AMERICAN
GENERALS IN
CAPTIVITY, July 1942. Seated, left
to right: Generals Moore, King, and Wainwright; two Japanese
officers; Generals Parker and Jones. Standing, left to right:
Japanese messenger; Generals Lough, Funk, Weaver, Brougher, Beebe,
Bluemel, Drake, McBride, and Pierce; Colonel Hoffman (interpreter);
and two Japanese soldiers. |
|
After General Homma's departure,
Wainwright offered his unconditional surrender to Colonel Nakayama, who
had remained behind to take the Americans back to Corregidor. He agreed
also to send one of his officers to Mindanao in a Japanese plane to
persuade Sharp to surrender. "But in the back of my mind," he explained
later, "was the strong hope that some way would still be found to avert
the surrender of all forces."
Colonel Nakayama refused to accept
Wainwright's proposal and told him he would have to wait until he
reached Corregidor. Homma's instructions, he explained, authorized only
the commander of the Japanese forces on Corregidor to accept the
surrender. He then took the Americans back to Cabcaben by car and thence
by boat to Corregidor, where they arrived late in the evening of 6 May.
The trip across the channel had been a
long and stormy one, but not long enough for Wainwright to find a way
out of his dilemma. MacArthur, he knew, expected Sharp's force to
continue the fight as guerrillas and to keep alive resistance on
Mindanao. He had done his best to achieve this aim, and Sharp was now
free to conduct guerrilla operations. "But each time I thought of
continued organized resistance on Mindanao," Wainwright recalled, "I
thought, too, of the perilous position of close to 11,000 men and the
wounded and nurses and civilians on Corregidor." The lives of these men
and women might well be the price of Sharp's freedom.
The dilemma in which Wainwright found
himself might perhaps have been avoided had the organization which
MacArthur established for the Philippines before his departure from
Corregidor been retained. At that time, it will be remembered, he had
established four forces: the Visayan Force, the Mindanao Force, the
Luzon Force, and the Harbor Defenses. It was his intention then to
exercise command over these forces from his headquarters in Australia
through his deputy, General Beebe, on Corregidor. The War Department had
changed this arrangement, and placed Wainwright in command of all forces
in the Philippines.
At the time this decision was made, the
reasons for overruling MacArthur and establishing the directing
headquarters for operations in the Philippines on Corregidor had seemed
compelling in Washington. But if there had been no such headquarters,
the Japanese would have had no alternative but to accept the surrender
of each force when it was defeated on the field of battle. It is
difficult to imagine on what basis they could have insisted that General
MacArthur in Australia surrender all four forces in the Philippines. Nor
was there any means, short of a direct threat of reprisals, by which
they could force MacArthur to consider such a proposal. Even if they had
followed the same procedure as on Bataan, where General King was told
that he had not surrendered but had been captured, the effect would have
been the same as the separate surrender of all four forces.
Wainwright could not consistently maintain
his right to surrender only a portion of his force on the pretext that
the remainder was no longer under his command. His presence on
Corregidor and his well-recognized position as commander of all forces
in the Philippines made him especially vulnerable to pressure from the
Japanese. Perhaps it was to avoid just such a situation that MacArthur
established the organization he did, and in this desire may lie the true
meaning of his cryptic explanations at the time to General Marshall that
he had made these arrangements because of "the special problems
involved," and the "intangibles of the situation in the Philippines."
In the time between General Wainwright's
departure from Corregidor and his return late that night, much had
happened on the island. The Japanese had filtered around Malinta Hill,
cutting it off from the rest of the island, and entered the tunnel by
way of the east entrance. By about 1600 they had cleared out all
Americans and Filipinos, except the hospital patients and staff
officers, and were in complete possession of the tunnel. Later that
night, in accordance with their original plan, the Japanese had landed
additional troops on the island.
There was little Wainwright could do on
his return to Corregidor late on the night of the 6th but surrender
under the terms dictated by the Japanese. He could see the enemy's
campfires all over the island and as he approached the tunnel he saw
that it was already in enemy hands. There was no point in further delay
and without waiting to complete the journey he asked Nakayama to take
him to the local Japanese commander. His guides led him around Malinta
Hill to the barrio of San Jose, and there, in the ruined market place,
he met his opponent, Colonel Sato, commander of the 61st Infantry.
There was no discussion of terms. The
surrender was unconditional and the document drawn up by the two men
contained all the provisions Homma had insisted upon. Wainwright agreed
to surrender all forces in the Philippines, including those in the
Visayas and on Mindanao, within four days. All local commanders were to
assemble their troops in designated areas and then report to the nearest
Japanese commander. Nothing was to be destroyed and heavy arms and
equipment were to be kept intact. "Japanese Army and Navy," read the
closing paragraphs, "will not cease their operations until they
recognize faithfulness in executing the above-mentioned orders. If and
when such faithfulness is recognized, the commander in chief of Japanese
forces in the Philippines will order 'cease fire' after taking all
circumstances into consideration."