"H" Co. RCT, left flank squad made no other contact with the enemy after 221500. "G" Co., on the right flank, made its third attempt of the day at 221530 to take the ground to its front and was again repulsed by flanking fire. The "I" Co. platoon to its left was held up in its attempt to cross to the intervening ridge by rough terrain. During the night 22-23 knee mortar rounds fell in the "F" Co. position and one enemy was killed attempting infiltration. No action in other company sectors. "H" Co. moved along RCT left flank meeting only long range mortar fire. A reconnaissance patrol to vicinity (40.8-97.5) reported abandoned enemy positions but nil contact. Other activities were seriously curtailed because of heavy rain throughout the day. A 75mm howitzer was moved to "F Co. sector as direct fire sup-port for planned assault 231600 to high ground forward. M•7's and tanks were placed to bring direct fire on suspected enemy positions. 1st Bn. Combat Team landed at Iloilo during the day and its arrival in RCT sector is expected to be completed by 241200I.

 Arty & 4.2 mortars laid harassing fire during the nite. No attempted infiltration of Bn C.P. perimeter. We had 5 KIA and 11 WIAs yesterday, Hq Co losing the most with 6 casualties from Schrapnel (sic) fragments. Our effective strength is now 26 and 450 enlisted men.

No air strikes, operations delayed because of heavy rains.

Two platoons of F co. assaulted hill to their fro:!t knocking out enemy MG position. 1600 Rain continues to delay assaults, our casualties are light today.

Bn C.O. informed that our 1st Bn is now at Bacolod.

At 0505 an enemy counterattack with covering mortar and HMG fire was repulsed by handgrenades and small arms fire. The Co. received no casualties and only one enemy officer confirmed dead. At 1100 the 3rd squad of the 3rd platoon under S/Sgt. William acted as security for mine detecting party going forward on the road. Security patrols from the 1st and 2nd platoons recovered an uniden­tified American soldier's body but nc, enemy was contacted. At 1400 small arms.'and MG fire dispersed what appeared to an assembly for an enemy "Banzai" attack. Pfc Kraus was wounded by enemy sniper fire at 1345. No enemy activity during the night.

No action, low ceiling, planes unable to give support. Fox Co. moved up on our left flank.

The rest of the ridge was taken by 1st platoon & secured by Company "F", this morning being the action (?) Pfcs. Richard Lampman and Earl Soucie were LWA.. The company captured 2 heavy heavy M.G.'s, 2 LMG's and (unreadable, but gives the number of killed)  definitely and unknown number was buried in bunker (unreadable) fire and demolitions. Also captured an unknown number of rifles carbines.

At dawn the first platoon attacked the hill to our northeast. This had been a thorn in our side as we had received machine gun and rifle fire from the enemy dug in there ever since we took the ridge the day before. The 1st platoon moved swiftly and was on the enemy before he could get organized. He had the weapons and the positions to put up a formidable defense, but these dawn attacks seemed to catch him off guard. Apparently the Japs felt that we would not move in the darkness, and we were surprising him. The 1st platoon damaged the enemy badly here and at light costs. Lampman and Soucie were wounded. Lampman's arm was shattered, and he went home. Soucie was less seriously wounded, and he later returned to duty with us.

We had been briefed that many of the Jap defenders were air force service troops. We felt that service troops were ill trained for combat. This was only partly true. These Japanese Air Force ground troops knew how to man a machine gun in a static pos­ition. Poorly trained for combat or not, they knew how to obey orders and this they did to the death. These were not the service troops from Korea and Formosa that we had encountered on Noemfoor. They gave us more trouble, and hurt us more severely than the elite marines. It does not take too much training for a man prepared to die to stay in a bunker firing his weapon until he is ordered to retreat or left to fight to the end.

The next big ridge lay several hundred yards to our front deadly menacing us, because we knew the Japs were there in as much, or more, strength than they had been on the ridge we presently occupied. Good fortune had been with us in this attack. What lay ahead?   The 462d PFA sent a 75mm pack howitzer to our ridge to give us direct fire support for the coming attack. They fire using their open iron sights as we did with our rifles.

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Infantry: "H" Co., advancing on RCT right flank, received knee mortar and MG fire vicinity (38.8-00.9) at 231715. Mortar fire was requested on the area. "H" Co. patrols have been unable to contact the enemy in that vicinity since that time. "G" Co., again attempting to take the high ground to its front was unsuccessful as of 231800 and withdrew for the night. During the night, 34-24, 2 enemy were killed by "G" Co. and one by "I" Co. attempting to infiltrate. A saber and blood were discovered in the vicinity of an "F" Co. booby trap. Two platoons of "F" Company advancing to a position abreast of "D" Co. discovered caves and recent graves containing a total of 30 enemy dead. In the vicinity of (40.5-97.0) "F" reported silencing one 20mm, one LMG, and 2 enemy KIA as it advanced. "G" Co. supported by "I" Co. platoon on its left destroyed 2 enemy 50 Cal. MG's and killed 3 enemy vicinity (36.3-97.6). An "I" Co. patrol killed 5 enemy in a cave vicinity (40.8-97.6). The cave contained all types of enemy weapons. "G" Co was in a fire fight as the period closed.

"RESULTS OF OPERATION: As the results of "F" Co.'s advance it is apparent that our efforts are inflicting casualties previously unreported. The continued pressure is forcing the enemy to bury his casualties on the spot rather than evacuate them to the rear. Our front lines, now more firmly consolidated, the 1st Bn. now are liable for the left flank protection and action, and the more advantageous position of supporting tanks and artillery, enhance our possibility of a more rapid advance.

About a mile separated the right flank of the 503d RCT and the barbed wire enclosed fortress of the 185th RCT. They had been forted up here when we arrived, and they would remain in their fort until they were withdrawn from the island. In between us were deep, wooded draws and high ridges. The ridges were rough with high hills in many places. The area was also more wooded. Although both our RCT and the 185th were supposed to patrol the area they were not noticeable early in the campaign and became extinct as time passed, so the 503d took care of this area. Before the 2d Battalion relieved the 3d as the assault battalion, as already stated, the 2d patrolled this rugged area. On one occasion Captain Taylor took his three rifle company commander and his S-3, 1st Lieutenant William E. LaVanchure, south down through a heavily wooded draw and up on the first ridge. We found signs of enemy occupation, but they were gone. A few hundreds yards to the east was a prominent hill. This was the hill which gave "G" Company so many problems as they attempted to advance to protect our flank. We probably went out a half mile or more, and I thought at the time it was poor judgment for five officers to be out on a patrol which should be done by a large combat patrol. I carried an 03-A3 Springfield with scope, the company's sniper rifle, Taylor carried a Colt 45 pistol, and the other three carried carbines. Fortunately the enemy had pulled back up to the hill.

1000

1600

1930

 At 1400 two tanks [Note: These were M-4, "Sherman," tanks; M-7's were self propelled 105mm's] were brought up to give supporting artillery fire on enemy positions to "D" Co. front. Enemy artillery secured a hit on one of the tanks but was immediately neutralized. At 1745 two short artillery rounds landed inside the perimeter wounding Pvt. Hardy in the arm. During the night several enemy infiltrations were repulsed.

We had received bouncing Betty mines as evidenced in the Periodic Report above which gives the account of an "F" company "booby trap." These were put out just before dark at a time set by battalion on possible routes of enemy infiltration. Then the next morning we took them up at dawn. Despite repeated warnings some men in our RCT were killed by them due to carelessness. They would forget and walk out of the perimeter. 

The 24th was a busy day for "F" Company. The "Chronological History of Company F" makes a mistake here. We were not sitting around writing home and cleaning weapons. That was almost a week off yet- and, even then, part of the company was out on patrols every day, and one platoon was up in the hills on outpost. Early the morning of the 24th "F" Company assaulted the next ridge. This was our first support by 4.2 mortars. They had been used to support other company attacks, but we had never seen them in action. For sometime we had heard of these terrible weapons in Europe , of how when the shells exploded raining phosphorus over the area the Germans jumped out of their foxholes and ran. We knew that in supporting other companies of our unit they were using both HE and WP, i.e., high explosive and white phosphorus. The barrage supporting us was short, because of the ammunition shortage, and we did not see any Japs jumping up and running. They fired several WP shells last resulting in some smoke on the ridge, but we still were not impressed. We moved out very rapidly in order to take advantage of the shock of the HE shells and the smoke. Much to our relief there were no mines and not much fire. The enemy did not seem to be prepared. The most resistance was encountered on the north end of the ridge where it dropped sharply and then rose rapidly back to a hill.    the 1st Platoon attacked this position. Bill McDonald was 1st scout for the 1st squad who was leading the attack along the ridge and then down into the deep swag. As Bill reached a point near the bottom of the swag the enemy opened up with a machine gun which was located in a bunker at the top of the hill. Bill crumpled and fell into the brush along side the trail. All who saw him fall were sure he was dead. The platoon halted and deployed seeking a method to effectively attack this hard to get to position. As they were pondering, suddenly, they heard hand  grenades exploding and a Thompson submachine gun firing. Rushing down to the swag and then up the hill they found Bill McDonald in charge with several dead enemy soldiers. Bill had not been hit by the machine gun's fire but had crumpled and rolled over into the grass to fool the Japs.    He crawled up the hill to the rear of the bunker and threw in a grenade. The Japs threw it back, and it exploded near Bill,  but did not injure him. Bill pulled the pin on another grenade, let the handle fly, and after it fizzed a couple of seconds threw it into the rear opening of the bunker. This one exploded before the Japs could react. Bill jumped down into the ditch behind the bunker ,and firing through the rear opening, killed the occupants. Bill was awarded the Silver Star Medal, and it was presented to him by General MacArthur, 8 June 1945, at 40th Division Headquarters in Silay.

The information given here along with the fact that there were three dead Japs_in the bunker comes from a news article printed in the Mt. Carmel, Illinois "Daily Republican" Register dated June 24, 1945. After forming the company into a defensive perimeter I reported to Captain Taylor over on Tokaido Road. which was still on our right.

When I reached Tokaido Road two M-4 tanks were sitting there behind a hill. They had been a short distance further to the east in front of the hill where they could survey the enemy country to their front and look for targets of opportunity. Suddenly a high explosive round hit the slope plate of the lead tank. This round was fired from a Jap dual purpose 75m gun. Dual purpose means that this high velocity gun could be used as an anti aircraft gun, or it could be used for ground targets. (Our S-3 was convinced that it was a 90mm gun). This particular gun was well concealed in a bunker further east and north of Tokaido Road.    The only damage to the tank was a black spot on the slope-plate where the round exploded. We suspected there was quite an odor inside the tank, but it was buttoned up so tightly that one would never know. I missed the show, but when I got there, the two tightly buttoned-up tanks sat there behind the hill in complete safety.

Captain Taylor pointed out the big ridge to our left front, on the north side of the road. It ran northeast to the southwest which put it at about a forty-five degree angle to the road. Taylor told me that hill was heavily fortified and was now "F" Company's next objective. As we advanced on the left "D" Company would continue to advance on the right. An, M-7, self-propelled 105mm howitzer from the canon company would be up early the next morning to give direct fire support. He told me to get with the platoon leader and see if we could pick out the bunker slits with a 20 power telescope . If the M-7 could find them they could destroy them.

We dug in for the night and at the proper time put out our Bouncing Betties. The incidence of attempted infiltrations decreased with the use of these mines. Even so, occasionally at night one of the bombs exploded. Usually the next morning we would find a lot of blood and a weapon or two. We did sleep better knowing they were there.

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0730

No enemy activity during the nite. F Co reports a booby trap set off. finding enemy rifle, pistol and bloody stains. The Japs are still carrying away their dead & wounded. They are burying their dead in large caves. D Co unearthed two such caves yesterday. We suffered 2 WIAs yesterday, one being Lt Mathers of F Co. There have been no messages the past few days as Capt Taylor has been up at the front directing operations verbally.

1000

F Co assaulted high ground to their front encountering enemy sniper fire. 4.2 mortars laid barrage prior to assault.

1300

E co has secured ridge to their front receiving MG & sniper fire. 1330 C Co. 1st Bn moved up in left flank of F Coo.

1600

Our casualties are heavy today. Hq Co M Gunners catching it again. Most of the casualties being GSWs. "I" co 3d Bn now on D Co right flank. Bulldozers are really doing a job in the operation, filling tank traps and widening the road to bring up supplies.

1800

There is a shortage of mortar ammo of all types. Units have been cautioned to uz.e it sparingly.

at 0545 enemy again attempted to infiltrate but was driven off by automatic weapons fire. One enemy confirmed killed. At 0900 "E" and "F" Cos. moved NE along D co. front. At 1400 the company less the 3rd platoon moved to ridge approximately 400 yds. to the direct front without opposition. At 1630 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the Co. and then moved to the next ridge for reconnaissance. Upon reaching reaching the top of the ridge the platoon came upon a enemy HMG and several supporting pillboxes. The platoon killed two enemy and then withdrew under heavy automatic fire. Pvt. Pitchford was killed and Pvt. Ozarzah wounded by enemy sniper fire, both machine gunners from Hq. Co. Qt 1745 Lt. Beaty in command of attached machine guns was wounded by sniper fire. During the night several attempted infiltrations were repulsed. No casualties.

The company with ate LMG's moved out at 1030 hr. with the mission of seizing and securing hill 500 yd's to the front. By 1400 hr. objective taken and the men were in position and dug in. 1 KIA & 2 WIA fr LMG's. 1 KIA & 4 WA fr Co.

I spent the early part of the morning with the M-7 commanded by 1st Lt Glenn F. Gibson. The two tanks were parked on the road ahead of the M-7. A brigadier general from the 40th Division had given the tank commander a direct order to stay in front of the M-7 and to move on Fentle's command. Gibson had a 20 power telescope mounted on a small tripod. I had my binoculars. We lay on the road beside the M-7 scanning the slope of the ridge we were preparing to attack. When we found a black spot in the grass the gun would fire direct fire at this spot. A large hole would be blown out revealing the remains of a bunker. The M-7 destroyed ten or twelve bunkers in a couple of hours. This would have been a very difficult position to take had we attacked it with the bunkers intact. It might have been more difficult than the line we attacked the 21st.  Now we were using our supporting weapons as we should. We had to learn, though.

We had never operated in open country with armor before. Armor could have been put to great use on Corregidor saving lives. Imagine the effect one tank or M-7 would have had the morning of 23 February operating with "E" Company on South Shore Road in the attack on Battery Monja.  While Gibson and I were studying the slopes of the ridge he called my attention to the bottom of a draw near the trail which our engineers were converting into Tokaido Road. There was a doorway leading into a small cave or dugout. A Jap field grade officer was standing in the doorway looking our way through binoculars. The reason we knew he was a field grade officer was because he wore leather leggins, a leather belt, and leather shoulder straps. I was closely watching him when he disappeared into a cloud of smoke, dust, and flying timber due to a direct hit from the 105mm gun. Later, after we advanced, some of the men found a leg encased in a leather leggin.

During the search and fire procedure Gibson had the tanks move forward two or three times. The tanks were tightly buttoned-up, so he communicated with them by the microphone hanging on the left rear of the tanks. The tanks never fired a round that morning. As soon as we felt that M-7 had destroyed the bunkers, I went over to the company and told Capt Taylor that we were ready. The 4.2's fired a short barrage of HE and then smoke, and we moved out. We were not fired upon. The M-7 had found and destroyed every bunker. This was a classic example of the use of direct supporting fire. Granted the situation was perfect for this support, i.e., the entire slope was in view and in line with the M-7.

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 The PR's now begin to usually list each battalion's action under separate paragraphs. The 1st Battalion is now responsible for the RCT's  left flank (north flank) relieving "H" Company. The 3d Battalion is responsible for the right flank. "G" and "I" companies are still engaged with the well entrenched enemy who have been holding up "G" company for several days. The 2d Battalion action is as follows: "

"D" Co. received four rounds knee-mortar fire at 260710; no casualties inflicted. "D" Co. began an assault on the high ground vicinity (39.5-97.05) after a concentrated barrage from the artillery, tanks, and mortar fire, practically neutralizing the ridge. An enemy MG and knee-mortar were captured.

"E" Co. sustained a dawn attack at 260610 by an estimated 30 enemy. Twenty were killed at practically point blank range including one officer. The group employed 2 MG ans one knee mortar.     

"E" Co. also neutralized MG position vicinity (40.0-97.3) with 81mm fire.

"F" Co. moved a platoon to the high ground vacated by "D" Co."

 "RESULTS OF OPERATION: With the addition of our third (1st) Bn Combat Team, the RCT has begun to exploit the left flank to a much greater width. This area has been viewed viewed with suspicion since the operation began, and is now proven to contain enemy strong points. The early morning attack seems to indicate that the continued pressure and assaults are contracting the enemy forces with the results that he is attempting to hold his position by counter-attack.

0730

Casualties of yesterday 4 klAs & 6 WIAs, Hq Co again having the most. E Co. reports a large group of Japs attempting of their perimeter early this morning. With MGs & mortars E Co. repulsed them killing 20 including one officer. Captured 1 LMG. D Co received mortar & sniper fire in AM.

1300

D Co. & E Co advanced assisted by 81mm & 4.2 and arty fire, plus M-4 tanks.

1515

40mm enemy gun fired on M-7 tank. M-7 returned fire with 3 rounds, knockeding out gum and observed 3 to 5 enemy dead near gun position.

1630

Air strike by 2 Corsairs bombed and strafed target.

1700

Received word that there are replacements enroute to regiment. With our loses we could use replacements at this time. Casualties heavy again today, losses split about even among companies.

One enemy killed attempting infiltration. At 1130 after an artillery and mortar barrage the 1st platoon under Lt. Mara advanced to the ridge to the company right front (SE). The second platoon under S/Sgt. Howard moved to the 1st platoon left flank and the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins moved to the right flank. resistance was light and Pfc. Reynolds was the only casualty being slightly wounded with head wounds. Nineteen enemy killed in action. Demolitions used during the day to destroy enemy pillboxes and caves. Shortly after dusk as three attached artillery machine gunners were setting out Bouncing Bettys, one enemy attempting to infiltrate activated one of the traps, killing himself and seriously wounding two of the artillery men.. The wounded men were evacuated during the night. At 2300 an attempted enemy infiltration was repulsed and two enemy were killed.

In predawn attack 9 enemy KIA, 1 Nambu LMG captured.Attack repulsed by 1st, 2nd, 3rd Pltn, and LMG's. 4 attached personnel (LMG-3, Med Det-1) WIA fr knee mortar attack following repulsed attack. Pltns remained in position on hill. 3 Enemy KIA by 2nd Plat 1730 hr hr bringing total kia 23 - 1 man WIA by sniper fire."

The other E Company history says:

Pre-dawn attack by Nips, 4 attch. personnel wounded. Nips killed numbered 23.

"The past two days have been spent quietly in the mens positions, giving all a chance to write home and clean weapons for the action that was seen in the future. During the afternoon of today an artillery shell burst over the company CP and fatally wounded Pfc Virgil Surber."

I have already commented that the company did not get any rest on the 24th and 25th April.

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