The moore reporT
the campaign

Index for part c

A.    8-28 December 1941 Position in Readiness Period
B.    29 December 1941-14 January 1942-  Initial Aerial Bombardment Period,
C.    15 January-23 March, 1942  Cavite Artillery Bombardment Period,
D.    24 March-9 April 1942  Second Aerial Bombardment and Bataan Reduction Period
E.    10 April-6 May 1942  Final Bombardment and Assault Period




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A. Position in Readiness Period, 8-28 December 1941   ^

8 December

0340 For eight days all units on the fortified islands had been at battle stations, "prepared for any emergency." At this time I was. awakened by a telephone call from Lt. Rudolph J. Fabian, U.S.N., the officer in charge of the Navy Radio Intercept installation on Corregidor. He read me two messages just received which were as follows:

"Hostilities commenced with air raids on Pearl."
"Air Raids on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

Both messages were signed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief. I went at once with the Harbor Defense Command Post ("H" Station) where certain staff officers were assembling, and issued orders to accomplish the following:

Seaward Defense Commander, Antiaircraft Defense Commander, and Beach Defense Executive notified, with instructions added to double sea and air surveillance against a surprise dawn attack;

Similar orders sent to Commanding Officer, Fort Wint; Text of above messages transmitted to USAFFE Headquarters in Manila, through Chief of Staff, PCAC; All passes suspended until further orders; Morning boat to Manila cancelled; Ordnance officer to establish ammunition dumps; Surgeon to establish aid stations; Batteries "B", 92d CA (PS) and M-60th CA (AA) directed to prepare for immediate moves to Bataan and Manila respectively as per War Plans.

0602- Message received from USAFFE as follows:

"A state of war exists between the United States and Japan. Govern yourself accordingly." All echelons notified. The Navy promptly closed Manila Bay to all outbound traffic until further orders. During the morning many vessels of all types were entering the bay via the channel through the controlled mine field, always with coordination between the Inshore Patrol and the Seaward Defense.

1026- First Air Raid alarm of the war when a flight of seventeen enemy medium bombers was reported from direction of Neilson Airport. The flight turned off without coming within range.

1315- First firing at an enemy target. Three medium bombers passed within range East of Corregidor and Fort Hughes. Two AA gun batteries, D-6Oth (Denver) and I-59th (Indiana) opened fire severely damaging one plane.

That afternoon, the Navy concurred with the decision of the Harbor Defense Commander to extinguish the light houses on Corregidor, Fort Hughes, and Monja Island.

1915- After dark, Battery M-60th CA (Anti-aircraft Machine Guns) departed via harbor boat Mambukal for Manila to furnish local protection against low flying aircraft for the Port Area, oil storage, railroad yards, Nichols Field, and other important installations.

At the same time Battery "B", 92d CA, departed via harbor boat McConville for Cabcaben en-route to its field position in beach defense at Bagac on the West coast of Bataan to man 155-mm. guns.

2000- Report received from PCAC headquarters in Manila, of enemy air raids that morning on Baguio and at noon on Clark Field.

9 December

During the night there was an air raid alarm when enemy planes dropped bombs on the mainland South of Fort Frank but no targets were offered.

0300- Battery M-60th CA was in action in the port area of Manila during an air raid.

0310- Heavy explosions were heard from the East and the Harbor Defense Signal Station reported a large fire in the direction of Cavite, later learned to be the Nichols Field hangar.

During the day many commercial vessels entered the Harbor and numerous Naval vessels departed.

10 December

0700- Telephone report from USAFFE that about 20,000 enemy had landed at Aparri, extreme northern Luzon, under cover of aerial and naval bombardments.

1254- Message from Pier I, Manila stated Cavite and Nichols Field being heavily bombed; also vessels at anchor in Manila Harbor.

1306- Twenty-seven Japanese bombers, in three flights of nine each, flew out of the North Channel at high altitude, probably 30,000 feet. Our AA went into action but planes were out of range for most batteries.

Much shipping passing in and out of the bay. Fires seen near Cavite until midnight. Radio towers and buildings were clearly silhouetted.

11 December

1900- Exodus of merchant vessels continued, all under Navy supervision.

2105- Message picked up from KGEI, "Germany declares war on the United States," and a little later,

2145- "Italy declares war on the United States." Manila and Cavite bombed as usual about noon.

12 December

0444- Report from USAFFE of Japanese Naval forces off Pangasinan Province, headed south.

0750- Message from PCAC, "Landing in force at Vigan: small enemy forces are at Legaspi and Naga."

1015- Fort Wint and Olongapo attacked by six planes; one shot down by AA fire of C-9lst.

1050- Deck of Fort Drum cleared of peace time temporary barracks, thus permitting all around fire for Battery (Wilson. Ed) Marshall (except for cage mast).

1634- Message received from USAFFE announcing: "A state of war exists between the United States and Germany and Italy."

13 December

Starting with a 0600 raid on Manila and Nichols Field enemy bombers during the day attacked Fort Wint and Olongapo.

1246- A formation of seventeen enemy planes flew east to west, high over Corregidor but dropped no bombs. AA was in action and shot down one plane into North Channel near Cabcaben.

14 December

Harbor Defense Command Post ("H" Station) moved from topside to Lateral 2 in Malinta Tunnel. Enemy air activity increasing.

15 December

1230- Three enemy dive bombers attacked Fort Wint but were dispersed by AA fire.

An Insular Government vessel proceeded to Fortune Island (eight miles off the coast from Nasugbu) to extinguish the lighthouse there.

16 December

Daylight saving time effective midnight 16 December. General MacArthur authorized use of Corregidor light by Navy to facilitate entrance of submarines. The procedure agreed upon was as follows:

Corregidor light to be shown the first ten minutes of each one-half hour on a secret schedule to be furnished by the Navy for each entry. White light only to be shown and on a fixed specified azimuth. During passage of submarine through the controlled mine fields the mines were to be on "safe" and the marking buoys to be illuminated by seacoast searchlights. Action by Inshore Patrol and proper Harbor Defense stations to be coordinated for each passage.

The Navy maintained a "Control Ship" inside the bay near the entrance to the channel through the mine fields. (Please refer to page 194 for continuation.)

Cavite Navy Yard area destroyed much fuel oil besides radio towers, shops, and other installations.

Iba Airfield in Zambales Province was also bombed during this period.

The first Coast Artillery casualties of the war occurred in the bombing of Fort Wint on 21 December when several men were wounded.

The next day the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet ordered the complete mining (Navy contact) of the entrance to Subic Bay, to be completed by dark 23 December.

Cabcaben Airfield on Bataan was heavily bombed on the 22d while reports received from USAFFE indicated Japs were advancing southward in the Central Plain of Luzon as well as northward from Tayabas Province.

24 December

One submarine entered before daylight, to lie on the bottom during the day, replenish with torpedoes after dark and exit again before morning.

0200- Word was received that General MacArthur and family with USAFFE Headquarters, U.S. High Commissioner Sayre with his family and staff, and President Quezon with family and staff, would arrive on Corregidor that night.

1500 Eight Japanese bombers circled Mariveles and bombed the Vichy French ship, Sikiang, setting it on fire, then strafed Corregidor with heavy machine guns. (The Sikiang carried five million pounds of flour when sunk. Ed.)

1800- USAFFE telephoned directing immediate evacuation of Fort Wint. Message relayed to the Fort Commander, Colonel Boudreau by code radio.

In the next several hours there was a large influx of personnel as the above-mentioned official parties arrived, heavily augmented by Headquarters Philippine Department, Admiral Rockwell and Naval District staff, and about 900 officers and men constituting the first contingent of the 4th U.S. Marines. This regiment had recently arrived in the Philippines from duty in Shanghai. After the evacuation of Cavite and Olongapo Navy yards it was attached to the Army for tactical employment, and directed to proceed to Fort Mills. It was assigned by USAFFE to the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays and the regiment was given the mission of manning the beach defenses of Corregidor.

2205- Radio report received that the harbor boat Mambukal was sinking in Manila Bay after having been rammed in the dark by the auxiliary Mine Planter Neptune. No lives lost.

A friendly submarine entered the bay before midnight.

25 December

Much air activity over Manila Bay and Bataan. USAFFE set up Headquarters in the west end of Topside barracks

1815- Message received from Colonel Boudreau, Commanding Officer at Fort Wint: "All personnel evacuated with materiel as directed," which included 34 officers, 505 men, 2 (10-ton) tractors, 2 (155-mm) guns, 4 (3-in) AA guns with fire control equipment, ammunition for both caliber and 1 (60in) AA Searchlight. Remaining seacoast armament was rendered unserviceable prior to evacuation.

The AA battery above C9lst (Cebu) went into position at the Dinalupihan bottleneck covering withdrawal of ground forces into Bataan then moved to vicinity of Mariveles covering the new airfield there and joining the 2d Bn, 60th CA (AA). The 155-mm battery ("D" 92d) joined the artillery of the II Philippine Corps near Bagac as did also the Philippine Army personnel from Fort Wint.

After a few days at II Corps Headquarters, Colonel Boudreau rejoined the Harbor Defense and was assigned to command Fort Frank which position he held until the surrender.

2000- 1st Lt. C. J. Wimer, SC of the Air-warning Service arrived at Mine Wharf with an SCR271. This was later set up at Topside near the Signal Station and proved a valuable complement to the Antiaircraft Information Service of the 60th CA (AA).

All day there were many planes over Manila Bay, Bataan, and Cavite indicating that the Japanese had established air bases in Luzon.

All U.S. Mobile forces in Luzon were moving into the Bataan peninsula a final stand.

26 December

Manila Port Area and Mariveles Harbor were heavily bombed, with enemy planes threatening all day. Many smaller vessels from Manila took refuge under shelter of the guns of Corregidor.

27-28 December

The enemy continued bombing vessels in Manila Bay sinking or setting them on fire. After dark on the 28th the second contingent of the 4th U.S. Marines, under Col. S. L. Howard, USMC, arrived, making a total of about 125 officers and 1400 men. This regiment, supplemented by Coast Artillery troops [mostly from 92d CA (PS). Ed.] manning 75-mm and 155-mm guns took over the Beach Defenses of Corregidor.

The commercial steamer Don Jose bombed and burning was beached by the Navy off Hooker Point, Corregidor.


B. Initial Aerial Bombardment Period,  29 December 1941 - 14 January 1942   ^


29 December

1145- The first aerial attack on the fortified islands occurred with Corregidor as its objective. It was a major attack lasting from 1145 until 1415. A total of 81 medium bombers and 10 dive bombers constituted the attacking force which used 300 lb bombs, instead of the 50 lb previously used on Manila and the airfields. There were no friendly planes in the air. In fact, no friendly aviation participated in the defense of the fortified islands at any time during the operations against them.

The medium bombers approached in formations or twenty-seven, broke into smaller formations of nine, and in waves, made numerous lengthwise crossings of the island. Altitudes were about 18,000-20,000 feet.

First bombs hit the station hospital. Others hit AA gun batteries, Topside Cine, Officers Club, Topside and Middleside barracks, Topside water tank, Officers' quarters, 60th CA garage, ships in Corregidor Bay, and the Navy gasoline storage dump at the tail of the island. It is estimated that more than sixty tons of bombs were dropped on Corregidor during the attack.

Numerous fires were started as wooden structures and gasoline burned. Two observation planes (Phil. Army) at Kindley Field were also destroyed.

Power, water, and communication lines generally were disrupted. Meanwhile the ten dive bombers were strafing the batteries with machine gun fire.

All AA firing batteries at Fort Mills, Fort Hughes, and on the Southern tip of Bataan participated in the action and shot down thirteen enemy planes, nine medium bombers and four strafing planes. The effectiveness of our AA fire resulted in the enemy raising his bombing altitudes to about 28,000 feet.

Total casualties were twenty killed and about eighty wounded. After the All Clear sounded, USAFFE Headquarters moved to Lateral 3, Malinta Tunnel.

30 December

Headquarters, Philippine Department moved to Bataan. With the evacuation of Manila, Battery M-60th returned to Corregidor via Bataan and went into positions at Kindley Field.

1417- A formation of six enemy bombers hit Mariveles, burning the town. Our AA guns (2d Bn, 60th) shot down the leading plane and others immediately dispersed.

1630- In the late afternoon the Inaugural Ceremonies for the President of the Philippine Commonwealth were held outside the east portal to Malinta Tunnel. The oath of office was administered to Quezon by the Honorable Jose Abad Santos, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines after which the President made a brief inaugural address. This was followed by the reading of a message from the President of the United States by His Excellency, Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines.

The Vice President, the Honorable Sergio Osmeņa, was then sworn in by the Chief Justice after which Gen. Douglas MacArthur, USAFFE Commanding General, spoke briefly but impressively.

The National Anthems of the Philippines and the United States, respectively closed the program.

2100- That night approximately 700 Philippine Army Air Corps Cadets arrived from Bataan and were assigned to Beach Defense duty with the 4th U.S. Marines.

31 December

The Harbor Defense Commander issued an official Commendation to the "Officers and Men of the Antiaircraft Defense Command" for the performance of all elements of the command during the bombing raids on 29 December 1941. The Commendation stated further,

Of the many reports received at this headquarters, all have testified to the superior behavior of our antiaircraft personnel under heavy bombing attack. It is a proud record of soldierly action and a high caliber of discipline under fire which these officers and men have made in this first serious combat action of the war in the Harbor Defenses.

1 January 1942

0900- A Japanese fighter plane swooped low over Kindley Field. Battery M-60th CA (AA machine guns) opened fire (260 rds) and plane crashed near Navy boat in Manila Bay.

Enemy bombing concentrated on Bataan during the day, particularly Balanga and Cabcaben areas.

1900- The rear echelon of USAFFE arrived from Manila after destroying records, port area warehouses, and installations.

2 January

All Manila radio stations were silent as the Japanese moved in to occupy the city.

1246- After a quiet morning under a low ceiling of shifting clouds, Japanese bombers returned to the attack of Corregidor, dropping through the clouds, releasing bombs and disappearing into the clouds again. By 1430, fifty-four enemy planes were operating in the area of the defense.

The car barn at Topside was hit and burned with several casualties.

The B.C. Station of Battery L-6Oth (Lansing), on South Shore Road, received a direct hit, killing the battery commander, Capt. Alva L. Hamilton and three of his men. (155-mm Battery South was renamed Battery Hamilton in honor of Captain Hamilton. Ed.)

Other objectives bombed were the barracks, quarters, and batteries at Topside.

Total casualties for the day: thirteen killed, thirty wounded.

3-6 January

During this period a single photo plane circled the fortified islands each morning and there were daily bombings of Corregidor, starting during the noon hour and continuing until about 1430.

On the 3rd, sixty-five bombers hit Topside and Middleside concrete barracks, roads, and AA batteries.

A storage dump of chlorine gas tanks near Battery Way was also hit causing occupants of the Antiaircraft Command Post nearby to wear gas masks for some time. Principal targets on 4 January were the wharves, shops, and warehouses at Bottomside where all buildings were burned. Of the forty-two bombers participating in this three-hour raid, six were shot down. Several main telephone cables were cut but details worked all night so that by morning communications were re-established. This happened frequently.

Similarly when gun batteries were damaged, they were rarely put out of action more than a few hours. Antiaircraft Command Post moved from Battery Way to Lateral 9, Malinta Tunnel.

On 5 January there were several air raid alarms during the day. Bataan was bombed in the morning and Corregidor hit heavily for an hour, 1245-1345. A barge in Corregidor Bay was bombed and set on fire. It drifted ashore setting a quantity of diesel fuel oil on fire near the Post Power Plant. On this date the rations for the garrison were reduced to one-half the authorized allowance. Several frame quarters at Middleside and new Navy quarters at tail of the island were burned. Battery G-6Oth (Globe), shot down one plane over Mariveles in the morning raids while Corregidor batteries accounted for two more in the afternoon.

A muzzle burst from a defective AA round at Battery C-9lst (Cebu) killed four and wounded eight, including the battery commander, Captain Gulick. (Read the Combat History written by John Gulick)

6 January saw the fifth consecutive day of severe bombing of Corregidor. From bomb fragments assembled it appeared that 1000 lb bombs were being used, making craters 4050 feet across.

At Battery Geary (12-in Mortars) where the assigned personnel (Battery H-59th) had been constructing a bombproof shelter, thirty-four men took cover in the incompleted shelter. Unfortunately, a large bomb hit adjacent to the structure collapsing it on the occupants. Three were gotten out, injured and shocked, but the other thirty-one were lost.

President Quezon's yacht the Casiana was bombed and sunk in Corregidor Bay that day also.

The week's bombing disrupted water and power lines all over the island. Emergency power plants were installed in Malinta Tunnel and distributing points for water designated but pumps on the well were soon working again.

7-13 January

There ensued then a week without bombing during which all utility sections took advantage of the respite to repair power, water, and communication lines.

A recapitulation to date showed a total of 75 enemy planes downed by antiaircraft fire of the Harbor Defenses and the 20Oth and 515th AA Regiments.

As the electrically operated air raid sirens were unreliable, these were supplemented by suspended large caliber projectile caps for beating with an iron rod or hammer.

On 13 January a small Japanese vessel approached Ternate on the Cavite shore but retreated promptly when Fort Drum opened fire with a 3-in gun (Battery Hoyle. Ed.) installed that morning on the stern of the ship.

l4 January

1239- Two flights of bombers, nine each, returned to the attack, hitting Topside mainly. The lighthouse and surrounding buildings were damaged but the light could still be operated by kerosene lamp. There was a huge crater in front of the Post Telephone Switchboard room but sandbag protection prevented damage. Several vacant quarters were hit.

Four of the raiding planes were shot down.


C. Cavite Artillery Bombardment Period, 15 January-23 March, 1942   ^


15-25 January

This period witnessed a change in enemy tactics. He was seen, by our AAIS detail in Cavite Province, emplacing artillery in defiladed positions between the village of Sapang and Ternate on the bay shore. His air activity over the Harbor Defenses was restricted to observation only, while on the west coast of Bataan he landed detachments in rear of our lines.

26-30 January

This resulted in a request from our forces in Bataan for artillery fire on an enemy concentration on Longoskawayan Point which was answered at 1213 on the 26th by Battery Geary (12-in Mortars). Sixteen rounds of 700 lb, point detonating, instantaneous fuze, personnel shells were used and proved most effective. According to our observers on Pucot Hill, Bataan, some fragments flew 500 yards and a large fire was started. This was the first firing by major caliber coast artillery guns at an enemy since the Civil War.

The next morning, twenty-four more rounds were fired with another sixteen on the 29th.

G-3 Information Bulletin of 2 February 1942: A wounded Japanese prisoner, captured at Longoskawayan Point, during interrogation by G-2 HPD was asked: "What effect did the large artillery shell fire have on your force?" Answer: "We were terrified. We could not know where the big shells or bombs were coming from; they seemed to be falling from the sky. Before I was wounded, my head was going round and round, and I did not know what to do. Some of my companions jumped off the cliff to escape the terrible fire."

On 28 January, a friendly submarine entered between 0500 and 0600. The submarine lay on the bottom of the Bay during the day of the 28th, replenished with torpedoes after dark and exited safely.

On the morning of 29 January, three enemy bombers came over Corregidor but dropped propaganda leaflets instead of bombs. These were labeled "Ticket to Armistice" and urged Filipino soldiers to surrender themselves. Similar leaflets by the thousands were dropped over our lines in Bataan. To combat this, President Quezon issued a proclamation by radio from Corregidor designed to reassure the Filipino people and warn them against Japanese propaganda designed to lead them to believe a large group of Filipino leaders were disloyal to America.

Late in January, a 1.1-in quadruple mount, automatic weapon, formerly intended for the U.S.S Houston, was turned over to the Harbor Defenses by local authorities, together with several thousand rounds of ammunition. A special concrete base was constructed atop Malinta Hill on which the weapon was mounted and turned over to the Anti-aircraft Defense Command. No fire control director was available but each round of ammunition was tracer type.

This quadruple mount was in action a number of times particularly in the zone between the effective maximum and minimum ranges of .50~aliber machine guns and 3-in guns.

31 January - 5 February

As enemy activity in Cavite Province increased, it was decided to take their operations there under fire from Fort Frank. On 31 January, Battery Koehler (12-in Mortars), which had not been fired for several years and never at an enemy blasted 30 rounds at a Japanese concentration near Ternate as did also Battery Frank North (155-mm guns) 36 rounds.

Thereafter for many weeks some of the seacoast batteries which could fire on the south mainland were in action almost daily, especially those at Forts Frank, Drum and Hughes. Observation was very difficult from the fortified islands but Captain Ivey, 60th CA (AA), with a small party of enlisted men, using a walkie-talkie radio at an OP on the mainland, gave spotting data until his detail was attacked and driven out.

On the night of 3 February, a fleet of submarine arrived direct from Honolulu, bringing 2750 rounds of 3-in AA, mechanical fuze ammunition.

Previously only one AA gun battery B-6Oth (Boston) had been equipped with this type of ammunition which permitted them to reach Japanese bombers at 30,000 feet. Other batteries had only the powder-train fuzed ammunition reaching to about 24,000 feet. With the new acquisition, Battery C-6Oth (Chicago) was also equipped with the mechanical fuze type. The submarine loaded about $4,000,000 in gold bullion from the Philippine Treasury vault on Corregidor, departed that night and eventually reached Australia safely with its valuable cargo. (This episode is referred to in Ed Michaud’s Article)

About that time General MacArthur informed me that in event of the collapse of Bataan, it was his intention to bring the Philippine Division to Corregidor to be assigned to my command to strengthen the beach defense. When they would be ordered over would depend on the development of the situation on Bataan. He directed me to make plans for their employment, to select bivouac areas, and to plan for an extension of hospital facilities. He further directed that food sufficient for 20,000 on the basis then in effect (1/2 ration) should be held at Corregidor to last until 30 June 1942. At this time the ration strength was 11,000. He directed that supply of Corregidor stores to Bataan Forces should not reduce the food supply below that amount.

6 February

0812- First enemy artillery fire against the fortified islands fell on Forts Drum and Hughes and Corregidor shortly after 0800. The bombardment came from 105-mm batteries on the Cavite mainland and lasted until about 1100. The principal concentration was against Fort Drum which received approximately 100 hits without, however, impairing its main fighting strength.

Observation to locate enemy batteries was difficult as most observers were looking directly at the sun. Based on the best information obtainable, the enemy fire was returned during the day by Battery Roberts (6-in) at Fort Drum and Batteries Koehler and Frank North at Fort Frank. Results were unknown.

A muzzle burst at Battery Koehler killed one Scout soldier and wounded seven others and the battery commander, Capt. Robert J White,92d CA.

7 February -11 February

The next day, Fort Frank was also included in the enemy bombardment. In fact from that time onward there was the constant threat of artillery fire from the Cavite shore. Daily counter-battery action from the fortified islands, especially from Fort Frank, answered the enemy fire.

On 9 February, aerial photographs taken from a P40 equipped with camera combined with Captain Ivey's information, furnished good data for counter-battery fire. Our guns set an enemy barracks on fire and secured several hits on his battery positions.

Several naval vessels, such as gun boats and launches which had been anchored in the south harbor, were removed over near the Bataan shore to avoid shelling.

12 February

Two Japanese dive bombers flew over Battery "C" 91st (near Mariveles) and were both shot down by the battery's 3in guns.

Battery "D", 2d CA (Phil. Army), consisting of eighty-six men and four officers, was transferred from Bataan to Fort Frank and the personnel attached to Batteries "E" and "F", 91st CA.

13 February -18 February

Daily artillery duels continued between the Harbor Defense batteries and the enemy's Cavite artillery. A typical afternoon action was the following on 15 February:

1540- Enemy opened fire on Corregidor from Cavite. Shells hit the vicinity of south dock.

1552- Batteries Hearn, Hamilton, and Frank North opened counter battery.

1610- Enemy fire ceased.

1623- Captain Ivey (observer on Cavite mainland) reported salvos hit right in area of enemy gun flashes. He recommended 155's sweep the area. Battery Frank North starting to "sweep."

1628- Fort Frank under fire.

1635- Corregidor under fire.

1655- Enemy ceased fire.

1715- Fort Hughes under fire. Fort Frank fired counter-battery.

1745- Firing ceased.

1911- Fort Hughes again under harassing fire.

2108- Corregidor again under harassing fire.

2115- Firing ceased.

Late that afternoon Captain Ivey and his spotters were attacked by Japanese patrol and forced to withdraw. An American corporal was killed and a sergeant captured but the officer and two Philippine Scouts eventually returned to Fort Frank safely.

On 16 February, all fortified islands were shelled beginning with Fort Drum at 2403.

A "dud" at Middleside on Corregidor indicated the enemy then using his 15cm guns, approximately 6in caliber.

A Japanese raiding party from Nasugbu blew up the Fort Frank fresh water line below the Calumpan dam at 1540. Distillation plant put into immediate operation.

Batteries Hearn, Koehier and Frank North replied with counter-battery fire at intervals. Fort Frank also fired 75's at enemy groups sighted on trails on the mainland.

On 17 February was a repetition of previous artillery action. The enemy opened fire on Fort Drum at 0615, and again on Corregidor at 0854 switching to Fort Hughes at noon. Although sporadic, this harassing fire was nonetheless annoying.

On the 18th, Fort Frank bore the brunt of enemy shelling which lasted from 1420 on. At 2130 just after Battery Frank North ceased counter-battery fire, an enemy shell landed in the powder pit of No.4 gun wounding seven members of the crew who were cleaning the gun.

19 February

The enemy continued intermittent fire at Fort Frank during the night. Sometime after midnight the harbor boat Neptune approached the Fort Frank dock to deliver supplies but withdrew when a shell landed nearby. Later at about 0330 she again came in to dock. At that instant an. enemy shell hit her forward deck exploding fifteen drums of gasoline destined for Fort Frank and turning the ship into a blazing furnace. The crew jumped overboard and swam ashore but the ship and all supplies aboard were a total loss. Many grass fires were started on the island but all hands turned out and fires were soon extinguished.

After daylight Colonel Boudreau, commanding Fort Frank, sent a volunteer working party of fifteen men to Calumpan barrio on the mainland to repair the fresh water pipeline which had been blown up two days previously by the Japanese.

While they were working they were attacked but succeeded in killing twenty-five to thirty Japanese and got back to Fort Frank safely. One Philippine Scout was wounded in the arm. Colonel Boudreau assisted with 75mm fire from Frank. The working detail credited Pvt. James L. Elkins, 60th CA (AA) with most of the Japanese casualties.

The enemy retaliated by burning Calumpan and Patungan barrios that night.

20 February

From 0930 until late afternoon Corregidor, Fort Hughes and Fort Frank were under fire at one-minute intervals. Most shells at Corregidor fell at Bottomside. The Post Power Plant was hit but only slight damage resulted. Several observing stations at Fort Hughes were badly damaged.

Battery Woodruff (14in gun) at Fort Hughes joined Batteries Hearn and Frank North in counter battery for the first time;

After dark a friendly submarine exited carrying President Quezon and Vice President Osmena of the Philippine Commonwealth together with the private and official family of the President. The party landed safely in the Visayan islands from which point some weeks later they proceeded by PT boat to Mindanao and thence by air to Australia.

Also departing for the southern islands was the Don Esteban, an inter-island steamer, carrying lesser members of the Quezon party.

21 February

Quiet day by land, sea, and air. The Princessa, 5000 ton inter-islander, came in during the night from Cebu with food stuffs and other supplies, while the Legaspi departed for Iloilo on a similar mission.

22 February

The CO at Fort Hughes reported a newly constructed battery of two155-mm guns completed and ready for action. This was named Battery Williams, in honor of 1st Lt. George L. Williams, CAC, killed in action in Abucay, Bataan.

At noon experimental firing was conducted by Battery Craighill (12in mortars) using high angle fire and 700 lb projectile with AA fuze. No bursts were secured so project was abandoned.

23 February

Batteries Woodruff and Frank North fired on Japanese activities in Ternate and Maragondon on the Cavite mainland. After dark the American High Commissioner, Mr. Francis B. Sayre, departed with his family and staff via submarine. They arrived safely some days later at Perth, West Australia.

24 February-1 March

G2 reports and other indications suggested Japanese were marking time waiting for reinforcements. Native informers reported enemy improving trails to new gun positions in Pico del Oro Hill with forced Filipino labor.

Meanwhile a tunnel for the Seaward Defense Command Post, started in 1921 but discontinued on account of treaty agreements, was nearing completion.

Seacoast batteries during this period fired daily road interdiction at Ternate and Maragondon to harass Japanese communications.

At 1400, 26 February Colonel Boudreau at Fort Frank scattered a Japanese looting party in barrio Calumpan with 75mm shrapnel,

That same day word was received that the Don Esteban and Legaspi had reached Cebu safely but that the Florence D coming up from Australia was lost while the Don Isidro had been bombed and sunk in Port Darwin harbor.

All batteries took advantage of lull in enemy activity to improve positions and dig in deeper. On 1 March a Japanese dive bomber came within range of the 1.1 mount (on Malinta Hill) which opened fire driving it off.

2- March

On 2 March the ration was further reduced to three-eights of the normal allowance.

Two dive bombers raided Fort Frank but with little effect. An 8in gun, which had been brought over from Bataan, was mounted on a prepared concrete base near R.J. 43 east of Malinta Hill. It had a range of 24,000 yards and all around fire except to the west which was screened by Malinta Hill After proof firing by the Ordnance Department on 4 March it was ready for service but as no troops were available for assignment to it, it was never in action against the enemy. It had been anticipated that troops would be available from Bataan to man this battery.

One 155-mm gun which had been located near Battery Gillespie at Fort Hughes was disassembled, moved down through the Fort Hughes tunnel, reassembled, and emplaced to fire past Hooker Point, Corregidor, toward the east coast of Bataan. This gun was designated Battery Hooker.

The CO Fort Frank reported enemy artillery being moved up prepared trails toward Pico del Oro. Battery Koehler dropped several salvos of 12in mortar shells in the area. Just before dark on 4 March our four remaining P-40's, equipped with improvised bomb racks, took off from Cabcaben airfield and raided the Jap base in Subic Bay. They left three cargo vessels burning and sinking, damaged several others and started fires on the Olongapo dock and Grande Island, now occupied by the Japanese. Unfortunately one plane failed to return while two others overshot the field and cracked up when landing. The Japanese radio reported that a large number of B-17's from a secret base had made the raid.

About that time the CO Fort Frank transmitted to Harbor Defense Headquarters a propaganda message he had received from the Japanese through a Filipino civilian. This man had been discharged from the Philippine Scouts prior to the war on account of suspected Sakdalista (Philippine Communist) activities. Substance of the message was as follows:

Surrender Carabao and save lives; the whole area along coast line of Cavite Province is now a Japanese Military Reservation; large guns in large numbers are being massed there; Carabao will be reduced by our mighty artillery fire, likewise Drum; after reduction of Carabao and Drum our invincible artillery will pound Corregidor into submission, batter it, weaken it, preparatory to a final assault by crack Japanese landing troops. Be wise, surrender now and receive preferential Japanese treatment.

Other similar messages were received from time to time.

On the morning of 6 March one enemy plane flew over Forts Drum and Frank several times. Both opened fire and E91st (Ermita) at Fort Frank shot it down.

The next morning another light bomber observation ship was shot down by " C" 91st over their position on Bataan, making No.11 for that battery.

During this period there were almost daily firings of some batteries at enemy operations on the Cavite mainland such as working parties, patrols, observation posts, bridges, or important road junctions. Participating in these firings were Batteries Woodruff and Leach at Fort Hughes, Roberts and Hoyle at Fort Drum, and Koehler and Frank North at Fort Frank.

9 March

The CO Fort Frank considered conditions favorable for repair of his water line to Calumpan dam so he sent out an armed working party in the morning with that mission. A 75mm fire from Fort Frank on a Japanese trail in rear of the dam drove back an approaching enemy patrol of about twenty men. The working detail remained under cover until the enemy retreated then completed necessary repairs, connected the water, and returned to Fort Frank after a nine-hour absence.

For several weeks thereafter Fort Frank put down occasional bursts of 75-mm or .50 caliber machine gun fire in the vicinity of the dam to discourage enemy activity there.

10 March

A single photo plane made daily early morning flights over the fortified islands but well above the range of our automatic weapons.

On Corregidor the Engineers completed constructing reinforced concrete roofs over several beach defense 75mm guns for protection from dive bombing attacks. Other Engineer activities in the Harbor Defenses are covered in the Engineer Annex Exhibit "E".

11 March

After dark General MacArthur, with his family and staff, and Admiral Rockwell, with his 16th Naval District staff, departed via four navy PT (Patrol-torpedo) boats for Mindanao, from which point all flew to Australia four days later. About one week prior to departure he informed me of his orders to go. He told me that he had protested to the President but in spite of that he had been ordered to leave. He told me he was leaving Col. Lewis C. Beebe behind as his deputy Chief of Staff in charge of an advance CP at Corregidor. He was setting up four independent commands in the Philippines: the Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay, under my command the Luzon Force under Major General Wainwright; the Mindanao Force under Brigadier General Sharp; and the Visayan Force under Brigadier General Chynoweth. He told me the principal function of his staff he was leaving behind was to try to get supplies into Corregidor and Bataan. He cautioned me against allowing any encroachments to be made on the Harbor Defense supplies for the other forces in the command which would reduce the ration supply below the requirement of sufficient food for half rations for a force of 20,000 to last until 30 June 1942. He cautioned me that in case of the ultimate fall of Corregidor I was to make sure that the armament was destroyed to such an extent that it could not be used against an American effort to recapture the Philippines. General MacArthur's last instructions to me before departing were to hold Corregidor until he returned.

12 March

Seacoast batteries continued to blast suspected enemy activities in Cavite Province.

13 March

There were scattered reconnaissance flights over the fortified islands and Bataan during the day Battery Leach was in action against the Ternate area, and Fort Frank fired many rounds of 75mm shrapnel at enemy activities in Patungan and Looc Cove.

14 March

Several batteries fired at motor launches which came within range inside the bay. Among these were Batteries Kysor, Fuger, Hooker, and Leach. One boat or barge was sunk and another set on fire.

15 March

The enemy opened fire promptly at 0730 against Corregidor and Fort Frank, shifting to Fort Hughes at 0800, and Fort Drum at 0900. During the day Forts Frank and Drum received the brunt of the bombardment, each being under a heavy concentration of 240-mm howitzer fire for the first time. Shells falling on Corregidor and Fort Hughes were still of 105-mm or 15cm caliber About 5% were duds. At Fort Frank the heavy howitzer shells did much damage especially at Battery Frank North (155-mm) and Ermita (3-in AA). In each case two of the four guns were destroyed and the other two damaged but repairable. The cable hoist and derrick were put out of commission and one machine gun emplacement demolished Seven out of eight mortars at Battery Koehler were out of action temporarily. Other batteries received less punishment. Casualties were very few, although approximately 500 shells hit the island. Starting that night beach defense details were doubled. At Fort Drum one 240-mm shell penetrated the casemate shield at Battery Roberts disabling one gun temporarily. A fire was started but was extinguished before it reached the powder. Several men were burned and gassed by the fumes in the casemate. There were approximately 100 hits on Fort Drum.

16 March

General bombardment of the Harbor Defenses from the Cavite shore continued starting against Fort Drum at 0935.

Batteries Hearn, Woodruff, and Craighill engaged in counter-battery.

At Fort Frank a 240-mm shell hit at the junction of the vertical wall and emplacement floor at Battery Koehler, penetrated 18 inches of concrete, passed under a six foot concrete wall and exploded under the powder room. The floor was broken up and sixty cans of mortar powder overturned but none was set off.

17 March

Battery Koehler’s mortars were back in action, firing at enemy positions on mainland in Jamilo Cove.

Battery Marshall (14in turret) at Fort Drum opened fire on same target.

Forts Drum and Frank were both under enemy fire. Battery Craighill fired at enemy in Hestinga Valley.

18 March -20 March

Fort Frank 75-mm fired at Japanese patrols while Batteries Koehler, Hearn, and Craighill engaged in counter-battery. Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank were under enemy fire periodically.

21 March

In compliance with orders from the War Department, General Wainwright assumed command of the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) and established his headquarters on Corregidor. He made no change in the Harbor Defense Command as established and no change in the conduct of the defense.

Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank were again enemy targets with the latter receiving the heaviest concentration. Again several hundred 240-mm and 105-mm shells hit the island, principal targets being Batteries Koehler and Cofton and the dock area.

One round of 240-mm penetrated a tunnel roof at an "L" causing damage in two directions. Many men were lined up in the tunnel awaiting inoculations at the nearby dispensary when the shell hit. Twenty-eight were killed and forty-six wounded of whom several died later. A barge was sent to Fort Frank that night to bring the wounded to Malinta Hospital and the dead to Corregidor for burial.

22 March -23 March

Batteries Hearn, Craighill, Marshall (Wilson. Ed.), and Koehler fired at various targets in Cavite Province.

Nightly details of 3 officers and 150 men were loading out barges of supplies to Bataan.


D. Second Aerial Bombardment and Bataan Reduction Period 24 March-9 April 1942   ^


24 March

0707- Batteries Woodruff, Marshall, and Koehier opened fire on Cavite targets.

0924- Air Raid Alarm No.77 sounded.

0925- Nine heavy bombers, a new type in the area bombed Middleside and Morrison Hill.

0945- Twenty-seven heavy bombers came in over tail of Corregidor (Hooker Point) and bombed Middleside, closely followed by seventeen heavies bombing Topside

0950- Twenty-five planes followed by nine more made another attack. Meanwhile, artillery shells from enemy batteries in Cavite were bursting on Corregidor. Several fires were started, communication cables and water mains cut, and an ammunition dump of 75mm shells on Morrison Hill was set off. These shells were exploding for hours. Battery Wheeler had a direct bomb hit on the racer of No.1 gun putting it out of action temporarily.

1110- All clear sounded.

1435- Air Raid Alarm No.78. Nine heavy bombers approached Corregidor from SE. Bombs dropped on Kindley Field.

1438- Seven more planes from SE with more bombs. Shelling from mainland also.

1529- All clear.

1552- Air Raid Alarm No.79. Nine heavy bombers hit Kindley Field again.

1620- All Clear.

1640- Air Raid Alarm No.80. Mariveles and Cabcaben areas hit by nine heavies.

1703- All Clear.

2053- Air Raid Alarm No.81.

2115- First night air raid. Two medium bombers dropped incendiary bombs in Cheney Ravine, Corregidor. Later returned and bombed Bottomside. No damage reported.

2234- All Clear. Bombs dropped during the day's raids were of heavier type than formerly, estimated as some 1100 lbs, 500 lbs, and none (except incendiary) less than 200 lbs.

Six enemy planes were shot down. Others believed severely damaged, were also probably lost to the enemy. The new bombers used were similar in appearance to the old medium bomber No.97, but appeared to be faster and were reported by observers to have a "turret in the tail." Altitudes for the heavy bombers varied from 21,000-30,000 feet.

There were very few casualties and damage to materiel was soon repaired.

The above account was extracted from records of the day preserved by staff officers who were present. It is given in some detail inasmuch as it marked the heavy reinforcement of Japanese air in Luzon and the beginning of the enemy's final offensive operations against Bataan and the fortified islands.

25 March

Another day similar to the preceding.

0630- Batteries Craighill, Woodruff, and Koehler got an early start against enemy on Cavite mainland. Lack of accurate observation prevented the most effective adjustment of fire.

0910- Nine planes from south heavily bombed 92d CA garage, barracks, and officers quarters. All wooden buildings burned.

1020- Five bombers flew east over Corregidor bombing top of Malinta Hill. One downed smoking and one motor shot out of another.

1125- String of bombs from nine of No.97's hit both portals of Malinta Tunnel and top Malinta Hill. Bottomside Cine, the Post Exchange, and Post Bakery were burned.

1129- Artillery fire fell on Topside.

1225- Nine planes approached from east.

1245- Ten bombers came in from south. Bombs hit Ramsey Ravine and James Ravine. During the last raids one plane shot down in flames while another fell in the China Sea; others apparently damaged.

1603- Nine bombers hit tail of island area including naval radio installations and quarters. Enemy shelling from Cavite shore. At 1730 and 1900 there were alarms but no bombs.

2052- A night raid by three No.97's started a warehouse fire and a barge fire off Engineer Dock at Bottomside.

26 March -31 March

Each day during the remainder of the month there were from eight to ten bombings of the Harbor Defense forts, accompanied frequently by artillery fire from Cavite. Inasmuch as the enemy heavy bomber operations were then based on Clark Field his attacks extended over a longer period of daylight hours than in December and January. There were many landslides blocking roads, besides bomb craters, so that Engineer crews were kept busy continually on repair work.

Several ammunition dumps were hit and the shells exploded. A quantity of TNT stored in the North and of Topside concrete barracks was hit and blown up, demolishing that end of the barracks.

Early in the morning of 27 March, it was noticed that forty-five bancas had been assembled on the beach of the mainland south of Fort Frank during the night. The CO Fort Frank interpreted this as a preparation to send a landing party to test his defenses. He opened fire with 75-mm guns and destroyed all bancas.

Every day various seacoast batteries at Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank engaged every reasonable target on the Cavite mainland with artillery fire.

At 1700, 30 March a formation of two bi-motor bombers approached Corregidor at just above 20,000 feet. Both were shot down in a brief fire action which caused much concern to the Japanese. Their excitement, evidenced in intercepted radio message, suggested that persons of importance may have been abroad. Thereafter they habitually put their bombers up as high as 30,000 feet which, due to limitations imposed by powder train fuze, silenced all 3-in AA batteries except the two equipped with mechanical fuze ammunition (Boston and Chicago. Ed.).

Eight bombing attacks by the enemy were ineffective. AA searchlights usually illuminated enemy planes before they reached the bomb release line whereupon planes would jettison bombs in the water and depart. Occasionally small bombs hit Corregidor at night but without serious result.

The heavy toll exacted by the antiaircraft defense caused the enemy to attack thereafter in small formations, frequently from one to three planes instead of nine to twenty-seven.

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1 April -8 April

The first week in April developed relatively less enemy activity against the fortified islands than the preceding week. During that time the enemy was concentrating his efforts against the Bataan peninsula in accordance with his radio announcement of 2 April that "we are starting an all out offensive in Bataan" which culminated in the capitulation of the Luzon Force on 9 April.

There were a number of attacks on the island forts by small formation of bombers and daily artillery shelling from Cavite.

Enemy air activities over Bataan were plainly visible from Corregidor resulting in numerous Air Raid Alarms due to the constant threat. In fact, there were many hours of air raid alerts for the entire command.

Counter-battery action against Cavite continued daily. About 1 April General MacArthur, in instructions to General Wainwright which he transmitted to me, directed that the requirement of 1/2 ration for a garrison in the Harbor Defenses of 20,000 until 30 June 1942 be changed to a requirement of 1/2 ration for 20,000 until 1 June 1942.

On 8 April, in anticipation of the early fall of Bataan, orders were issued for the withdrawal of the 2d Bn 60th CA (AA) less Batteries F (Flint) and H (Hartford) and with Battery C-91st (Cebu) CA (PS) attached, to Corregidor, via Mariveles. The AA gun batteries were given priority as they were considered more valuable to the defense than additional AA searchlights or radio direction finders.


The movement was accomplished during the night 8 April amid vast congestion and confusion along all roads in the Mariveles area caused by the disorganized troops of the Luzon Force and masses of civilian refugees. Due to forcible intervention by the Military Police the AA troops were permitted to withdraw only 2 (3-in) AA guns and about 650 rounds of ammunition.

All equipment left behind, such as 3-in AA guns, AA searchlights, RDF's, fire control equipment, and ammunition destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

From 1810, 8 April till 0500, 9 April Battery Hearn, upon the call of the Luzon Force Commander, fired road interdiction to delay the enemy advance southward on Bataan Roads. In accordance with previous plans, during the closing days of the Bataan struggle, I took up with USFIP Headquarters the question of augmenting the Harbor Defenses by units of the Philippine Division as originally planned. Orders for the withdrawal of any elements of this Division were delayed so long that the 57th Infantry (PS) and the 31st Infantry (American) became hopelessly involved in the fighting on Bataan and could not be extracted. The 45th Infantry (PS) was ordered to Corregidor and was actually assembled and started to Mariveles for embarkation to Corregidor but it never reached there. The only elements of this regiment to reach Corregidor were the Regimental Commander, his Adjutant and Chaplain.

When Bataan fell, General Wainwright directed that no troops would be brought to Corregidor except the 45th Infantry (PS), the 2d Bn 60th CA (AA) (less "F" and "G") and with C-91st attached, and the army nurses; also, that no civilians would be evacuated to Corregidor.

In spite of his orders the following arrived without authority:

680th and 681st Ord. Cos.

80 P.C.

300 Navy

900 Misc. troops

800 Civ.

All night 8 April and all day on the 9th refugees from Bataan poured into Corregidor by boats, rafts, bancas or any means by water.

That night the sky was illuminated for hours as ammunition stores and various installations were blown up. In Mariveles harbor the Taiping, loaded with bombs, was blown up.

At 1310 on 9 April troops in fatigue clothing were observed marching NE on the Cabcaben road.

Meanwhile Corregidor had suffered four bombing attacks during the morning and Topside was under artillery fire from Cavite.

At 1540 nine planes, in waves of three, dropped bombs near Batteries Wheeler and Gerry and Ordnance Instrument Shop, returning at 1549 to bomb Malinta Hill and Kindley Field. All vessels were moved from the North Harbor to South Harbor for better protection from Bataan. These included the Navy gunboats Oahu, Mindanao and Luzon, the Army Mine Planter Harrison and a number of launches. Following their arrival on Corregidor the troops which had been on Bataan were assigned for tactical employment as follows:

Battery G-6Oth to AA guns to be emplaced on golf course (two guns brought from Bataan, one from C-6Oth).

Battery E-6Oth (Erie) (less two S/L section) to man Battery Way (four 12in seacoast mortars).

Two S/L sections of E-6Oth to man two spare searchlights of A-6Oth on call nightly from Harbor Defense Headquarters as emergency searchlights for Seaward Defense.

Battery C9lst to man Battery Morrison (two 6-in seacoast guns facing Bataan).

All other military and naval personnel were turned over to the Beach Defense Commander to augment his forces. Such civilians as were physically able were drafted as laborers for the Quartermaster, Army Transport Service or the Engineer Department. The remainder were a dead load. At 1600 on 9 April a Japanese 75mm battery which had been rushed forward, opened fire on Corregidor from the beach near Cabcaben, Bataan as a foretaste of what we were to expect. As this battery was in plain sight it was quickly destroyed by 155mm fire from Battery Kysor. However, on account of the large numbers of our own captured troops being marched out on the Bataan roads, and on account of the two base hospitals filled with our own sick and wounded which were located there, General Wainwright prohibited our artillery firing into Bataan until further orders.



Hundreds of surrendered troops mill around awaiting orders as to their fate. The true circumstances of the surrender will not be known in the West for until 1943-44. Dispirited and directionless, many not knowing why they have been surrendered, groups of men stand around waiting for orders.  Some units maintained cohesiveness due to strong leadership, but others fell apart from lacklustre officers more interested in themselves than the welfare of their men. 




E. Final Bombardment and Assault Period 10 April-6 May 1942   ^


10 April

The CO Fort Frank reported the fresh water line cut and two lengths of pipe removed. As no other pipe was available the distillation plant was again put into operation and water rationed to the garrison.

With our forces in Bataan out of the way the enemy lost no time in moving his artillery forward and into defiladed positions from which to pond (pound? - Ed) Corregidor and Fort Hughes. He found many such positions in the valley occupied by our base Hospital No.2 and proceeded to ring this hospital with his artillery.

0830- On the morning of 10 April, for the first time, an enemy observation balloon was seen rising from the vicinity of Lamao, concurrently with a bombing attack on Topside. A Japanese plane was seen landing on Cabcaben airfield just behind our troops on the road.

0835- Second string of bombs landed at Middleside.

0850- Shells from Cavite shore fell near Ordnance Point.

0950- Fort Frank under fire.

0952- Four flights of three each bombed Topside and Morrison Hill.

0958- Two bombers hit Topside.

1045- Two bombers again hit Topside.

1056- Enemy shelled Corregidor from south mainland (Cavite shore).

1115- Bombs dropped at Bottomside and Morrison Hill.

1121- One plane landed at Cabcaben.

1127- Two heavy bombers hit Morrison Hill.

1144- Four heavy bombers hit between Morrison Hill and Middleside.

1147 Three planes bombed Morrison Hill.

1220 Japanese plane took off from Cabcaben.

1222 Long column of troops marched north of Cabcaben road.

1313- Nine heavy bombers, in flights of three, dropped bombs along south shore roads.

And so it continued hour after hour. Battery C-6Oth (8-in AA) was located in Morrison Hill, as were Batteries Morrison and Grubbs (James. Ed.). The AA battery was a particular objective of enemy bombers that day but shortly thereafter anything visible from Bataan was subjected to gruelling artillery fire at comparatively short ranges. With the great elevations available in Bataan for CP's plus captive balloons and their own air-planes to spot artillery fire for them, the Japanese were able to adjust quickly and accurately on any point desired. This factor contributed more than any other to the ultimate wearing down of the defenses to a point where its effectiveness was greatly reduced. The enemy took advantage of this situation to gradually lower his customary bombing altitudes.

11 April

The day was a repetition of 10 April with frequent bombings of Topside, Morrison Hill, Middleside, and Bottomside.

1730- Five landing barges appeared from around Hornos Point of Bataan hugging the shore as they headed for the inner bay. Batteries Rock Point, Sunset, and Hanna opened fire and boats retreated out of sight around Hornos Point. Observers estimated them as about 42 feet long and with some type of shield in the stem, probably protecting the power and steering unit.

12 April

By that time the enemy had emplaced a number of his Bataan batteries within range of Corregidor and at 0600 began his intensive daily artillery bombardments, supplemented by cross fire from Cavite.

Battery Kysor (155-mm) destroyed a Japanese harbor vessel at the east coast of Bataan but was immediately subjected to enemy counter-battery.

Battery Geary then opened fire on the enemy and was in turn shelled and bombed.

There were nine separate bombings at Corregidor while artillery fire was almost continuous.

Battery Craighill at Fort Hughes participated in the counter-battery action and was shelled from Bataan.

Our vessels which had taken refuge between Corregidor and Hughes came under artillery fire from Cavite.

By 12 April it appeared our own troops had been moved out of the southern tip of Bataan except for Base Hospital Nos. 1 and 2. General Wainwright thereupon authorized counter-battery fire against definitely located enemy targets. All seacoast batteries were then furnished maps of Bataan with the hospital areas clearly marked and instructed, when adjusting fire on targets in these vicinities, to approach from the direction away from the hospital. Although hundreds of rounds were fired in those areas only one accident occurred as far as known. One shell detonated on some tree tops in a hospital area causing several casualties. Another shell (155-mm) landed in a crowded ward but fortunately was a dud.

13 April -17 April

During this period there were seventeen separate bombings of Corregidor, four of Fort Hughes and two of ships in the South Harbor.

Artillery fire from Bataan destroyed one gun at Battery Kysor on the 15th. The other was removed and emplaced together with one from Battery Ordnance Point, defiladed from Bataan, near the Ordnance Point cemetery. Batteries Morrison, James, Sunset, Rock Point, and Hanna, and all seacoast searchlights facing Bataan were subjected to accurate artillery bombardment, and it was with the utmost difficulty that Ordnance personnel were able to keep some batteries repaired. As time progressed some guns were put out of action permanently.

On 15 April during a heavy bombardment part of the Philippine Army. personnel manning Battery James took shelter in excavation in Morrison Hill behind the battery. The intensity of the enemy fire collapsed the hillside above the entrance suffocating seventy Philippine Army occupants. The Seaward Defense Command, some time previously, had organized a special observation section with officers detailed as observers in CP's at Topside, Morrison Hill, Malinta Hill, and on the Don Jose, beached off Hooker Point. From 12 April on, this group concentrated on locating enemy batteries in Bataan for our counter-battery action.

On 17 April, three B-17's from Australia via Mindanao bombed Clark and Nichols Fields.

18 April -24 April

For several days no 240-mm howitzer fire had come out of Cavite and on 18 April the reason was apparent. These heavy batteries had been moved around through Manila and emplaced in southern Bataan for bombardment of Corregidor. Thereafter they were a constant threat and with their high angle fire were able to blast our 12-in mortar pits which flat trajectory weapons had been unable to reach. By that time a number of our seacoast and antiaircraft guns had been disabled. Battery Morrison was cut completely and Battery C-9lst had been transferred to Battery Grubbs, two 10-in seacoast guns facing Bataan. At Topside all AA height finders were cut but one. A telephone circuit from that one provided altitudes for the other batteries pending repair of their own instruments. It was apparent that every thing visible from Bataan was fast being put out of action thus crippling our counter-battery work. To remedy this, it was decided to select a number of 155-mm positions defiladed from Bataan. Guns were to be emplaced in some of these to fire counter-battery. That night they would be moved to other positions and the scheme repeated. The plan worked splendidly. These were called "roving gun" batteries and were designated by the name of the officer commanding the battery.

The enemy repeatedly put down counter-battery fire sweeping across the island in the general area from which they knew our fire was coming. Our personnel would take cover in fox holes until the enemy barrage had passed over and comparatively few casualties resulted. Minor damage was inflicted on the materiel each day but frequent inspections and efficient ordnance repairs kept these roving guns ready for action most of the time. These roving batteries were our main dependence for counter-battery fire against enemy batteries on Bataan from that time till the surrender.

On 20 April our seacoast searchlights were supplemented with two "roving" lights. Personnel from E6Oth (Erie) from Bataan were then manning two spare AA searchlights of A-60th (Albany). Several positions were selected from which to illuminate water areas. At dark each night these two lights would occupy two of the positions, operating under the Seaward Defense Commander. At daylight they would pull back under cover.

During this period there were usually three or four bombing raids daily combined with a great deal of enemy shelling, especially from Bataan.

On 24 April, starting at 1500, an exceptionally heavy concentration of 240-mm fire was put down on Battery Crockett (two 12-in guns) punishing the battery severely. The rear of this battery was toward Bataan and the battery personnel had erected protective barricades of oil drums filled with earth but repeated pounding by heavy shells demolished all such construction. No. 1 gun was put out of action; one man was killed and several injured. Shot hoists were ruined and fire started in the lower passages of the battery but did not reach the powder rooms. The controlled mine channel being then subject to artillery fire from Bataan the Navy started sweeping a channel through their contact mine field South of Corregidor in order to permit passage of our own boats.

Reports which had been received indicated that the enemy might be assembling a landing force up to the East Coast of Bataan. After dark on 24 April, the U.S. Engineer launch' Night Hawk, 1st Lt. James Seater, CE, in command with a volunteer crew of six enlisted men from the 59-th and 60th Coast Artillery regiments made a reconnaissance up the East coast of Bataan looking for any concentration troops or landing craft.

Off Lamao they contacted a small boat containing two Japanese whom they took prisoner. Continuing, off Limay they were hailed by a large enemy vessel, launch size (120 feet). The' Night Hawk opened machine gun fire killing most of the crew and setting fire to the boat.

Meanwhile, the prisoners jumped overboard and were shot. The Night Hawk endeavored to attach a line to the enemy launch to tow her in but when more enemy boats came rushing out from shore it had to cut loose and run for it. The Night Hawk returned to Corregidor at about 0505.

25 April

Enemy dive bombers concentrated on shipping in the South Harbor, burning and sinking the harbor boat Miley. There were four separate bombing attacks during the day besides cross-fire from Bataan and Cavite. Craighill, Geary and two roving batteries fired counter-battery.

2158- At this time a heavy shell exploded in the midst of a large group of men outside the west entrance of Malinta Tunnel causing about fifty casualties. Several were killed instantly.

26 April

Starting at 0323 the enemy shelled Bottomside and Topside until 0630, then ceased firing until 2200. The Navy Inshore Patrol placed two vessels east of Corregidor to patrol about 600 yards off shore during hours of darkness in order to give warning of the enemy approach by a vertical sweep of their searchlights. There was no bombing that day.


27 April

Enemy artillery opened fire against Corregidor at 0305, shelling the Kindley Field area for. fifteen minutes. There were four bombing raids during the morning; Malinta Hill, 92d CA area and roving battery Farris hit the heaviest.

The afternoon was quiet with a few rounds on Bottomside starting at 2020.

28 April

2409- Beginning just after midnight, enemy artillery put fifteen rounds on the North dock area.

0843- Heavy truck movements through Cabcaben having been spotted roving batteries Byrne (Wright. Ed.) and Rose opened interdiction fire. These two batteries were in action against enemy targets five times during the day and Battery Monja once. Battery Rose set fire to a Japanese harbor boat, the Apo with four direct hits.

1061- Two dive bombers bombed ships in South Harbor but missed all.

1105-- On another raid, bombs were dropped on D-6Oth (Denver), water tanks and Battery Keyes starting fire at the latter.

l208- Battery Way (four 12-in mortars) which had been out of service for several years had been taken over by E-6Oth when they returned from Bataan. Having completed reconditioning the battery, it was proof fired shortly after noon and reported ready for action.

29 April

0730- Almost concurrently Air Raid Alarm No.260 sounded, two flights of bombers hit Fort Hughes, three dive bombers hit Malinta Tunnel entrance and South dock, enemy shells from Bataan hit Bottomside and his observation balloon rose above Cabcaben.

0755- Six dive bombers dropped bombs on Malinta Hill and 92d garage.

0800- Extremely heavy shelling at both portals of Malinta Tunnel and North dock.

0821- Enemy shelling Topside while observations plane overhead adjusts fire. Stockade level and Spanish Fort receiving some shells.

0840 to 100O- Counter-battery fired from Marshall (Wilson. Ed.), Crofton, Way, Cheney, Craighill, Geary, Byrne (Wright. Ed.), Rose, and Farris.

O923- Bombs dropped on west end of Corregidor.

0935- Battery Ramsey and H-6Oth bombed. Fire started below Middleside Incinerator.

0957- Middleside barracks bombed; some men injured.

0958- Enemy shelling near North Point.

lO02- Two ammunition dumps at Topside exploded.

1012- Fires in stockade burned fiercely.

1031- Cheney area under fire.

1037- Enemy shelled Malinta Hill.

1040- James Ravine under fire.

1120- Heavy shelling of Malinta Hill continued.

1240- Four planes attacked Fort Drum. No damage.

1255- Three planes glide bombed Fort Hughes.

1405- Batteries Gulick and Monja fired at enemy targets in Bataan.

1507- Battery Koehler fired a truck column on Cavite road.

1625- Eight bombers dropped several strings of bombs; at B-6Oth, head of Ramsey Ravine, parapet of Battery Way and Middleside Barracks.

1750- Battery Marshall fired interdiction fire at intervals until 2000.

As a result of the above enemy action a number of our observing stations on hills were destroyed. The power plant for No.8 fixed seacoast searchlight atop Malinta Hill was hit and burned. The 1.1 quadruple mount on Malinta Hill was wrecked and several were killed. The three 75mm beach defense guns atop Malinta Hill were destroyed and two ammunition dumps were burned as well as several buildings.

2300- That night two naval sea planes from Australia, via Mindanao, landed in the bay South of Corregidor. They brought some medicines and 740 mechanical fuzes for 3-in AA ammunition.

As soon as these were unloaded, fifty selected passengers (including about thirty-eight American nurses) were taken aboard and the planes took off for Lake Lanao, Mindanao. In spite of a full moon shining, the ships had not been detected by the Japanese.

30 April

Fort Hughes was bombed three times and Corregidor, six. The whole island was raked by artillery fire until 2235, the heaviest concentration being on Battery Way where, in spite of approximately 100 hits, its four mortars were still ready for action.

Several batteries engaged enemy targets. Monja sank a tug boat in Mariveles harbor and later fired on a truck column; Gulick and Farris fired on the Cabcaben airfield; Rose and Farris exploded an ammunition dump; Wright started a large fire; Craighill, Rose, and Farris were in counter-battery action.

1 May

2403- Enemy shelled Topside.

0205- Enemy shelled Kindley Field area.

0402- Enemy shelled from Kindley Field to Cavalry Point.

0505- Enemy shelled Middleside.

0828- Two dive bombers hit Fort Drum. Four dive bombers hit 92d garage.

0830- Two dive bombers hit Fort Hughes.

0921- Three dive bombers hit Fort Drum.

1004- All clear.

1120- Battery Gulick opened fire on truck column in Cabcaben Battery Gulick opened fire on truck column in Cabcaben.

1140- Enemy shells from Cavite fell on Ramsey Ravine.

1220- Battery Koehler fired counter-battery.

1227- Enemy resumed shelling from Bataan.

1320- Batteries Craighill and Cheney fired counter-battery.

1341- Air Raid Alarm No.273.

1405- Six bombers bombed vicinity of RJ 43 and West of Malinta Hill.

1440- All clear.

1 May

1515- Air Raid No.274. Eight bombers came over. Bombs dropped on Malinta Hill. AA opened fire. Bombs hit both entrances, Malinta Tunnel. Much mess equipment, motor transportation and communications destroyed.

1540- Air Raid No.275. Bombs aimed at Drum. Most of them hit in water. One machine gun destroyed. During afternoon Fort Frank under fire from Cavite shore. Thirty-six shells fired, nine hits on land. No serious damage. Between 1700 and 1800 two air raid alarms (276 and 277), but no bombs dropped. After dark, Navy continued sweeping a channel through their south channel mine field and blew two mines.

2 May

0730- Corregidor under fire from Bataan.

0800- Air Raid Alarm No.278.

0840- Load of bombs dropped Malinta Hill to Kindley Field.

0900- More bombs at Bottomside.

0915- Big load of bombs on Fort Hughes and our boats in San Jose Bay.

Station B’9 (Gillispi) wrecked and two Navy men killed. Water barge and Mine Planter Harrison hit. Harrison burning at 1000. Chief Warrant Officer James Murray, Master, killed.

1030- All clear.

1100- Corregidor under fire from Bataan. Fort Hughes under fire from Cavite.

1130- Air Raid Alarm No.279. Our AA firing at two planes over South Channel.

1150- All clear.

1330- Air Raid Alarm No.280. Our AA opened fire. Enemy opened artillery fire concurrently from Bataan against Corregidor.

1400- All clear.

1530- Heavy artillery fire from Bataan fell on Corregidor and Fort Hughes, Battery Cheney under fire, also G3 station.

1542- Fort Drum turrets (14in) opened counter-battery against Bataan.

1557- Enemy opened counter-battery against Fort Drum from Cavite side.

1620- Battery Koehier opened counter-battery against Cavite batteries.

This day the heaviest concentration yet experienced of 240mm fire fell on Corregidor, plastering the whole island. During a five-hour period twelve 240mm shells per minute or a total of 3600 hit in the Geary, Crockett area at Topside. Various other calibers were also being used.

1627- A terrific explosion rocked Topside. A 240mm shell fire had penetrated and blown up Battery Geary magazines.

1635- Message received from C-1 (Fort Mills Primary Fire Control Station) requesting medical aid be sent to Battery Geary. First Aid station at Wheeler Tunnel contacted through PACP and word received that a Medical Officer and aid detail had already proceeded to Geary.

1640 to 1940- Meanwhile, many communication lines cut throughout the Harbor Defenses.

Battery Koehler failed to silence Cavite guns so opened counter-battery again. Heavy truck movements north of Mariveles noted by C-1 but not communication C-1 to G-4 or G-4 to its batteries. Battery Crafton at Fort Frank got away with two shots but came under heavy counter-battery fire from the Cavite side and took cover and resumed fire later. Battery Marshall at Fort Drum fired thirty rounds at three targets in Bataan, believed to have been with good effect. No.1 Harbor Defense searchlight near Battery Point subjected to terrific concentration of 240-mm fire and light buried. Some 306 live shells exploded there and 195 duds. Battery Marshall apparently silenced these enemy guns.

1945- Communication re-established to C-1 from "H".

3 May (Sunday)

0545- Engineers during the previous night had drilled hole through concrete wall of Battery Geary to get at entrapped personnel. Water and food passed through hole to four entombed men at 0100. At this time the hole was being enlarged.

0645- Air Raid Alarm No. 281 One low flying plane overhead and our AA machine guns opened up but no bombs dropped.

0745- All clear.

0800- Air Raid Alarm No.282. Topside under artillery fire from Bataan.

0820- Rescue work at Battery Geary completed. Four men dug out alive and sent to Malinta Hospital via ambulance. (Note: One of these died later, the rest recovered)

0830- Enemy artillery fire increasingly heavy and dust blinded our spotters.

0843- Planes overhead Enemy 240-mm fire fell on Fort Hughes.

0900- More air activity overhead. Fort Hughes 240-mm shelling slackening. One plane over Fort Frank but no bombs dropped there.

AA Battery at Fort Hughes firing.

1000- Battery Marshall, Fort Drum, fired nine rounds at enemy guns north of Babuyan, Bataan silencing them, at least temporarily. Only sporadic smaller caliber shelling now. All clear.

1125- Air Raid Alarm No.283. Load of bombs dropped near Kindley Field. No AA fire. All AA defense crippled by loss of guns, height finders, personnel, due to artillery fire, also to displacement of D-6Oth to new positions.

1240- All clear.

1245- Air Raid Alarm No.284. Battery Wright (D-91st "Roving" 155-mm at Topside) opened fire on enemy truck train parked north of Cabcaben, near bridge with apparently good effects.

1325- Load of bombs dropped on Malinta Hill.

1400- All clear.

1436- Air Raid Alarm No.285. James Ravine bombed.

1450- All clear.

1455- Air Raid Alarm No.286. Salute Hill and North Shore hit.

1515- All clear.

1625- Air Raid Alarm No.287. Boats in South Harbor attacked by dive bombers.

1700- All clear.

1900- Corregidor under lively artillery fire from Bataan. Considerable truck activity in vicinity of Cabcaben.

2200- At about 2000 a U.S. submarine stopped just outside the South Channel Mine field for an hour. Navy small boats were sent out to her via the recently swept channel through the mine field. Departures included: Colonel Doyle, 45-th Infantry; Colonel Irwin, G-3, USFIP, with complete rosters of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who were alive then; Colonel Jenks, Finance Officer, USFIP, with all money accounts; Colonel Hill, Inspector General, USFIP; Colonel Savage, Air Officer, USFIP; Colonel Ramsey, Veterinary Officer, USFIP; five Naval Officers; thirteen or fourteen Nurses, ANC; many USAFFE and USFIP Records and Orders and several bags of mail for States. (Note: This was the last outgoing mail, personnel and official orders before surrender of Corregidor on 6 May.)

Battery Craighill fired counter-battery in vicinity of Mariveles. Enemy artillery active during evening against Corregidor and Fort Hughes but quieted down around 2200.

4 May (Monday)

0730- Air Raid Alarm No.288.

0800- Corregidor under heavy artillery fire from Bataan.

0827- All clear.

0900- Air Raid Alarm No.289. Observation plane overhead adjusting enemy artillery fire which then increased in volume after having slackened before 0900.

1000- All clear.

1030- Fort Drum turrets started counter-battery fire.

1035- Air Raid Alarm No.290. Boats in South Harbor but missed.

1125- Three planes dive bombed east end of Corregidor. Topside still under artillery fire. Communication lines C-1 to G-3 out; TI (Time Interval) bell system and Air Warning lines out.

1200- All clear.

1300- Air Raid Alarm No.291. Corregidor under heavy cannonading from Bataan. String of bombs out phone lines "H" to C-1between Malinta and Topside.

1330- Another load of bombs on Topside.

1350- All clear. Our observers reported string of fifteen invasion barges being towed North to South out of range beyond Hornos Point

1445- Batteries Monja and Wright (roving 155-mm D-91st) opened fire against Gorda Point.

1452- Corregidor under fire from Bataan.

1500- Air Raid Alarm No.292. Planes overhead. Heaviest general artillery bombardment yet, falling on Corregidor: all calibers including 240-mm. A continuous drumfire of bursting shells.

1551- Planes overhead again. Radio communication established with C-1 through Navy Queen Tunnel. Artillery bombardment continued.

1640- All clear.

1700- Fort Drum under fire from Bataan and Cavite.

1710- Air Raid Alarm No.293.

1740- All clear.

1808- Air Raid Alarm No.294. All defense crippled so very little fire. Battery Cheney under artillery fire from Bataan.

1838- All clear.

1900 to 2230- Fort Drum and Battery Gulick fired counter-battery at enemy positions near Cabcaben. Our searchlight No.2 and Emergency searchlights (Mobile) were on alert for possible landing attacks by the enemy, but none developed. Harbor Defense Headquarters building hit by bombs today, also Post Exchange again and the Post Office building which burned.

Desultory enemy artillery fire throughout the evening. Our communication and ordnance details out repairing damages from today's action. The bulk of enemy fire was switched today to beach defenses, especially James Ravine, Power Plant Ravine and the beach between North and Cavalry Points. Some machine guns and 75-mms damaged.

5 May (Tuesday)

During night communication lines repaired between "H" Station, C-1 and all outposts.

0835- Air Raid Alarm No.295. Corregidor under heavy fire from Bataan. Some AA fire.

0905- Fort Drum under artillery fire.

O923- Corregidor being bombed, hit Bottomside.

0955- All clear.

1003- Fort Frank and Corregidor received artillery fire. Battery Marshall opened counter-battery silencing one 240-mm but others continued. Air Raid Alarm No.296.

1055- Battery Craighill opened counter-battery fire.

1100- All clear.

1106- - Air Raid Alarm No.297. Five dive bombers attacked Corregidor. AA fire opened.

1130- All clear.

1203- - Air Raid Alarm No.298. Corregidor bombed. AA fire opened promptly.

1230- Heavy counter-battery fire opened concurrently by Batteries Crafton, Marshall (Wilson. Ed.), Way, Cheney, Wheeler, Monja, and "roving" Batteries Wright, Rose, and Gulick at selected targets in Bataan. Several enemy batteries silenced and three ammunition dumps set on fire.

1250- Forts Frank and Hughes under artillery fire.

1300- All clear.

1315- Fort Drum under artillery fire from Cavite.

1327- Air Raid Alarm No.299.

1400- All clear.

1447 - Air Raid Alarm No.800. AA fire opened promptly.

1515- Fort Hughes hit by bombs. Both pits at Battery Craighill filled with debris. Six men injured. Corregidor under intermittent artillery fire during afternoon.

1800- Seaward Defense opened heavy bombardment against selected targets including Cavite side. Fire promptly returned by enemy. By 1887 all the fortified islands were under heavy fire. On Corregidor, James Ravine, the North Shore and the tail of the island were pounded terrifically. Communication lines were cut in many places; numerous beach defense guns and B.D. searchlights put out of action and many beach defense land mines blown up by enemy artillery action.

2100- Beach Defense reported manned.

2230- Message from "H" Station to Beach Defense Commander, C-1 and AACP as follows: "Prepare for probable landing attack."

Japanese cannonading of tail of island very heavy, telephone communications out in many cases. Two Naval vessels were stationed as usual on nightly watch east and north-east of Corregidor to warn of the approach of enemy landing boats by use of vertical sweep of their searchlights.

(Note: At this time beach defense installations on the north side of the island were practically nonexistent. Barbed wire entanglements, land mines, machine gun emplacements, and personnel shelters and most of the 75-mm beach defense guns had been destroyed. The north side of the island was bare of trees and vegetation and the ground was powdered dust. All wire communications had been shot away. Command could be exercised and intelligence obtained only by use of foot messengers which medium was uncertain under the heavy and continuous artillery and air action. It had been estimated by Harbor Defense Headquarters that the Japanese had from 350 to 400 guns emplaced on Bataan Peninsula varying in caliber from 75-mm to 240-mm. Later, Japanese officers informed various prisoners of war that the Japanese had 422 guns firing at Corregidor and that they fired over 200,000 artillery shells during the last ten days prior to the surrender.)

2350- No warning received from Naval vessels on watch, but at this time a runner arrived at "H" station from North Point and reported an enemy landing.

(Note: As really as can be determined the first wave of the Japanese landing attack hit the beach at 2330, 5 May 1942.)

Seaward Defense Commander was ordered to send personnel from B, C, D, H, 59th CA manning Batteries Cheney, Wheeler, and Crockett to positions in Beach Defense Reserve; later other Coast Artillery troops manning seacoast and AA armament were released to Beach Defense Commander in accordance with prearranged plan of priorities. Enemy barrage caught C-59th (Capt. Harry Schenk) at Bottomside, Captain Thompson killed, among casualties.

6 May (Wednesday)

2450- A messenger from Lieutenant Colonel Biggs, 92d CA, brought word he had formed line across Kindlev Field Water Tank Hill with Batteries "E" and "F" 92d CA (PS) and was cooperating with Marines in defense in East Sector.

One 2-gun 75-mm battery (Lieutenant Lawrence) near tail of island had never disclosed its positions and its fire apparently came as a complete surprise to the Japanese. These two 75-mm guns sank a number of barges and accounted for many casualties. Lieutenant Lawrence stated later that the continuous stream of tracer bullets from the shore line gave enough illumination to permit firing at barges. By 0150 the moon had risen so that effective fire could be placed on landing party. A few remaining searchlights had gone into action but were quickly shot out. Many boats were destroyed causing heavy enemy casualties.

(Later information received from Japanese officers indicated the first wave consisted of 2000 of which approximately 800 got ashore. The second wave was 10,000: total casualties, 4100 Japanese.) More or less uncoordinated fighting continued generally throughout the night..)

Battery Way (12in mortars) at Fort Mills manned by Battery E-6Oth CA (AA) fired on the landing barges as did also the 3-in AA Battery, Battery Craighill (12-in mortars) and two 75-mm beach defense guns on Fort Hughes.

0400- Fort Drum opened fire on Cabcaben dock area. At dawn, about 0440 a wave of landing boats was seen approaching Corregidor. Drum changed targets to boats which were also taken under fire by Battery Stockade (A-9lst) and Lieutenant Wright (D-9lst) with "roving" 155-mm with damaging effect. Captain Gulick (C-9lst) with "roving" 155-mm at Ordnance Instrument Shop, who meanwhile was firing on Cabcaben docks, switched to boats.

This artillery fire broke up what happened to be another landing attack destined for the Bottomside dock area and Power Plant Ravine.

Beach Defense Commander had reported the situation under control but landings behind our line near Infantry Point necessitated withdrawal toward Malinta Hill.

At dawn the Beach Defense Reserve Battalion and Batteries "B" and C-59th CA and all other available troops counter-attacked in the East Sector.

This counter-attack drove the enemy back for some distance and effectively stopped his advance. However, in the early light effective artillery fire from Bataan was brought to bear on our attacking troops and dive bombers and strafing planes attacked in large numbers driving some of our troops back into Malinta Tunnel and pinning all others to the ground on the final defense line east of Malinta Hill. The entire area of the island between Malinta Hill and Kindley Field Water Tank Hill held by the Japanese was saturated with artillery fire. Bottomside and Topside also were thoroughly covered. Our reserves suffered severe casualties passing through these barrages to the East Sector.

1020- At this time enemy tanks had landed on the island and were assembling in the vicinity of Kindley Field. General Wainwright sent for me and informed me that in view of the present situation and what might be expected to occur during the ensuing night he had decided, in order to prevent the further useless sacrifice of lives, that he was going to surrender the fortified islands to the Japanese at noon. He said he was going to have a message to that effect broadcast at once. He further directed me to have all the armament destroyed in accordance with secret orders which had already been given to regimental and Fort Commanders, this destruction to be accomplished by noon and if not completed that nothing should be destroyed after that time. Plans called for the destruction of all armament above .45 caliber. He ordered further that my command would lay down their arms at noon and at that time the flag of Corregidor would be lowered and burned and that white flags would be displayed. These instructions were relayed to all concerned as fast and insofar as disrupted communications permitted. All units received the order in time to comply with instructions except Fort Hughes.


This photograph of the lowering of the Corregidor garrison flag was widely distributed as Japanese propaganda.  It was stage was staged solely for the camera. Unfortunately, less than careful scholarship has seen the resulting film clip enter into the public domain as an actual occurrence.  Col. Paul Bunker commanded a work detail, under fire, which retrieved and burned the garrison flag prior to the surrender. A member of that work detail, Val Gavito, has written an exclusive article for The Corregidor Historic Society about the true circumstances of the lowering of the American flag over Corregidor on 6 May 1942. See Article

1200- At noon the flag, which had been shot down and replaced twice under fire during the siege, was lowered and burned by Col. Paul D. Bunker, CAC, the Seaward Defense Commander, whose Command Post was at Topside not far from the flag pole. He was accompanied on this sad duty by Lt. Col. Dwight Edison, 59th CA. A flag of truce was carried by Capt. Golland L. Clark, USMC, who was accompanied by 1st Lt. Allan S. Manning, USMC, who proceeded toward the Japanese lines until they had contacted the Japanese and were taken to the senior Japanese officer on the spot.

Meanwhile all records of value to the enemy, secret maps, papers, correspondence, and diaries were destroyed. Disregarding the flag of truce, the enemy artillery fire, dive bombing and machine gun fire continued unabated.

1330- The Marine Corps Officers returned to Malinta Tunnel with the word that General Wainwright should come out to the Japanese commander if he desired to discuss terms.

1400- General Wainwright took me, Lieutenant Colonel Pugh, and Major Dooley, his aides, and Major Brown, my aide; and we proceeded, under a white flag, by car to the foot of Kindley Field Water Tank Hill where we left the car and walked up the hill to meet the Japanese commander. Dead and dying were on every hand, the proportion being about three Japanese to one American. Arrangements were made for General Wainwright and party to be taken to Bataan to meet General Homma. A Japanese colonel, an English speaking Japanese lieutenant, and General Wainwright's party started on foot for the north dock via Malinta Tunnel. When about halfway there, fire from the Japanese in rear was opened against the tunnel entrance passing over our heads and dive bombers began strafing the area just east of Malinta Hill between us and the tunnel entrance. The Japanese Colonel declined to proceed any further in that direction. He took his own officer, and General Wainwright and Major Dooley went back in rear of Japanese lines and took a boat from North Point to Cabcaben. Lieutenant Colonel Pugh, Major Brown and I continued on to Malinta Tunnel.

surrendr.jpg (80204 bytes)

At about 1600 the Japanese took over Malinta Tunnel and Bottomside. Topside was bombed relentlessly throughout the afternoon. Meanwhile the Japanese advanced to Middleside and along South Shore Road. At about dark, perhaps 1930 General Wainwright and staff returned to Corregidor, General Homma having refused to accept his surrender of the Harbor Defense only instead of all USFIP. General Wainwright contacted the senior Japanese Commander on Corregidor with a view of surrendering the garrison to avoid annihilation. He agreed at that time also to surrender all other American and Filipino forces in the Philippines.

2330- The Japanese landed and took over Fort Hughes.

7 May

0300- Japanese forces landed at James Ravine and Powder Plant Ravine in accordance with their previous plan, but without opposition.

Other Japanese had reached C-1 Tunnel and ordered Colonel Bunker to have all troops out of Topside by 0700 as at that time an intense artillery and air bombardment would begin. Runners were sent to all groups and all troops evacuated Topside as ordered. All our personnel, military, naval, and civilian were congregated in and around Malinta Hill by daylight and stayed there during that day and succeeding night while the installations of Topside were heavily bombarded.

In the late afternoon General Wainwright and staff proceeded under Japanese escort to Manila via Cabcaben, to endeavor to contact our other forces in various locations in reference to their surrender.

Together with certain USFIP staff and several Naval officers I was held in Lateral 10, Malinta Tunnel. The Harbor Defense staff was held in Lateral 1. Twenty-four dead in the Hospital could not be buried at once and the Japanese did not permit it for three days. Looting by the Japanese was extensive. During the day various officers were conducted to a Japanese Headquarters in the Barrio Market building at Bottomside for questioning.

0900- All personnel except officers and a few orderlies in Laterals 10 and 1 of Malinta Tunnel, the sick and wounded in the hospital, Medical Department personnel, and MP's were ordered out of Malinta Tunnel via the west entrance, marched around the hill and down to the 92d Garage Area where the Japanese had decided to establish a Concentration Camp.

1330- Japanese troops landed and took over Forts Frank and Drum.

2100- 0fficers who had remained in Lateral 1 marched to join the others in Camp at the 92d CA Garage Area. Colonel Cottrell and Colonel Bowler of the Harbor Defense Staff, my aide, Major Brown and I together with several USFIP staff officers as well as Captain Hoeffel with his Naval staff were held in Lateral 10 at Malinta Tunnel. Colonels Stickney and Mielenz, and a group of about twenty other Engineer officers were held in the Engineer Tunnel in Power Plant Ravine.

Except for a small detachment the surrendered garrison was kept in the above locations until removed to Manila by Japanese authorities, the majority being evacuated on 24 May. The captured Fort Hughes garrison was transferred to the 92d CA Garage Concentration Camp on 8 May. Troops at Fort Drum and Fort Frank were consolidated at Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas by the Japanese and were also evacuated to Manila on 24 May.