THE SS CORREGIDOR

THE LOSS OF THE SS CORREGIDOR A JOURNEY INTO THE FOG OF WAR Editor: Paul F. Whitman

THE LOSS OF THE SS CORREGIDOR A JOURNEY INTO THE FOG OF WAR CORREGIDOR HISTORIC SOCIETY FORUM 2009-2022

In the earlier years of the internet, text-based bulletin boards, “forums”, were wildly popular. Through the years a great many of them sunk with nary so much as a trace. Sometimes, they touched upon significant topics, only to be forgotten again when the next big fad, Facebook, came along. Meta, Facebook’s more ruthless successor, is now shepherding WokeWorld into a brave, new technological future of political propaganda and advertising. Bulletin Boards have ceased to compete, if they ever did. Anticipating my board’s ultimate irrelevance, I have created this “white paper” about the single most controversial issue that we at https://corregidor.proboards.com illuminated. Shortly after the commencement of America’s War in the Pacific, the S.S. Corregidor, an inter-island Philippine steamer between Manila and Cebu, hit a live mine and sunk in the mouth of Manila Bay. Best estimates (now) are that the loss of life exceeded a thousand souls. (In those days too, America did not count the deaths of its allies.) It happened, though, that one of those fatalities was an American citizen, which meant that American Law would be justified to examine the issue of his death. But that would never come to pass. The Officer who declined the request to turn the mine off, died in Japanese captivity. There was a war on, and the “fog of war” was taken advantage of. There were social and political implications between America and the Philippine Commonwealth arising from the disaster, but these were swept under history’s carpet in the interests of “National Interests.” I admit I started with a preconceived bias, asking myself whether, had it been to America’s advantage that everyone should know more of this incident, then why hadn’t we been told. Instead, a cover story was put out. Why was it, then that the incident sunk almost without trace, as did the S.S. Corregidor? Was it in the national interest that the ultimate truth not be known? Paul F. Whitman Editor

JOHN MOFFITT MAY 29, 2009 0016 HRS Most disasters are not caused by one event but by a chain of events. Break the chain and the disaster may not happen. It seems Col. Bunker was a link in this chain. The Captain of the SS Corregidor and Col. Bunker both made decisions to allow this disaster to happen. Before I read the Captain George Steiger diary, I had assumed that the ship captain was solely responsible. As for the Steiger diary itself, I think it is as credible as anything we will find including Bunker’s. Both officers worked together at the same time on Corregidor and even socialized together. What better way to get to know your boss than socially, especially if alcohol is involved. You will probably learn things you wish you did not know. At the start of the war I can see certain things being ‘overlooked’ as the brass would think they had much more important things to deal with at the time. It does not make it right, just understandable. Also, I don’t think we can fault anyone for being a “man of his times”. We always look at yesterday’s decisions with today’s biases. Hopefully we can understand the context in which they made decisions. Considering that, not deactivating mines for an approaching friendly ship seems inexcusable. Too bad Bunker’s detailed diary does not start until the month following this incident. That in itself seems a little strange in that people I know just do not abruptly start a diary. Writing is almost in their blood and they have done it for years. We will never know what Bunker wrote about the incident. (Col. Bunker did keep a diary for 1941, and fleetingly explains its loss. It is as if Col. Bunker’s 1941 diary carried a burden he preferred not to bear. – Ed.)

* * * * * * * * * * A SURVIVOR’S ACCOUNT OF THE SINKING (She would know nothing about Col. Bunker’s fateful decision) A TRAGIC CHRISTMAS By Jenara Regis Newman Sixty years ago on Dec. 16, Cebu, as well as other Visayan and Mindanao students studying in Manila filled the boat, the S.S. Corregidor, for their Christmas vacation. For these students, this vacation was different as it could turn out, as it did, to be a much longer vacation instead of a Christmas break. Already, the Philippines was at war, with the Japanese attacking some of her northern provinces after their attack on Pearl Harbor. In an article, Ret. Col. Manuel Segura wrote that Manila Bay was already filled with mines as early as August of that year. And most of the boats going in and out of Manila Bay had to be escorted by a military boat from Corregidor Island in order to pass through the mine field safely. But not this fateful night. The captain, who had been in and out of Manila for the previous months, decided to proceed without waiting for the escort. And then, shortly after midnight, wham! The boat had hit a mine and all hell broke loose within the ship. Among the passengers was Adelaida Pages. This is her story: I was studying in Philippine Women's College taking up P.E. I was still young and "innocent" in the manner of those days. Ignorante gyud. Innocente gyud kaayo. I had been booked in an airconditioned cabin along with my schoolmate Emma Pelaez, her brother Tristan and

Delfin Teves, a friend of my brother. I had gone to bed with my PE uniform on. The blast woke us up and Delfin was the first to get out of the boat. But when he went out the door, it slammed shut and would not open anymore. We were locked in! But the door had louvres and Tristan managed to break the slats and we managed to get out of the cabin and rushed to the upper deck where it was every man for himself. Tristan almost got shot by an American from whom he wanted to get his lifejacket for his sister and me. There were lifeboats but they were packed with people. By the time we got into one, the boat was sinking and we sank along with the boat. I sank, and I felt someone was tugging at me. I thought it was Emma. I did not realize it was the boat's sinking that pulled me down. When the sinking stopped, I struck for the surface. There were no signs of Emma or Tristan. I saw a pillow and tried to grab that, but it would not do as a lifesaver. I saw a barrel and tried to get on it but it kept rolling. Then I saw a raft and clambered aboard. When the raft was filled, other survivors had to cling to its sides. Soon, a searchlight announced the arrival of a PT boat. I took off my skirt and waved it so the rescuers could see us. The boat picked us up and brought us to Corregidor Island. I was amazed at what I saw. It was a very well equipped camp with a hospital. The works. While we waited for a launch to take us back to Manila, we were given blankets and served hot coffee. In Manila, Helena Benitez was waiting for me and I was taken into her home. Meanwhile, my father, learning of the incident, sent the family launch to pick me up and my brother Peping. Because of the mines, the launch docked in Batangas. To get there, Peping and I and Mario Paca walked part of the way, rode a carromata as far as it would take us, rode horses, and slept overnight in a nipa hut. The trip to Cebu took about two days, during which time Mario was seasick. We first docked in Bantayan before we proceeded to the city.

For me it was all one grand adventure. I was even enjoying myself! Later I was to learn that both Emma and Tristan perished in the accident, as did Delfin. So many young and bright people died in that accident. But it was only afterwards that I learned of the immensity of the tragedy. At the time of the sinking and afterwards, all that occupied me was to struggle to stay above water, to latch on to something solid, to get home. And home I was for Christmas, with lots of stories to tell. * * * * * * * * * * Excerpts from the Journal of Commodore Ramon A. Alcaraz (Note the part about the SS Corregidor being escorted by a PT boat and veering away toward the mines. Also, the ship was carrying not only passengers but war materiel) Source as at 2009, is no longer available: www.geocities.com/comralcaraz/dec1941.ppt “The approaches to Manila Bay west of Corregidor are mined. A narrow channel serves as entrance and exit to Manila Bay and one of the PT jobs is to guide those vessels not familiar with that channel”. “By night time, the tragedy was compounded by the sinking of SS Corregidor in our own defensive minefields guarding the entrance to Manila Bay west of Corregidor Fortress. SS Corregidor is one of the best among our inter-island commercial vessels with civilian and military personnel aboard bound for Visayas and Mindanao”. “Loaded also are Artillery pieces, equipment and supplies of the 101st FA, and other Vis-Min Units. From initial scant report I got from my Mistah Alano, ExO of Q-111 that participated in the rescue, he said the ship hit a mine and sunk so fast virtually all passengers went down

with the ship including her Captain. There were very few survivors. The mined area is under the responsibility of the Harbor Defense and PT RON 3. I should know more details about this tragedy after I talk with some of my comrades on duty then at PT RON 3”. “This 17 Dec 1941 entry has special although sad, significance to me personally. My late father, First LT Carlos G Agustin XC6 221 263 CE aboard the SS Corregidor”. “I also talked with Ens George Cox, CO PT 41 on duty when SS Corregidor sunk five days ago. He said PT 41 was leading the ill fated ship at the channel but suddenly, all at once, the SS Corregidor veered course towards the minefields and his efforts to stop her were to no avail. There was a loud explosion after hitting a mine, the ship sank so fast virtually all aboard went with her including the ship captain. There were very few survivors”. * * * * * * * * * * The SS Corregidor itself was constructed in England as a ferry in 1911 and later was commissioned into the Royal Navy to carry seaplanes. After WWI, she was sold back to her original owners and finally ended up in the Philippines.

CHAD HILL Apr 9, 2012 1102 HRS I read Bunker's diary ("Bunker's War") a year or two ago and thought it was a great piece of history. A couple of things struck me. First, the diary contained what I thought today would be considered sensitive, possibly classified, information. I was surprised that Bunker included it in case the diary was found by the Japanese. Second, I was surprised by his frequent critical opinions of other officers, both superior and subordinate, which would have caused him some trouble if the diary had been found by fellow Americans! John Gordon, in "Fighting for MacArthur" (p. 73-76), faintly implies that Bunker may bear some responsibility for the tragic sinking of the SS Corregidor with the loss of over 900 lives, mostly civilian, on the night of December 16-17, 1941 (there is no mention of it in the diary, which begins on January 3, 1942). The SS Corregidor, departing Manila Bay for the southern PI, was approaching La Monja when it struck a mine between Corregidor Island and Sisiman Cove, and quickly sank. According to Gordon: "Apparently the Navy was not informed of the ship's intention to depart Manila Bay that night. No word of SS Corregidor's intent to leave the Bay was passed to the Seaward Defense Command on Corregidor, where the Army's electrical mines were controlled. The gunboat Mindanao spotted SS Corregidor as she headed toward the entrance of the Bay. Since the ship had not been officially cleared to depart, the gunboat tried to force her to stop, but to no avail. "The ship's master, Apolinar Calvo, was an experienced captain who had already made trips through the tightly controlled entrance to the minefields... "Army observers on The Rock spotted her approaching the North Channel and preparing to turn into the lane through the minefield. There was

confusion at the Army's Seaward Defense Command headquarters on Corregidor. Some duty officers recommended that the Army's electrically controlled mines be switched to the "safe" setting. According to several accounts, Colonel Paul Bunker, the Seaward Defense Commander who controlled not only Corregidor's big guns but also the Army's mines, ordered that the mines remain active, having not received any word of the ship being cleared to leave the Bay. "The tragic sinking of SS Corregidor was never properly investigated...Apparently some Army officers unofficially told a reporter from a Manila newspaper that the mines were set to the safe position immediately after the explosion..." Some internet sources state that the SS Corregidor may have been sunk by a mine laid in early December by the Japanese sub I-124. * * * * * * * * * * JOE PATTERSON Apr 9, 2012 1137 HRS Hey Chad...Thanks for the follow up poop on that tragic sinking. Some of the stuff I have read in the past and also have seen earlier on this forum pertaining to the good Colonel's almost callous actions (whether the SS Corregidor was "cleared" or not, Colonel Bunker should have disabled the minefield. Yamamoto with his Task Force wasn't lurking outside the harbor entrance, poised for a dash into the Bay) and decisions in regard to that tragedy leaves me ‘cold’ in my view of this officer. He may very well have been an outstanding Coast Artillery Commander, braver than Sergeant York/Audie Murphy, etc, but his views concerning others, the USMC/Navy, Filipinos, personal comfort, RHIP, etc, just colors my opinion of the man to a large degree. Cheers. Postscript...The SS Corregidor was a larger vessel than I had imagined. Fine looking steamer. Too bad she had such a tragic end, plus such a large loss of life, especially civilian. Escaping the Japanese threat was a difficult enough ordeal without facing flawed, for whatever reason, decisions by the powers that be.

Bunker’s War Edited by Keith Barlow starts in January 1942 and contains nothing of the SS Corregidor incident which occurred in December 1941. Bunker’s 1941 diary was lost without prospect of recovery. .

CHAD HILL Apr 10, 2012 0432 HRS Thanks guys, my purpose was to retell history as it was and not to intentionally defame the reputation of a doubtless patriot who had his faults and made his mistakes, sometimes terrible ones. I recall that after Bunker hauled the colors down on 5/6/42 he cut out a piece of the flag before burning it and carried the piece with him until his death as a POW. Great link with lots of info, John. I noted that a Mr. Kerwin Ronquillo, who claimed to have lost three relatives on the SS Corregidor, wrote Steiger in 2005 that the ship was originally supposed to have an escort through the minefield. Captain Calvo, however, feared that his ship would be bombed by Japanese aircraft and decided to leave that night, ahead of schedule. According to Gordon, by coincidence that day the USN had changed their procedure by marking the Army's minefield channel with lighted buoys instead of posting a gunboat there, as they had done previously. I wonder if Calvo had expected to follow a gunboat thru the channel and when none showed up, he ran afoul of the buoys, not realizing their meaning. Howell's "The Battle for Corregidor" (p. 186) quotes Frank Jonelis, a LT in the 91st CAC(PS) Battery A and range officer at M Prime West, a fire control post. Battery A controlled off-shore mines, and at M Prime West vessel traffic was observed and plotted. When a vessel was spotted, Jonelis said: " We would notify our group commander's station which controlled lights, artillery and mines. The group commander was COL Paul D. Bunker. Next, we would notify COL Carl Engelhart at the casemate building in James Ravine. COL Engelhart was in technical command only. "...When M Prime West notified Group (COL Bunker's C-1 Command bunker) that a large ship was leaving Manila Harbor through our channel and requested permission to set all mines in channel on alert (meaning "safety"-CH), COL Bunker ordered "Leave them on contact" which would cause immediate explosion of the 400 lbs. H.E. when the mine tilted. Because of this the ship SS Corregidor, about 5000 tons, got tangled in the cenetary cables and almost instantly sank..."\

(Chart courtesy of Corregidor.org from The Moore Report)

JOHN MOFFITT Apr 10, 2012 0845 HRS With the exception of a couple paragraphs, everything I have read about Col. Bunker has come from his own words i.e., his diary in book form. I get the impression he was a good war-time officer but in my mind, the events of this night are hard to justify. Like everything else we try to investigate, unfortunately we will never know the whole story. Lt. Jonelis mentions that the M Prime West control station was informed of a ship “leaving Manila Harbor through our channel” (the North channel). This station has no view of ships coming toward them from Manila so I assume M Secondary East just above the North Shore Road near Battery James told them. M Prime West which is south of Battery Hanna still exists although the roof is heavily damaged. The direct viewing area of this station is north across to the southern tip of Bataan plus west and south into the South China Sea. M Secondary East could probably see the lights of Manila on a dark night. CHAD HILL Apr 10, 2012 1109 HRS John, I agree absolutely. The events of that night and Bunker's apparent role in them are most difficult to justify. Thank you for pointing out the location of M Prime West, south of Battery Hanna. I didn't know where it was. Now you've got me thinking... I've been trying for a couple hours to find the sunken location of the SS Corregidor. Seems like I bookmarked a shipwreck map from the web for Manila Bay/South China Sea when I was looking into the Casiana yacht thread, but cannot find it anymore. My maps from the 1980s do not show it, either. Can anyone enlighten me? Here's my point. Consider the minefield chart from above. The Army's two minefields went from Bataan-Corregidor and La Monja-Corregidor, with the Navy running the others. As you pointed out, M Prime West was south of Battery Hanna, on the extreme west coast of Corregidor. If LT Jonelis did indeed see the ship then perhaps it had somehow penetrated the Bataan-Corregidor minefield unscathed, and was headed towards the second minefield between La Monja-Corregidor (or even the Navy mines NW of La Monja). If we knew the location of the wreck it would confirm which minefield did the ship in. Furthermore, if by chance the wreck is somewhere between the two minefields, that could suggest the I-124 may have played a hand as some think. Just my $.02, and maybe I'm out of my paygrade.

John moffitt Apr 10, 2012 1244 HRS Hi Chad and Joe, Great photo there, I have not seen that before. In the past Joe and I had a little discussion about the SS Corregidor and Bunker's role in the sinking. I will repost this account that corroborates the text you posted that Bunker was aware of the ship coming toward Corregidor and refusing to deactivate the mines. This article (from another US officer’s diary who also served on Corregidor) says that Col. Bunker knew it was a civilian ship that departed from Manila and he refused to order the mines be de-activated. Regardless of the actions of the SS Corregidor’s captain, this disaster could have been prevented by Bunker. Text of the SS Corregidor sinking from “Captain George Steiger: A POW Diary” www.fsteiger.com/gsteipow.html “The Army and the Filipino skippers had long been butting heads. All the channels out of Manila Bay had been mined for many months. At this time, the mining was strictly up to date and operational. At 1 AM on 16 December, the SS Corregidor, carrying 760 refugees, attempted to go thru the mine field without asking clearance. This request would have been granted. The Lieutenant who was on watch in the mine casement, on sighting the SS Corregidor called his superior, who in turn, called the seaward defense commander, Col. Bunker, requesting information as to whether he should de-activate the contact mines in the channel. With a lifetime of experience with the Filipino, going back to the '98 Insurrection, Col. Bunker said "No!" My first knowledge of this affair came when my duty watch called me at 12:55 AM. The Corregidor had struck one of our mines and in the four or five minutes it took to reach my battery command post, the vessel had sunk. Approximately 500 lives were lost. The 260 or so who survived came on the Rock. Thereafter, we had no trouble with unauthorized Filipino boats attempting to traverse the channel”. Too bad we cannot read Col. Bunker's diary that predates the one used for the book. It would help to understand the reasons for his actions that night. Chad, many of the comments in the diary surprise me too.

JOHN MOFFITT Apr 10, 2012 1468 HRS Hi Chad, I think we are in the same boat here. Long ago I saw a map online that pointed out the location where the SS Corregidor sunk. I have no idea where the creator of the map got his information. Of course, no way can I find that map now to show you. (The sketch is compliments of Peter Parsons) One thing I do remember that seemed odd to me is that it showed the ship going down south of the Points in the area where the Navy contact mines were. I had always read that it was an Army mine that they struck (or even a Japanese submarine laid mine as you mentioned). I think you will be interested in the detailed sketch of the Corregidor Minefields in 1941. Note the locations of M’W and M’E. This is the only time I have ever seen M’W labeled anywhere.

WILL WALKER Apr 11, 2012 0921 HRS Dear Fots and other members I have a nice piece of information from a first hand account and eye witness of the sinking of the SS Corregidor. The excerpt I'm about to post was published in a book called "Life as an American Prisoner of War of the Japanese" by Charles Balaza. I highly recommend the book. Mr. Balaza served with Battery K, 59th Coast Artillery on Corregidor. Here is his remembrance of that night: Pg. 32 "One night after being relieved from unknown hours of duty (I don't remember if I fell asleep, or passed out from lack of it), my short rest was ended by one of my crew telling me that a ship had just struck a mine in our area. Due to the fact that it was our searchlight that controlled this area of entrance from the China Sea into Manila Bay, and part of the North Channel between Corregidor and Bataan, I was very concerned as to what happened. We never received any orders from our command post to stand by for action, or to illuminate the buoy markers for any vessel's safe passage through the minefield. I immediately gave orders to interlock with searchlight #3, which was already in action, helping the rescue operation. Just then our phone rang, it was our command post ordering us to illuminate the area where the ship had hit one of the mines. I told them our light was already in action and had the ship in sight. I was ordered to keep the light in action until further notice. I looked at the vessel, it had struck a mine near a little island called Monja. It was in a vertical position, with its bow looking up to the heavens of the dark sky, as if begging for mercy by some great unknown miracle to be spared from her dreadful fate. In a few short minutes, it disappeared into its murky, watery grave, making sounds like that of a coffee percolator from the bubbling water that was filling its insides. At that moment, I forgot about my loss of sleep and minor problems. Our problems were insignificant compared to the men, women, and children who were trapped in shark infested waters trying to survive. I felt very helpless until I realized that our searchlight played a very important part in the rescue.

Without our searchlight, the rescue mission would have been hampered by the darkness, making rescue operations more difficult in finding the people who were still alive. There was no moon, and the only light came from a few shining stars. Tired as we were, no one asked to be relieved from duty. We all stayed up until early dawn assisting in the rescue. Our concentration on rescuing the remaining survivors was soon broken when we heard what we though sounded like a flight of bombers. A dreadful fear spread among us, but no one suggested putting out the searchlight. We were committed to stay in action until further notice, and committed we stayed. To our joy, the noise that sounded like bombers was PT boats coming from Mariveles Naval Base in Bataan to assist in the rescue operations of the people who looked like little black specks in the distant waters. At about 4:30 or 5:00 AM we heard the sound of a fighter plane coming up from behind our position. It came up so quickly that it took us by surprise, and we all ducked for cover. The plane flew by without incident, so we thought it was our one and only plane going to help in the rescue. However, it banked right, and opened fire on Searchlight #3. I don't know why he didn't open up on us, we were perfect silhouette targets for him. As daylight broke, we secured our searchlights and could see PT boats circling the area looking for remaining survivors. After we couldn't help anymore, my crew and I passed out from exhaustion. I'm sure we weren't the only crew that had this problem. I was told that I even slept through a bombing that morning without flinching an eyebrow. I don't know the true reason why the captain of the SS Corregidor tried getting through the minefields without permission or searchlight assistance. On that dark night he nearly made it, only to strike a mine a short distance from the open sea." This is a very in-depth account of what the scene was like that night. This seems to be a very controversial issue, and I'm not sure that I've seen enough evidence (through my own personal research) to arrive at a complete conclusion as to how this happened. However, I do believe the information is out there somewhere. Hope this helps. Sincerely, WW

CHAD HILL Apr 11, 2012 1024 HRS That is an incredible map, John. I have not seen such detail about the Army minefields before. The legend notes there are 28 groups of 19 mines each (for a total of 532 mines). The mines are 100' apart with an "Effective distance or danger area 75' " and the 28 groups are 100' apart. The channel for safe passage is 600 yards wide through each field. What is even more remarkable is that on close inspection the electrical control cables for each mine group can be seen connecting to the casemate in James Ravine. I am curious as to the meaning of the phrases "Observation for channel mines necessary" and "Observation for other mines possible". I read somewhere that the Army had no control over the Navy mines since they were of the "contact" type. That being the case, the only safe passage for a vessel transiting from the South China Sea to Manila Bay would be through the 600-yard-wide channels between La Monja and Corregidor, and Bataan and Corregidor, where the vessel could be closely monitored in low visibility weather. I searched the web and my library for information on the location of the SS Corregidor's sinking and was quite surprised how little there is. Winslow's book "The Fleet the God's Forgot" says the ship hit a mine off Sisiman Bay. Some accounts of MTB-3's PT boats, which picked up 282 survivors (7 later died) leave the impression that the ship struck a mine in the North Channel. Gordon's book by far has the best account overall but says only that the ship exploded as it "moved through the lane in the direction of the tiny island of La Monja". I wonder if that would be the mine groups #16-21 in the chart? Searches on the web revealed almost nothing more until I came across excerpts from the Moore Report on - you guessed it- corregidor.org! Under the section "War Damage, Appendix E, Eyewitness Statements" dated 6 OCT 45 were brief statements by two officers from the 91st CA(PS): LTCOL Carl E. Englehart "On 8 December I was in the office of G-2, Philippine Department. Upon evacuation to Fort Mills I was appointed mine director principally because of my detailed knowledge of the new mine system. "Two mine fields had already been planted, one called Monja Field, consisting of three lines of nine groups each, a total of 500 mines. There was a smaller field in the North Channel..."

COL Joseph P. Kohn: "At 0002, 17 December, the SS Corregidor missed the gate in the MONJA MINEFIELD (capitals are mine-CH) and was sunk by our mines with the loss of about 500." The only info I've been able to find so far about the Japanese sub I-124 theory appears to stem from a 1983 book by the German author Jurgen Rohwer titled "Axis Submarine Successes 1939-45". It is reported the book claims the SS Corregidor was sunk by a Japanese mine planted near Corregidor by the I-124 on December 8th. The I-124 was later sunk off the coast of Darwin on January 21, 1942. * * * * * * * * * * LATE ENTRY!! P.S.- Will Walker, what a great post you made! I was typing and researching this one of my own and did not realize you had posted yours until I was done! This extra information you provided sure seems to strengthen the case for the ship going down in the Monja minefield. Nice job, good research.

PAUL WHITMAN Apr 11, 2012 1133 HRS The SS Corregidor issue is something that has always intrigued me, but even more so when John Moffitt raised some pertinent issues a while back. Capt. George Steiger The most extraordinary facts, in the sense they are the most direct, are contained in Captain George Steiger: A POW Diary. Here is the link: www.fsteiger.com/gsteipow.html His diary entry for 16 December 1041 reads: About this time, the troops went on field rations. Capt. Owen instructed the houseboys at the quarters to keep the bathtubs filled with water in case of fire. We later bathed in these tubs of water for two weeks, until the water became very insanitary, indeed!

The Army and the Filipino skippers had long been butting heads. All the channels out of Manila Bay had been mined for many months. At this time, the mining was strictly up to date and operational. At 1 AM on 16 December, the SS Corregidor, carrying 760 refugees, attempted to go thru the mine field without asking clearance. This request would have been granted. The Lieutenant who was on watch in the mine casement, on sighting the SS Corregidor called his superior, who in turn, called the seaward defence commander, Col. Bunker, requesting information as to whether he should de-activate the contact mines in the channel. With a lifetime of experience with the Filipino, going back to the '98 Insurrection, Col. Bunker said "No!" My first knowledge of this affair came when my duty watch called me at 12:55 AM. The Corregidor had struck one of our mines and in the four or five minutes it took to reach my battery command post, the vessel had sunk. Approximately 500 lives were lost. The 260 or so who survived came on the Rock. Thereafter, we had no trouble with unauthorized Filipino boats attempting to traverse the channel. PS With regard to the comment correctly raised by Chad Hill, ("Some internet sources state that the SS Corregidor may have been sunk by a mine laid in early December by the Japanese sub I-124.") I did pursue the Japanese sub articles, and came to the conclusion that the articles cannot be relied upon. Without referring to my (informal) notes, my recollection is that a series of subsequent articles referred to an earlier published article, and that no confidence in the speculation contained in the earlier published article is warranted. (It's sort of like citing Chariots of the Gods by Erich von Daniken as proof that time travelling astronauts built the pyramids.) The causative issue in the SS Corregidor sinking was - and in some places still is - a very sensitive factor in respect of US-Philippine relationships, and the story about the Japanese sub was a convenient misdirection serving U.S. interests during the early part of the war, and remained in play for some years thereafter. Ultimately, the official U.S. Navy Chronology of WWII did set the matter straight, quietly and authoritatively attributing the incident to an Army mine. Here's a good topic for some Foreign Policy Major to write a thesis, if ever there was one. I have discussed SS Corregidor with John Gordon, and I consider what he writes about the incident to be entirely reliable. The short of it is that, yes, some internet sources do blame a Japanese mine, and they are wrong. The man who was the direct and proximate cause, closer even to the cause than the ship's master, didn't survive the war, and his published diary conveniently does not contain any entries prior to 1 January 1942. (We are left with no alternative but to lament the loss of the 1941 Diary – Ed). Lest the original Steiger page disappear, there is a backup hosted at Corregidor.Org

JOHN EAKIN APRIL 11,2012 2025 HRS The SS Corregidor sank around Midnight December 16-17, 1941 which was a Tuesday-Wednesday night. According to the schedule included in post #21 above, the normal schedule for the SS Corregidor was to depart Manila on Tuesdays at 3 p.m. This would indicate that the ship was LATE in sailing rather than departing early to avoid being bombed. (Unless it took them 9 hours to cross the bay.) Granted, there's no way to know if this schedule was in effect at the time of the sinking, but does lend some credence to the story that the captain was deviating from the normal schedule. JOHN MOFFITT APRIL 11,2012 2120 HRS Paul and I have occasionally had an offline discussion about the SS Corregidor. Some of this discussion is new information for us. Will (Walker) that is very interesting. Mr. Balaza not only mentions seeing the ship sinking near La Monja Island but also confirms it by saying that Searchlight #3 was helping to

illuminate the rescue operation. Searchlight #3 is located on the south west side of Corregidor in Cheney Ravine. It has no view of the north-side Army minefields but can look directly toward La Monja Island. “There was no moon and the only light came from a few shining stars,” he says. An internet search confirms that the full moon in December of 1941 was on the 3rd. Two weeks later, when the ship sunk on the 17th, there would be no moon as he stated. Finally Mr. Balaza writes that the SS Corregidor almost made it to open sea which again would be near La Monja Island. Balanza’s multiple comments are quite specific, only the bit about the airplane turning right has me baffled. One more source makes a statement that also agrees with the sinking to be in the La Monja Island area and not north of Corregidor where some of the Army electrical mines were laid. Here is a comment from the journal of Commodore Ramon A. Alcaraz of the Philippine Navy. He was an officer on a Q-Boat that was operating in Manila Bay. Part of his December 1941 journal entry has the following text. “…the sinking of SS Corregidor in our own defensive minefields guarding the entrance to Manila Bay WEST of Corregidor Fortress”. Here is some more general information about the sinking of the SS Corregidor. Did you know that a US Navy PT boat was said to be guiding the ship through the mine fields at the time of the disaster? Obviously, I cannot say if this is true or not but the source is quite credible. Again, from the journal of Commodore Ramon A. Alcaraz: "I also talked with Ens George Cox, CO PT 41 on duty when SS Corregidor sunk five days ago. He said PT 41 was leading the ill-fated ship at the channel but suddenly, all at once, the SS Corregidor veered off course towards the minefields and his efforts to stop her were to no avail. There was a loud explosion after hitting a mine. The ship sank so fast virtually all aboard went with her including the ship captain. There were very few survivors". Factor in Chad Hill’s detailed information from different sources and we now have substantial evidence as to the probable location of the sinking of the SS Corregidor. Is it possible to be even more accurate than “in the area of La Monja Island”? Maybe there is a clue in the battery that Mr. Balaza was a member of. It was “K” Battery, 59th Coast Artillery. This battery manned Searchlight #1 at Battery Point. Their light illuminated the ship as it was sinking that night. SL #1 is 50 feet above sea level (from 1936, 5-ft contour interval map). To the west, Morrison Point (almost 200 ft above sea level) obstructs SL #1’s view of La Monja Island. For SL #1 to have been able to illuminate the sinking SS Corregidor, the ship must have been sinking north of La Monja Island.

There were two 600-yard-wide channels where ships could safely pass through the mine fields. From the information we have collected, the ship must have passed the north minefield’s channel unscathed. The second channel is between La Monja and Corregidor but this is out of view from SL #1. The ship may have deviated from taking the second (outer) channel and veered out to open sea. If the above statements are true, (there are suggestions later that they might not be – Ed) then it was not one of the Army’s mines that sunk the SS Corregidor. It would have been one of the Navy mines or SL #2 would not have been able to see it and play a part in the rescue. Getting through the first channel unscathed might have been a miracle but the ship’s luck soon ran out. One person who also had some luck that night would have been Col. Bunker. The ship passed his “activated” northern minefield and later struck a contact mine in which he has no control over. Was Col. Bunker NOT involved in the sinking of the SS Corregidor?

PAUL WHITMAN APRIL 11,2012 2233 HRS Of interest: “From Official Chronology of the US Navy" Dec 17, Wed. 1941 Pacific Philippine steamship Corregidor , crowded with about 1,200 passengers fleeing Manila for Mindanao, hits an Army mine off Corregidor and sinks with heavy loss of life. Motor torpedo boats PT-32, PT-34, and PT-35 pick up 282 survivors (196 by PT-32 alone) distributing them between Corregidor and the requisitioned French steamship Si-Kiang; seven of those rescued die of injuries suffered in the tragedy. Dr. Jurgen Rohwer, in his volume on Axis submarine successes, attributes the sinking to a mine laid by Japanese submarine I 124 on 8 December 1941 off Corregidor, P.I. Interestingly, Corregidor was formerly the British seaplane carrier HMS Engadine, which took part in the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Source: www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1941.html This item quotes "about 1200 passengers" and says there were 282 survivors. Do the math, and note that the newspapers announced nothing like those figures. One might also make inferences concerning the number of undocumented extra passengers, as the SS Corregidor is said to have departed early because of the Captain's concerns that it was already overloaded. The fear of getting bombed seems implausible. (Indeed, there was time to have a number of passengers sign a damage waiver of their rights with respect to the extra passengers, and the non-availability of lifebelts for all aboard. – Ed.) Straying even further off topic, hasn't History Chanel done enough Titanic specials? How about a ‘Ballard’ dive on the SS Corregidor? Or National Geographic sponsoring James Cameron? Where's a film producer when you need one? Haven't they ever heard of the tragedy of the MV Wilhelm Gustloff? I am suffering a Titanic overload! More seriously, one would have expected there to have been some official Army-Navy examination of the matter, probably classified secret, and probably still so, for no official document has ever escaped. Probably in the box next to the Ark of the Covenant. (Editor’s Note: The attribution by Dr. Jurgen Rohwer that the sinking was caused by a mine laid by Japanese submarine I 124 is later to be disproven.)

WILL WALKER APR 12, 2012 0137 HRS Very interesting information. This is a very fascinating topic that seems to have not been thoroughly looked at in years (until Mr. Gordon's recent book). I'm not sure who to pin the blame on, but I am reluctant to pin the blame entirely on Col. Bunker as well. We all know the degree of negativity that existed between the Army and Navy during this time. I have read Bunkers diary and studied it. The night of the sinking was not the only day/days that are not included in the Bunkers War book. There are several days missing throughout the siege and his imprisonment. Colonel Bunker was an Army officer of the "old school". There were many men that served under him that didn't like him. Many of the officers that served under him in the 59th were young men (most very capable officers) not too many years removed from West Point. One doesn't have to read very far in his diary to find out that these feelings were mutual. He was very critical of everybody. I just have a hard time wrapping my head around him intentionally letting this happen. PAUL WHITMAN APR 12, 2012 0927 HRS Yes, certainly until John Moffitt prompted me, the SS Corregidor incident was just one of those (many) unexplained things in my "To Do" list. It's a very touchy topic, but I do believe that Col. Bunker was not enamored with the Filipinos, which is my code-phrase for saying that he appears to be a man of fixed opinions and great prejudices, race being only one of them. I think you can see hints in what others are writing about him, noticing that they too are using oblique phrases. Trying to unravel Bunker's motives is a very indefinite science - I am no psychologist, but Steiger does bracket his story between two statements which suggest he (Steiger) wants us to consider the incident in a very specific light - that of an ongoing dispute with Filipino skippers who were ignoring Army minefield procedures, and their being taught a lesson to follow the Army rules. To allow a minefield to remain live when a watch officer in a position to turn off the mines requests the "off" order, is a pretty serious decision which one cannot take lightly. Killing over 900 people is a hell of a way to make the Filipino skippers respect your rules. My personal view is that, in a perfect world, had Bunker survived the war, then there should have been some form of a Board of Enquiry with a view to establishing whether Bunker should have been charged. Of course, the Philippines is not a perfect world, Bunker never survived to face the implications of his decision, there never was an enquiry, and the interests of the US were best served by not mentioning the entire incident.

The Army never denied the Navy conclusion that it was an Army mine, and they would have known for sure. In the interests of the war effort, no one said anything, and they let the great unwashed think it was a Japanese Sub. That is, my friends, another example of the Fog of War. The Uniform Code of Military Justice which operates currently, was written to create many offences in respect of conduct which, before the Code, would have been considered morally wrong but not criminal. I suspect that Bunker's conduct would have left him open under the UCMJ had it existed.* (I suppose that is one possible implication of the phrase "a man who is a product of his times", which I take to mean that what a man might be admired for in those times, he can face a war crimes charge today. But in 1941, do we have an authority to assist us? Don't we have any budding Herman Wouk's out there? Such is one of the attractions of history. (* I am told, but not authoritatively, that pre-UCMJ, the death of a non-combatant American citizen caused by the failure of a U.S. Army Officer to discharge his duties changes the equation. Frankly, I don’t know. - Ed)

PAUL WHITMAN APR 12, 2012 0137 HRS I am not quibbling with you on this, because what you say is quite valid. I had adopted another view of "early", more or less not considering as a factor what the advertised departure times might or might not have been. In my view, the Army had been attempting to establish a set of wartime rules for passages of craft in and out of Manila Bay, and one of those rules was that inter-island steamers were allocated a time slot to present themselves at a designated point to cross the minefields. Irrespective of the time that the skipper left the wharf, the S.S. Corregidor arrived at the physical point where the minefield transit procedures began to apply at a time earlier than that allocated for him. It was like arriving early at a gate that is scheduled to be opened for you in a few minutes, and being so foolhardy, reckless and impatient to barge on through that you throw caution to the wind and run at the gate. As to why the skipper was there before his appointed time, my surmise is that his ship was already so grossly overloaded, there was no point in staying as a potential target. So he left the wharf ahead of the published schedule in order to stop even more people from boarding, given that everyone was doing whatever they could to get out of Manila and back to the southern islands for the duration. Even if I am wrong on this aspect (always a probability) and the skipper did leave the wharf late, my view has it that he still arrived at the minefield entrance earlier than his allocated transit time. Thinking that the Army will turn off the minefield, he miscalculates, and runs at the gate. Col. Bunker is in a mood this night to show the recalcitrant Filipino Skippers who is boss. The rest, they say, is history. JOHN EAKIN APR 12, 2012 1001 HRS It really doesn't make any difference if he was early or late - the skipper knew he wasn't following procedures and Bunker knew what he was doing. It was a deadly game of chicken. There must have been precedent for what the skipper did and getting away with it, but I have trouble with the mindset that risks 1200 lives on a bet just like I do with the mindset that knowingly doesn't deactivate the mines - something that had been done in the past - just to make a point. Were there no lessor options available to Bunker - signals, radio, a round across the bow, etc - to indicate that the mines would not be deactivated? Was the tactical situation such that they couldn't deactivate the mines as they had done in the past? Was it even necessary for the mines to be routinely activated other than to show who was in charge?

JOHN MOFFITT APR 12, 2012 1001 HRS Are you guys dismissing the detailed eyewitness account of Mr. Balaza at Searchlight #1? Considering all the information presented in the posts above, what are your thoughts on where the SS Corregidor was sunk? (This 2012 query is best answered by a diagram prepared by Neil (“Snake”) Krumbeck, posted in 2021, but previewed here. Krumbeck has dived on SS Corregidor multiple times, thereby establishing absolutely its exact resting place. - Ed.)

JOHN EAKIN APR 12, 2012 2220 HRS You make a good argument that it was a Navy contact mine in the North minefield that actually sank the SS Corregidor. Could the right turn - directly toward the contact mines - indicate a rudder malfunction? PAUL WHITMAN APR 13, 2012 0158 HRS What intrigues me is that the Official Navy Chronology, a publication which can not be taken lightly, says that it was an Army mine, and the Army has never denied it. In order to make it the official record of the US Government, which is what the Official Chronology is, I postulate that the Navy knows more than we do, but for reasons of national interest, is not declassifying its sources. (The Navy keeps its WWII secrets close, even now. For example, no declassified maps of its tunnels under Malinta Hill have ever escaped captivity.) It's not unlike the sinking of the Lancastria, in which the official report has been exempted from the normal rules of release of WWII documents, and can only be released after 100 years. I don't think I will make it to 2042, so you young guys, keep an eye on t, will you? I suspect that the results of any investigation into this incident will NEVER be declassified. If there's someone out there who can make an FOI application, I'd encourage them. I am unaware of there even being a thesis, or scholarly article published on the issue. Most of what's out there is just media speculation, anniversary articles, human interest stories etc. As for blogging, I heard a wonderful put-down of blogs lately. "Blogs are just graffiti with punctuation."

WILL WALKER APR 13, 2012 0618 HRS You raise some very valid points EXO. I am not denying that Capt. Steiger's diary is anything but accurate. There's no question as to Col. Bunkers attitude toward Filipinos either. I'm just thinking there may be some details that still could possibly be fished out on this topic. I'm going to start digging. I also have a hand drawn map that is in Charles Balaza's book of the approximate area that he remembers it going down at. I'm going to scan it a little later on today and put in on here. WW TOM ARING APR 13, 2012 2249 HRS There are answers out there........ Maybe from Keith Barrow who edited Colonel Bunkers Diary? The following is copied from the Bunker thread from this site. The member’s name is gilbunker Re: COL. PAUL D. BUNKER'S CORREGIDOR REVISITED Reply #109 on Dec 23, 2009, 12:10pm » I am very impressed and totally excited to discover this informative site about Col. Paul Bunker and his book. There are other diaries written by the colonel that predate his last one. I have not yet had an opportunity to read them as they are owned by Paul D Bunker III who is actually a nephew of the Colonel. Paul mentions about his genealogical research of the Bunker family history and disappointment about losing the material. He did send information back to the Bunker Family Association for their records and eventual publication. Paul was elected the first president of the Bunker Family Association (BFA) in 1913 and the research of our family continues as we approach our centennial celebration. We celebrated our 93rd reunion (2006) by visiting West Point with an appropriate ceremony at the graves of Paul, his wife and son, Paul Jr. Descendents of the Colonel attended along with other members of the BFA. The museum had the flag remnant on display for us to gaze and ponder the heroic days on Corregidor. Paul and Paul Jr both graduated from The Point, Paul Sr in 1903, the same class as MacArthur, and they were on Corregidor together.

Paul's diary is a fascinating read and now you gentlemen have brought the book to life. For the Bunker Family Association, I thank you for adding your personal experiences to this epic. There is so much to read on these pages and I must now re-read the colonel's book. I shall also inform our membership about your efforts and the OMG photographs. I'm blown away. I would certainly like to shake hands with those who experienced the last days in Corregidor and felt the wrath of Japanese brutality in the POW camps. I was a mere lad of seven in 1942 when Paul lowered the flag but after reading the book would like to add some personal thoughts about this particular event Paul claims he saved a piece of the flag and sewed it under his arm patch, his secret till almost the end of his days. Knowing how the Japanese would react on finding the remnant, absolutely no one could be witness to the event including those who were there at the time the flag was lowered, and immediately retired to the flames. If he had needle and thread to hide the piece of red, surely he had a knife or razor blade to cut the piece. Just because those that attended the final ceremony didn't see the colonel save the small piece doesn't mean it didn't happen as Paul recorded it in his diary. He didn't want anyone to see it. Boy, would I ever like to walk the tunnels on Corregidor, please keep me informed of visits, maybe, just maybe...Merry Christmas and thanks for the great gift. Gil Read more: corregidor.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=talk&action=display&thread=403&page=6 #ixzz1rvpEWqAN

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