Targets on Call
Scheduled fires were requested daily through the
liaison officer. Concentration lasting from ten minutes to an hour were
fired in preparation for attacks on the day’s objectives. At night
illumination schedule usually called for one or two star shells every
few minutes until moonrise.
Targets of opportunity were worked all days. If we
picked them up, we asked for the fire and got it. Often the ship picked
them up. It was quite common to hear from the radio, “We see what
appears to be a gun position at so-and-so. May we fire?” The Navy’s
“may-we-fire” attitude was worth a million to us.
A good example of coordination on a target of
opportunity happened one night. The normal night schedule was in
progress, one ship firing star shells, the other on patrol. From the
light of a star shell, the Malinta OP observer picked up a long column
of heavily laden Japs coming out of the east entrance to Malinta Tunnel
and moving down toward the eastern tip of the island. The telephone
switchboard began to snap with business, SCR-300 radios began to talk
and SCR-284 generators began to whir.
In the first three minutes, four machine guns were
set to cover the column from head to tail, four 81mm. mortars were
likewise shifted, star-shell illumination was increased to continuous
lighting. All machine guns and mortars opened fire together. The initial
bursts caused heavy casualties and pinned the Japs down. Seven minutes
later, the destroyer on patrol had reached its firing position and had
fired the initial round for adjustment. For the next thirty minutes,
five-gun broadsides raked those monkeys from tip to tail. If any of the
150-odd Japs in that party lived through it, I don’t know how. Smooth
teamwork that night saved the lives of quite a few Doughboys who would
have to dig those Japs out of a hole the hard way later on. The Navy got
a “well done” from us for that one and we weren’t just being polite.
In addition to scheduled fire and targets of
opportunity, we had several special targets. The east entrance to the
main tunnel was a tricky one. While the 503d was working on their
Topside job, my 34th Infantry force held Malinta Hill. But there just
weren’t enough troops to maintain control of the east tunnel entrance at
night. At the same time, both Colonel George Jones, commanding officer
of the 503d “Rock Force,” and I wanted to stop this nightly business of
Japs bringing supplies out of the tunnel down to the east end of the
island. We knew exactly where the entrance was, but we were leery about
firing on it. It was right below our own men on the hill, but it
couldn’t be seen from there for adjustment. Firing from our verbal
descriptions wouldn’t do because it was hidden under heavy bushes and
hard to locate. Our patrols visited the area almost daily, so we had
several officers who had seen it. But there was no place on the island
from which they could adjust fire on the tunnel entrance. The Navy gave
us a simple solution by invitation. “Come out to the ship and show us,”
they said, so we did.
Colonel Jones, Lieutenant John Bierne, who had
patrolled the area, and I went out one afternoon. Bierne laid the fire
control cross-hairs right on the entrance. The fire of one gun was
adjusted and then the ship poured in a hundred more rounds of APC. Our
patrol the next morning reported the entrance closed. Our visit to the
destroyer not only accomplished an important mission, but fostered
mutual esteem and friendship which made for even better teamwork in the
future, if that were possible.
The coordination between the higher planning staffs
of the Army and Navy is excellent and produced first-rate results. I’d
like to see more opportunity for the men doing the
job to get together and work out details. Skippers of destroyers and
gunboats should have at least one conference with the staff of a landing
team before the show, and several more during the show if possible.
I have probably made the Corregidor operation sound
like a picnic. It wasn’t. The troopers took their share of casualties in
sweating out the extermination of six thousand Japs and there are
hundreds of stories to be told about it. It would, however, have cost
many times the price in blood if Air, Navy, and Ground Forces
coordination had not worked so magnificently. Anything we can do to
foster and improve our teamwork will always be of prime value in
finishing this war as cheaply as possible.
E. M. Postlethwait