . . ... . . .. .. .. ..... . 2 IO 61 Battle of Surigao Strait . . .. ... ... . ... . .... ...... ... . ........... . . . ... . . . . . .... .. .. . . .214 62 Battle off Samar . . .. . ..... . .. . .. .. .. .................... . . .. ... . ... . ... . ... . .. .. . . . . . .. .219 63 Leyte Attack Continues, 25 October-2 November '944 .. · . · .·.· . .. ... . .. 227 64 Ormoc-Carigara Corridor, 3 November-25 December '944 . . . ... ... ... 231 65 General Situation, Leyte Campaign, 3' December 1944 . .. ................. 238 66 Enemy Shipping Routes Destroyed during the Leyte Campaign . ... .... 239 67 "Musketeer III" Plan: Love and Mike Operations · ·· · .· ··· ·· ......... . . 244 68 Luzon ...... . ... . ... . . . .. . .. ... ........... . ... . . ............... . . ... . . .. .. .. .. . . ........... . 245 69 Japanese Operational Airfields on Luzon, 31 December 1944 ...... . . . ... 248 70 Mindoro-Marinduque .............. . ... . ....... . ........... . .... .. ... . . ... ... .. .. . ... 249 71 Organization of Naval Forces for the Lingayen Assault ... ................ . 253 72 Organization of Ground Forces for the Lmgayen Assault .................. 255 73 Approach of Forces to Lingayen .... . ............. . ....... . ... ... . ... ........... . . 257 74 Sixth Army Landings, Lingayen Gulf, 9-'7 January '945 .. .... . . . . . ..... 260 75 Drive to Manila, 18-26 January 1945 ........ . ..... .. . . . ............ . . . ... . .. .... 264 76 Japanese Plan for Defense of Luzon, 19 December 1944 .. . ..... . .. . .... . . 265 77 The Envelopment of Manila, 27 January- 5 February 1945 ........... . . . 268 78 The Battle of Manila, 3 February- 3 March 1945 ...... . . ..... ... . . .. . . . . . . 274 79 Bataan Retaken, '3-21 February '945 ·.·· · . ·· · ··· · ·······.· ... .. . . ............ . .. 278 80 Recapture of Corregidor, 16-28 February '945 ........................ . ....... 279 8, Assault Eastward from Manila. 8 March-28 May 1945 ... ... . ... . ... . ... 282 82 Operations in Northern Luzon. 26 January- 8 August ' 945 .. . ... . . . ... 286 83 Operations in Southern Luzon , '5 March-25 May 1945 ......... . . .... . 290 84 Major Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines, '942- '945 ......... .. ... ..... . 299 85 Military Districts, '943- ' 94' . ... .......... . ....... . .............................. . 303 86 AlB and PRS Penetrations of the Philippines, '943-.,944 ..... .. . . ..... 306 87 Philippine Islands Communications, '5 December '943 ........... .. ...... . 307 88 General Philippine Intelligence Coverage. '943- ' 944 ................. . ... . 3 IO 89 Mindanao Guerrilla Organization, 3 ' January '945 .... .. . ....... . ...... . .. . 311 90 Central Philippines Guerrilla Organization, October- November 1944 . . .. 314 9 ' Guerrilla Forces on Luzon , October- November '944 .... ....... ... . . .. .... 319 92 Cabanatuan Prison Raid, 30-31 January '945 .......... . . ........... . . ....... 322 93 The Philippine General Radio Net Developed durmg the Japanese Occupation, 9 October '944 .. . ......... · ..................................... ·· 326 94 Plan of "Montclair III": Victor Operations, 25 February '945 . 330 95 Clearing of the Visayan Passages, '9 February-8 May 1945 .......... 33 r 96 Operations on Palawan, 28 February-30 June 1945 ·· ·· ··· ··· . . ...... . ..... 334 97 Seizure of Zamboanga and the Sulu Archipelago, '0 March- 20 June, 945 · .335 xiv
Page 98 Operations in Panay and Negros Occidental, 18 March-20 June 1945 .. 34° 99 Landings on Cebu, Bohol, and Negros O[iental, 26 March-20June 1945 .. 345 100 The Assault against Central Mindanao, 17 April-5 May 1945 .. .. .... 349 lOT Final Operations on Mindanao, 6 MaY-II August 1945 .... · .......... ·353 102 The Philippine Campaign, October 1944-July '945 ... .... .. · .. · ........ .. 35 6 103 Enemy Shipping Routes Destroyed during the Philippine Campaign .... 361 104 Enemy Ground Dispositions, General Pacific Area, 30 April '945 .......... 365 105 Enemy Dispositions on Borneo, 30 April 1945 ....................... · .. · ...... ·373 105 Tarakan Operation, I MaY-2I June '945 ...................................... 376 107 Brunei Bay Operations, 10 June- 14 July '945 ........... .. ..................... 377 108 Balikpapan Operation, 1-18 July 1945 ...... .................. .... ..... . ..... 381 109 The Borneo Operations, May-July '945 · .. .. .. · .................... .... .. 384 IIO Mop·Up Operations in Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, and Bougainville .................. . ............... . .... . .................... . ........... . .385 II I Organization of United States A"my Forces in the Pacific .................. .. 390 II2 " Downfall" Plan for the Invasion of Japan, 28 May 1945 ........ .. .... 396 1'3 Kyushu ........... . ............... . .......................................... .. · .... ·· .. · ·Aoo I '4 Disposition ofJapanese Army Ground Forces in the Homeland, April '945 · A04 "5 Road and Railroad Net, Kyushu ............. .. . .. .......................... .. .... 408 II6 Organization of Forces for "Olyrr. pic" .... ........ ...... ...... ................. '109 "7 Staging of Forces for "OlympIc" .. ............ ........ .. ....................... '112 II8 "Olympic," the Invasion of Kyushu .............. .. .. .. ............... .. ... .. .. 413 "9 Estimated Enemy Ground Dispositions on Kyushu, 28 July '945 ...... 416 120 Japanese Ground Dispositions on Kyushu, 18 August '945 ........ .. ... A20 O .. fF C "C " I 2 I rgamzatlOn 0 orces IOr oronet ...................... ....... .. ........... 422 122 Honshu................ . ... . .. . ..... , ........ .. .................... . ....................... 424 123 Landing Beaches, Roads, Railroads, and Critical Defiles, Kanto Plain .. 425 124 "Coronet," the Invasion of Honshu ............................................. '128 125 Japanese Ground Dispositions on Honshu, 18 August '945 ........ .... .. 429 126 Allied Landings, August '942 to August T945 ................... .. ........ -432 127 Third Fleet Pre·Invasion Operations against Japan .......................... 434 128 "Blacklist " Organization of Forces ................................. . ..... ...... -438 129 Basic Plan for the Occupation of Japan ......... .... . .. .. . ..... .. ..... ........ -439 130 Aerial Bombardment of Japan ....... .. ...... .. ..................................... 443 .'3' Organization of Ground Forces for the Occupation of Japan Proper ....... '15' '32 Surrender Document .... .. ...... .. .................................. . .. .. .. ... ........ 456 '33 Japanese Surrender throughout the Pacific ...... ................................ 462 '34 Japanese Strength Overseas, August '945 .................. .... ........... . .... 463 xv
SOUT H rt:iQll' \\o,,, " CHINA PLATE NO. I 10 IJI.HMI IS L E G END OGASAWARA GROUP (80MIN IS) "AUG' ATTACKS JAPANESE CONQUERED TERRITORY WHICH ISOLATED GENERAL MACARTHUR'S FORCES MAR I ~N'IS IS ... HoI-U....", I '/lOOt-ElI.! •• I!AU.. 1$ P.J 'I""\I1\ IS ·,~O$ . P I A SENV4VIII I~ JA" CORAL SEA U.'OU AHI' The Japanese Conquests which Isolated General MacArthur's Forces In the Philippines
CHAPTER I THE JAPANESE OFFENSNE IN THE PACIFIC Pearl Harbor The devastating attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 D ecember 1941 ' and the subsequent Japanese thrusts in Asia left only one important obstacle in the path of the Japanese onslaught III the Southwest Pacific-General MacArthur and his small forces, isolated in the Philippines. (Plate N o. I) Their tenacious defense against tremendous odds completely upset the Japanese military timetable and enabled the Allies to gain precious months for the organization of the defense of Australia and the vital eastern areas of the Southwest Pacific. Their desperate stand on Bataan and Corregidor became the universal symbol of resistance against the Japanese and an Illspiration for the Filipinos to carry on the struggle until the Allied forces should fight their way back from New Guinea and Australia, liberate the Philippines, and then press on to the Japanese homeland itself.' By the end of November 194 I the Japanese had completed their over-all preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The Japanese Combined Fleet was directed to attack the naval forces of those nations and to combine with the Japanese Army and Air Force in a manypronged offensive against Allied territories. The target date for the commencement of operations was 8 December 1941, East Longitude Time.' Japanese Strategic Objectives Japan's ultimate aim was complete hegemony in Asia and unchallenged supremacy in the western Pacific. Her strategic objectives were the subjugation of the Philippines and the capture of the immense natural resources of the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. The conquest of the Philippines became an immediate military necessity. The Islands represented America's single hope of effective resistance in Southeast Asia, and, given the time and resources, General MacArthur would r Unless otherwise indicated, hours and dates used throughout this volume refer to the local time of the specific area under discussion. 2 The Japanese themselves realized the important effect of the protracted resistance in the Philippines. H Politically it stood as a symbol [0 the Filipinos and encouraged them to coritinue their resistance even after the fall of Corregidor," said Maj. Moriya Wada of the Fourteenth Army Staff. Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, Intelligence Staff, Fourteenth Army, expressed the same opinion: U There was an influence, a spiritual influence, exerted by the American resistance on Bataan. Not only did the Japanese at home worry about the length of the period of American resistance on Bataan, but it served as a symbol to the Filipinos that the Americans had not deserted them and would continue to try to assist them." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ. FEe. 3 NaY1 Operation Plan, and Orders. '94'-'944. RecoY<red from CA NACHI. ATIS, G-2. GHQ. SWPA, Limited Distribution Translation No. 39. Part VIII. 1
accomplish his long-range plan of making the islands impregnable.' He once called the Philippines "the key that unlocks the door to the Pacific." The Japanese understood this completely, for the islands lay directly athwart their path of future ago gresslOn. Close to South China and the island stronghold of Formosa, they were not only an obstacle to Japan's international ambitions, but they could be made into a powerful strategic springboard for their drive south and eastward. Flanking the vital sea routes to the south, they were the hub of the transportation system to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific; from the Philippines, lines of communication radiated to Java, Malaya, Borneo, and New Guinea. Economically too, they were necessary to Japan's grandiose scheme of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As a thriving democracy, the Philippines were a living symbol of American political success in Asia and a direct negation of the national and moral principles represented by Japan. The Japanese were convinced that the PhilIppines must be con'luered. The abundant supply of oil, rubber, and other essential products in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya which Japan needed for her vast war machine was another lucrative ptlze. The Japanese planned to isolate this region by destroying Allied naval power in the Pacific and Far Eastern waters, thus severing British and American lines of communication with the Orient. The unsupported garrisons of the Far East would then be overwhelmed and the areas marked for con'luest 'luickly seized. . Air attacks launched from progressively advanced airfields would prepare the way for amphibious assaults. The first major operations would be directed against the Philippines and Malaya, with the invasion of British Borneo following as soon as possible. In the early stages of these campaigns, other striking forces were to seize objectives in Celebes, Dutch Borneo, and southern Sumatra, enabling the forward concentration of aircraft to support the invasion of Java. Afrer the fall of Singapore, northern Sumatra would be occupied; operations would also be carried out against Burma at an appropriate time to cut the Allied supply routes to China. Singapore, Soerabaja, and Manila were expected to become major bases.' The Japanese also planned to capture other strategic areas where they could establish advance posts and raise an outer barrier against an Allied counteroffensive. Their scheme of con'luest envisaged control of the Aleutians, Midway, Fiji and Samoa, New Britain, eastern New Guinea, points in the 4 Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe. Deputy Chief ' of the Army General Staff, stated that an important factor in Japan's decision to go to war and (0 invade the Philippines was the fear on the part of the Japanese General Staff of General MacArthur's ten-year plan for the defense of ..he Philippines . The plan was in its sixth year and a potential menace to Japan's ambitions. The Japanese had to intervene before it was too late. Lt . Gen. Alc.ira Mutc, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, voiced virtually the same opinion; II General MacArthur's program among the Filipinos was a potential obstacle to the Japanese plan of expansion in Asia . .. . If the Philippines were fortified and the defense strengthened by additional troops. Japan could not have undertaken war with the United States." Lt. Col. Hikaru Haba. Intelligence Staff. Fourteenth Army, laid : II If there had been 50,000 additional men in the Philippines, and had the defenses been completed, we would have had to reconsider carefully the consequences of going to war." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEe. 5 Na'7 Op",a'ion Plan, and Ordm, 1941-'944, R«o..r,d from CA NACHI, ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Limited Distribution Translation No. 39. Pan VIII. 2
Australian area, and the Andarnan Islands in the Bay of Bengal. All these would be seized or neutralized when operational conditions permitted.' If the offensive succeeded, the United States would be forced back to Pearl Harbor, the British to India, and China's life line would be cut. With this eminently favorable strategic situation and control of the raw materials which they required, the Japanese felt they would be in a position to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion and to realize their ambition to dominate the Far East. Initial American Dispositions Japan's war potential, her probable action and plans of invasion had been brilliantly anticipated many years before by Homer Lea in his amazing book, The Valor of Ignorance, published in 1911.' Although this extraordi· nary publication had created a sensation among the general staffs of the world, the growing Japanese menace was not fully appreciated. Among the few, General MacArthur had clearly recognized the danger signals. His long and close association with the Philippines and the Orient had given him a rich background of knowledge and experience with 6 Ibid. which to judge the situation in the Far East. His grasp of the Japanese character and psychology and his understanding of]apanese military policy and aggressive intentions had induced him to voice repeated warnings of the shape of things to come. In a desperate race against time, he had attempted to stem the tide by initiating preparations for the defense of the Philippines. Working against almost insuperable political and administrative obstacles, he had commenced in 1935 to create a modem Philippine Army of ten divisions to counter the Japanese attack that he knew would soon come from the north, swiftly, fiercely, and without warning. As the signs of impending conflict became unmistakably clear, General MacArthur prepared his meager forces in the Philippines for the inevitable storm. He grouped them into three principal commands, the Northern Luzon Force, the Southern Luzon Force, and the Visayan-Mindanao Force. The major unit was assigned to northern Luzon, for General MacArthur expected the principal enemy attack to be launched at the entrance to the great Central Plain, the natural corridor from Lingayen Gulf to Manila' The forces at General MacArthur's disposal included reguiar United States Army 7 Homer Lea's accurate forecast of the basic strategy which the Japanese would usc: in their invasion of the Philippines reads : "As the conquest of Cuba wa~ accomplished by ianding forces distant from any fortified port, 50 will the Philippines fall. Lingayen Gulf on the north coast of Luzon, or Palillo Bight on the east coast, will form the Guantanamo Bays of the Japanese . ... Japan , by landing simultaneously one coiumn of twenty thousand men at Dagupan and another column of the same si ze at Polillo Bight, would , strategically, render the American position untenable . These points of debarkation are almost equidistant from Manila, and are connected with it by military roads, while a railroad also connects Dagupan with the capital. The impossibility of defending Manila with the force now stationed on the islands is seen in the strategic advantages inherent in Japan's convergent attack. These two columns, more than double the strength of the American force, converge on Manila at right angles .... If the American forces, on the other hand, should remain behind their lines at Manila, they would , in two weeks after the declaration of war , be surrounded bv overwhelming numbers. The lines about Manila, as was demonstrated during the Spanish-American War, are incapable of prolonged defense. An aggressive enemy in control of the surrounding country can render them untenable in a short period. of time." (Harper's 1942 edition ) pp. 174-176. 8 This strategy followed in general War Plan Orange III which envisaged holding the entrance to Manila Bay. 3
units, regiments of the Philippine Scouts whIch were a part of the Army of the United States, the Philippine Army, and the Philippine Constabulary units. From I September 1941, orders were progressively issued to various units of the Philippine Army calling them to active duty. The over-all command was designated the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) which had been created by the War Department on 26 July 1941. The air arm of USAFFE, designated the Far East Air Force (FEAF), was headed by Maj. Gen. Lewis R. Brereton. The Japanese operations which plunged the United States into total war occurred in rapid sequence and were well timed. The surprise attacks against Pearl Harbor and the Philippines were followed at once by the invasion of Malaya, the seizure of Guam, and the capture of other Amertcan and British areas in the Pacific and the Far East. When the first blows fell, Nazi Germany, Japan' s ally, had aiready conquered most of Europe. The German armies were deep in Russia on a broad front, and in the Middle East Rommel' s armored divisions were attacking the British troops defending Egypt. General MacArthur recommended that the Soviet Union strike Japan from the north. Such pressure, he felt , supplemented by United States air concentrations in Siberia, would limi t the range of Japan' s striking power, counter her initial successes, and gain time to strengthen the Philippines and the N etherlands East Indies. .He believed it would throw Japan from the offensive to the defensive and that it would save the enormous outlay in blood, money, and effort necessary to regain lost ground. The Soviet Union, however, did not elect to engage in hostilities with Japan, and the British were unable to supply the reinforcements needed to protect their outposts in the Far East. The burden of stopping the Japanese rested largely upon the Allied forces already in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region and such additional strengrh as the United States could provide.' Allied Strategy after Pearl Harbor The United States was not prepared for war, and the effort which could be exerted against the Japanese was immediately and sharply linxited by the global strategy adopted. President Roosevelt and Prinxe Minister Churchill, in a Washington conference after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, confirmed a previous decision to concentrate first on the defeat of Germany. ,. Until victory was won in Europe, operations in the Pacific would be directed toward containing the Japanese and maintaining pressure upon them by conducting such offensive action as was possible with the linxited resources available." The prospects for the Allies in the Pacific were highly discouraging. Eight battleships of the United States Pacific Fleet had been sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor. Two days later the British battleship, Prince of Wales, and the battle cruiser, Repulse, were sent to the bottom off the east coast ofMalaya. There remained in Netherlands East Indies waters some United State" Dutch and British cruisers, destroyers and submarines, but Japa9 Militacy Intelligence Division (MID), War Department (WD), The World at War, 19J!r1944 (Washington, 1945 ), pp. '''9-"0 . 10 The general plan to support the Atlantic Theater was previously crystallized in the Anglo-American staff conferences that had begun in Washington in the spring of 1941II Ibid pp. 105-107. Prime Minister Curtin, Ltr to CINCSWPA, 30 May 42, AG GHQ 38" Aust Req B SWPA, (MS). 4
- PLATE NO. 2 JAPANESE ORDER OF SATILE ARMV GROUND FO~CES T.oopo ""d.t dl...,t Iv"", Comm""! A"my Lin. of Commll'l'c.ni"tI T.QopI Shipping Un,1s IIlh Oi.i.i"ft !U, OJ.i,ic," ! EI'mOfl'lit! 16th Diy,.;"" f6th DiY/lion , 1i1.m.,,1t I 21.1 0,..1,,011 IEI.m.ntH ,6th OJ'';,;on EI,,...IIII ) 6'111 (1"9.01. R.pltc,,,.,nh , I... 16th Di.. (;. 6'11, B,;, 1. ARMY AIR FORCES lth Ai, 6.oup bOIl. 1-1..., Bomb.. Rf'91 blncl 1-1••...,. Bomb.. R'lIt &Ilih 1".1. Fi\lM., 5"... 01._ El.""nh 2201 Ai. B.ig.d. HQ Tabl 1,01f 1&,11117 10,9.,0 9.330 10.9" 2,bb7 IA,07' ),622 3,930 ",obl _,'00 b,blQ ~ tll1, lI]S IO,n8 ." '" " .. Milc.U.n,...,. S., .. i~. EI."...nb 61' 3. NAVY Third FI •• t Ai, Fore•• Spec;,) N.y.1 l ...ding Troop. M"n B"dy, South.,n Noy,l FOfCt 3d Soulh"n "_peciil;"....., FI..I Tol.1 n ,Jn 21 ,8116 10,0611 I,U6 7,nl 3,118' ~ 19',939 Source: Japtnese F;rf~ (;. Second Oemobiliution Bur.fllii. FROM PALAU .' ItAW IO ., Ut.uo IS The Japanese Invasion of the Philippines and the Forces Employed
nese naval supremacy was temporarily assured. The enemy already possessed overwhelming superiority in air and ground forces available at well.developed bases extending from French Indo·China to Formosa and the Mandated Islands. The principal obstacles to Japanese expan· sion in Southeast Asia were the United States and Filipino forces under the command of General MacArthur in the Philippines, the British Imperial III Corps defending Singapore, and the concentration of Dutch forces in Java. Without substantial reinforce· ment these forces were not capable of more than delaying action." The Attack against the Philippines The Japanese strike against the Philippines on 8 December was anticipated by General MacArthur several days in advance. On 4 December his pursuit interceptor planes began night patrols. Each night, they located 12 MID, WD, op. cit., pp. 109-110. hostile Japanese bombers from twenty to fifty miles out at sea, but the enemy planes turned . back before actual contact was made. The last of these night flights was intercepted and turned back at the exact time of the attack on Pearl Harbor." When the enemy attacked the Philippines in overwhelming strength, the relatively weak American air force of fewer than 150 planes suited to combat service was totally inade· quate to turn back the attackers." Enemy bombers were guided in by sympathizers or espionage agents located near military objectives. Complete reports on American airfields and troop dispositions, procured by an extensive espionage net just prior to hostilities, enabled the Japanese to concentrate their attacks accurately on the most important objectives. Serious damage was inflicted on American planes and airdrome installations in the central Luzon area. On 10 December the naval base at Cavite was heavily bombed, and simultaneously the Japanese began their ground 13 GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 23 Jan 42. There has been some speculation as to what might have happened if our bombers had duplicated these pre.hostilities Bighcs and attacked the Formosan airfields. The answer is that they would in all probability have run into a hornet's nest of 300.7°0 planes. See footnote 14. 14 In the scattered notes whi ch Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma wrote during the subsequent fighting on Sataan, the following statement is pertinent : " One of our greatest advantages is that we have complete control of the air ." (" General Homma's Notes During the Battie of Bataan ,") Interrogation Files, G- 2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.) Against the weak Far East Air Force the Japanese used 307 first· line army planes in the Philippine operation and 444 navy planes ( land-based and carrier)- a tO[al of 751 aircraft. Uapanese First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureau Reports, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.) The American air strength in the Philippines had been closely watch ed by the Japanese , and it figured heavily in their military calculations before Pearl Harbor. Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, formerly of the Navy General Staff, offered a significant opinion on this subject : II The Japanese through long experience learned that they must have a 3-1 ratio in the air to attain supremacy ; if General MacArthur had had an air force which exceeded 500 planes , Japan would never have been able to strike the Philippines." The statement of CoL Monjiro Akiyama, Organization and Order of Battle Department, Imperial General Headquaners, is also of interest : II In my opinion, the presence of a well-equipped air force in the Philippines would have had a great effect on the decision to attack Pearl Harbor and to begin a war with the United States." Important too, is the statement of Lt . Col. Tolcutaro Sato, Fourteenth Army S taff Operations: "We had estimated that there were 200 planes available to General MacArthur in the Philippines before the opening of hostilities . Had there been twice this amount, I doubt that it would have been possible to attack the Philippines successfully. Had General Mac· Arthur had this additional air power, the Japanese might not have been able to attack the Philippines at all, and possibly would have been unable to open hostilities elsewhere." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEe. 6
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