15 APRIL - 21 APRIL 1945


 APRIL 1945








25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30          



15 April 1945


No. 8
141600 April 45
151600 April 45

Infantry: Continued extensive patrolling of the RCT sector occupies our troops during the period. E Co. (503) and K Co. (74th) located at SINAYPANAN (36.5-07.5) reported nil activity or evidence of enemy activity within 2500 yd. radius. They were again resupplied by air. A reconnaissance patrol from G Co. found only a few abandoned positions along a well beaten trail at (37.3-99.8). A recon. patrol was fired upon in the vicinity (38.?-01.8) at 1330I. Mortar fire will be brought to bear upon position during the night 15-16 and a combat patrol is planned for the area about 15 Apr. Saw movement in the vicinity (38.6-02.4) and believed it to be an enemy OP. This has been brought under mortar fire and is to be investigated 15 Apr. An F Co. reconnaissance patrol reported sighting three enemy vicinity (38.7-99.3) at 1130I and directed mortar fire on the area. Difficult approach to the area prevented results to be obtained at close of period. G Co. reconnoitered the area from (3?.6-99.7) to (37.4-01.3) without contact. I Co. patrol reconnoitered the area (37.5-01.0) south to (39.1-98.8). Reported bunkers and dug in positions approx. 1000 yds. east at (39.0-08.7). A patrol searching for mine fields was fired upon at (38.6-98.3) from an undetermined position. Our OP station at (38.4-98.8) drew long range fire during the day. An overnight C.P. is established at (39.2-98.0).



 A group of 3 or 4 enemy attempted infiltration on Bn perimeter at 0030 hrs, 15 Apr 45. They approached from NNW direction, were fired upon but no evidence found this morning.


To Hq Co, D. F. Secure mortar fire until further orders (air strike) Sgd C.O. 2nd Bn. [Note: After the 4.2 mortar round apparently hit the A-20 on the right wing, mortar fire was always suspended during air strikes].


 To Hq Co, D,F. Be on the alert for improvised land mines made from knee mor­tar and aircraft bombs. Several found in area. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn.


 To CO's D,F, Hq Cos. There will be a meeting of all officers at 1800 hrs Bn C.P. Sgd CO, 2d Bn


 Easy Company with atch Guerillas still in Sinaypanan area, rations dropped by L-5's. Routine patrols from Bn report trcent occupation by enemy but no contact.


 Lt Kemp of Engr Co conducted Officers School of new activating device for grenades & demolition charges."

The heading of each page of the 2nd Battalion Journal has two short lines in which to enter the "PLACE:"    The place which has been given since the battalion arrived on Negros, or 8 April is "Vicinity of Silay, Occidental Negros.

At 0830 one squad under Lt Preston with 22 guerrillas patrolled area 1000 yds. north and east of the perimeter. Patrol returned a 1300 having made no energy contact.

Local patrols by all platt. and the guriella's. (sic) Ore squad ER 2nd Platt. took a Nip truck and patrolled N.W. to Victorias and to Silay. Japs had evacuated a week ago.

Nc entry.




16 April 1945



 No attempted enemy infiltration during the night.



 Patrols ready to move out, due to heavy rains thye are being held up until rains "let up".



 To all Cos & atch units. No captured vehicles or enemy equipment will be used or tampered with by unauthorized personnel. Violatons will be courts-martialed under 80th A.E. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn '


[Note: Captured enemy equipment is the property of the U.S. Government. The "E" Company entry above of capturing a Nip truck and patrolling NW to Victorias and Silay has the smell of a joy ride. These towns were down on the coast on Highway No. 1 far to our rear].



To CO E Co. Await Sinaypanan until further orders. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn.


Patrols moved out but had to return as troops with heavy equipment were unable to descend & climb steep ravines. Radios are out, sets wet by heavy rain.Heavy clouds over enemy prevented scheduled air strikes.


1425 Easy Company rations dropped by C-47 from Mindoro at red smoke signals.


1720 To all Cos & atch units. No one is to leave Bn perimeter without express permission of Bn C.O.    Sgd C.O. 2d Bn.


1803 To all Cos & atch units. Booby traps will be armed at 1830 hrs. Sgd 2d Bn C.O.


Patrol to cross MULAGO RIVER. Postponed because of heavy rain."

Local patrols, no action. One squad left by truch for rt.gt by way of Victorias.

No entry




17 April 1945


No. 9
161600 April 45
171500 April 45

All patrols reporting after close of 161600 period negative. The RCT resumed the attack to the southeast at 0800 hour. The advance progressed 2500 yards against relatively light opposition. Tanks advancing with forward elements were halted due to craters. A bulldozer brought forward to fill in the craters was demolished by a land mine, injuring one. The road forward is heavily cratered and two tank traps have been located. Heavy enemy opposition from mutually supporting bunkers and emplacements is being met at close of the period. We are engag­ing the enemy with machine gun, mortar, artillery, and rifle fire. "E" Co, 503d RCT, and "K" Co, 74th G-F Inf. located at SINAYPANAN continues patrolling that area with nil contact at close of period.


One platoon "E" Co was proceeding to SAN ISIDRO to investigate after a civilian report of enemy located there was received.


[Note: The distance between these two locations is less than 1000 yards. Actually San Isidro can be seen from Sinaypanan which is slightly higher in elevation. The ground was grass covered old sugar cane fields and even.. There were trees on the bluffs at San Isidro which would provide concealment.]


An overnight combat patrol of "I" Co.., 74th G-F Inf. and one plat­oon "L" Co. departed 0800 hr to establish and ambush and reconnoiter the area in vicinity (39.0-02.5). Patrol reached MANSIGUIO (37.2-01.7) with nil contact !430I. A reconnaissance patrol from "F" Co. located an abandoned enemy dump at (36.5-01.5). Dump contained sugar, tinned goods, and demolition bombs and fuses. All demolition stores were destroyed. Food will be salvaged. Security patrols assigned the mission of reconnoitering draws paralleling the RCT route of advance made nil contact."


"Results of Operations: Our forward elements had moved forward approximately 2500 yards and were in contact with well dug in enemyat the close of the period. Rifles and a few machine guns are the only weapons encountered thus far, however these are more num­erous than previously encountered. Our left flank patrol has encountered no evidence of enemy trying to escape to the north." [Note: The enemy had quit withdrawing because we were now facing his main line of resistance, or rather, the first fortified line.]


 Weather clear, thou cloudy in spots. Rain ceased. No attempter infiltration during the nite.


 Reinforced pit. of D Co moved out on over nite patrol. A-20's bombed & strafed enemy positions to frony of 3d Bn lines.

28 1130 To C.O. 2d Bn. Request 81mm fire on (37.3-03.0). Our position is now at (37.3-01.7)   Sgd D Co patrol.


 To C.O. 2d Bn, Civilian reported some Japs in the hills 3 Km due east of San Isidro. No definite number. Have sent reinforced platoon to try and make contact. Sgd C.O. E Co.


 To E Co. 3d Bn has advanced approx 2500 yds. Having light resistance and still on the move. Reinforced Plt from D Co now at (38.0-03.3) on over nite patrol. D Co less 1 Plt is mopping up in rear of 3d Bn advance.1 Plt F Co. is right flank security for 3d Bn advance. F Co. less 1 Pit. in Bn. reserve. In view of conststant (sic) reports of enemy activities vicinity San Isidro, it is desired you lay ambush there tonite or tomorrow nite. Continue with your patroling pending orders. sgd C.O. 2d Bn.


 C.O. 2d Bn. 20 cases rations & radio batteries dropped by C-47. Sgd. C.O. 2d Bn.


 D Co overnite patrol reported Filipino statement of 400 Japs near Losong bario 1;st week. 500-1000 Japs reported by civilians to be in Casa Nova area. Japs traveing at nite. Five light tanks and 4.2 chemical mortar Co spent the nite it our perimeter.

Delayed entry- 1st Lt Beatty trans from E Co to Hq Co as ass't Pit. Ldr. VOCO, 503d R.C.T. Effective 15 Apr 45. 2d Lt. Anthony trans from D Co to E Co as Pit. Ldr, Effective 17 April 45. VOCO, 503d R.C.T. Lt Bailey, C.O. F Co to hospital today. Lt. Calhoun now commands F co.


3rd plt under Lt Watkins w/1 LMG section. 1 section 60mm mortars, and 65 guerrillas crossed Malago River 0900. At 1500 approximately 3000 yds north of the Co. Flip civilians were questioned and gave information that approx­imately 400 enemy had moved through the area the past week. They said Jap foraging patrols were common in the area. Patrol set up perimeter at given designation. During the night interdictory 81mm and 60mm mortar fire used by the patrol. No known enemy casualties.

Local patrols into hills to the N.E. where natives had reported seeing NIPs. None found. Patrols brought in some telephones to be passed on to Regt.

 No entry.

The bulldozer which was destroyed was operated by one of our engineers. They built Tokaido Road as we advanced. It was just a trail in this area, and they converted it into a road. The mine was a large bomb. We though probably a 500 pound bomb. when pressure was applied to the nose of the bomb it was armed. The when the pressure was released it exploded. The bombs were buried vertically with the noses barely exposed, or just under the dirt. When the blade of this D-7 dozer passed on off the nose of the bomb it exploded tearing the blade and its frame off the dozer and hurling it forward. The dozer was thrown backwards down the hill some distance. The driver survived.



18 April 1945


No. 10
171600 April 45
181600 April 45

Infantry. During the night our forward elements were subjected to intermittent small arm fire. The enemy attempted to draw our fire by calling and rattling tin cans bit no attack was made. Our troops retaliated only with mortar and artillery harassing fire. Heavy enemy automatic and rifle fire broke out immediately upon our resumption of the attack which was proceeded by a Division artillery and 4.2 mortar barrage. Tanks, initially unable to move for-ward because of tank-traps, moved into the assault after Engineers had repaired the roadway. At the close of the period our troops had advanced approximately 300 yards and were slowly advancing against enemy automatic and rifle fire.


 No enemy activity during the nite.


To E Co. Render report of compliance on Memo: Censorship Regulations, today, to Bn Sgd Reagan


E Co alerted for move from Sinaypanan area. Guerilla Co ordered return to Reg1l C.P.


To Pit. Ldr. 81mm. Cease mortar fire until further orders- Air Strike. Sdq C.O. 2d Bn.


To C.O. 2d Bn. Rations & radio batteries dropped by C-47. Sgd. C.O. E Co.


D co. Pit. overnite patrol returned. Contacted enemy, 4 enemy KIA. We suffered 4 Guerillas WIA.


To all Cos & atch units. Arm booby traps at 1845 hrs. Inform all personnel not to move out of perimeter. Sgd C.O. 2d bn.


At 0830 patrol moved east. At 1230 a squad of attached guerrillas engaged two enemy snipers, killing a Jap officer. Squad received aromatic fire from 100 yds. south wounding two guerrillas. The 1st and 2d squads under Sgt. Dablock and S/Sgt. Hadrava engaged enemy, killing three and neutralizing automatic weapons fire. As patrol reorganized intense knee mortar fire and small arms fare was received. Pfc. sierra, Pvt. Kimball, and four guerrillas were -lightly wounded.


60mm mortar fire directed by Pfc. Bates was effective to a degree but there was no confirmed enemy casualties. The patrol withdrew upon receiving snoper fire from the right flank. Before recrossing the Mulago River, Lt. Watkins directed the fire of two tanks on the enemy position but the fire was ineffective due to masking ridge. Patrol returned at 1830."


Local patrols. No enemy action. The guriela (sic)Co moved back to their regt. at 1300hr.

no entry


The country was growing more rugged. The flat fields had fallen behind us and we were now headed along parallel ridges separated by deep draws. The closer we came to the mountains the higher were the ridges, and the deeper the draws. Some of the deep draws were heavily wooded, but most of them were clear, with clumps of vegitation, such as banana plants. The ridges were mostly clear of trees and covered by grasses about three feet tall.

The enemy defenses were growing more elaborate. The Japs had a lot of time to prepare these defenses, and they used their time well. Machine guns in deep bunkers were expertly placed so that they were mutually supporting. The north flank of the enemy line extended to the cliffs dropping off to the Mulago River, making flanking approaches impossible. The deep bunkers were connected by trenches dug in the reverse slopes. The flanks were well covered, making flanking movements more perilous than frontal attacks.





19 April 1945


No. 11
181600 April 45
191600 April 45

"Our Operations" states that air strikes at 181630 at (38.6-02.3). No advance. Constant knee mortar fire during the night from which we suffered 1 KIA and 3 WIA.' The enemy harrassed our perimeter with grenades. 1 enemy KIA and approximately seven others heavily fired upon with unknown results.

"An airstrike, beginning at 190730, landed directly on the target at approximately 1500 yards forward of our lines. One A-20 shot down by Enemy A-A. All the crew landed safely within our lines. The enemy A-A believed located at approximately (41.0-95.6) and after being bombed and strafed the area was shelled by our artillery. The change in disposition of our troops became effective at 191000 and the relocation and orientation was being completed as the period closed.      

"G" co. platoon, located at (39.8-96.5) observed a group of approximately 20 enemy digging in the vicinity of ('9.5-96.6). Mortar fire was laid on the position killing three enemy and scattering the remainder. "H" Co. patrolling in vicinity (38.7-02.9) reported no contact 191400. No further report. 3d Bn., 74th G-F replaced forward."

 Results of Operation: "There was no appreciable gain in our front lines during the period. Our activities consisted chiefly of regrouping units, consolidating positions and harassing known and suspected enemy positions."


 Established new C.P. at (39.2-97.7). E Co now under control of 3d Bn control. G Co 3d Bn under control of 2d Bn. We now have attached a air Ln group from 160th Inf, Div arty Ln group of 5 from 40th Dlv, 1. Plt of Co B,-80th Chemical Mortar Bn, two M-7 tank destroyers of 160th Cannon Co, 5 M-4 tanks of 716th Tank Bn, a 90mm gun and crew from 739.. AAA Gun Bn.


Capt Taylor confers with Col Erickson on tactical situation.We are to take over.


Co C.O.'s left for aerial recto flight of front line:


To all C.O.'s & Bn Staff, report to Bn C.P. at 1800 hrs this date.  Sgd C.O.2r Bn.


Had a few enemy artillery burst over Bn. C.P. area with no casualties, also some small arms fire,air strikes again today.


At 0900 Co. moved east on foot to relieve "H" Co. At 1500 while acting as observer for mortar fire, S/Sgt Hadrava was wounded in both arms and Pfc. Gray wounded in left shoulder by automatic weapons fire. At 1600 Pvt. Cousineau accidentally shot himself in the foot. At 2230 approximately 15 enemy attempted infiltration, estimated four enemy casualties were unconfirmed."

The entire Co. moved to (35.6-06.4) and set up peri­meter on Wight ground N. side of Calaptan River . The 1st Platt with mortars and LMG's patrolled S.E. 4000 yds and reported recent NIP occupation.

No entry.


At this time the 2d Battalion was replacing the 3d Battalion as the assault battalion, F Company had been following the 3d Battalion and patrolling the flanks. By this time the patrols were confined to the right flank due to the impossibility of movement along the cliffs of the Mulago River on the enemy's right, our left, flank.  D Company, F Company, and Battalion Headquarters Company moved forward to the front line. We were in perimeter along Tokaido Road (which our engineers had just built) and to the south of the road. The road fell off to the north into a deep ravine. F Company was on the left and D Company on the right, in the center. G Company was on the right flank.





20 April 1945


No. 12
191600 April 45
201600 April 45

"a. Infantry: During the night 19-20 the enemy subjected our forward elements to mortar fire killing one and wounding three. An infiltration attempt cost him 3 KIA. An airstrike at 200730 was relatively ineffective as five of six bombs failed to detonate; the sixth did fall and explode in the target area, enemy dug in positions (40.9-97.3). In its forward effort our leading elements met with fierce machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. This resistance was continuing as the period closed. "E" Co. releived from RCT left flank by "H" Co., in turn replacing "D" Co in the forward central position, A 3d Bn OP discovered a cave in the vicinity (37.7-96.4) in front of 185th Inf. sector. 105mm fire from M-7's were brought to bear and several direct hits were scored. This position will be kept under harassing fire during the night 20-21. "H" Co., patrolling the RCT right flank reported nil contact after having searched the NW-SE ridge in the vicinity (37.6-02.5). Other 3d Bn. patrols searching adjoining ridges to the route of advance reported nil contact. 3d B^., 74th G-F, patrolling the NW-SE ridge (36.5-01.4) reported nil contact."


Results: "The known results of our operations for the period was continued heavy pressure against the strongly held and entrenched enemy MLR."


a. Our Casualties:

(1) For the period: 8 KIA, 12 WIA

(2) To date:   39 KIA, 105 WIA

b. Enemy Known Casualties:

(1) For the period: 3 KIA

(2) To date: 89 KIA, 0 POW"




 During the nite, the enemy attempted infiltration of F Co. perimeter. We suffered one KIA & ooe WIA, 2 enemy KIA.
0800 Air strike by six Corsairs.
10OO E co joins battalion. G Co reverts back to #d Bn control, tho they are still covering our right flank.
12.00 D Co given the mission to take the height ground to their front.
1503 To C.O. 2d Bn. Our C.O. Nickel was just KIA. Sgd D Co. Lt Collins now new commander "D" Co.
1600 F Co reports five enemy arty shells landed in their area beleived to be 90mm. 1630 E Co moved out to take position on rt. flank of D Co. Lt Corder in command. Capt Hill duty to Sk. Hosp.
1700 Lt David, Hq Co LMG Plt Ldr killed in action, body cannot be recovered at this time
1800 'Bn area under small arms fire believed to be spent missies.

3d platoon under Lt. Watkins, attacked and secured ridge to left front of company. No resistance encountered but intense mortar fire was received killing platoon sgt. Rabe, wounding Lt. Preston in the leg, and Pvt Ladig suffered shell shock. The platoon was forced to withdraw. At 1330 the 1st Platoon, under Lt Nikle and the platoon leader Lt. Mara secured the hill and advanced to the next hill  on the right front. Only mild resistance was encountered on the assault but as soon as the hill was secured the enemy countered with very intensive machine gun and small arms fire from the front and both flanks supplemented by accurate mortar fire.

A mortar shell killed Lt. Nickle, amputated T/4 Upchurch's leg causing him to bleed to death, and slightly wounding Pfc. McLaughlin. Pfc Huerter was lightly wounded in a few minutes by mortar fragments, and Lt. David, in command of attached MG platoon, was killed by an enemy sniper. Lt David's body was on the forward slope in an exposed position and Pfc Schupp and Pfc. Fisher were wounded by enemy fire while trying to recover the body. Pvt. Lapidus received a bullet wound in the neck causing his death two days later. At 1400 the 2nd platoon joined the 1st; one squad under Sgt. Minor aided in securing the ridge acid the other two squads under Sgts. Evleth and Stowe acted as litter bearers. Lt Collins assumed command of the Co.


  The Company History has erroneously spelled Lt. Nickel's name as Nickle. Pvt. Drew enlisted Carroll County, NH.

The Company History has erroneously spelled Pfc. Ezra LAPIDOOS' name as Lapidus.  His home state was New York.

  At 1430 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the 1st to strengthen up the position. Enemy mortar fire with sporadic machine gun and small arms fire continued throughout the day. At 1700 one platoon of "E" Co advanced to forward position as support of "D" Co. but was repulsed by hand grenades and small arms fire. At 1800 Pfc. Lovgren was wounded in the shoulder by enemy sniper fire. At 2100 in an unsuccessful attack on a machine gun position one enemy was killed. Mortar fire throughout the night."

The entire Co. moved out at 0900 hr to rejoin the B.N. which releived the 3rd Bn 4-19. At 1500 hr. joined Dog Co. Thwlst platt moved o')t to take Hill 458 on Dog Co's left flank. Hill was taken, four men W.I.A. 1st Putt withdrew to rear of D Co.and set up perimeter. Rest of Co. took up positions along ridge 300 yds west of Hill 458. 14 NIP's counted KIA. 3 Prob.

No entry


The 2d Battalion having replaced the 3d Battalion was now moving forward. "E" Company's left flank was on Tokaido road. "D" Company was on "E" Company's right flank. "F" Company was moved north of Tokaido road to prepare to attack a fortified position commanding two ridges which ran parallel to the ridge which Tokaido Road followed.

The northern slope of the most northern ridge dropped off into the chasm of the Mulago River. One of the companies of the 3d Battalion had been stopped cold there. Another company had been moved over to make the attack. The officers and N.C.O.'s of this company ware gathered with the company commander behind a forward knoll near the line of departure for a briefing. This was on the most northern ridge. Suddenly a shell burst among the group, killing several and wounding several. "F" Company was moved over to position during the latter part of the afternoon of the 20th and prepared to attack the next morning. A narrow dirt road with deep ditches on the sides climbed up to the top of the ridge at an angle. Near the top of the hill where the round exploded the arm of an American soldier, still covered with a fatigue jacket sleeve, lay in the ditch.

"F" Company was to attack along the two parallel ridges and seize a fortified defensive line on a ridge formed by the convergence of the two east-west ridges, and this ridge ran more north-south. Thus the ridge "F" Company was to attack was higher in elevation and at an almost right angle to the line of approach. This was one excellent defensive position, but it was typical of the entire enemy defensive positions, i.e., the enemy held the higher elevations and dominated the line of approach. A flanking movement around the left was impossible because of the cliffs as already explained. We decided to attack with three platoons abreast. The mid platoon, under Lt. Clark, was to attack along the crest of the southern ridge. The 1st platoon, under Lt. Mathis, was to attack along the crest of the northern ridge. The 3d platoon, under Lt. Fennell, was to attack up the draw between Tokaido Road ridge and the southern ridge. This draw was chosen because there was more vegetation and cover, and there was a chance that they could flank the southern end of the enemy held ridge.  Bill Calhoun, accompanied the 1st platoon, which was in the middle of the attack, and attached the flat trajectory mortar squad  (under Pfc. Henry McCrory as the squad leader) to the 1st platoon. The other two 60mm mortars were left in position at our line of departure. They had no ammunition, but it was hoped that might become available.

[Note: This was the same conditions of 9 April when our mortar platoon was left behind because there was no ammunition. What a difference it would have made had we had mortars and ammunition when we were pinned down out in the field at Sinaypanan.   I stated my views of the 8th Army previously, so I will not bore you with redundancy..)   Our other attachments were two artillery sections,  one .50 caliber machine gun from D Battery, 462d P.F.A. Bn.   This was emplaced at the line of departure to be used for direct fire support if the opportunity arose.





21 April 1945


No. 13
201500 April 45
211500 April 45

"a. Infantry: The fire fights In progress at 201500 continued with no gain in ground. Our troops maintained the posit-ions reached and dug in. During the night MG and mortar fire again harrasses our forward elements. infiltration attempts by the enemy resulted in no casualties to our troops while the enemy suffered 4 known KIA's. Air strikes at 210815 (40.9-96.3) and 211215 (38.9-95.4) were very effective, landing in the vicinity of many dug in positions. In our assault to secure high ground to the front "D", "E", "F", and "G" all met with mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from well dug in enemy positions. "G" Company advancing to the position shown on overlay was attempting to secure high ground to it immediate front as the period closed. If secured "G" Co. can aid 1st Bn [ Note: The 1st Battalion was sill on Mindoro. Obviously should read 2d Bn.] with flanking fire and fire on caves in a=verse slopes. Companies "D", "E", and "F" were engaged in fire fight to their front as period closed. "I" Co. patrols to the right and left of route of advance reported nil con-tact during the period. "H" Co. patrolling our left flank, encountered a group of enemy estimated at vicinity (38.4-01.9). The enemy withdrew upon being fired upon evacuating an estimated five casualties. A few rifles, a telephone and wire, some radio components, packs and food were abandoned. Another "H" Co. patrol found and killed one enemy vicinity (38.2-02.2) at an apparent CP. Trenches and positions for about 40 located (38.3-02.2) were unoccupied but showed signs of recent occupation. The 3d Bn, 74th G-F patrolling our left flank reported nil contact. Infiltration attempts against the guerrilla forces during the night cost the enemy 2 KIA." The patrols to the left flank of H Company were far to the left across the Mulago River in the Manzanares area.


"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Our efforts during the period concentrated on continued pressure on enemy's MLR,      right flanking movement by "G" Co. and the searching of left flank positions by "H" Co. See overlay." (MLR is main line of resistance).



D & F Co reports reports repulsed enemy infiltration during the nite. Yester­day the Bn suffered loses of 4 KIAs, 1 DOW and 8 WIAs. D Co. had the most casualties. Lt Nickel C.O. D Co KIA, Lt. Preston D Co. WIA.


Corsairs bombed & strafed targets and also the road.


F Co. moved out to assault hig's, ground on D co. left flank.


D,E,F Co. report receiving heavy enemy Mg & rifle fire.


Our forward movement is being supported by 4.2 Mortar 8 75 & Arty fire.


We suffered several losses again today from enemy gunshot and mortar fire.


Lt. David's body recovered.


Enemy MG fire spotted 1000 yds to G Co front. 90mm gun fired on target effectively.


At 0400 several Japs including a light machine gun squad attacked the company position and succeeded in entering one of the forward trenches; killing Sgt. Circo and Cpl. Sokencamp. One enemy was killed in action but several other estimated enemy casualties were unconfirmed. Sporadic small arms fire continued througout the day. At 1330 Sgt Cleres was killed while observing mortar fire.

Remained in position. 1st platt received knee mortar fire. Two men KIA, 4 WIA. Other fire during the day. No other casualties." Another E company history gives this entry: 'Received enemy mortar fire. Pfc Surwald, Pfc Jandras, and Pfc Showstead KIA. 4 men WIA.

Company attempted to attack an enemy h&c! ridge but, because of the large number of enemy automatic weapons & bunker system, had to withdraw until more support could be brought in. During this action, Pfc Henry McCor: (mispelled-McCrory is the correct spelling) & Pvt Karl Schneider were killed. S/Sgt. Chris Johnson 8 Sgt. Con were wounded." This last name evidently was William F. Cox who is listed in leabhart's 2d Battalion aid station patient registry 21 April with this diagnosis: WIA­GSW-Lt hand. Cris Johnson is diagnosed: WIA-GSW-Lt arm.

Note: Leabhart's 2d Battalion aid station registry is Appendix No. 1. The names of the wounded given only as numbers can be found with the corresponding dates. This also applies to KIA's and DOW's.  Some of the histories do not give the names



2d Battalion commander, Captain Neil Taylor, had ordered "F" Company to be ready to cross the line of departure at 0830 and to take the fortified ridge. The artillery would lay down a barrage ending with smoke rounds to cover the enemy's observance of our attack. We were to move out on a company front, seize and secure the objective. The artillery support would be from our 462d 75mm pack howitzers. The 4.2 mortars would not be able to join in because they were out of ammunition. 

I expected a heavy artillery barrage and was acutely disappointed at the small number of rounds fired. I felt at the time that the only thing that this preparatory fire had accomplished was to alert the enemy that we were coming. Then several smoke rounds were fired, but not nearly enough to form an adequate screen. We could still plainly see the enemy held ridge through the light smoke and knew that they saw us just as well.

Welcome to the new army.

We moved out when the smoke was fired. After moving a short distance, some 50-60 yards, we came to a mine field. It was not well camouflaged. We could easily see the bright, metallic noses of hundreds of small aerial bombs exposed just above the ground waiting to be stepped on. It was probably at least 200 yards to the enemy position, and we suspected the mine field would extend nearly to it. About the time we paused to consider the mine field, a withering blast of machine gun fire swept both ridges. The machine guns' rapid rate of fire identified them as air corps guns. The guns were well concealed in deep bunkers, and we could not spot them. The Japs were so well supplied with air corps machine guns that soon we were saying that where you find two Japs gathered together, you will find a machine gun. Fortunately they were not always too accurate, or we would have all been killed. We hit the ground instantly.

Our situation was not hard to assess. We were pinned down in three foot grass facing a large mine field in full view of the enemy and his automatic weapons. Any movement was reflected in the grass and drew an immediate response of machine gun fire. Any forward movement meant sure death. Henry McCrory was just to my left. Karl Schneider was next to McCrory. Both were hit, McCrory in the head and Schneider in the chest. Both men died before they could be evacuated. McCrory was an old man, Schneider a new man.

The 2d platoon on the north ridge was in the same situation as we were. They were up against the mine field and pinned down. They had wounded, and any movement on their part drew machine gun fire.   The 2d platoon in the draw had not been fired upon, but they were at the mine filed, so the enemy had placed the field completely across the zone of our operation.

The 3d platoon leader, Lt. Fennell. ,told me over his SCR-536 that he thought he could clear a path through the mine field without too much danger, because the noses of the bombs were visible. He would have to proceed slowly. He could see a large banana grove at the base of the enemy held ridge. I told him to go ahead, and the rest of the company would retain their positions in order to keep the enemy occupied. The one fortunate circumstance about our situation was that we were drawing no mortar fire. The enemy made a grave error here. I really believe that he felt that his position was so strong that it could be defended by machine guns and rifles alone, and he allotted his mortars to weaker positions. We lay there baking in the hot, tropical sun with our hopes on the 2d platoon being able to breach the mine field and getting close to the enemy without being detected. Every so often the enemy would sweep the ridges with automatic fire. The hours passed. We still had not spotted one enemy bunker.

As the afternoon wore on Chris Johnson was hit in the arm by a bullet from one of the machine gun bursts. Over on the north ridge William Cox was hit in the hand by a burst. There was some activity around both wounded men causing movement of the grass, so both areas received a lot of attention from the Jap machine gunners. In the meantime Clark and his 2d platoon were gingerly digging out the bombs to clear a way through the minefield.  They were slowly drawing nearer to the banana grove, still undetected.

In the meantime the powers that be were growing impatient. Captain Taylor told me he had received some artillery ammunition, he was going to have another barrage of high explosive (HE) and smoke fired and for us to make an all out assault. I told him that this would be suicidal. We were conversing over SSR-300 radios. I told him we could not charge through a mine field into mutually supporting machine guns with their interlocking lanes of fire and live. I told him I had a platoon in the draw which had worked its way nearly to the banana grove.  Since it was growing late the platoon would probably reach the grove by dark; Fennell and I had decided that it would be better for them to spend the night in the banana grove and attack the ridge at dawn. I planned to send one of the other platoons through the mine field following their path at first light to support Fennell's  attack.

Taylor approved this plan but said he wanted that ridge the next morning. I know Taylor was being pressured to move forward, and I appreciate even more his willingness to go a little slower and save lives. Even today I still become very apprehensive when I think of what would have happened to "F" Company had an all out frontal attack been made.

Near dark, after the 3d platoon reached the banana grove, the company withdrew back to our perimeter on the north ridge. In the growing darkness, suddenly, a Jap jumped up about 20 yards in front of the .50 caliber machine gun, which was dug in on theand charged the gun. The crew members of the gun had been sniped at all day and had never seen a target. The .50 caliber gunner hit the Jap with his first burst and rolled the body over and over along the ground, tearing the body to shreds. He burned up his gun barrel, but he did get a release for tensions and rage which he'd been building up during the long day. We settled down for the night, but Jap infiltrators were active all night and kept us busy. To put it mildly, we did not get a good night's sleep although we were dog tired.

Too much credit cannot be given to Fennell and his platoon for their initiative in pushing through the mine field despite the fact that any moment they might be seen, and subjected to heavy fire in the middle of a mine field. Recommendations were made for awards for this action, but, like many others, I don't think any were ever granted.