COMMENTARY NOTES CONCERNING HUDSON HILL'S MAP
 

MAP POINTS

Map Point 7 - The Pumping Station near the beach;

Map Point 8 - On 17 February, four Japanese MG's emplaced at a cave entrance on the west side of the ravine - the jaw of a well prepared trap -  pin down a number of men on the east side of the ravine until 1610 hrs (17 February) before they can be pulled out;  This cave entrance again features on 19 February, when there is a short fire-fight here, with fourteen Japanese killed. Inside this cave, Hill say the control system for the mines across the North Channel is found.

Map Point 9 - A concrete pillbox was situated adjacent to the road so as to cover the beach and the roadway. It is encountered at 0905 hrs and impedes the advance until 1000 hrs. (17 February)

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The initial attack on the ravine was made with a reinforced platoon at 0800 the 17th of February. The platoon followed the roads on the east side of the ravine. There is no reconnaissance or covering presence on the right side of the ravine, allowing the Japanese to spring a trap.  By 0905 the platoon has advanced against heavy enemy sniper fire and machine gun fire to point 9. This pillbox impedes the advance until 1000 hrs. Within a further 50 yards, the advance section of the reinforced platoon advance is brought to a halt when the Japanese spring their trap.  Pinning them down under multiple MG fire from the west side of the ravine, there is insufficient time to bring any forces to bear which will outflank the Japanese. The platoon can only be extracted  by the combined efforts of the heavy mortar platoon, the LMG section and the calling in of 5" suppression fire from a destroyer. It's late in the afternoon before the men can be extracted, and they must return to the perimeter at Topside.

Stinging from the failure of the 17th, fresh plans are made that evening. An air attack is to be called in at 0738 hrs (18 February). A platoon is sent down the west side of the ravine, to cover the main advance down the east side.  This  attack down the roadway along the eastern side of the ravine again fails, the advance being stopped again at Point 9. The men withdraw at 1714 hrs. Day 2 has seen the attack not even get as far as it had on the first attempt.

Notwithstanding the failure of the second attempt, the plans for the following day (19 February) are no different. Air support is again called in. The only difference is that the air attack continues until a later hour, and E Company's attack does not get underway until 0900.  It proceeds cautiously, having regard to the drubbing they received the previous days.  Inexplicably, the advance does not meet with the expected opposition, and at 1015 hours, the platoon arrives at Point 9 where they had been caught the previous day. They find three MG's prepared, but unmanned. Passing Point 9 without resistance, they are now in a position to lay in fire down towards the western side of the ravine, where there is a bombproof infantry tunnel.  A number of Japanese rush out to man their unattended defensive positions and instead are caught in a barrage of fire. Hill records 65 being killed. The wounded withdraw into the tunnel, and the troopers advance to positions where they can bring fire upon the tunnel entrance, to prevent any further Japanese emerging. 

Demolitions are prepared around the tunnel entrance and the James Tunnel entrance is blown.

Hill says that fires were still burning inside the barracks, two days later. (Curious - I cannot recall James Tunnel being badly burned. I shall have to look into this, next visit. The entrance certainly has been collapsed by explosives.)

E Company continue to return into James Ravine on the 20th, 21st and 22nd of February, closing (in all) 19 caves and tunnels.   Ultimately, they lose 10 men to James Ravine - 8 KIA and 2 DOW, with 11 WIA. They take one prisoner, and count 211 bodies. Hill estimates the underground barracks might have contained a further 250 men. Company strength has been reduced to 4 officers and 71 EM's, and the company would now be tasked to attack Wheeler Point.

Hill can be criticized for what was essentially a debacle in James Ravine. He remained, for the most part, at the 59th CA Barracks during the movement down into the Ravine. Insufficient thought had been given to the number of Japanese in the ravines - after all, if they weren't concentrated on topside, where were they? It had become quite obvious to those at the sharp end of the combat that the enemy strength was far more than the early intelligence estimates  and that they had been concentrated in the ravines.  What, after all, had the Regimental Staff made of the long line of vehicles (US Chevrolets, civilian cars, troop motorcycles and other Japanese vehicles) lined up along the trail down Grubbs Ravine? This had clearly been intended to be a mobile "flying reserve" force to counter an American amphibious landing.

 E Company, after James Ravine, was not in good shape - they had only Lt. Roscoe Corder and Lt. Crawford commanding the remaining two platoons. They had started Corregidor already under strength, due in the main to heavy jump casualties arising from poor jump mastering. Not one of the jumpmasters in E Company had attended the jump master school at Ft. Benning.  The lack of knowledge hurt "E" Company and the 2d Bn HHG Co.