22 APRIL - 28 APRIL 1945


 APRIL 1945








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22 April 1945


No. 14
211500 April 45
221500 April 45

"Infantry: "G" Co., advancing with its objective the high ground (38.3-97.8) was forced to withdraw under heavy machine gun and mortar fire to (938.1-97.8) at 211730I. The enemy lost a known 10 KIA during the action. "H" Co. reported 1 enemy KIA attempting observation of the position. 2d Battalion constituting our forward elements, continued its fire fight until dark and consolidated on the 100 yards gained. Mortar fire fell on "E" and "F" Cos. during the night killing 4 and wounding 3.    "H" Co. repulsed an estimated 60-70 Enemy attacking in three columns 22530I. The enemy left a known 10 KIA before withdrawing. "H" Co. patrols were attempting contacts as the period closed. One U.S. heavy machine gun was found abandoned by the enemy along with 1932 Frankford Arsenal ammunition. Enemy aid men were seen evacuating casualties. One platoon "I" Co. moved to occupy ridge vicinity (38.8-97.3) reaching the objective at 221500I. "G" Co. made a dawn attack (220545) behind artillery and 4.2 chemical mortar barrage and secured two hills to its immediate front. By flanking fire, "D" Co. aided "F" Co. to draw abreast as the period closed.

"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Our advance, though small in yardage, gained valuable high ground to our front and flanks. It is believed that "H" Co. engaged and inflicted severe casualties on approximately 25% of the enemy's right sector troops. This estimate is based on G-2 reports of approximately 200 enemy in that vicinity. Known enemy positions under artillery, tank, and air bombardment continually during the period, causing unestimated casualties."


a. Our Casualties:

    (1) For the period: 12 KIA, 14 WIA

    (2) To date:      53 KIA, 131 WIA

b. Enemy Known Casualties

    (1) For the period: 49 KIA

    (2) To date 143 kia, 0 POW"



Arty & 4.2 mortars laid fire for 20 minutes on two hills to the left front of D Co. D co. assaulted erectly after barrage and succeeded in taking high ground objective.


 Casualties for 21 April 45, 7 KIAs, 2 DOWs, 9 WIAs, with E company having the most losses. In addition to Battle casualties, we are having too many hospital cases die to Jaundice & F.U.O.

[Note: Jaundice is hepatitis, called "infectious hepatitis." 
"F.U.O." is "fever of undetermined origin." ]

Air strike by 8- P•-38s, bombed & strafed effectively.


Air strike made on same targets.


E Co preparing assault on enemy positions to their right front.


Air strike again on our front line targets by P-38s.


 Our casualties are heavy again today, our Hq Co LMG Plts attached to line companies are suffering heavy casualties. Gunshot & mortars taking their toll.


Guerrillas quite a problem; nothing but holler for more clothing and food. No sanitation, no discipline, no morale. Moved out on their own will about 1600 this afternoon.


Tanks, 4.2 Mortars & Arty supported our advance today. We had three air strikes today by P-38s, dropped 500 lb bombs and strafed.


0530 a short round from "E" Co. mortars landed by the attached machine gun platoon killing Pfcs. Alexander and Hendricks and seriously wounding Sgt. Pittinger and Pvt. Jackson, all attached from Hq.Co.,2d Bn.

The Company History has erroneously spelled Pfc. Raymond L. HENDRICK's name as  Hendricks.  Pfc. Hendrick's enlisted 11.11.42 and his hometown was Scott County, IA.

At 0545 the 3rd platoon with LMG squad attached, under Lt. Watkins, attacked the ridge 200 yds. to the left front with artillery support, attached 50 cal. machine guns, 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, and small arms fire of both "D" and "E" Cos.    Heavy enemy mortar fire was encountered with no casualties. At 0630 the 1st platoon under Lt. Mara moved to the ridge to the direct front followed by the second platoon under S/Sgt Howard which moved along the ridge to join the 3rd platoon. Sgt. Stowe of the 3rd platoon and Pfc Seims acting as mortar observer were wounded by enemy machine gun fire as the position was being secured. The enemy continued to place mortar fire on the position with no casualties. At 1330 "F" Co. notified "D" Co. that two Japs were in a cave on the forward slope of the ridge occupied by "D" Co. Five men under Pvt. Drews assaulted the cave and killed the enemy. The patrol then moved up the road for reconnaissance. Approximately 50 yds. to the front the patrol received withering rifle fire from concealed positions killing Pvt. Drews and forcing the remaining men to withdraw. With fire support from the entire Co. a volunteer group of five men under Sgts. Minor and Dolan recovered Drews's body. The taking of the two ridges also allowed for the recovery of Lt. David's body."


The Company History has erroneously spelled Pvt. Clyde A. DREW's name as Drews. Pvt. Drew's hometown was Carroll County, NH.


Mortar's & LMG's gave support to Dog Co. who attacked Hill 458 and seized and occupied it at 0630 Hr. At 0800 hr 1st & 2nd and LMG's and mortar Platt moved forward and went into position on Hill 458 with D Co. one man S.I.A. from booby trap left by D Co when they moved forward. light knee mortar and sniper fire during day. Co Hq and 3rd Platt remaining in position."


During the night the enemy pulled an infiltration attack throwing anti-personnel bombs which fatally wounded Pfc. Ralph Bright. During the morning the company successfully attacked & secured part of the ridge which we had failed to take the day before. During this action, T/Sgt Ben Forte was fatally wounded & Pfc Charston & Pvt Allen Klisher were LWA. The third platoon led this attack."


Bright and Penton were Corregidor veterans in the 2nd and 3rd platoons respectively. Forte and Klisher were Mindoro replacements, and I do not know their platoon assignments.

After the 3d platoon approached the banana grove late in the afternoon of the 21st radio silence was observed so that the Japs on the ridge would not become aware of their presence. The platoon remained silent during the night. At first dawn they were on the ridge taking the Japs by surprise. Only the Japs on the north end managed to escape, and they fled to an isolated hill about 200 yards to the northeast. Their attack was over before the support could see well enough to pass safely through the mine field. Over on the south side of Tokaido Road "D"  Company had jumped off at dawn and taken their objective.

During the day we drew considerable machine gun and rifle fire along with occasional mortar fire from the hill to our northeast and to our direct front from another ridge which had been fortified. It was not encouraging to see that we had another strong line of enemy defense to assault. Sergeant Forte was killed during the day as the Jap fire increased. This increased fire led us to believe for a while that the Japs were preparing to counterattack. This was a different breed of Japs, though, from the gung-ho banzai type we knew, especially the Jap Marines on Corregidor. Fighting these more docile Japs was much more difficult and perplexing. They dug in deep, in well prepared positions and patiently waited for us to dig them out. Then at the last moment, they would retreat to the next prepared position, forcing us to start all over again. As things were going we (the assault group) were suffering more casualties than the Japs.

We were still in open country, although the fields were now broken into ridges and draws.  We could look back for miles and miles across the land receding toward the sea.  (See Photo) It was easy to see why the Japs knew all our movements. Looking ahead we could see the forested foothills still some distance away. There looming behind them were tall mountains whose tops were hidden by clouds most of the day. The plains below and to the west were mostly old sugar cane fields. The almost constant winds kept the tall grass moving so that it appeared like waves of water, a true "sea of grass'' as the early settlers described the appearance of the plains. Like the great plains of the United states, this grass was about "stirrup high".

Capt. Jim Mullaney
CO "H" Co.



From my records a better understanding of the happenings on 22 April could be obtained if I start a few days earlier.

April 20, 1945 - Friday.

Moved out of position and proceeded up mountains at 1200 hour.

Met some Filipinos but no Japs. The Filipinos gave us directions but didn't know the Jap strength. Said there were a high number of them - maybe in the hundreds. We crossed Malago. Set up perimeter on high ground. Dug in.

April 21, 1945

0530 Hour.

Mortar fire (knee type) started. Apparently the enemy had watched us dig in last night. Their fire was very accurate and demoralizing. We could hear the shells dropped in the tubes and see a dim outline of them in the early morning darkness as they reached their apogee and began their descent on our positions. a helpless feeling. I estimate this went on for about fifteen minutes.

As the knee mortar shelling lessened the Jap machine guns opened up. All of us new it was their guns because of their higher explosive sound and more rapid fire than ours.

A few M-1s came to life - than BARs - then our machine guns with their deep throat sound opened. Both sides were well trained. No Hollywood trigger squeezing till the belt is empty or the barrel overheats. Short burst were the order of the day for both armies.

Their were screams - shouts- and the usual battle sounds for = maybe - twenty minutes. It was then daylight. The enemy - about 75 of them - began to withdraw. They left with us 10 Jap bodies.

Because we had dug in very well last night the "H" casualties were six wounded.

As the enemy withdrew they crossed a deep ravine and headed up a path about 600 yards from our position. A patrol was sent out but was told to keep them in sight if possible but not to get any closer than a few hundred yards.

"H" set up machine guns in their direction but held fire. The artillery liaison officer was requested to notify his gun crews and spotter pilots.

"H" Company machine guns and 60mm mortars and the seventy fives from our artillery all opened up at a precise moment. After a few minutes firing our patrol moved in. Very few Japs escaped but I can't find in my notes how many were killed.

It was about 7AM when things settled down and the aid men were treating the wounded. I talked to each of them and was making plans for evacuations. PFC Cecil White was conscious and talking but his arm was gone. The stump was about four inches long. He asked me how badly he was hurt. I told him he was seriously wounded and that I would try to get an L19 spotter plane to land and transport him to Bacolod. All the company started cutting grass with their machetes to prepare a landing strip of a few hundred feet. After about an hour the spotter pilot flew over the newly cut strip and radioed he would give it a try.

He sat down within a few feet of the threshold but couldn't stop the roll-out before crashing. He was uninjured but the propeller broke in several pieces.

I dejectedly walked back to Cecil White - not knowing what to tell him.

Cecil White was dead.

The medics told me that in addition to the loss of his arm he also had a "sucking wound" in his chest that was unnoticed earlier.




23 April 1945


No. 15
221500 April 45
231500 April 45

"H" Co. RCT, left flank squad made no other contact with the enemy after 221500. "G" Co., on the right flank, made its third attempt of the day at 221530 to take the ground to its front and was again repulsed by flanking fire. The "I" Co. platoon to its left was held up in its attempt to cross to the intervening ridge by rough terrain. During the night 22-23 knee mortar rounds fell in the "F" Co. position and one enemy was killed attempting infiltration. No action in other company sectors. "H" Co. moved along RCT left flank meeting only long range mortar fire. A reconnaissance patrol to vicinity (40.8-97.5) reported abandoned enemy positions but nil contact. Other activities were seriously curtailed because of heavy rain throughout the day. A 75mm howitzer was moved to "F Co. sector as direct fire sup-port for planned assault 231600 to high ground forward. M•7's and tanks were placed to bring direct fire on suspected enemy positions. 1st Bn. Combat Team landed at Iloilo during the day and its arrival in RCT sector is expected to be completed by 241200I.



 Arty & 4.2 mortars laid harassing fire during the nite. No attempted infiltration of Bn C.P. perimeter. We had 5 KIA and 11 WIAs yesterday, Hq Co losing the most with 6 casualties from Schrapnel (sic) fragments. Our effective strength is now 26 and 450 enlisted men.


No air strikes, operations delayed because of heavy rains.


Two platoons of F co. assaulted hill to their fro:!t knocking out enemy MG position. 1600 Rain continues to delay assaults, our casualties are light today.


Bn C.O. informed that our 1st Bn is now at Bacolod.


At 0505 an enemy counterattack with covering mortar and HMG fire was repulsed by handgrenades and small arms fire. The Co. received no casualties and only one enemy officer confirmed dead. At 1100 the 3rd squad of the 3rd platoon under S/Sgt. William acted as security for mine detecting party going forward on the road. Security patrols from the 1st and 2nd platoons recovered an uniden­tified American soldier's body but nc, enemy was contacted. At 1400 small arms.'and MG fire dispersed what appeared to an assembly for an enemy "Banzai" attack. Pfc Kraus was wounded by enemy sniper fire at 1345. No enemy activity during the night.

No action, low ceiling, planes unable to give support. Fox Co. moved up on our left flank.

The rest of the ridge was taken by 1st platoon & secured by Company "F", this morning being the action (?) Pfcs. Richard Lampman and Earl Soucie were LWA.. The company captured 2 heavy heavy M.G.'s, 2 LMG's and (unreadable, but gives the number of killed)  definitely and unknown number was buried in bunker (unreadable) fire and demolitions. Also captured an unknown number of rifles carbines.


At dawn the first platoon attacked the hill to our northeast. This had been a thorn in our side as we had received machine gun and rifle fire from the enemy dug in there ever since we took the ridge the day before. The 1st platoon moved swiftly and was on the enemy before he could get organized. He had the weapons and the positions to put up a formidable defense, but these dawn attacks seemed to catch him off guard. Apparently the Japs felt that we would not move in the darkness, and we were surprising him. The 1st platoon damaged the enemy badly here and at light costs. Lampman and Soucie were wounded. Lampman's arm was shattered, and he went home. Soucie was less seriously wounded, and he later returned to duty with us.

We had been briefed that many of the Jap defenders were air force service troops. We felt that service troops were ill trained for combat. This was only partly true. These Japanese Air Force ground troops knew how to man a machine gun in a static pos­ition. Poorly trained for combat or not, they knew how to obey orders and this they did to the death. These were not the service troops from Korea and Formosa that we had encountered on Noemfoor. They gave us more trouble, and hurt us more severely than the elite marines. It does not take too much training for a man prepared to die to stay in a bunker firing his weapon until he is ordered to retreat or left to fight to the end.

The next big ridge lay several hundred yards to our front deadly menacing us, because we knew the Japs were there in as much, or more, strength than they had been on the ridge we presently occupied. Good fortune had been with us in this attack. What lay ahead?   The 462d PFA sent a 75mm pack howitzer to our ridge to give us direct fire support for the coming attack. They fire using their open iron sights as we did with our rifles.




24 April 1945


No. 16
231500 April 45
241500 April 45

Infantry: "H" Co., advancing on RCT right flank, received knee mortar and MG fire vicinity (38.8-00.9) at 231715. Mortar fire was requested on the area. "H" Co. patrols have been unable to contact the enemy in that vicinity since that time. "G" Co., again attempting to take the high ground to its front was unsuccessful as of 231800 and withdrew for the night. During the night, 34-24, 2 enemy were killed by "G" Co. and one by "I" Co. attempting to infiltrate. A saber and blood were discovered in the vicinity of an "F" Co. booby trap. Two platoons of "F" Company advancing to a position abreast of "D" Co. discovered caves and recent graves containing a total of 30 enemy dead. In the vicinity of (40.5-97.0) "F" reported silencing one 20mm, one LMG, and 2 enemy KIA as it advanced. "G" Co. supported by "I" Co. platoon on its left destroyed 2 enemy 50 Cal. MG's and killed 3 enemy vicinity (36.3-97.6). An "I" Co. patrol killed 5 enemy in a cave vicinity (40.8-97.6). The cave contained all types of enemy weapons. "G" Co was in a fire fight as the period closed.

"RESULTS OF OPERATION: As the results of "F" Co.'s advance it is apparent that our efforts are inflicting casualties previously unreported. The continued pressure is forcing the enemy to bury his casualties on the spot rather than evacuate them to the rear. Our front lines, now more firmly consolidated, the 1st Bn. now are liable for the left flank protection and action, and the more advantageous position of supporting tanks and artillery, enhance our possibility of a more rapid advance.



About a mile separated the right flank of the 503d RCT and the barbed wire enclosed fortress of the 185th RCT. They had been forted up here when we arrived, and they would remain in their fort until they were withdrawn from the island. In between us were deep, wooded draws and high ridges. The ridges were rough with high hills in many places. The area was also more wooded. Although both our RCT and the 185th were supposed to patrol the area they were not noticeable early in the campaign and became extinct as time passed, so the 503d took care of this area. Before the 2d Battalion relieved the 3d as the assault battalion, as already stated, the 2d patrolled this rugged area. On one occasion Captain Taylor took his three rifle company commander and his S-3, 1st Lieutenant William E. LaVanchure, south down through a heavily wooded draw and up on the first ridge. We found signs of enemy occupation, but they were gone. A few hundreds yards to the east was a prominent hill. This was the hill which gave "G" Company so many problems as they attempted to advance to protect our flank. We probably went out a half mile or more, and I thought at the time it was poor judgment for five officers to be out on a patrol which should be done by a large combat patrol. I carried an 03-A3 Springfield with scope, the company's sniper rifle, Taylor carried a Colt 45 pistol, and the other three carried carbines. Fortunately the enemy had pulled back up to the hill.


 No enemy activity during the nite. Our casualties yesterday were 3 KIAs.
0920  Air strike by 4 Corsairs with poor results.


1st Bn moving up, their C.O. is about 300 yds up the road from ours. They will will work on F Cos left flank.
1330 2 M-7 tanks moved forward to give D Co direct fire support.



Our companies having pushed forward, the Bn C.P. moved forward to (40.4-97.06). Casualties light today so far.


D Co received 6 bursts of enemy artillery believed to be 90mm. No casualties suffered.

 At 1400 two tanks [Note: These were M-4, "Sherman," tanks; M-7's were self propelled 105mm's] were brought up to give supporting artillery fire on enemy positions to "D" Co. front. Enemy artillery secured a hit on one of the tanks but was immediately neutralized. At 1745 two short artillery rounds landed inside the perimeter wounding Pvt. Hardy in the arm. During the night several enemy infiltrations were repulsed.

No Patrolling.

We had received bouncing Betty mines as evidenced in the Periodic Report above which gives the account of an "F" company "booby trap." These were put out just before dark at a time set by battalion on possible routes of enemy infiltration. Then the next morning we took them up at dawn. Despite repeated warnings some men in our RCT were killed by them due to carelessness. They would forget and walk out of the perimeter. 

The 24th was a busy day for "F" Company. The "Chronological History of Company F" makes a mistake here. We were not sitting around writing home and cleaning weapons. That was almost a week off yet- and, even then, part of the company was out on patrols every day, and one platoon was up in the hills on outpost. Early the morning of the 24th "F" Company assaulted the next ridge. This was our first support by 4.2 mortars. They had been used to support other company attacks, but we had never seen them in action. For sometime we had heard of these terrible weapons in Europe , of how when the shells exploded raining phosphorus over the area the Germans jumped out of their foxholes and ran. We knew that in supporting other companies of our unit they were using both HE and WP, i.e., high explosive and white phosphorus. The barrage supporting us was short, because of the ammunition shortage, and we did not see any Japs jumping up and running. They fired several WP shells last resulting in some smoke on the ridge, but we still were not impressed. We moved out very rapidly in order to take advantage of the shock of the HE shells and the smoke. Much to our relief there were no mines and not much fire. The enemy did not seem to be prepared. The most resistance was encountered on the north end of the ridge where it dropped sharply and then rose rapidly back to a hill.    the 1st Platoon attacked this position. Bill McDonald was 1st scout for the 1st squad who was leading the attack along the ridge and then down into the deep swag. As Bill reached a point near the bottom of the swag the enemy opened up with a machine gun which was located in a bunker at the top of the hill. Bill crumpled and fell into the brush along side the trail. All who saw him fall were sure he was dead. The platoon halted and deployed seeking a method to effectively attack this hard to get to position. As they were pondering, suddenly, they heard hand  grenades exploding and a Thompson submachine gun firing. Rushing down to the swag and then up the hill they found Bill McDonald in charge with several dead enemy soldiers. Bill had not been hit by the machine gun's fire but had crumpled and rolled over into the grass to fool the Japs.    He crawled up the hill to the rear of the bunker and threw in a grenade. The Japs threw it back, and it exploded near Bill,  but did not injure him. Bill pulled the pin on another grenade, let the handle fly, and after it fizzed a couple of seconds threw it into the rear opening of the bunker. This one exploded before the Japs could react. Bill jumped down into the ditch behind the bunker ,and firing through the rear opening, killed the occupants. Bill was awarded the Silver Star Medal, and it was presented to him by General MacArthur, 8 June 1945, at 40th Division Headquarters in Silay.

The information given here along with the fact that there were three dead Japs_in the bunker comes from a news article printed in the Mt. Carmel, Illinois "Daily Republican" Register dated June 24, 1945. After forming the company into a defensive perimeter I reported to Captain Taylor over on Tokaido Road. which was still on our right.

When I reached Tokaido Road two M-4 tanks were sitting there behind a hill. They had been a short distance further to the east in front of the hill where they could survey the enemy country to their front and look for targets of opportunity. Suddenly a high explosive round hit the slope plate of the lead tank. This round was fired from a Jap dual purpose 75m gun. Dual purpose means that this high velocity gun could be used as an anti aircraft gun, or it could be used for ground targets. (Our S-3 was convinced that it was a 90mm gun). This particular gun was well concealed in a bunker further east and north of Tokaido Road.    The only damage to the tank was a black spot on the slope-plate where the round exploded. We suspected there was quite an odor inside the tank, but it was buttoned up so tightly that one would never know. I missed the show, but when I got there, the two tightly buttoned-up tanks sat there behind the hill in complete safety.

Captain Taylor pointed out the big ridge to our left front, on the north side of the road. It ran northeast to the southwest which put it at about a forty-five degree angle to the road. Taylor told me that hill was heavily fortified and was now "F" Company's next objective. As we advanced on the left "D" Company would continue to advance on the right. An, M-7, self-propelled 105mm howitzer from the canon company would be up early the next morning to give direct fire support. He told me to get with the platoon leader and see if we could pick out the bunker slits with a 20 power telescope . If the M-7 could find them they could destroy them.

We dug in for the night and at the proper time put out our Bouncing Betties. The incidence of attempted infiltrations decreased with the use of these mines. Even so, occasionally at night one of the bombs exploded. Usually the next morning we would find a lot of blood and a weapon or two. We did sleep better knowing they were there.



25 April 1945



No enemy activity during the nite. F Co reports a booby trap set off. finding enemy rifle, pistol and bloody stains. The Japs are still carrying away their dead & wounded. They are burying their dead in large caves. D Co unearthed two such caves yesterday. We suffered 2 WIAs yesterday, one being Lt Mathers of F Co. There have been no messages the past few days as Capt Taylor has been up at the front directing operations verbally.


F Co assaulted high ground to their front encountering enemy sniper fire. 4.2 mortars laid barrage prior to assault.


E co has secured ridge to their front receiving MG & sniper fire. 1330 C Co. 1st Bn moved up in left flank of F Coo.


Our casualties are heavy today. Hq Co M Gunners catching it again. Most of the casualties being GSWs. "I" co 3d Bn now on D Co right flank. Bulldozers are really doing a job in the operation, filling tank traps and widening the road to bring up supplies.


There is a shortage of mortar ammo of all types. Units have been cautioned to uz.e it sparingly.


at 0545 enemy again attempted to infiltrate but was driven off by automatic weapons fire. One enemy confirmed killed. At 0900 "E" and "F" Cos. moved NE along D co. front. At 1400 the company less the 3rd platoon moved to ridge approximately 400 yds. to the direct front without opposition. At 1630 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the Co. and then moved to the next ridge for reconnaissance. Upon reaching reaching the top of the ridge the platoon came upon a enemy HMG and several supporting pillboxes. The platoon killed two enemy and then withdrew under heavy automatic fire. Pvt. Pitchford was killed and Pvt. Ozarzah wounded by enemy sniper fire, both machine gunners from Hq. Co. Qt 1745 Lt. Beaty in command of attached machine guns was wounded by sniper fire. During the night several attempted infiltrations were repulsed. No casualties.

The Regimental records indicate that as well as Pvt.  Charles L. Pitchford of HQ & HQ Co. 2d Bn,  a Pfc. Bernard T. Owczarzak, also of HQ & HQ Co. 2d Bn died this date, of wounds sustained in combat. Given the difficulty in pronouncing the name, it is almost certain that the two entries are one and the same casualty.  Pfc Owczarzak is buried in Manila.

The company with ate LMG's moved out at 1030 hr. with the mission of seizing and securing hill 500 yd's to the front. By 1400 hr. objective taken and the men were in position and dug in. 1 KIA & 2 WIA fr LMG's. 1 KIA & 4 WA fr Co.


I spent the early part of the morning with the M-7 commanded by 1st Lt Glenn F. Gibson. The two tanks were parked on the road ahead of the M-7. A brigadier general from the 40th Division had given the tank commander a direct order to stay in front of the M-7 and to move on Fentle's command. Gibson had a 20 power telescope mounted on a small tripod. I had my binoculars. We lay on the road beside the M-7 scanning the slope of the ridge we were preparing to attack. When we found a black spot in the grass the gun would fire direct fire at this spot. A large hole would be blown out revealing the remains of a bunker. The M-7 destroyed ten or twelve bunkers in a couple of hours. This would have been a very difficult position to take had we attacked it with the bunkers intact. It might have been more difficult than the line we attacked the 21st.  Now we were using our supporting weapons as we should. We had to learn, though.

We had never operated in open country with armor before. Armor could have been put to great use on Corregidor saving lives. Imagine the effect one tank or M-7 would have had the morning of 23 February operating with "E" Company on South Shore Road in the attack on Battery Monja.  While Gibson and I were studying the slopes of the ridge he called my attention to the bottom of a draw near the trail which our engineers were converting into Tokaido Road. There was a doorway leading into a small cave or dugout. A Jap field grade officer was standing in the doorway looking our way through binoculars. The reason we knew he was a field grade officer was because he wore leather leggins, a leather belt, and leather shoulder straps. I was closely watching him when he disappeared into a cloud of smoke, dust, and flying timber due to a direct hit from the 105mm gun. Later, after we advanced, some of the men found a leg encased in a leather leggin.

During the search and fire procedure Gibson had the tanks move forward two or three times. The tanks were tightly buttoned-up, so he communicated with them by the microphone hanging on the left rear of the tanks. The tanks never fired a round that morning. As soon as we felt that M-7 had destroyed the bunkers, I went over to the company and told Capt Taylor that we were ready. The 4.2's fired a short barrage of HE and then smoke, and we moved out. We were not fired upon. The M-7 had found and destroyed every bunker. This was a classic example of the use of direct supporting fire. Granted the situation was perfect for this support, i.e., the entire slope was in view and in line with the M-7.



26 April 1945


No. 17
251500 April 45
261500 April 45


 The PR's now begin to usually list each battalion's action under separate paragraphs. The 1st Battalion is now responsible for the RCT's  left flank (north flank) relieving "H" Company. The 3d Battalion is responsible for the right flank. "G" and "I" companies are still engaged with the well entrenched enemy who have been holding up "G" company for several days. The 2d Battalion action is as follows: "


"D" Co. received four rounds knee-mortar fire at 260710; no casualties inflicted. "D" Co. began an assault on the high ground vicinity (39.5-97.05) after a concentrated barrage from the artillery, tanks, and mortar fire, practically neutralizing the ridge. An enemy MG and knee-mortar were captured.

"E" Co. sustained a dawn attack at 260610 by an estimated 30 enemy. Twenty were killed at practically point blank range including one officer. The group employed 2 MG ans one knee mortar.     

"E" Co. also neutralized MG position vicinity (40.0-97.3) with 81mm fire.

"F" Co. moved a platoon to the high ground vacated by "D" Co."

 "RESULTS OF OPERATION: With the addition of our third (1st) Bn Combat Team, the RCT has begun to exploit the left flank to a much greater width. This area has been viewed viewed with suspicion since the operation began, and is now proven to contain enemy strong points. The early morning attack seems to indicate that the continued pressure and assaults are contracting the enemy forces with the results that he is attempting to hold his position by counter-attack.



Casualties of yesterday 4 klAs & 6 WIAs, Hq Co again having the most. E Co. reports a large group of Japs attempting of their perimeter early this morning. With MGs & mortars E Co. repulsed them killing 20 including one officer. Captured 1 LMG. D Co received mortar & sniper fire in AM.


D Co. & E Co advanced assisted by 81mm & 4.2 and arty fire, plus M-4 tanks.


40mm enemy gun fired on M-7 tank. M-7 returned fire with 3 rounds, knockeding out gum and observed 3 to 5 enemy dead near gun position.


Air strike by 2 Corsairs bombed and strafed target.


Received word that there are replacements enroute to regiment. With our loses we could use replacements at this time. Casualties heavy again today, losses split about even among companies.


One enemy killed attempting infiltration. At 1130 after an artillery and mortar barrage the 1st platoon under Lt. Mara advanced to the ridge to the company right front (SE). The second platoon under S/Sgt. Howard moved to the 1st platoon left flank and the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins moved to the right flank. resistance was light and Pfc. Reynolds was the only casualty being slightly wounded with head wounds. Nineteen enemy killed in action. Demolitions used during the day to destroy enemy pillboxes and caves. Shortly after dusk as three attached artillery machine gunners were setting out Bouncing Bettys, one enemy attempting to infiltrate activated one of the traps, killing himself and seriously wounding two of the artillery men.. The wounded men were evacuated during the night. At 2300 an attempted enemy infiltration was repulsed and two enemy were killed.

In predawn attack 9 enemy KIA, 1 Nambu LMG captured.Attack repulsed by 1st, 2nd, 3rd Pltn, and LMG's. 4 attached personnel (LMG-3, Med Det-1) WIA fr knee mortar attack following repulsed attack. Pltns remained in position on hill. 3 Enemy KIA by 2nd Plat 1730 hr hr bringing total kia 23 - 1 man WIA by sniper fire."

The other E Company history says:

Pre-dawn attack by Nips, 4 attch. personnel wounded. Nips killed numbered 23.


"The past two days have been spent quietly in the mens positions, giving all a chance to write home and clean weapons for the action that was seen in the future. During the afternoon of today an artillery shell burst over the company CP and fatally wounded Pfc Virgil Surber."


I have already commented that the company did not get any rest on the 24th and 25th April.

The artillery round that killed Virgil Surber was fired early that morning while the men were heating their 10 in 1 rations. The mortar platoon was about 40-50 yards from the company C.P. They were down the ridge and below us, and I could see them plainly The round burst in the air, and there seemed to be no unusual activity such as yelling "medic". As a consequence I was stunned to learn that Surber was dying. Just one single air burst that seemed so insignificant.

Soon after this the 1st platoon reported a Jap digging a hole at a long distance, to their front. Their M-1 did not disturb him, and they wanted the sniper rifle - the Springfied 03-A3 with telescope. I had been carrying the rifle, since my weapon did not matter much. I took the rifle to them along with some Blue Goose ammunition. (These were incendiary bullets used by the Air Corps, specifically the Australian Beaufighters,  which still numbered 30 caliber machine guns in their armament. These bullets were excellent to spot the point of impact because you could see a point of flame there.  We set the scope at zero windage and 1000 yards range. Bill McDonald was selected to be the shooter. The Jap had his back to us and was about knee deep in the hole he was digging. He would straighten up throwing the dirt over his shoulder and then bend forward away from us as he dug in with his shovel. Bill fired and the Blue Goose flamed a couple of inches above where the Jap's suspenders crossed. The body lay there for days and could be seen from the road after it was extended up into that area. The body lay on the side of the hill with the feet still in the hole, indicating our enemy had died instantly.

We received orders to move across the road to the south side. AA guns were being emplaced in forward positions to give us direct fire support. A quad fifty mounted on a trailer (four .50 caliber machine guns) and a 90mm were attached to our battalion. The 90 was emplaced on a high prominence on the south side of the road. A revetment consisting of several rows of sand bags was built around the gun. This gun faced a deep valley with the ridges running to the southeast.  We moved down into this valley and up on to two parallel ridges to the southeast of the gun, about three hundred yards away. Tokaido road had been completed to the gun, and the trail continued on along the north side of the north ridge of the two parallel ridges we were occupying. We set up a perimeter defense here.

That afternoon I was called to report to the battalion command post.    It was located near the 90mm gun. "F" Company was given the mission of taking the high ground. The ridges led to some 400-500 yards to our front. We were to dig in immediately upon seizing the objective, preparing to repel a counterattack. The position was a very strong defensive position. The armored vehicles could not be used in this rugged terrain, so we would have strong  artillery and mortar support. A battalion of corps artillery, 155mm rifles (Long Toms), would be used to support us along with 4.2 mortars, battalion 81mm mortars, and our own 60mm mortars would be take part in the supporting fires. This was the first time we would have such support. Even so, we knew how deep the Japs dug in, so we were not expect-miracles. I personally would have much rather had an M-7, but that was out.

After being briefed and receiving my orders I took the shortest route back to the company, which was down the trail into the valley, up the valley crossing under the 90mm (perhaps 100 feet above), and on to the ridge where our C.P. was located. Just as I got in front of the 90,  it fired. Although it was far above me the concussion almost knocked me to my knees. I would never walk in front of one of those things again.

About this time the mystery of the Jap dual purpose gun was solved. The Jap crew made the fatal error of firing at the 90, and they were only 600-700 yards away. The HE shell hit the outer wall of the revetment protecting the 90. Aside  from throwing up a lot of sand and damaging some of the outer rows, no real damage had been done. But someone in the 90 crew had seen the muzzle flash in the side of the hill. The 90 fired several rounds,  and the side of the hill seemed to explode with dirt, logs and debris flying through the air. Lying among the logs was the gun barrel on the lower slope of the hill. Several feet were missing from the muzzle. The remaining barrel was split and spread out like a blunderbuss. Looking west toward the sea we could see all the way to the coconut grove, several miles away, where Donaldson was killed 10 April. We never found another gun in this area and felt this was the gun that had been firing on us and the tank.

Several days before this, while we were still a mile or so away, our artillery and mortars had caught a resupply train of mules bringing in supplies to the Japs. This was in a draw not far to the north of the 75mm dual purpose gun. After we had begun our advance against the Japs every few days the Japs would rake our front lines with intense machine gun and mortar fire for 15 to 20 minutes. These sudden attacks would put us down deep in our foxholes. There had to be a reason for these outbursts so during one of the attacks, someone kept a close observation of the enemy lines. Sure enough, a good distance to the east a mule train was spotted coming over a ridge. In a short time our artillery and mortars rained in on the draw into which the train was heading. This stopped Japanese resupply. I was later told that our troops who went into that draw found a lot of dead mules. Nothing is mentioned in the periodic reports, so maybe it had been just us who had thought that the Japanese efforts had been hurt.

But then, what do front line soldiers know?




27 April 1945


No. 18
261500 April 45
271500 April 45


2d Bn: "D" received 6 rounds of knee-mortar at 270100 which evidently proceeded an infiltration attempt at 270139. Two enemy were killed as a result. The company supported "F" Co. during the day. "E" Company in supporting "D" Co's attack 261445 assault, reported 3 enemy killed. After a mortar, art­illery, 90mm and machine gun preparation "F" Co. assaulted and secured the ridge vicinity (39.5-96.9). In doing so "F" Co. encountered MG and rifle fire. One 20mm cannon was destroyed and one captured. A Browning 30 caliber machine gun was also captured. At the close of the period "F" Co. was patrolling to its front.


[Note: The Browning machine gun was probably one of the U.S. Army's captured in 1942]. The 3d Bn report states that "G" Company with one platoon of "I" Company supported by flanking fires from "F" Company finally were able to advance. Also under the "Artillery Report" the PR's state that 40mm AA guns were used in direct support of our attacks.


Casualties yesterday 10 WIA from both Y.S. & S.F. Our total casualties to date 28 KIAs &!DOWs- 50 WIA. Bn effective strength 24 off- 413 Em. Moradle- High despite losses.


F Cv moved out to assault ridge to their front that was subjected to heavy arty, mortar and tank fire, secured ridge and sent out patrols.


Very few casualties today up until this time.


Air strike by 4 Corsairs on targets about 1000 yds to F Co fronts.


General Brush &aide were out at front today with Col Jones & Capt Taylor viewing operations.


At 1100 Pvt. Elias was wounded in the left shoulder by enemy sniper fire. No other enemy contacts were made.

1 man WIA by sniper fire in C. P. Co. remained in position on Hill #452. 8 Enemy attempted infiltrate our position approximately 2200-2300hr. 2 Enemy KIA by 2nd Platt. and remainder driven off. 2 caves..?"

The other history says: "One man WIA by sniper fire, 2 Nips K.I.A.

Company moved out on the attack after heavy artillery barrage and advanced to hill approximately 200 yds. in front of our perimeter. The 1st and 2nd platoons led this attack, which resulted in Pfc Morton Kaufman being LWA. Four HMG's were captured.


The 1st platoon was to attack up one ridge and the 2d was was to attack up the other ridge. The 3d platoon was to follow in reserve. We had an ample supply of 60mm mortar ammunition. I believe the 60's of "D" and "E" Company joined in this barrage. The battalion 81mm's and the 4.2's also delivered a heavy bombardment. The star of the show, though, were the 155mm "Long Toms" which I believe were being used for the first time supporting our RCT. The 40th had preserved this corps artillery for their own support up until this time. As the stars, the "Long Toms" began the show. These guns were to the south of us, and we could see them them through our binoculars as they fired from their position in the 185th fortress. To our consternation the first round landed in our position. Fortunately no damage was done and corrections were made. The combined weapons laid down a terrific barrage of considerable length, and the ground was shaking.  Now we had the ammunition that we should have had all along.Map available by request only

When the smoke rounds were fired signifying the end of the barrage and our signal to move out rapidly on a line of skirmishers. It was beautiful. The men were tired. This was their seventh day in continuous combat. They had made one assault after another on well defended positions, subject to sniper fire during the daylight hours, and then getting little sleep during the night due to the enemy attempting to infiltrate our positions. Even today every man who was there has many accounts to give of these almost nightly attacks. Yet when the platoon leaders blew their whistles signaling the men to move out, they arose as one man at moved forward very rapidly. I'll never forget this scene and the surge of tremendous pride in serving with such me. Never were the words "I'm proud I'm allowed" more evident. As I remember I was on the south ride and could see both platoons very clearly. Of all the assaults I participated in, this magnificent charge stands out by far the clearest in my mind. Hollywood could not have staged an equal. The Australian instructors in the Jungle Warfare School had cautioned us to observe our men when the signal was given to move out in the assault in order to make sure that everyone was up and moving even if it meant "blowing a bit of dust out from under their noses".  That was needless advice to us. Our men were airborne.

The Japs had been set in good positions with their automatic weapons set up with interlocking lanes of fire and protected in deep bunkers. The heavy, prolonged barrage hurt them, and before they could recover their wits our men were on them. Morton Kaufman was our only casualty, and he was "lightly wounded". Of course the classification "lightly wounded" was anything short of critical. It was possible in the 503d to lose a leg or an arm, and still be considered "lightly wounded." We captured four heavy machine guns and felt like a few light machine guns got away. We actually saw Japs running for their lives several hundred yards to the east as we took the high ground which was our objective.

We sent out local security patrols to check the bushes around us and dug-in. "D" Company moved into the position we had occupied the night before. This was 400-500 yards to our rear and not 200 yards as the company history states. "D" Company was to attack the the next morning by moving up to our position and using it as their line of departure. Their objective was a ridge which ran north-south for a short distance, a ridge formed by the two ridges we were on converging. This ridge was a high commanding position. The forest of the foothills began here.

About this time the company commanders were being flown over the Jap lines in liaison planes which belonged to the artillery. Even though this gave us a good view on the terrain we were to attack, we were not overjoyed to make these flights. The pilots had to fly in low in order for us to see, and the Japs loved to shoot at these slow, low flying airplanes. You could hear many of the bullets cracking when they passed nearby. It was not a comforting thought to think that there was only a thin piece of fabric for protection. Machine gun burst were especially discomforting.

 One other incident happened here as I remember. Another A-20 was shot down. Two other downing of A-20's have already been given, but this one was different in that a civilian was aboard. The A-20 was flying across our front along the position on the perpendicular ridge which D Company was to attack the next day. This was 800-900 yards ahead. As the A-20 was bombing and strafing this position, suddenly flame shot out of its left engine. The pilot banked sharply back toward our lines. By now most of the left wing seemed to be engulfed in flames. As he approached our position, he was several hundred yards to our right, a flaming wheel fell off. The wheel looked like a flaming doughnut as it feel harmlessly into an area of rough terrain. The plane was close to the ground and was losing altitude, but the land was sloping down toward the south, so as he passed to our right, he seemed to be maintaining his altitude. Our RCT headquarters was located on a grassy plain, and we could easily see their tents. As the plane  approached this area,but several hundred yds. south of the command post a parachute popped operas though the ripcord had been pulled early, jerking the jumper free of the plane.

 The chute appeared to brush the tail of the plane before it popped fully open. Watching through binoculars I could see that the jumper appeared to land safely, even though he had jumped so near to the ground. The plane bellied in and as it slid along the ground two men could be seen jumping over the side from the interior of the plane - the cockpit and the gunners position. Of course was a mile or more,  and we could not see any other details with the binoculars. A few hundred yards further along the plane exploded. All three occupants escaped serious injury. The parachutist, the civilian, was a photo­grapher for "Life Magazine." I read of this incident in some book many years ago, but I do not remember the name of the book. We heard that the plane was hit by a mortar round. This was the same story we heard as the cause of the other A-20 downings. In fact there was a standing order that mortar fire would cease during air strikes. The A-20's flew low and horizontal at a fairly slow speed, so I really think that Jap AA, fire, probably 20 or 40mm, was hitting these planes.




28 April 1945


No. 19
271500 April 45
281500 April 45


The 1st Battalion on the left flank, and the 3rd Battalion on the right flank continued to take some ground in order to keep up with the 2d Battalion and protect their flanks. They also did much patrolling.

2d BN: "D" Co. reported two or three enemy attempted infiltration 280230 but were dispersedd with hand grenades. Two enemy found dead by security patrol at 280600 presumably killed by artillery harassing fire. After artillery and mortar preparation "D" Co. passed through "F" Co. and by assault advanced to (40.5-96.7) encountering knee-mortar and long range rifle fire.

"E" Co. repulsed a 280500 infiltration attempt with hand grenades and no known casualties on either side. "E" Co. secured high ground


Our casualties yesterday were 3 WIAs. D& E Co reports attempted enemy infiltration early this A.M.


Air strike by four Corsairs.


Barrage of arty, mortar and tanks prior to assault by D Co. on ridge to their front. 


E CO. move out on assault encountered heavy sniper & MG fire.


Our casualties are very heavy today due to forward movement by D & E Co.


500lb bomb hung on Corsair making bomb run. Bomb broke loose over our C.P. area falling 50 yds from 3d Bn C.P.


F Co moved forward to aid D Co in holding the ridge. Our Bn received 28 replacements, 19 being assigned to D Co and 9 to Easy Company. Replacements were from Para replacement pool, left the States early part of March. There were several rated among them.     The replacements will just about cover our losses for today.

 The S-3 journal does not mention any replacements being directed to "F" Company,  but this was the day that an unfortunate young paratrooper arrived.  Jose Calderon will be fated to spend less than a week with his new company.

At 1245 after an artillery preparation the Co. advanced thru "F" Co. to secure a ridge junction 800 yds. to the front. The 2nd platoon under S/Sgt Howard moved up the ridge on the right side of the 1st platoon under Lt. Mara on the ridge to the left and the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins slightly to the rear on the right ridge and in the intervening valley. As the 2nd platoon advanced they received intense small arms fire from both flanks. Small arms fire from the 3rd platoon neutralized the enemy fire from the left and 60mm mortar fire silenced the fire on the right. In the advance Pfc. Jackson was killed and Pfc. Benci was wounded in the wrist and leg, both by snipers.

When the 1st platoon was stopped by small arms fire a heavy concentration of enemy mortar fire wounded Lt. Mara in the legs, Pvt. Raines in the hip, Pvt. Verdell in the arms and foot, and Pvt. Jones hit in the leg. The 3rd platoon moved over to the 1st platoon position and incorporated the remainder of the first platoon as a squad under S/Sgt Davis and with the aid of Co. "E" which was attacking on "D" Co. left flank overran the Jap position. The 3rd platoon then continued on along the valley to the ridge junction. Pfc. Sierra and S/Sgt. Van Horn were slightly wounded by enemy hand grenades.

Sgt. Koner of the attached machine guns was wounded in the hand by rifle fire. After the position was secured "E" Co. dug in on the left with "F" Co. in the center and forward and "D" Co. on the right rear. Enemy sniper fire was continued throughout the day. At 1630 "D" Co. received 19 replacements, 9 of which went to the combined 1st and 3rd platoons and 10 of which went to the second. Occasional mortar fire was received during the night but no "D" Co. casualties.


Displaced forward app. 900 yds in Co assault. Captured and secured ridge at road junction. Our casualties- Coord. (40.5-96.9) 2 KIA, 6 WIA plus 1 KIA LMG Sect., 4 WIA - plus 1 Filipino litter bearer . An estimated 30 Enemy KIA. Radio Transmitter detected under knoll at above coordinates - 2nd Bn. Demolition Squad-spent afternoon sealing caves, Flame throwers, etc. Demo. Sgt SWA. Some sniper fire received at sundown - during night. 3 Japs dug out of one sealed cave - 1 killed inside perimeter. 1 nip LMG (not a Nambu) captured in afternoon assault."

Other E company history:

"Company assaulted 900 yds. to the front, Sgt. Butch and Pfc Perrault K.I.A. 6 men W.I.A. Estimated 30 Nips killed.

Company spent the morning doing local patrolling. Sniper fire killed Pfc. Ace Dibble and seriously wounded Pfc. Woodrow Hart and Johnny Peters.


Dibble was in the 3d platoon and had jumped on Corregidor. Hart was also in the 3d platoon. He was one of the oldest (in "F" company service) men who was probably due rotation. He was seriously wounded on Noemfoor. Now he had another wound classified as serious. I believe he lived over this serious wound, too. Peters  also had jumped on Corregidor. He was in the 2nd platoon, and I believed survived his serious wound, too. The histories were written some time later, and usually if the person died, the history would record him as DOW (died of wounds.)

After removing the bouncing Betties and sending out short security patrols to make sure no Japs were lurking in nearby bushes, we prepared to support "D" Company's attack and to follow them up the ridges.   Our support would be principally with our 60 mm mortars, the LMG platoon attached to us,  and the 50 caliber HMG attached to us from "D" Battery, 462d PFA.  For some reason that I do not remember today, the attack was not made early in the morning when we were having our most success. Probably we had to wait for a resupply of mortar and artillery ammunition. I do not think the artillery and mortar support was as complete as the day before, when they supported "F" Company. The 155mm "Long Toms" were not used. I really think the G-2 underestimated the enemy capabilities, that the positions seized the day before had broken the last of the fortified entrenchments on Tokaido Road.

We were not impressed by the 40th G-2. One thing that always upset us was that they would fire the 155mm day and night, at intervals of course, at forested areas in the mountains. They would fire a certain number of rounds and take a percent figure and this was the number of enemy casualties they recorded. Our figures came from a body count. If we didn't find a dead body, it didn't count.

"D" Company was to attack along the two ridges we followed and take the ridge junction. "E" Company was to follow attacking along the north side of the north ridge guiding on the trail. Their objective was the ridge formed by the convergence of the two ridges. This short ridge was about perpendicular to the two converging ridges. It was a very high, razor back ridge which was about 150 yards long running north-south. It dropped off rapidly at both ends. The south end merged with a smaller ridge south of the south ridge we attacked along. This lower ridge continued on east into the forest. The trail which our engineer company had been converting into a road for vehicles (Tokaido Road) climbed up on the north end of the tall, razor back ridge, followed the spine of the ridge south, down to the lower ridge and followed it into the forest going east. We would come to know this trail well, since it led to an outpost a mile or so up in the forest where we would set up an out post.

 After "D" Company moved through our automatic weapons fire was limited in order not to fire into the assaulting "D" company troopers. We did have a good field of fire on the south slope of the south ridge. The 50 caliber HMG was set up to fire along this slope. We saw a Jap jump up and make a run for the bottom of the draw. The HMG caught him before he made it to safety. The burst of the machine gun caught him in full stride and an arm was clearly seen to fly off ahead of the body before it fell.

 We moved out following "D" Company and soon were passing "D" Company casualties. Again I "praised" the lieutenant general for his "skill" in supplying his command. In my opinion "D" Company suffered because of a reduction in artillery and mortar support. Lt. Jack Mara was among the first casualties we encountered. Jack had served briefly as my assistant platoon leader when he joined the outfit on Leyte, and I thought a lot of him. He was a good officer. There was a bullet hole on each side of his neck where a bullet had entered one side and exited the other. Amazingly, the bullet had passed through without hitting the spinal column or any vital organ. In fact Jack was unconcerned over this wound. An exploding mortar round had sprayed his legs with fragments causing multiple penetrations and considerable pain. I was telling the medic to do something about Jack's neck, and Jack was telling him to see to his legs.    Fortunately, the wounds were not serious, and Jack was back in a month or so.

The good soldiers healed quickly.

"D" Company with "E" Company's help on the north ridge took the objective.  "F" Company moved up on "D" company's right and occupied the north-south ridge. "D" company shifted over and set up on the lesser ridge on "F" Company's right flank. "E" Company set up on the north ridge with their right flank tying to "F" Company's left flank. As said above,  the north-south ridge was a high, narrow ridge with steep sides. The company dug in along the crest, or rather two platoons did. The mortar platoon and the other rifle platoon were down in the draw of the junction of the ridges. One section of the 3d LMG platoon attached to us was dug in on the crest, too.  This platoon served well with us, and  I  am sorry that our company history fails to record the casualties they suffered while attached to us. I can remember several, but not by name.

The "History, 503d RCT, Phase X" states in the 28 April entry made at 2400 hour: "We have had more casualties than the enemy- there are 18000 of them. Progress is extremely slow."

Throughout, the guerrillas presented a problem for us.  Except when they were under the control of a regular officer who could order them to a designated task, they were an ill disciplined group of mouths to feed, and backs to clothe. Later, some of the people "liberated" in Victorias would advise me privately that they had been in as much fear from some of the guerillas bands as they had been of the Japanese.