Not long after the South Luzon Force had started hurriedly for Bataan, it was halted by orders from the rear echelon headquarters of USAFFE in Manila. About 1030 of the 30th General Jones was notified by Lt. Col. Jesse Traywick, G-3 of that headquarters, that he was to withdraw no farther unless forced to do so by enemy pressure. Probably the change in orders was an attempt to delay the final evacuation of Manila, thus gaining time for the transfer of additional equipment to Bataan and Corregidor. Jones, unaware of the situation to the north, was puzzled by the new order, coming as it did but thirty-six hours after the order calling for a top-speed withdrawal. But without question and happy for an opportunity to meet the enemy, he immediately made his plans. He went forward to Santiago where the bulk of his force was and arranged an ambush. The position was an excellent one, the force adequate, and time sufficient to prepare the trap. Except for a few patrols, the Japanese were still around Tiaong and Candelaria, consolidating and moving up equipment and supplies, the last of which had been landed about noon of the 28th. Those elements advancing were doing so slowly and cautiously.

The withdrawal of the South Luzon Force had been eminently successful. With little loss, the Filipino and American troops had retreated approximately 140 miles through rugged terrain from Lamon Bay to Plaridel. Most of the South Luzon Force had already gone to Bataan. Although Jones had inflicted no major damage on the enemy, he had shown great skill in hampering Morioka's pursuit. After the 28th of December the Japanese had been unable to maintain contact with the withdrawing South Luzon Force. Indeed, on New Year's Day, their advance elements were still near Santiago and in no position to influence the struggle for Luzon. So effective had been Jones's destruction of highway and railroad bridges that he thought "the South Luzon Force could have effectively delayed the enemy's advance on Manila for a considerably longer period had it been necessary."²⁵ The correctness of this conclusion is amply confirmed by General Morioka, who complained frequently of his inability to bring up armored cars, artillery, and supplies because of the destruction of roads and bridges and the back-breaking task confronting his overworked engineers.

By the last day of the year most of Luzon was in the hands of the enemy, but General MacArthur's forces were still intact. The first part of the double retrograde movement to Bataan had been successfully accomplished, and the USAFFE commander could report to Washington that "the South Luzon Force had made firm contact with the North Luzon Force in the San Fernando area."²⁷ All that now remained to complete the withdrawal of the troops east of the Pampanga River was the difficult maneuver across that river and the movement north through San Fernando then south into Bataan, while the troops along the D-5 line fell back along the roads leading into Bataan. It would be a hazardous operation, for enemy air and ground forces were an ever-growing menace as the area of maneuver became smaller. But the greatest test, the complicated movement of thousands of men and tons of supplies from north and south Luzon toward San Fernando, had gone well. The success of the withdrawal would be decided during the next few days.