The year 1898 found the
United States, with the acquisition of the Philippines, joining that select
group of nations having colonies in the Far East. Once the Army and Navy had
captured the Philippines in the Spanish-American War they set out to develop
and implement a plan for its defense. Soon, as a result of recommendations
made by the Taft Board on coastal defense, a system of fortifications was
built from 1905 to 1914 to defend the entrance to Manila and Subic Bay. With
the completion of these fortifications most Naval and Army officers adopted
the attitude that the Philippines could be held against any enemy. This view
was further reinforced during World War I as the United States developed its
industrial and military might.
However the 1920s saw a
gradual modification in the belief that the U.S. could defend the
Philippines against all nations. America following World War I demobilized
her Army and by treaty abandoned her fleet. Adopting the philosophy that
disarmament lessened the chance of war the nation decided not to update what
had become obsolescent fortifications in the Philippines. This obsolescence
was due to the advent of the airplane and long range naval gunfire. As a
result of these developments professional naval and military opinion
examining the defense of the Philippines brought forth a revised estimate of
the nation's ability to hold the islands. A new plan, War Plan Orange 3, now
called for the Philippines to hold out for six months while a rescue force
was raised stateside and shipped the 6,800 miles to rescue the Philippines.
The decade of the 1930s
saw a new military understanding of the defence of the Philippines. Further
cuts in the American defense budget coupled with Japan's increased naval and
military preparedness led many Army and Navy leaders to doubt whether the
Philippines could be defended. This was followed in the late 1930s by the
philosophy that the Philippines, were undefendable and should be abandoned.
This conclusion was based on actions of Congress which called for economic
retrenchment, defense cutbacks, neutrality with a vengeance and independence
for the Philippines on July 4, 1946. In addition the fact that Japan, only
1,500 miles from the Philippines, possessed an army and navy more than equal
to the United States weighed heavily on some minds. That Japan possessed an
army and navy equal to the United States seemed due almost entirely to the
failure of Congress to fund the Army and Navy to full war strength as
provided by law and treaty.
As the year 1940 brought
with it the fall of France, Norway and the Low Countries, England fighting
desperately for her life, China slowly being conquered and Japan, Germany
and Italy flexing their military muscles, none but the most optimistic of
the American military leaders lent any credence to the conviction that the
Philippines could hold out against a Japanese military assault until an
American fleet arrived in relief. It was a foregone conclusion as far as the
Army General Staff was concerned that the Philippines were to defend
themselves as long as possible, thereby tieing down Japanese troops and
ships while American mobilized. The United States forces in the Philippines
had a sole mission, to deny Manila Bay to the enemy as long as militarily
possible — and then surrender.
However 1941 saw a
complete reversal of the official and unofficial line on the defense ability
of the Philippines. That year saw the reinstatement of General Douglas
MacArthur into the U.S. Army by his appointment as commander of United
States troops in the Philippines. Since 1936 MacArthur who had retired from
the Army, had been serving as military advisor for the Philippine
Commonwealth government. During this period he had formed a plan that called
for the raising of ten Filipino Army divisions plus an airforce and a coast
defense Navy to defend the islands from an invader. Though the Philippine
government had at first wholeheartedly supported the plan, most political
leaders in the Philippines considered the islands undefendable and had cut
the defense budget accordingly. MacArthur however refused to consider the
islands undefendable.
Once appointed commander
of all U.S. army and Philippine troops MacArthur began to implement a
beachhead resistance plan in place of the existing plan for passive defense
of Manila Bay. So active a lobbying campaign did he press for this concept
that the War Department found itself pouring troops and equipment into the
Philippines at the expense of other commands. The official policy now was
that the Philippines could
be defended. Further United States Armed Forces for the
Far East headquarters claimed that if the Japanese waited until the summer
of 1942 to attack, the Islands could be so reinforced that no such operation
could succeed.
The plan developed by
USAFFE called for the main center of American Philippine resistance to be
located on Luzon. Supplies and reinforcements would be funneled from the
other islands to Luzon over the Sibuyan and Visayan Seas. To protect this
supply route from attacking Japanese surface ships the channels leading into
these "Inland Seas" from the South China, Sulu and Philippine
Seas would be fortified by the emplacement of 8-inch and 155mm guns.
Sometime in 1939 there
were shipped to the Philippines seven 8-inch railroad guns and 24 155mm (GFP)
guns. On arrival these weapons were placed in storage at the Ordnance Depot
in Manila. The 8-inch guns were model M1888 which had originally been
mounted stateside at coastal defense forts. In 1917 some 50 of these guns
were uprooted for conversion to railroad guns to provide mobile heavy
artillery for the American Army in Europe. The war ended however after only
three had reached France. The remainder were retained stateside as mobile
coast artillery guns. Now seven of these guns less their railroad platform
cars but still mounted on the M1918 Carriage Barbette were in Manila. Along
with the guns had arrived a number of sets of coastal defense fire control
gear. Range of the 8-inch gun firing its 240-pound shell was 23,000 yards
while range of the 155mm (GFP) 100-pound shell was 17,000 yards.
A
155mm gun (GPF) on Panama mount, emplacement allowing
360° 180° fire from fired base; also allowed use
mobile field artillery piece.
Though the guns had
arrived in Manila in 1939 few steps were taken to utilize them until July,
1941. At that time Captain Steve Mellnik serving with the 91st CA (PS) was
seconded to USAFFE Headquarters there Colonel William Marquat, G1, after
greeting Mellnik pointed to a wall map of the Philippines and said:
"Those colored circles
represent artillery fields of fire around important channels. About two
years ago Washington sent 24 155mm guns and seven 8-inch railway cannon to
seal those channels. But Washington did not provide construction funds, and
the cannon are now in a warehouse. USAFFE plans to install those guns. Your
job is to convert the circles on the map and the cannon in the warehouse
into Philippines Army firing units on the ground! You'll stake out the
location of each gun, observation station and barracks area; requisition the
necessary fire-control equipment; schedule the induction and training of
Filipino personnel, and supervise all elements of the program. We call this
the `Inland Seas Defense Project.'"
Captain Mellnik commenting
later said: "I was astounded at the magnitude of the task. A few months
indeed — the project would take a year! Dozens of questions leaped to mind.
I asked them. Bill's answers were not encouraging. The project consisted of
circles on a map, cannon in a warehouse, a Washington promise to provide
construction funds, and a Commonwealth commitment to provide manpower on
call."
Assigned also to work on
the project was Major Guy Stubbs.' Working together the two officers using
field manuels, maps and technical manuals laid out a work schedule that
projected a completion date for the Inland Seas Defense Project of April,
1942. Though the gun positions had been located on maps each of the 12
proposed sites would have to be visited on foot to confirm the sites'
suitability and to physically lay out the battery. Due to the primitive
transportation in the Islands and the location of most sites some distance
from an urban area it was projected that 12 weeks would be needed just to
visit them.
While selection of the
firing sites was up to Mellnik and Stubbs who were now assigned to the
Philippine Coastal Artillery Command, actual construction was to be overseen
by the Philippine Army Engineers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Max
Janairo. To assist the two officers in laying out the sites and starting
preliminary design work Colonal Janairo assigned an officer to accompany
them on the field reconnaissance.
The positions surveyed,
running in a counter clockwise direction from Manila, were located in
general terms at: (1) Cape Santiago on Luzon; (2) Mananao on Mindoro; (3)
Southern tip of Mindoro; (4) Seminara Island; (5) Caluya Island; (6) Pucio
Point on Panaya; (7) Nampulugan Island;(8) Santander on Cebu; (9) Panglao on
Panglao Island; (10) Massin on Leyte; (11) Allen on Samar, and (12) Southern
tip of Luzon.
First battery under
construction was the 8-inch gun at Cape Santigo.' The morning of December 8
saw construction at the 8-inch battery having progressed enough to be ready
for concrete pouring.' That day Stubbs and Mellnik inspected the position
and authorized the concrete. This pouring was not to take place because
before the day was over the Japanese struck the Philippines. The following
day after the two officers had returned to USAFFE Headquarters Major Stubbs
was called before Colonel Constant Irwin, G3, to justify continuance of the
Inland Seas Defense Project and report on possible completion dates. In
response Stubbs stated, "By cutting corners we can make the first battery
operative by mid-February."
Colonel Irwin after
evaluating this information along with a study of available manpower,
recommended to USAFFE Headquarters that construction be stopped because:
"Things are so uncertain, that no one can predict our situation even two
weeks from now. And since 11 of the 12 positions are south of Luzon, the
enemy can capture them at will! General Sharp's force has only enough
small-arms ammunition for guerrilla warfare. Let's not spend our limited
resources on things we can't hold."
In response to this
recommendation Major General Richard Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff,
ordered, "Scrub the project and turn its assets over to Major General Edward
King," who was in command of the field artillery. The 24 I55mm (GFP) were a
welcome long range addition to King's artillery park. These guns served by
Filipino soldiers were to be the backbone of the field artillery on Bataan.
Since the 8-inch guns
lacked mobility Stubbs was ordered to destroy five of them and transfer the
other two to the Manila Bay Harbor Defense Command. One of the guns was sent
to Corregidor and the other to the west coast of Bataan. Due to the rugged
terrain of Bataan the only position Stubbs and Millnik could locate in the
short period allowed was near Bagac. This position half way up the west
coast of Bataan, near the proposed Rear Battle Position and would have
provided a seaward defense against any Japanese ship trying to bombard
Bataan's west coast and add a punch to I Corps artillery support.
The fate of the Bataan
8-inch gun is uncertain. It is claimed that it was destroyed after being
mounted by enemy action, or destroyed by American troops when they fell back
to the Bagac-Orion line on January 26, 1942. Only six weeks had passed since
orders had been issued to mount the gun and General Mellnik states that he
doubts it was mounted at all, as the Engineer troops were spread thin and
their major concern was building the MLR between Mauban and Mabatang on
Bataan.
The 8-inch gun sent to
Corregidor "was mounted on a prepared concrete base near RJ43 east of
Malinta Hill — and (had) all-around fire except to the west which was
screened by Malinta Hill." This gun was proof fired on March 4, 1942 and
passed all stability tests. Though now ready for combat use the gun was
never again fired as the troops that were to man it were never evacuated
from Bataan. It was later destroyed by the American troops on Corregidor
before they surrendered.
As far as can be
determined only a few of the 24 155mm (GFP) guns sent to Bataan fell into
Japanese hands in working order. Most were destroyed by enemy action or by
their crews before surrendering. Thus ended the Inland Seas Defense Project.
Yet a number of questions remain to be answered. When and by whom was the
Inland Seas Defense Project originally conceived?' Were the guns originally
sent to the Philippines for carrying out the Inland Seas Defense Project or
were they sent for some other reason? Were the 155mm guns used to arm Forts
Mills, Frank and Hughes in 1941 also drawn from this source?' To whom did
the guns belong — to the American or Philippine Army? Who was to have manned
the Inland Seas Defense Project as not enough troops existed to man all the
existing coast defense batteries at Manila Bay?6 Who authorized
sending these guns? How effective would they have been? Anyone having any
additional information is asked to write the author.
See MAIL CALL for responses to
this article