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Having the Company Executive Officers of the Second Battalion jump with the first wave in the morning worked out well. The Companies were able to get themselves organized much faster than they would have otherwise.

The writer served in Company "E" of the Second Battalion. He knew more about the activities of its Companies (Headquarters, "D", "E" and "F") than what went on in the First and Third Battalion. With that in mind, the following will deal with some of the actions of those Companies.

By 1400 hours Company "E"'s platoons were organized and in their positions down at the base of the hill below the Mile Long Barracks. The Company CP had been set up two thirds of the way to the west of the middle of the Mile Long Barracks. Twenty one men had been injured in the jump or wounded in action. First Lieutenant Dick E. Atchison had broken a leg on the jump. His third platoon was taken over by Second Lieutenant Lewis B. Crawford who had been the Assistant Platoon Leader of the first platoon under First Lieutenant Joe M. Whitson, Jr..

The third platoon, under Lt. Crawford, moved out with the mission of seizing and securing the old Hospital Building, the most conspicuous feature in the Company area of responsibility. The other platoons formed a base around the old Commissary Building, a short distance from the Hospital.

A patrol from the First Platoon was sent down to the area of the Senior Non Commis­sioned Officers Quarters to extricate PFC Andrew J. Rabinko and Pvt. Pace who had been pinned down by a Japanese Machine Gun.

At the end of the first day on Corregidor we had five men missing in action. They were Staff Sergeants Leonard R. Ledoux and Edward Gulsvick and PFC's Emory N. High, Matthew D. Musolino and Jimmie T. Rovolis.

Early in the morning of 23 February Company "E" relieved Company "B" of the First Battalion down near the base of Crocket Ravine on the South Shore Road.

All First and Third Battalion companies were withdrawn to Bottomside on the morning of 23 February. The men who had been on the go from the time they had landed on the island had an opportunity to get cleaned up a bit, shave and get something to eat which was a little better than the "K" rations they had been stuck with. There, also, was plenty of fresh water for drinking and coffee making.

At about 0300 of 24 February three strong explosions shook Malinta Hill, with flames coming from all entrances. Somewhat later two more explosions shook the hill with flames again pouring out of the entrances. Since neither the 503rd or the 34th Infantry were initiating any actions at that time, the explosions were assumed to have been set off by the Japanese occupying the tunnel.

The interlude of rest and recovery by the First and Third Battalions was not to last long because Colonel Jones, his staff, Major Robert Woods and Lt. Colonel John Erickson were cooking up a new mission for the two battalions. The plan was for the First Battalion to pass through the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry and push an attack toward the eastern end of the Island. The Third Battalion of the 503rd was to bring up the rear and mop any islands of Japanese defenders which the First Battalion had left. The 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry continued to occupy a line across the middle of the Island, astride Malinta Hill.

The Second Battalion was to maintain its base at Topside and continue its aggressive patrol activities and wipe out any remaining Japanese troop pockets. While the Western end of the island, including Topside, was considered "under control" there were a good many Japanese left. None of these were ready to surrender voluntarily. Some were forced out of their hiding places and mowed down by small arms fire. Others had their caves or tunnels closed by demolition men. While not participating in the big push toward the tail of the island with the First and Third Battalions, the Second Battalion would continue to be well occupied.

Elements of the First Battalion began the attack toward the East end of the Island at 0830 sharp on 25 February. The movement, while fast enough for the men who were in the lead, seemed like a snail’s pace to the main body of the First and Third Battalions. The route of the attack was so narrow, and astride a ridge known to us as Water Tank Hill.

For the 503rd, which had been used to fighting a self-sufficient war with little help from any other source, having Naval and Air Corps assistance was a welcome oddity. With the further assistance of the 75 mm guns of the 462nd Parachute Artillery Battalion the advancing Battalions were getting more support than our infantry had ever seen.

Malinta Hill sat astride the middle of Corregidor. At that point the Island is about 900 yards wide. Little room was left on either the North or South side for roads. To the south the South Shore Road edged its way along a narrow shelf. On one side of the road was a near-sheer cliff of about 100 feet leading down to the water. On the other was the cliff leading up to the south end of the ridge, which Malinta Hill really is. The road on the north side begins at sea level and climbs to about a hundred foot elevation over a distance of about three hundred yards.

That is a slope of over 10 percent, hardly a level surface. At that point the road really begins to get steep. It climbs another hundred feet in about 150 yards. Such pitches even put a strain on the two tanks which were to accompany the attacking forces.

Tanks were an entirely new phenomena to the 503rd. In the jungles the outfit had been operating in they would have been of little value so, in the most part, they were held back until MacArthur's troops landed in the Philippines where some of the land lent itself to tank operations. Now, however, the 503rd found it strange having this potential tool at their disposal. Few, if any, of the Officers and men had any experience in tank warfare and, as a consequence, failed to take full advantage of the support they could have provided.

Where the initial slope really became steep, the troops encountered the Northern entrance to Malinta Tunnel. This entrance, in reality the outside entrance to the Hospital Lateral, was suspicious since it was not known if there were any Japanese troops in the tunnel who were still in condition to provide a threat. The 34th Infantry had been in the area but the 503rd was experienced enough in fighting the Japanese to know they could not take neutralization of the entrance for granted.

As one of the tanks was abreast of the Hospital entrance about 50 Japanese swarmed out of the entrance in a Banzai attack. Fire from the tank wiped them out.

Lithe did either the 503rd or the 34th Infantry know that there were two significant air shafts which surfaced above and to the side of this entrance. While the shaft led up at a steep forty five degree angle from the Hospital area they allowed Japanese, in limited numbers, to come and go to harass the troops as they crept past. These entrances held the advancing column for some time while a good deal of firepower and explosives was spent on it. The experiences with tunnels and caves on the western part of the island had not been lost on the troops.

Once the leading elements reached the top of the second, and steeper of the two slopes, the road leveled. While Water Tank Hill loomed ahead, it was possible to see a good deal of the Eastern part of the island reaching out to the extreme end at Hooker Point.

Concurrent with the main column heading up the North Shore Road, a patrol had fol­lowed the rugged shore line, keeping even with the main body higher on the Malinta Hill. This patrol passed Malinta Point and encountered the old Enlisted Men's bathing beach. Remains of the shark net installed to protect swimmers from the marauders could still be made out just below the surface of the water. Then the patrol rounded Engineer Point and made its way around Artillery Point. The Officers Swimming Beach opened up before them. But, much to their surprise, a whole fleet of small boats was beached along the shore line. Upon investiga­tion, it became evident this was the base of the "Q" Boats we had heard about. Unknown to us boats had been very active on the day and night before the 503rd had jumped. A fleet of them had attacked our naval ships and landing craft in the Mariveles Harbor. Now a number of the craft were up on rails ready for launching into the North Channel to attack any of our ships which tried to enter Manila Bay. Other of the boats were under cover back in tunnels which had been bored back into the cliff. There originally, had been well over a hundred of these "Q" Boats, which the Japanese called Shin-Yo-Tai, when the unit left Japan. The boats were about twenty feet long with a freeboard of about a foot--not designed for long trips in the open seas. Consequently, many of the boats had been lost on the move from Japan. The United States military forces, with its huge war machine, would have moved boats like this utilizing large, sea- going vessels. The Japanese military machine was then stretched to its limits. Given the resources they had to work with, the Japanese did not have adequate shipping facilities to move the boats.

By 5 o'clock in the afternoon advance elements of "A" Company had reached Camp Point, beyond the 92nd Garage area. "C" Company was nearing Infantry Point but were meeting stiff resistance. Because night comes on fast in the Philippines in February, the Battalions began to settle while it was still light enough to see what was going on. The First Battalion set up its Command Post in a large bomb crater.