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15 April 1945
No. 8
141600 April 45
to
151600 April 45 |
Infantry: Continued extensive patrolling of the RCT sector occupies our
troops during the period. E Co. (503) and K Co. (74th) located at SINAYPANAN
(36.5-07.5) reported nil activity or evidence of enemy activity within 2500
yd. radius. They were again resupplied by air. A reconnaissance patrol from G Co. found only a few abandoned positions along a well beaten trail
at (37.3-99.8). A recon. patrol was fired upon in the vicinity (38.?-01.8)
at 1330I. Mortar fire will be brought to bear upon position during the night
15-16 and a combat patrol is planned for the area about 15 Apr. Saw movement
in the vicinity (38.6-02.4) and believed it
to be an enemy OP. This has been
brought under mortar fire and is to be investigated 15 Apr. An F Co.
reconnaissance patrol reported sighting three enemy vicinity (38.7-99.3) at
1130I and directed mortar fire on the area. Difficult approach to the area
prevented results to be obtained at close of period. G Co.
reconnoitered the area from (3?.6-99.7) to (37.4-01.3) without contact. I
Co. patrol reconnoitered the area (37.5-01.0) south to (39.1-98.8). Reported
bunkers and dug in positions approx. 1000 yds. east at (39.0-08.7). A patrol
searching for mine fields was fired upon at (38.6-98.3) from an
undetermined position. Our OP station at (38.4-98.8) drew long range fire
during the day. An overnight C.P. is established at (39.2-98.0). |
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0745 |
A group of 3 or 4 enemy attempted infiltration on Bn perimeter at
0030 hrs, 15 Apr 45. They approached from NNW direction, were fired upon
but no evidence found this morning. |
0935 |
To Hq Co, D. F. Secure mortar fire until further orders (air
strike) Sgd C.O. 2nd Bn. [Note: After the 4.2 mortar round apparently
hit the A-20 on the right wing, mortar fire was always suspended during
air strikes]. |
0945 |
To Hq Co, D,F. Be on the alert for improvised land mines made from
knee mortar and aircraft bombs. Several found in area. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn. |
1548 |
To CO's D,F, Hq Cos. There will be a meeting of all officers at
1800 hrs Bn C.P. Sgd CO, 2d Bn |
1600 |
Easy Company with atch Guerillas still in Sinaypanan area, rations
dropped by L-5's. Routine patrols from Bn report trcent occupation by
enemy but no contact. |
1800 |
Lt Kemp of Engr Co conducted Officers School of new activating
device for grenades & demolition charges." |
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The heading of each page of the 2nd Battalion Journal has two short lines in which to
enter the
"PLACE:" The place which has been given since the battalion arrived
on Negros, or 8 April is "Vicinity of Silay, Occidental Negros. |
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At
0830
one squad under Lt Preston with 22 guerrillas patrolled area 1000 yds.
north and east of the perimeter. Patrol returned a
1300
having made no energy contact. |
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Local patrols by all platt. and the guriella's. (sic) Ore squad ER 2nd
Platt. took a Nip truck and patrolled N.W. to Victorias and to Silay.
Japs had evacuated a week ago. |
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Nc entry. |
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16 April 1945
0700 |
No attempted enemy infiltration during the night.
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0900 |
Patrols ready to move out, due to heavy rains thye are being held
up until rains "let up".
|
0940 |
To all Cos & atch units. No captured vehicles or enemy equipment
will be used or tampered with by unauthorized personnel. Violatons will
be courts-martialed under 80th A.E. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn ' |
[Note: Captured enemy equipment is the property of the U.S. Government.
The "E" Company entry above of capturing a Nip truck and patrolling NW
to Victorias and Silay has the smell of a joy ride. These towns were
down on the coast on Highway No. 1 far to our rear].
|
1258 |
To CO E Co. Await Sinaypanan until further orders. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn.
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1300 |
Patrols moved out but had to return as troops with heavy equipment
were
unable to descend & climb steep ravines. Radios are out, sets wet by
heavy rain.Heavy clouds over enemy prevented scheduled air strikes. |
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1425 Easy Company rations dropped by C-47 from Mindoro at red smoke
signals. |
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1720 To all Cos & atch units. No one is to leave Bn perimeter without
express permission of Bn C.O. Sgd C.O. 2d Bn. |
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1803
To all Cos & atch units. Booby traps will be armed at
1830
hrs. Sgd 2d Bn C.O. |
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Patrol to cross MULAGO RIVER. Postponed because of heavy
rain." |
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Local patrols, no action. One squad left by truch for rt.gt by way of
Victorias. |
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No entry |
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17 April 1945
No. 9
161600 April 45
to
171500 April 45 |
All patrols reporting after
close of 161600 period negative. The RCT resumed the attack to the southeast
at
0800
hour. The advance progressed 2500 yards against relatively light opposition.
Tanks advancing with forward elements were halted due to craters. A
bulldozer brought forward to fill in
the craters was demolished by a land mine, injuring one. The road forward is
heavily cratered and two tank traps have been located. Heavy enemy
opposition from mutually supporting bunkers and emplacements is being met at
close of the period. We are engaging the enemy with machine gun, mortar,
artillery, and rifle fire. "E" Co, 503d RCT, and "K" Co, 74th G-F Inf.
located at SINAYPANAN continues patrolling that area with nil contact at
close of period.
One platoon "E" Co was proceeding to SAN ISIDRO to
investigate after a civilian report of enemy located there was received.
[Note: The distance between these two locations is less than 1000 yards.
Actually San Isidro can be seen from Sinaypanan which is slightly higher in
elevation. The ground was grass covered old sugar cane fields and even..
There were trees on the bluffs at San Isidro which would provide
concealment.]
An overnight combat patrol of "I" Co.., 74th G-F Inf. and one
platoon "L" Co. departed
0800
hr
to establish and ambush and reconnoiter the area in vicinity
(39.0-02.5). Patrol reached MANSIGUIO (37.2-01.7) with nil contact !430I. A
reconnaissance
patrol from "F" Co. located an abandoned enemy dump at (36.5-01.5). Dump
contained sugar, tinned goods, and demolition bombs and fuses. All demolition
stores were destroyed. Food will be salvaged. Security patrols assigned the
mission of reconnoitering draws paralleling the RCT route of advance made
nil contact."
"Results of Operations: Our forward elements had moved forward approximately
2500
yards and were in contact with well dug in enemyat the close of the period.
Rifles and a few machine guns are the only
weapons encountered thus far, however these are more numerous than
previously encountered. Our left flank patrol has encountered no evidence of
enemy trying to escape to the north." [Note: The enemy had quit withdrawing
because we were now facing his main line of resistance, or rather, the first
fortified line.]
|
0700 |
Weather clear, thou cloudy in spots. Rain ceased. No attempter
infiltration during the nite. |
0900 |
Reinforced pit. of D Co moved out on over nite patrol. A-20's
bombed & strafed enemy positions to frony of 3d Bn lines.
28 1130 To C.O. 2d Bn. Request 81mm fire on (37.3-03.0). Our position is
now at (37.3-01.7) Sgd D Co patrol.
|
1250 |
To C.O. 2d Bn, Civilian reported some Japs in the hills 3 Km due east
of San
Isidro. No definite number. Have sent reinforced platoon to try and make
contact. Sgd C.O. E Co. |
1558 |
To E Co. 3d Bn has advanced approx 2500 yds. Having light
resistance and still on the move. Reinforced Plt from D Co now
at
(38.0-03.3) on over nite patrol. D Co less 1 Plt is mopping up in rear
of 3d Bn advance.1 Plt F Co. is right flank security for 3d Bn
advance. F Co. less 1 Pit. in Bn. reserve. In view of conststant (sic)
reports of enemy activities vicinity San Isidro, it is desired you lay
ambush there tonite or tomorrow nite. Continue with your patroling
pending orders. sgd C.O. 2d Bn. |
1650 |
C.O. 2d Bn. 20 cases rations & radio batteries dropped by C-47. Sgd.
C.O. 2d Bn. |
1900 |
D Co overnite patrol reported Filipino statement of 400 Japs near
Losong bario 1;st week. 500-1000 Japs reported by civilians to be in
Casa Nova area. Japs traveing at nite. Five light tanks and 4.2
chemical mortar Co spent the nite
it
our perimeter.
Delayed entry- 1st Lt Beatty trans from E Co to Hq Co as ass't Pit. Ldr.
VOCO, 503d R.C.T. Effective 15 Apr 45.
2d Lt. Anthony trans from D Co to E Co as Pit. Ldr, Effective 17 April
45. VOCO, 503d R.C.T. Lt Bailey, C.O. F Co to hospital today. Lt.
Calhoun now commands F co.
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3rd plt under Lt Watkins w/1 LMG section. 1 section 60mm
mortars, and 65 guerrillas crossed Malago River 0900. At 1500
approximately 3000 yds north of the Co. Flip civilians were questioned
and gave information that approximately 400 enemy had moved through the
area the past week. They said Jap foraging patrols were common in the
area. Patrol set up perimeter at given designation. During the night
interdictory 81mm and 60mm mortar fire used by the patrol. No known
enemy casualties. |
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Local patrols into hills to the N.E. where natives had reported seeing
NIPs. None found. Patrols brought in some telephones to be passed on to
Regt. |
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No
entry. |
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The bulldozer which was destroyed was operated by one of our engineers.
They built Tokaido Road as we advanced. It was just a trail in this
area, and they converted it into a road. The mine was a large bomb. We
though probably a 500 pound bomb. when pressure was applied to the nose
of the bomb it was armed. The when the pressure was released it
exploded. The bombs were buried vertically with the noses barely
exposed, or just under the dirt. When the blade of this D-7 dozer passed
on off the nose of the
bomb it exploded tearing the blade and its frame off the dozer and
hurling it forward. The dozer was thrown backwards down the hill some
distance. The driver survived. |
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18 April 1945
No. 10
171600 April 45
to
181600 April 45 |
Infantry. During the night our forward elements were subjected to
intermittent small arm fire. The enemy attempted to draw our fire by calling
and rattling tin cans bit no attack was made. Our troops retaliated only
with mortar and artillery harassing fire. Heavy enemy automatic and rifle fire broke
out immediately upon our resumption of the attack which was proceeded by
a Division artillery and 4.2 mortar barrage. Tanks, initially unable to
move for-ward because of tank-traps, moved into the assault after
Engineers had repaired the roadway. At the close of the period our
troops had advanced approximately 300 yards and were slowly advancing
against enemy automatic and rifle fire. |
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0700 |
No enemy activity during the nite. |
0810 |
To E Co. Render report of compliance on Memo: Censorship
Regulations, today, to Bn Sgd Reagan |
1300 |
E Co alerted for move from Sinaypanan area. Guerilla Co ordered
return to Reg1l C.P. |
1512 |
To Pit. Ldr. 81mm. Cease mortar fire until further orders-
Air Strike. Sdq C.O. 2d Bn. |
1655 |
To C.O. 2d Bn. Rations & radio batteries dropped by C-47. Sgd. C.O.
E Co. |
1700 |
D co. Pit. overnite patrol returned. Contacted enemy, 4
enemy KIA. We suffered 4 Guerillas WIA. |
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To all Cos & atch units. Arm booby traps at 1845 hrs. Inform all
personnel not to move out of perimeter. Sgd C.O. 2d bn. |
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At 0830 patrol moved east. At 1230 a squad of attached guerrillas
engaged two enemy snipers, killing a Jap officer. Squad received
aromatic fire from 100 yds. south wounding two guerrillas. The 1st and
2d squads under Sgt. Dablock and S/Sgt. Hadrava engaged enemy, killing
three and neutralizing automatic weapons fire. As patrol reorganized
intense knee mortar fire and small arms fare was received. Pfc. sierra,
Pvt. Kimball, and four guerrillas were -lightly wounded.
60mm mortar fire directed by Pfc. Bates was effective to a degree but
there was no confirmed enemy casualties. The patrol withdrew upon
receiving snoper fire from the right flank. Before recrossing the Mulago
River, Lt. Watkins directed the fire
of two tanks on the enemy position but the fire was ineffective due to
masking ridge.
Patrol returned at
1830."
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Local patrols. No enemy action. The guriela
(sic)Co
moved back to their regt. at 1300hr. |
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no entry |
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The country was growing more rugged. The flat fields had fallen behind
us and we were now headed along parallel ridges separated by deep draws. The closer we came to
the mountains the higher were the ridges, and the deeper the draws. Some of the deep draws were
heavily wooded, but most of them were clear, with clumps of vegitation, such
as banana plants. The ridges were mostly clear of trees and covered by
grasses about three feet tall.
The enemy defenses were growing more
elaborate. The Japs had a lot of time to prepare these defenses, and
they used their time well. Machine guns in deep bunkers were expertly placed so that
they were mutually supporting. The north flank of the enemy line
extended to the cliffs dropping off to the Mulago River, making flanking
approaches impossible. The deep bunkers were connected by trenches dug in
the reverse slopes. The flanks were well covered,
making flanking movements more perilous than frontal attacks.
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19 April 1945
No. 11
181600 April 45
to
191600 April 45 |
"Our Operations" states that air strikes at 181630 at (38.6-02.3). No
advance. Constant knee mortar fire during the night from which we suffered 1 KIA and 3 WIA.'
The enemy harrassed our perimeter with grenades. 1 enemy KIA and
approximately seven others heavily fired upon with unknown results.
"An airstrike, beginning at 190730, landed directly on the target at
approximately 1500 yards forward of our lines. One A-20 shot down by
Enemy A-A. All the crew landed safely within our lines. The enemy A-A
believed located at approximately (41.0-95.6) and after being bombed
and strafed the area was shelled by our artillery. The change in
disposition of our troops became effective at 191000 and the relocation
and orientation was being completed as the period closed.
"G" co.
platoon, located at (39.8-96.5) observed a group of approximately 20
enemy digging in the vicinity of ('9.5-96.6). Mortar fire was laid on
the position killing three enemy and scattering the remainder. "H" Co.
patrolling in vicinity (38.7-02.9) reported no contact 191400. No further
report. 3d Bn., 74th G-F replaced forward."
Results of Operation: "There was no appreciable gain in our front lines
during the period. Our activities consisted chiefly of regrouping
units, consolidating positions and harassing known and suspected enemy
positions." |
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0930 |
Established new C.P. at (39.2-97.7). E Co now under control of 3d
Bn control. G Co 3d Bn under control of 2d Bn. We now have
attached a air Ln group from 160th Inf,
Div arty Ln group of 5 from 40th Dlv,
1. Plt of Co B,-80th Chemical
Mortar Bn, two M-7 tank destroyers
of 160th Cannon Co, 5 M-4 tanks of 716th Tank Bn, a 90mm gun and crew
from 739.. AAA Gun Bn. |
1000 |
Capt Taylor confers with Col Erickson on tactical situation.We are to take
over. |
1430 |
Co C.O.'s left for aerial recto flight of front line: |
1730 |
To all C.O.'s & Bn Staff, report to Bn C.P. at 1800 hrs this
date. Sgd C.O.2r Bn. |
1800 |
Had a few enemy artillery burst over Bn. C.P. area with no
casualties, also some small arms fire,air strikes again today. |
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At 0900 Co. moved east on foot to relieve
"H" Co. At 1500 while acting as
observer for mortar fire, S/Sgt Hadrava was wounded in both arms
and Pfc. Gray wounded in left shoulder by automatic weapons fire. At
1600 Pvt. Cousineau accidentally shot himself in the foot. At 2230
approximately 15 enemy attempted infiltration, estimated four enemy
casualties were unconfirmed." |
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The entire Co. moved to (35.6-06.4) and set up perimeter on Wight
ground N. side of Calaptan River . The 1st Platt
with mortars and LMG's patrolled S.E. 4000 yds and reported recent NIP
occupation. |
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No entry. |
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At this time the 2d Battalion was replacing the 3d Battalion as the
assault battalion,
F Company had been following the 3d Battalion
and patrolling the flanks. By this time the patrols were confined to the
right flank due to the impossibility
of movement along the cliffs
of the Mulago River on the enemy's right, our left, flank. D
Company, F Company, and Battalion Headquarters Company moved forward to
the front line. We were in perimeter along Tokaido Road (which our
engineers had just built) and to the south of the road. The road fell
off to the north into a deep ravine. F Company was on the left and D
Company on the right, in the center. G Company was on the right flank.
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20 April 1945
No. 12
191600 April 45
to
201600 April 45 |
"a. Infantry: During the night 19-20 the
enemy subjected our forward elements to mortar fire killing one and
wounding three. An infiltration attempt cost him 3 KIA. An airstrike at
200730 was relatively ineffective as five of six bombs failed to
detonate; the sixth did fall and explode in the target area, enemy dug
in positions (40.9-97.3). In its forward effort
our leading elements met with fierce machine gun, mortar, and rifle
fire. This resistance was continuing as the period closed. "E" Co.
releived from RCT left flank by "H" Co., in turn replacing "D" Co in the
forward central position, A 3d Bn OP discovered a cave in the vicinity
(37.7-96.4) in front of 185th Inf. sector. 105mm fire from M-7's were
brought to bear and several direct hits were scored. This position will
be kept under harassing fire during the night 20-21. "H" Co.,
patrolling the RCT right flank reported nil contact after having
searched the NW-SE ridge in the vicinity (37.6-02.5). Other 3d Bn.
patrols searching adjoining ridges to the route of advance reported nil
contact. 3d B^., 74th G-F, patrolling the NW-SE ridge (36.5-01.4)
reported nil contact."
Results: "The known results of our operations for the period was
continued heavy pressure against the strongly held and entrenched enemy
MLR."
"CASUALTIES:
a. Our Casualties:
(1)
For the period: 8 KIA,
12 WIA
(2) To date: 39 KIA, 105 WIA
b. Enemy Known Casualties:
(1) For the period: 3 KIA
(2) To date: 89 KIA, 0 POW"
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0100 |
During the nite, the enemy attempted infiltration of F Co.
perimeter. We suffered one KIA & ooe WIA, 2 enemy KIA. |
0800 |
Air strike by six Corsairs. |
10OO |
E co joins battalion. G Co reverts back to #d Bn control,
tho they are still covering our right flank. |
12.00 |
D Co given the mission to take the height ground to their front. |
1503 |
To C.O. 2d Bn. Our C.O. Nickel was just KIA. Sgd D Co. Lt
Collins now new commander "D" Co. |
1600 |
F Co reports five enemy arty shells landed in their area beleived
to be 90mm. 1630 E Co moved out to take position on rt. flank of D Co.
Lt Corder in command. Capt Hill duty to Sk. Hosp. |
1700 |
Lt David, Hq Co LMG Plt Ldr killed in action, body cannot be
recovered at this time |
1800 |
'Bn area under small arms fire believed to be spent missies. |
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3d platoon under
Lt. Watkins, attacked and secured ridge to left front of company. No resistance encountered but
intense mortar fire
was received killing platoon
sgt. Rabe, wounding Lt. Preston in the leg,
and Pvt Ladig suffered shell shock. The platoon was forced to withdraw.
At 1330 the 1st Platoon,
under Lt Nikle and the platoon leader Lt. Mara secured the hill and
advanced to the next hill on the
right front. Only mild resistance was encountered on the assault but as
soon as the hill was secured
the enemy countered with very intensive machine gun and small arms fire from the front and both flanks supplemented by accurate mortar fire.
A mortar shell killed Lt. Nickle, amputated T/4 Upchurch's leg causing
him to bleed to death, and slightly wounding Pfc. McLaughlin. Pfc
Huerter was lightly wounded in a few minutes by mortar fragments, and
Lt. David, in command of attached MG platoon, was killed by an enemy
sniper. Lt David's body was on the forward slope in an exposed position
and Pfc Schupp and Pfc. Fisher were wounded by enemy fire while trying
to recover the body. Pvt. Lapidus received a bullet wound in the neck
causing his death two days later. At 1400 the 2nd platoon joined the
1st; one squad under Sgt. Minor aided in securing the ridge acid
the other two squads under Sgts. Evleth and Stowe acted as litter
bearers. Lt Collins assumed command
of the Co.
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The Company History has erroneously
spelled Lt. Nickel's name as Nickle. Pvt. Drew enlisted Carroll County,
NH.
The Company History has erroneously
spelled Pfc. Ezra LAPIDOOS' name as Lapidus. His home state was
New York. |
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At 1430 the 3rd platoon under Lt. Watkins joined the 1st to strengthen up the position. Enemy mortar fire with sporadic machine gun
and
small arms fire continued throughout the day. At 1700 one platoon of "E"
Co advanced to forward position as support of "D" Co. but was repulsed
by hand grenades and small arms fire. At 1800 Pfc. Lovgren was wounded
in the shoulder by enemy sniper fire. At 2100 in an unsuccessful attack
on a machine gun position one enemy was killed. Mortar fire throughout
the night." |
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The entire Co. moved out at 0900 hr to rejoin the B.N. which releived the 3rd Bn 4-19. At 1500 hr. joined Dog
Co. Thwlst platt moved o')t to take Hill 458 on Dog Co's left flank.
Hill was taken, four men W.I.A. 1st Putt withdrew to rear of D Co.and
set up perimeter. Rest of Co. took
up
positions along ridge 300 yds west of Hill 458. 14 NIP's counted KIA. 3
Prob. |
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No entry |
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The 2d Battalion having replaced the 3d Battalion was now moving
forward. "E"
Company's left flank was on Tokaido road.
"D" Company was on "E" Company's
right flank. "F" Company was
moved north of Tokaido road to prepare to attack a fortified position
commanding two ridges which ran parallel to the ridge which Tokaido Road
followed.
The northern slope of the most northern ridge dropped off into the chasm
of the Mulago River. One of the companies of the 3d Battalion had been
stopped cold there. Another company had been moved over to make the
attack. The officers and N.C.O.'s of this company ware gathered with
the company commander behind a forward knoll near the line of departure
for a briefing. This was on the most northern ridge. Suddenly a shell
burst among the group, killing several and wounding several. "F" Company
was moved over to position during the latter part of the afternoon of
the 20th and prepared to attack the next morning. A narrow dirt road
with deep ditches on the sides climbed up to the top of the ridge at an
angle. Near the top of the hill where the round exploded the arm of an
American soldier, still covered with a fatigue jacket sleeve, lay in the
ditch.
"F" Company was to attack along the two parallel ridges and seize a
fortified defensive line on a ridge formed by the convergence of the
two east-west ridges, and this ridge ran more north-south. Thus the
ridge "F" Company was to attack was higher in elevation and at an almost
right angle to the line of approach. This was one excellent defensive
position, but it was typical of the entire enemy defensive positions,
i.e., the enemy held the higher elevations and dominated the line of
approach. A flanking movement around the left was impossible because of
the cliffs as already explained. We decided to attack with three
platoons abreast. The mid platoon, under Lt. Clark, was to attack along
the crest of the southern ridge. The 1st platoon, under Lt. Mathis, was
to attack along the crest of the northern ridge. The 3d platoon, under
Lt. Fennell, was to attack up the draw between Tokaido Road ridge and the
southern ridge. This draw
was chosen because there was more vegetation and cover, and there was a
chance that they could flank the southern end of the enemy held ridge. Bill Calhoun,
accompanied the 1st platoon, which was
in the middle of the attack, and attached the flat trajectory mortar
squad (under Pfc. Henry McCrory as the squad leader) to the 1st platoon. The
other two 60mm mortars were left in position at our line of departure. They
had no ammunition, but it was hoped
that might become available.
[Note: This was the same conditions of 9
April when our mortar platoon was left behind because there was no
ammunition. What a difference it would have made had we had mortars and
ammunition when we were pinned
down out in the field at Sinaypanan. I stated my views of the 8th
Army previously, so I will not bore you with redundancy..)
Our other attachments were two artillery sections, one .50 caliber
machine gun from D Battery, 462d P.F.A. Bn. This was
emplaced at the line
of departure to be used for direct fire support if the opportunity
arose.
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21 April 1945
No. 13
201500 April 45
to
211500 April 45 |
"a. Infantry: The fire
fights In progress at 201500 continued with no gain in ground. Our
troops maintained the posit-ions
reached and dug in. During the night MG and mortar fire again harrasses
our forward elements. infiltration
attempts by the enemy resulted in no casualties to our troops while the
enemy suffered 4 known KIA's. Air strikes at 210815 (40.9-96.3) and
211215 (38.9-95.4) were very effective, landing in the vicinity of many
dug in positions. In
our assault to secure high ground to the front "D", "E", "F", and "G"
all met with mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from well dug in
enemy positions. "G" Company advancing to the position shown on
overlay was attempting to secure high ground to it immediate front as
the period closed. If secured "G" Co. can aid 1st Bn
[ Note: The
1st Battalion was sill
on Mindoro. Obviously should read 2d Bn.]
with flanking fire and fire on
caves in a=verse slopes. Companies "D", "E", and "F" were engaged in
fire fight to their front as period closed. "I" Co. patrols to the right
and left of route of advance reported
nil
con-tact during the period. "H" Co. patrolling our left flank,
encountered a group of enemy estimated at vicinity (38.4-01.9). The
enemy withdrew upon being fired upon evacuating an estimated five
casualties. A few rifles,
a
telephone and wire, some radio components, packs and food were
abandoned. Another "H" Co. patrol found and killed one enemy vicinity
(38.2-02.2) at an apparent CP. Trenches and positions for about 40
located (38.3-02.2) were unoccupied but showed signs of recent
occupation. The 3d Bn, 74th G-F patrolling our left flank reported nil
contact. Infiltration attempts against the guerrilla forces during the
night cost the enemy 2 KIA."
The patrols to the left flank of H Company
were far to the left across the Mulago River in the Manzanares area.
"RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Our efforts during the period
concentrated on continued pressure on enemy's MLR, right flanking movement by
"G" Co. and the searching of left flank positions by "H" Co.
See overlay." (MLR is main line of
resistance). |
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0730 |
D & F Co reports reports repulsed enemy infiltration during the nite. Yesterday the Bn suffered loses of 4 KIAs, 1 DOW and 8 WIAs. D
Co. had the most casualties. Lt Nickel C.O. D Co KIA, Lt. Preston D Co.
WIA. |
0815 |
Corsairs bombed & strafed targets and also the road. |
0900 |
F Co. moved out to assault hig's, ground on D co. left flank. |
1230 |
D,E,F Co. report receiving heavy enemy Mg & rifle fire. |
1300 |
Our forward movement is being supported by 4.2 Mortar 8 75 & Arty fire. |
1500 |
We suffered several losses again today from enemy gunshot and mortar
fire. |
1600 |
Lt. David's body recovered. |
1800 |
Enemy MG fire spotted 1000 yds to G Co front. 90mm gun fired
on target effectively. |
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At 0400 several Japs including a light machine gun
squad attacked the company position and succeeded in entering one of the
forward trenches; killing Sgt.
Circo and Cpl. Sokencamp. One enemy was killed in
action but several other estimated enemy casualties were unconfirmed.
Sporadic small arms fire continued througout the day. At 1330 Sgt
Cleres was killed while observing mortar fire. |
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Remained in position. 1st platt received
knee mortar fire. Two men KIA, 4 WIA. Other fire during the day. No
other casualties." Another E company history gives this entry: 'Received
enemy mortar fire. Pfc Surwald, Pfc Jandras, and Pfc Showstead KIA. 4
men WIA. |
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Company attempted to attack an enemy h&c! ridge but, because of the
large number of enemy automatic weapons & bunker system, had to withdraw
until more support could be brought in. During this action, Pfc Henry McCor:
(mispelled-McCrory is the correct
spelling) & Pvt Karl Schneider were killed. S/Sgt. Chris Johnson 8 Sgt.
Con were wounded." This last name evidently was William F. Cox who is
listed in leabhart's 2d Battalion aid station patient registry 21 April
with this diagnosis: WIAGSW-Lt hand.
Cris Johnson is diagnosed: WIA-GSW-Lt arm. |
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Note: Leabhart's 2d Battalion aid station registry is Appendix No. 1.
The names of the wounded given only as numbers can be found with the
corresponding dates. This also applies to KIA's and DOW's. Some of the
histories do not give the names |
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2d Battalion commander, Captain Neil Taylor, had ordered "F" Company to be
ready to cross the line of departure at 0830 and to take the fortified
ridge. The artillery would lay down a barrage ending with smoke rounds
to cover the enemy's observance of our attack. We were to move out on a
company front, seize and secure the objective. The artillery support
would be from our 462d 75mm pack howitzers. The 4.2 mortars would not be able
to join in because they were out of ammunition.
I expected a heavy artillery barrage and was acutely disappointed at the
small number of rounds fired. I felt at the time that the only thing
that this
preparatory fire had
accomplished was to alert the enemy that we were coming. Then several
smoke rounds were fired, but not nearly enough to form an adequate screen.
We could still plainly see the enemy held ridge through the light smoke
and knew that they saw us just as well.
Welcome to the new army.
We moved out when the smoke was
fired. After moving a short distance, some 50-60 yards, we came to a
mine field. It was not well camouflaged. We could easily see the bright,
metallic noses of hundreds of small aerial bombs exposed just above the
ground waiting to be stepped on. It was probably at least 200 yards to
the enemy position, and we suspected the mine field would extend nearly
to it. About the time we paused to consider the mine field, a withering
blast of machine gun fire swept both ridges. The machine guns'
rapid rate of fire identified them as air corps guns. The guns were well
concealed in deep bunkers, and we could not spot them. The Japs were so
well supplied with air corps machine guns that soon we were saying that
where you find two Japs gathered together, you will find a machine gun.
Fortunately they were not always too accurate, or we would have all been
killed. We hit the ground instantly.
Our situation was not hard to assess. We were pinned down in three foot grass
facing a large mine field in full view of the enemy and his
automatic weapons. Any movement was reflected in the grass and drew an
immediate response of machine gun fire. Any forward movement meant sure
death. Henry McCrory was just to my left. Karl Schneider was next to
McCrory. Both were hit, McCrory in the head and Schneider in the chest.
Both men died before they could be evacuated. McCrory was an old man,
Schneider a new man.
The 2d platoon on the north ridge was in the same situation as we were.
They were up against the mine field and pinned down. They had wounded,
and any movement on their part drew machine gun fire. The 2d
platoon in the draw had not been fired upon, but they were at the mine
filed, so the enemy had placed the field completely across the zone of
our operation.
The 3d platoon leader, Lt. Fennell. ,told me over his SCR-536 that he
thought he could clear a path through the mine field without too much
danger, because the noses of the bombs were visible. He would have to
proceed slowly. He could see a large banana grove at the base of the
enemy held ridge. I told him to go ahead, and the rest of the company
would retain their positions in order to keep the enemy occupied. The
one fortunate circumstance about our situation was that we were drawing
no mortar fire. The enemy made a grave error here. I really believe that
he felt that his position was so strong that it could be defended by
machine guns and rifles alone, and he allotted his mortars to weaker
positions. We lay there baking in the hot, tropical sun with our hopes
on the 2d platoon
being able to breach the mine field and getting close to the enemy
without being detected. Every so often
the enemy would sweep the ridges with automatic fire. The hours passed.
We still had not spotted one enemy bunker.
As the afternoon wore on Chris Johnson was hit in the arm by a bullet
from one of the machine gun bursts.
Over on the north ridge William Cox was hit in the hand by a burst.
There was some activity around both wounded men causing movement of the
grass, so both areas received a lot of attention from the Jap machine
gunners. In the meantime Clark and his 2d platoon were gingerly digging
out the bombs to clear a way through the minefield. They were slowly
drawing nearer to the banana grove, still undetected.
In the meantime the powers that be were growing impatient. Captain
Taylor told me he had received some artillery ammunition, he was going
to have another barrage of high explosive (HE) and smoke fired and for
us to make an all out assault. I told him that this would be suicidal.
We were conversing over SSR-300 radios. I told him we could not charge
through a mine field into mutually supporting machine guns with their
interlocking lanes of fire and live. I told him I had a platoon in the
draw which had worked
its way nearly to the banana grove. Since it was growing late the
platoon would probably reach
the grove by dark; Fennell and I had decided that it would be better
for them to spend the night in the banana grove and attack the ridge at dawn. I
planned to send one of the other platoons through the mine field following their path at
first light to support Fennell's attack.
Taylor approved this plan but said he wanted that ridge the next morning. I know Taylor was being pressured to move forward, and I
appreciate even more his willingness to go a little slower and save
lives. Even today I still become very apprehensive when I think of what
would have happened to "F" Company had an all out frontal attack been
made.
Near dark, after the 3d platoon reached the banana grove, the company
withdrew back to our perimeter on the
north ridge. In the growing darkness, suddenly, a Jap jumped up about 20
yards in front of the .50 caliber machine gun, which was dug in on theand charged the gun. The crew members of the gun had been sniped at all
day and had never seen a target. The .50 caliber gunner hit the Jap with
his first burst and rolled the body over and over along the ground,
tearing the body to shreds. He burned up his gun barrel, but he did get
a release for tensions and rage which he'd been building up during the
long day. We settled down for the night, but Jap infiltrators were
active all night and kept us busy. To put it mildly, we did not get a
good night's sleep although we were dog tired.
Too much credit cannot be given to Fennell and his platoon for their
initiative in
pushing through the mine field despite the fact that any moment they
might be seen, and subjected to heavy
fire in the middle of a mine field. Recommendations were made for awards
for this action, but, like many others, I don't think any were ever
granted.
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