17 February 1945

The morning of 17 February dawned. At 0830, right on time, the forty-four planes of the 39th, 40th, 41st and 46th Squadrons of the 317th Troop Carrier Group began their runs on Corregidor. Led by their commanding officer, Colonel John Lackey, the column of C-47's passed over 'A' Field, dropping all their equipment bundles.

Expecting to welcome the arrival of the 1st Battalion, many of the 2d and 3d Battalion men on the ground were surprised when the only parachutes to fall from the aircraft were those of the equipment bundles. Word had not filtered down to all ranks that it had been decided that Topside was sufficiently secure that there was no need to suffer unnecessary jump casualties on the dangerous and undersized landing zones.

It was just as well, for whilst Topside may have been considered by Rock Force HQ to be secure, the ravines surrounding it were most definitely not. It was from the ravines that numerous streams of small arms fire arced upwards towards the fully-laden aircraft as they slowed overhead to drop their bundles. Sixteen of the aircraft received fresh holes from hits. Several men, principally airmen, were wounded by this ground fire.

If there was to be a consistent view from HQ at Topside, it would be the consistent underestimation of the numbers of Japanese defenders remaining in the ravines, and of the dangers that they represented. This optimism, that the worst had already passed, would come to hurt the 2nd Battalion more than the others, particularly as Colonel Jones's attention would become focused towards the east of the island. Ultimately, it would also impact upon the 1st Battalion, which would suffer a fate worse than decimation. But that, as they say, was in the future.

The planes flew on and landed at San Marcelino. The battalion was loaded on an old World War I four stacker destroyer and was transported to the island to join the affray the afternoon of the 17th.

On the ground, Second Battalion was struggling to cope with the casualties of the previous day, and to face the challenges of the present one. It had lost * on the jump. Its executive officer, Red LaVanchure, had sprained both ankles so badly in landing that he was unable to walk, but he was able to continue, being piggy-backed everywhere.

Periodic Reports covered a twenty-four hour period beginning at 1800 hour (6:00 P.M.) and ending at 1800 hour the next day. Thus P.R.No.1,Rock Force begins the late afternoon of 15 February, or the day before the jump. These reports were made to the next higher headquarters, in this instance, to the Commanding General, XI Corps. Unfortunately P.R. No. 1, has not been located during the course of our research. What follows is Report No. 2, which is reproduced in its entirety. Those P.R.'s following will not be.

By way of comparison, an S-3 Journal was also kept by Major Ernest C. Clarke, the Rock Force S-3. This was a journal kept within the command as required by Army Regulations.

Concerning Periodic Reports
NOTE: - Army regulations require the keeping of a great many reports and journals. During an operation, they varied greatly in comprehensiveness and accuracy, though they are always a good place to start from. It was not unknown for them to be re-created days after the battle, particularly where conditions were not conducive to the creation of paperwork. *The best place to start is with the* Periodic Reports, which cover a twenty-four hour period beginning at 1800 hours (6:00 PM)Indicated time, and ending at 1800 hour the next day. Thus P.R.No.1, Rock Force begins the late afternoon of 15 February, or the day before the jump. Unfortunately, P.R. No. 1 has eluded us, and our examination of the Corregidor Operation commences with P.R. No. 2, which covers the period 800 hrs 16 February to 1800 hrs 17 February. These reports were made to the next higher headquarters, in this instance, to the Commanding General, XI Corps. We will reproduce P.R. No. 2 in its entirety to allow the casual reader to understand the scope of the report. Thereafter, we will extract the relevant entries.

S-E-C-R-E-T

.	......................	.
:	SECRET	:
:	AUTH:CO, ROCK FORCE	:
:	INIT: (Clark)	:
:	DATE: 17 February 45	:
:	......................	:
F	rom: 16-2-45, 18001
T	o : 17-2-45, 18001

S-3 PERIODIC REPORT

R	OCK FORCE
A	PO 73
1	7 Feb 45, 1900I

No. 2.

Map: CORREGIDOR ISLAND, 1/12,500.

1. OUR FRONT LINES: See Overlay.

2. LOCATION OF OUR TROOPS: See Overlay.

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

All troops in this area are included in the Rock Force.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Cool and unlimited.

5. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. INFANTRY: Platoon and company activity securing commanding ground and destroying enemy emplacements. Areas of extensive enemy resistance.

(1 ) Bunkers and tunnels vicinity 31.25-39.55.

(2) Draw in vicinity 31.5-39.5.

(3) Bunker 32.2-39.3.

(4) Caves 32.8-39.4.

(5) MALINTA HILL-NORTH SLOPE.

(6) ICE HOUSE 32.7-40.7 and vicinity.

(7) Caves and tunnels vicinity 32.2-41.1.

(8) Bunkers and tunnels vicinity 30.9-40.45.

b. FIELD ARTILLERY: Extensive supporting fire to assault troops.

c. AVIATION:

(1) Lift for resupply.

(2) Strafing support to assault troops in vicinity MALINTA HILL.

d. ENGINEERS (Airborne) Assault team assistance with demolition and flame throwers.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Our casualties-

This Report- 21 KIA, 50 WIA, 25 MIA

To Date - 34 KIA, 106 WIA, 159 JUMP IIA (Corrected Figure)

7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Known enemy casualties:

This Report- 281 KIA, 0 PW

To Date - 361 KIA, 0 PW

Enemy casualties probably much greater but cannot verify.

(Signature)

CLARK

S-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

#32	0700	E. Co. & 462 F.A. section laid down supporting fire for H Co. who advanced on Battery Point hill - 22.15-40.80. Hill secured by noon with exception of caves in cliff near the shore.
#33	0900	Sniper fire opened up on main exchange & Library Bldg and all personnel were pinned to the floor. 2nd Bn reported they were assaulting the bunker* that the fire was being returned by the enemy and hitting our C.P. At 0830 all firing ceases."
*The bunker was Battery Wheeler. The statement that all firing ceased is puzzling.
#34	0915	Message #1 from XI Corps informing us that only bundles would be dropped on A Field and 1st Bn be landed at Marcelino field (San Marcelino Field) and brought tc San Jose by boats.
#35	1156	Troops scheduled to land San Jose beach according to message from XI Corps.
#36	2300	No change report to CG XI Corps
#37	0805	Situation report to XI Corps
#38	0920	Report of planes dropping bundles to XI Corps. Also enemy resistance stiffning.
#39	1225	Situation report to XI Corps Msg 40
#40	0945	" " " XI Corps Msg 39
#41	1425	Resupply planes began dropping at 14152. Recovery about 80% - no change of other activity - Msg 41
#42	1915	S-3 Periodic reports to XI Corps - Msg 42
#43	2112	Report of small fire fight to XI Corps Msg 43
#44	1645	1st Bn landed 1645 on San Jose Beach. Arrived by boat and were pinned down on beach immediately after landing from Jap fire on hill near Breakwater Point. Navy opened up and silenced guns. Preparation made for a naval & air strike followed by an infantry assault to wipe out point on 18 Feb 45. 1st Bn then proceed to relieve G Co who teamed in with I Co to expand our perimeter.
#45		H Co worked on hill at Battery point and cleared area during the day. Light opposition and this helped G Co in trying to clean out caves in vicinity of power and refrigeration plant and heavy opposition met. G Co then moved to position of I Co when relieved by 1st Bn 503 RCT.
#46		D & E Co worked on gun emplacement (31.25-39.55) and AA positions in vicinity of (31.45-39.55)" E company was operating far to the north toward James Ravine. This gun emplacement is Battery Wheeler (31.4-39.50. F company and D company are companies involved here. This is about the usual situation with regiment. They did no know what was going on. "Ammo dump (31.25-39.55) caught fire in the night and flames 50 to 100 ft high resulted. Any remaining Japs were burned. A few casualties resulted.
*Error: "D" Co. and "F" Co. were at Battery Wheeler and the A. A. area, Battery Boston. "E" Co. was far to the north, in James Ravine.
#47		F Co worked on Japs dug in at point (31.5-39.41) during day. Hill still not cleared at dark.
*The text may read either "I" or "F". "I" was not in this position, but "F" was; However it is difficult to equate this action to "F" Company's action.
#48		F.A. gave remarkable pinpoint fire in support of all companies and prob�ably accounted for quiet a few of the enemy dead. No accurate report of enemy dead rec ceived this period.
#49		Ammo dump & gun position destroyed about 1000 hour at (30.8-40.5) by artillery phosphorus bombs. Quiet a large explosion and Japs inside burned. Still Japs located on top of hill and in caves on other side of James Gully & Rock Pt. Set as a target for 18 Feb by second Bn.
#50		Nite very quiet except for small arms fire fight around 1900 hour in vicinity of Power plant. Other sectors quiet. Navy kept flares over area around power plant periodically during the nite.


(and Commentary)		"Just after sunrise, a gun battle was going on between a platoon of "E" Co. and the Japs who had come up during the night. Facing north to our left front was a pill box and entrance to a tunnel. Our perimeter faced directly to it. We opened upon it and started a fire. For one hour and a half it burned steadily with huge detonations. Anything in that tunnel is well roasted now. At about 0830, our re-supply planes came over with the intention of dropping bundles in the parade ground. Many of them went in the low area to the south, near the pill box of Japs " (Battery Wheeler). "There was a scramble to the bundles by our boys and the Japs, both. Firing went on all over the parade ground. A combat team was made up to go after these pill boxes. We used point blank artillery fire in addition to bazooka and flame throwers. Its quiet down there now- they're closing in. Our latest count on hospitalized casualties is 29 and two men are still missing. It looks like there'll be a record high on jump casualties. As soon as we contact all platoon leaders we'll get a more complete report. I hope they recover some water in those bundles. We're getting mighty low. We heard the seaborne landing troops had come in but as yet we've made no contact. We also heard an LSM had come in with water but until contact is established we can't get it here. There's still firing going on around. The Nips have ways of getting around that we don't know about. But I think it'll be a lot more quiet tonight. We're clearing away the debris to set up a co. cp. We've heard that the 1st Bn, was coming in by water. They were ordered not to jump because of the high rate of jump casualties in the 2d and 3d Bns. As we understand it they landed at Neilson Field and went aboard LSM's to come in there. There was quiet a bit of gunfire at the beach at 1400 when they did come in. They were getting a hot reception with mg fire. Four P-47's came in to strafe the Japs who were firing on them. At about 1430, Lo and behold a tank came through from the beach landing with news that the road was being cleared by bulldozers. At 1500 we sent our 3d L.M.G. Platoon with "D" Co. to clean out 3 pillboxes on our south.
		In 1945 we jumped without knowledge of the names of Corregidor's batteries and most of its installations. None of the buildings were named on our maps, nor any of their purposes, hence the "3 pillboxes on our south" would later become Battery Wheeler when we spotted the name painted near the Battery entrance. Except for Malinta Hill and Topside, we did not know the names of its ridges, hills and ravines. The names of its trails were a complete mystery to us. The army had determined that a comprehensive map was too great a secret as to be known by those to be sent to do the job. Later we would find out that even Colonel Jones was not in possession of such secrets as the names of the Batteries, or of the purposes or designations of the buildings and installations, or of the quickest ways between two points. It never stopped us though, and we would come up with an assortment of names, and we would get the job done. Only occasionally, when we had the good fortune to find a painted sign, were we able to give a place its proper "map" name.
		"There had been an attack on it about 1200 hr, unsuccessful"
		[No attack was made at Battery Wheeler about 1200 hr. ]
		There was quite a battle there and they cleaned up one of the strong points. Fortunately we had no casualties (LMG plat.) We employed our one 81mm mortar on it "with some darn accurate shooting."
		[MacKenzie's 3d LMG platoon was ordinarily attached to F Co. I was in the radio shelter with the 3d plt. when Jim Gifford brought his platoon in and relieved us. There was no lmg platoon there, nor was any .81mm mortar support. We watched every bit of Gif's attack, and then my platoon moved out to retake the Btry B (Boston) area.]
		"At 1500 hour the 1st platoon of D Company with attached machine guns [italics mine] moved up to attack Battery Wheeler as detailed below."
		It is obvious that the people holed up in the Topside Barracks had no real conception of what was taking place. Shooting an 81mm mortar at the heavy concrete emplacement would have been less effective than the bazooka used the night before.
		"At 1700 we were given 26 gals. of water which was not quite enough to give one canteen per man. Except for little bits of fire - not much happened until dark. One of our missing in action turned up - he had been pinned down by small arms fire on his jump but came through ok. This leaves one man still missing in action - PFC Guidice. All our M.G. platoons and part of the mortars are out in perimeter tonight."

Building 28D (on the right) - was "F" Company's Command Post.


	One platoon sent out to relieve "F" Co and take pillbox [Btry Wheeler]. Platoon assaulted and took pillbox suffering 6 casualties. Pucci, Combs, Hess, Verdell, and Mayberry were wounded during the assault. Sanguinette was lightly wounded by shrapnel prior to the patrol. The platoon occupied the pillbox and during the night some ammo, which had been laying in the pillbox exploded, killing DeLane and causing the platoon to evacuate the position." [Wheeler's magazines blew up]. "Approximately 60 Japs were killed during the day. Co. running short of food and water."
	Our platoons pulling light patrols. S/Sgt Ledoux, formerly MIA, was killed this morning by sniper fire while a patrol from F Co. was attempting to get him to the aid station after being wounded on the jump. Four men men are still missing in action: S/Sgt Gulsvick, Pfc's High, Musolino, and Revolis. [four mortar plt. men all killed in Cheney Ravine due to early exit.] "Resupply coming in all day." [If you call less than a canteen of water resupply].
	The (battle) grew fierce during the morning. First Lt. William Campbell & Sgt. Hoyt' [S/Sgt} 'were killed. Lt. Campbell was killed in front of Wheeler Battery while preparing an attack & Sgt. Hoyt was killed south (?) south of jump field while attempting to rescue a wounded comrade.� [Hoyt, 2^nd plt., was killed at the NCO Quarters]. �Lt Miller, Lt Flash, Pfc O�Connell, Pfc Anthony Lopez, Pfc Greek Kambakumis, Pfc Akerman, Pfc Harrigan, Pfc Chrimisin, were wounded today.

With the 1^st Platoon, T/Sgt Todd, Jensurd, and I slept in the front yard of 28-D. After daylight many Japs were back in the AA (Battery B) area sniping at us. A light machine gun (Nambu) was firing at us from the depths of Crockett Ravine. We had an artillery heavy machine gun, .50 caliber, from Battery D with us. They set the gun up on the second floor porch on the west side of the house. The porch was roofed over and bordered by a heavy concrete banister. We prepared to retake the AA area.

One reason my memory is so vivid of Doc Bradford being at 28-D the morning of the 17th is that he gave me a tremendous scare. We were west of 28-D keeping low in craters, because the snipers in the AA area were firing away, and the Nambu in Crockett Ravine was shooting at anything that appeared on the skyline. While I was crouching in a shallow crater someone called my name. I looked up behind and there stood Doc towering ten feet tall. It took some anxious_/persuasive talk by me to get him to come down on my level.

Meanwhile the 2d platoon, Ed Flash's, account:

"About 0900 hrs. Col. Jones and Maj. Caskey came to our sector. I briefed them on the situation. Jones and Caskey told me the first priority was to recover the wounded and the dead Americans and search the railroad tracks for other wounded or dead. They withdrew elements of "E" Company from my left flank to another area. I extended my platoon to cover this area. As we attempted to recover some dead troopers, my platoon sergeant was wounded. We recovered the dead man and evacuated my platoon sergeant and dead man to the aid station. While all this was going on the artillerymen set up their gun and fired point blank into the hillsides and caves, assisting us in the recovery."

Ed Flash

"Staff Sergeant Ross Watson, platoon sergeant, 2nd platoon never assembled or reported to the 2nd platoon while I was there. I was told he injured his leg on the jump. I put Sgt. Hoyt in charge as platoon sgt."

T/Sgt Ross Watson reported back sometime after Ed was wounded. I don't know what day. S/Sgt Charles "Happy" Hoyt died that morning.

"About noon I took 3-4 men and searched the area in the vicinity of the tracks and warehouses. We put wire on the steel doors to pull them open in case of booby traps. It was full of old U.S. radios and supplies.

About this time two troopers with flame throwers came up shouting, "Where are the Japs in this area! "They scared me as they were exposing themselves. Anyway they left the area.

Shortly after noon we got word that the rest of F Company was preparing for an attack. A runner had gone back to the Co. H.Q. earlier with our disposition. I don't recall using my AN/PRC 9 walkie-talkie - we were down in the ravine - F Co. H.Q. was much higher. I didn't know the exact location and doubt if we could have communicated with them, being masked by buildings and hillsides. Besides we busy. I was concerned about ammunition resupply, we were thirsty as all hell and trying to find and fix the Japs and develop a plan of attack once we were told to move out.

This warehouse sounds like Building #443 which was the storehouse for the Coast Artillery Engineers. It was located in front of the NCO Quarters, northwest, about a hundred yards away. There was another building, #41, a short distance north of 443, an ordnance magazine which Ed may have investigated, too.


Ed Flash	"I guess it was afternoon and we heard a trooper calling for help from the tracks. With the assistance of the artillery firing point-blank and using 50 cal., three of my men and I worked our way to the track under heavy Jap rifle fire from several directions. We placed the trooper on a G.I. bed springs, started back across a hard stand area and four of us were hit by rifle fire. None real serious. All walking wounded. We dragged the wounded trooper into the ravine and worked our way back up with assistance of fire support once again. The walking wounded took themselves and the barely living trooper to the aid station. I sent a runner to F Co. H.Q. and explained the tactical situation."
The trooper was the missing E company's S/Sgt Ledoux who died.
	On the evening of 17 Feb., 45, I went up the hill to the aid station. Their first diagnosis of my arm was gangrene above the elbow. Scared the hell out of me. On the 18th I was evacuated to the Hospital Ship (Hope) and then to Hollandia and to Letterman in San Franscisco; finally to Newton D. Baker General Hospital where I stayed a year."
	�